I. Introduction

There seems to be in man a natural curiosity that inevitably leads him to enquire, at some stage, ‘How did everything begin? How did the vast complex of life and nature originate?’ Nearly every folklore under the sun has its tales giving some sort of answer, however partial and inconclusive, to such questions. For the orthodox Jew and Christian alike, Genesis 1 has long supplied the answer. But during the latter half of the last century this chapter was subjected to three serious attacks, with which it still has to contend. In the wake of Darwin’s findings came the much-publicized scientific challenge: Genesis 1, it was claimed, did not accord with scientific facts. Secondly, the discovery and examination of ancient myths from various parts of the Near East revealed a number of points of similarity between them and the biblical statements. In point of fact, the parallels between such myths and certain passages in Job, the Psalter and Isaiah were far more obvious; but there were enough points of contact with Genesis 1 to raise the question whether the Old Testament account was in truth divinely inspired, or whether it was merely the Hebrew version of a Near Eastern folktale. The third challenge came from literary criticism, and was stated most cogently by Wellhausen; stylistic considerations led him and many other Old Testament scholars to see two distinct accounts of creation in Genesis 1f.; and in their efforts to prove this, not a few of them argued that the two accounts contradicted each other at various points. Doubt was thus thrown upon the accuracy and value of both accounts, with the position further complicated when other passages (such as Jb. 26:12f.; Ps. 74:13-17; 89:9-11; Is. 27:1 and 51:9f.) were taken into consideration.

By the year 1900, therefore, many people had been educated to believe that the Bible’s statements about creation were neither accurate, inspired, nor consistent. But what is the position today?

It may be timely to attempt a reappraisal of the situation, not only because of the apologetic treatments by conservative Christians, but also in view of the constructive approach of recent scholarship in general. There is much more attention paid to the unity of the Old Testament nowadays, and little energy is spent in efforts to minimize its value. The scientific challenge may not have been modified; but its validity and force depend upon biblical exegesis, since it must be decided what exactly the biblical teaching is before any criticism of its accuracy can be made.

Let us first review the three attacks, noting however that my interest in the scientific challenge is here limited to its relation to, and effect upon, biblical exegesis.
II. The Challenge From Science

Superficially, the scientific attack is probably the simplest to counter. It is easy enough to argue that the evolution of the universe and of man is nothing but a hypothesis, lacking any real proof, which can therefore be disregarded. Some ‘defenders of the faith’ do little more than search out a variety of weak points in the evolutionary theory, and parade them as evidence of the veracity of the Genesis account. However, the great majority of thinking Christians have been obliged to pay some heed to the scientists’ findings; for example, the tremendous antiquity of the universe can scarcely be denied, and Ussher’s proposed date for the creation, 4004 BC, was one of the first casualties in the battle between science and faith.

In point of fact, the scientific challenge has done a very real service, in that it has forced us to examine the biblical record closely to see what Genesis does teach. It is all too easy to hold preconceived notions of what Scripture has to say. As soon as Genesis 1 is scrutinized, the fact becomes apparent that it is not a ‘scientific’ document in the present sense of the term; its language is not that of physics, geology, anthropology, or of any branch of the natural sciences. Moreover, while stating that God was the Maker of the universe and all it contains, Genesis shows a total disinterest in the mechanics of creation. It certainly gives an answer to the question, ‘Who?’; it does not remotely answer the question, ‘How?’ (The divine fiat is strictly speaking not so much the mode as the instrument or agent of the Creator.) As soon as this fact is understood and assimilated, one realizes that it is both proper and sensible to resort to scientists if one wishes to learn anything of the mechanics of creation. They do not have all the answers yet, to be sure; but such textbooks as there are come from them, not from the biblical writers.

As regards general treatment, then, there is no contact between scientific textbooks and the Bible (unless the scientific writers exceed their function and declare that their understanding of the ‘how’ entitles them to deny the ‘who’). But in matters of detail there may be some inconsistencies between them. It is this possibility which has led to so many Concordist treatments of the subject, treatments which argue that if the biblical statements are understood aright, they accord with scientific discoveries. Two well-known Concordist arguments may be mentioned by way of illustration. The ‘gap’ theory, which supposes that some lengthy period and unnamed catastrophe occurred between the events related in Genesis 1:1 and those of 1:2, is a simple expedient to align the biblical story with the scientists’ certainty that the universe dates back millions of years.\(^1\) Another view, solving the same problem, is that the six ‘days’ of creation are not to be understood as literal days of 24 hours’ duration, but as lengthy aeons of time. Now whether such Concordist treatments ever prove scientifically sound I am not qualified to judge; the issue, as far as I am concerned, is whether one is justified in treating Genesis 1 as a scientific statement—as Concordist arguments inevitably presuppose it to be, in effect.

The late P. J. Wiseman used quite a different approach: suggesting that the six days were days of revelation, not creation, he took the passage out of the scientific sphere altogether, for

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\(^1\) The ‘gap’ theory itself, as a matter of exegesis, antedated the scientific challenge; but the latter gave it new impetus.
Genesis 1 became not a semi-scientific account in strict chronological sequence, but a dramatic revelation of a creation effected long before.\(^2\) The chief objection such a hypothesis faces is linguistic—can ‘āšāh (‘to make’) be pressed to mean ‘reveal’ in Exodus 20:11? It is also open to question whether God is viewed as speaking to some early patriarch (Adam himself?) in Genesis 1. There is no hint of this in the passage (verse 28 can scarcely give any guidance, since it is parallel to verse 22) not even the colophon in 2:4 contains any individual’s name. But the Concordist treatments often founder on the same linguistic rock. The ‘gap’ theory is obliged to translate the simple verb Ḥāyāḥ (normally ‘to be’) ‘to become’ in Genesis 1:2, against linguistic probability. Those who make the ‘days’ aeons can reasonably claim that the word yōm is often used figuratively in the Old Testament; but the use of the phrase ‘evening and morning’ and the reference to the Sabbath are strong reasons for taking the word literally in this particular context. Our understanding of the biblical narrative must be based on a proper understanding of the Hebrew. To take the word mîm (‘kind’, Gn. 1:11, etc.) as referring in some way to species or genera (an interpretation the writer has heard more than once) is to read into it, not to interpret it. The majority of Concordists take the scientific data as their starting-point, and interpret the biblical statements to fit them. But it is essential to achieve first a sound exegesis of the latter; and then, if any rapprochement is necessary, it can be made on a firm basis. Biblical exegesis is paramount, even when the scientific challenge is under consideration.

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III. The Challenge From Mythology

Since 1872, when George Smith first introduced the Gilgamesh Epic to English readers,\(^3\) numerous writers have taken it for granted that the early narratives of Genesis rest squarely on earlier myth and folklore. See, for instance, the article ‘Creation’, by H. Zimmern and T. K. Cheyne, in Encyclopaedia Biblica (1899-1903). Now it is true that various features of Genesis 1f. seem to have parallels in ancient myths, epics, and the like. Egypt has provided us with a very early ‘creation’ account (albeit a theogony, not a cosmogony) in which a sort of Logos doctrine appears;\(^4\) from Iran we have the conception of a creation in six stages (although a parallel to the Hebrew Sabbath is, significantly, missing).\(^5\) Such isolated similarities of detail are most probably coincidental, unless the biblical writer effected a pot-pourri of traditions. (In any case, it should be noted that a number of extra-biblical ‘parallels’ are of very late date, and the borrowing, if any, could well have been in the opposite direction.) It has been commonly assumed, however, that the original underlying Genesis i as a whole was the

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\(^2\) P. J. Wiseman, Creation Revealed in Six Days, 1948, especially pp. 39f. The reader is recommended to peruse this book for an alternative view to that expressed in this paper. Many of Wiseman’s arguments about the nature of Genesis 1 are cogent. I cannot accept, however, that the relevant clause in Exodus 20:11 means anything but ‘in six days the Lord made heaven and earth’. Any distinction between a revelation of creation in Genesis 1 and an earlier performance of it seems to me, therefore, to be denied by the Exodus passage.

\(^3\) G. Smith, The Chaldean Account of Genesis, 1876, presented his findings in book form; but the first news was conveyed by Smith in 1872, through the columns of The Times and a lecture to the Society of Biblical Archaeology (published in the Society’s Transactions, II, 1873, pp. 213-234).


\(^5\) Cf. ‘The Bundahishn’, in R. C. Zaehner, The Teachings of the Magi, 1956, pp. 34-41; but this Iranian work is of much too late date to have influenced the biblical story.
Babylonian Epic of Creation (generally known as Enuma Elish) or something very like it. But this suggestion has never, in fact, commanded general agreement. It may not be common knowledge that Wellhausen—who has rarely been classed as a conservative scholar!—could find no mythological element in Genesis I except chaos: a view deplored by Cheyne. In 1921, Ryle admitted that the points of resemblance between the Babylonian and Israelite cosmogonies were neither numerous nor close. In more recent times, von Rad has remarked that ‘the common characteristics scarcely go beyond... catchwords’, while Kinnier Wilson declares, ‘It seems very probable that the epic has no connections of any kind or at any point with Genesis, and that each is sui generis’. This judgment is the more impressive in that Kinnier Wilson does not hesitate to admit a close connection between the Gilgamesh Epic and the biblical deluge story. The truth is that nobody can deny that the contrasts between Genesis I and any extra-biblical cosmogony known to us are invariably more striking than the resemblances.

The possible points of contact between the Babylonian and the Israelite accounts are as follows: a linguistic connection, in the Babylonian ‘Tiamat’ and the biblical ãhôm, ‘the deep’ (Gn. 1:2); an initial chaos; an emphasis on the figure seven; and a considerable correspondence in the chronological order of creation. The first of these features tended at one time to be taken as proof incontrovertible of the dependence of Genesis I on a Babylonian original; closer examination has shown that the connection is more apparent than real. The Babylonian Tiamat is a person, a mythical female being symbolizing one part of the primeval chaos waters; in Genesis I, ãhôm is clearly inanimate, not the foe of God, but simply one section of the created world. The word is moreover masculine in Hebrew. As Professor James Barr’s recent book has reminded us, the meaning of Hebrew words in the Old Testament is to be determined by their use and context, not by their etymology. Nowhere does ãhôm mean anything more than waters, whether primeval, as here, or something more limited, such as the Nile. Furthermore, Heidel has argued strongly that the different gender of the Hebrew word indicates that it does not derive immediately from Tiamat, but that both words go back to some earlier common Semitic term; a Babylonian word tâmtu, meaning ‘ocean’ simply, is cited as evidence, and Ras Shamra has provided additional linguistic support for this view. The question of a chaos principle is closely connected with this issue; Tiamat can correctly be called a chaos ‘principle’, but in Genesis I chaos has no powers whatever. To suggest that

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6 There are various other versions of Babylonian creation myths, many of them listed by Heidel, *The Babylonian Genesis*, 1951, pp. 61-81; but Enuma Elish may be taken as representative of them.  
7 *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, I, col. 941.  
12 Cf. Ezek. 31:4. The plural is used of the Red Sea in Ex. 15:5, 8, etc.  
there is a latent conflict in the chapter is to read into it from mythology; chaos is a passive, powerless element in God’s primeval creation. It is significant that to convey the idea of chaos, the biblical writer has to introduce other terms besides ὅμοιος, such as ‘formless’, ‘void’, ‘darkness’, and, if von Rad (following Goodspeed) is right in his interpretation of מָרֵאָה מַעֲלֵת (usually translated ‘the Spirit of God’), ‘a mighty wind’ too. But in Enuma Elish, Tiamat needs no description. (Hence the uncertainty whether she was a lady or a monster!) In spite of these important contrasts, however, it is true that both accounts do postulate an initial chaos; although it must not be overlooked that in Genesis the existence of God seems to precede that of chaos, whereas Enuma Elish presents us at the start with two chaos deities, Apsu and Tiamat. It is grammatically possible to translate Genesis 1:1f., ‘When God began to create... the earth was formless and void...’, thus making chaos the contemporary of the Creator; but this construction is linguistically cumbersome, and such a dualism is theologically incompatible with the rest of the chapter.

The number seven is certainly an important feature of the Hebrew account; at first blush, the fact that there were seven distinct tablets containing Enuma Elish does seem a parallel worthy of note. But there is no correlation at all between the six days of creatorial activity, followed by the Sabbath of rest, in Genesis, and the seven sections of Enuma Elish, not all of which deal with either creative acts or cessation from them.

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In any case, it is improbable that the sevenfold division of the Creation Epic had any significance; it may well have been simply a matter of scribal convenience.

There is, on the other hand, considerable correspondence between the Babylonian order of creation and that presented in Genesis 1. The parallels are not exact: some Genesis details are missing from Enuma Elish, and vice versa, and there are some variations in order too (for instance, the luminaries are listed in reverse sequence). But the following details occur in the following order in both accounts: chaos, light, the firmament, dry land, luminaries, man and divine rest. The question is whether this similarity can be coincidental. Zimmern went so far as to state that the early appearance of a watery chaos in Genesis I ‘is unintelligible in the mouth of an early Israelite’; for he supposed that the concept was derived from a purely Mesopotamian phenomenon, the winter flooding of the great Mesopotamian plain, followed by the spring sunshine and dissipation of the waters, with the subsequent appearance of fresh vegetation. This climatic argument was challenged by Clay, however, who pointed out that the flooding of the rivers of Babylonia is not strictly a winter phenomenon. In other words, an initial chaos is no less natural to an Israelite than to a Babylonian. After all, it seems a perfectly natural assumption, especially for an agricultural people, that chaos preceded ‘cosmos’—or so my limited experience as a gardener leads me to think! As for the seventh

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15 Ibid.
16 It is true that Enuma Elish and the second narrative of Genesis (Gn. 2:4b-25) begin with a temporal clause; but this seems to me irrelevant, since there is little structural similarity between the three narratives.
17 Cf. von Rad, op. cit., p. 46.
19 Encyclopaedia Biblica, I, col. 940.
20 A. T. Clay, The Origin of Biblical Traditions, 1923, pp. 77-78; cf. Heidel, op. cit., p. 98. While the Mesopotamian rivers start rising in the middle of winter, the peak month is April, so that extensive flooding in that region is in general a phenomenon more of spring than winter.
correspondence, that of divine rest, it would be surprising if this were anything but the final event. The five intervening parallel creative acts follow an intelligible pattern; the first three are really resolutions of chaos, light emerging from darkness, and first heaven and then earth appearing out of the waters of chaos. These three creations are all acts of separation, primarily. Once this is clear, it no longer occasions surprise that the luminaries are considered separately from light itself, in both narratives. In each case, the luminaries are presented as occupants

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of one part of the cosmos. The only other occupant (apart from the various deities) whose creation is described in Enuma Elish is man himself; Genesis I relates the creation of vegetation and of animals, birds and marine creatures as well.\textsuperscript{21}

It must probably remain an open question whether, with Kinnier Wilson, we consider the correspondence to be coincidental, or whether, with Heidel, we conclude that there must be some relationship between the stories, despite the vastly different treatment. If the latter scholar is right, the further question arises, which account is primary? It is easy enough to contend that the Babylonian and other creation narratives are grossly distorted versions of the divinely inspired Genesis account; but so far as the literary evidence goes, it rather supports the priority of the Sumerian and Akkadian stories. Genesis I \textit{may} have been recorded on a patriarchal tablet centuries before Moses, as Wiseman suggests,\textsuperscript{22} but it must be borne in mind that this chapter tells of events unobserved by human eyewitnesses, and is therefore rather different from other narratives in Genesis. If the biblical narrative was no earlier than the time of Moses,\textsuperscript{23} it is fairly evident that Enuma Elish was not dependent on it, for in the opinion of most scholars the Epic first appeared early in the second millennium BC, even though no extant text of it antedates the first millennium.\textsuperscript{24}

To the second chapter of Genesis there is no close mythological

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parallel extant, although some of the details are not unique to this chapter. For example, the Sumerian story of Enki and Ninhursag\textsuperscript{25} is set in a paradise of sorts, apparently, and a rib figures in a minor way in the narrative. Other features of Genesis 2 reminiscent of myths are

\textsuperscript{21}Heidel (pp. 117f.) discussed the possibility of the contents of the missing Tablet V of the Epic containing some account of the origin of fauna and flora. His doubts have since been justified; \textit{cf.} B. Landsberger and J. V. Kinnier Wilson, 'The Fifth Tablet of \textit{Enuma Eliš}', in \textit{Journal of Near Eastern Studies (JNES)}, XX, 1961, No. 3, pp. 154-179.


\textsuperscript{23}\textit{Cf.} J. D. Douglas (ed.), \textit{The New Bible Dictionary (NBD)}, 1962, p. 461 (in the article ‘Genesis’, by J. S. Wright and J. A. Thompson). Of course, most proponents of the Documentary Hypothesis maintain that Gn. 1 was not written before the Exile; in that case, Enuma Elish is indubitably the older document.

\textsuperscript{24}\textit{Cf. ANET}, p. 60, Even if it were established that the biblical story was in some way dependent on the Babylonian, it would not necessarily follow that the Israelites first became acquainted with the myth during the Exile; it was presumably current in the time of Abraham. On this question, see Heidel, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 130ff. Certainly the Atrahasis Epic, with its version of creation, goes back to 1600 BC at least. See \textit{ANET}, pp. 99-100, 104-106; J. Laessøe (‘The Atrahasis Epic: a Babylonian History of Mankind’, in \textit{Bibliotheca Orientalis}, xiii 3/4, 1956, pp. 90-102) shows that this story relates the original, pre-deluge creation, and not a re-creation after the Flood, as was formerly thought.

\textsuperscript{25}\textit{Cf. ANET}, pp. 37-41; S. N. Kramer, \textit{From the Tablets of Sumer}, 1956, pp. 169-175, gives the parallels in full.
creation out of dust, and Adam’s function as a gardener. But there the resemblances virtually end.  

IV. The Challenge From Literary Criticism

Thirdly, we have to consider the view that there are contradictory accounts of creation within the Old Testament itself. Before investigating the major problem, the relationship of Genesis 1 and 2, let us note that there are passages elsewhere in the Old Testament which mention a primeval conflict reminiscent of the Marduk-Tiamat battle in the Babylonian Epic. No such conflict is apparent in Genesis I or 2. Whether the writers of such passages as Psalm 74:14 and Isaiah 27:1 knew the Babylonian account is not clear, but it seems idle to deny that there is a definite *linguistic* dependence on the Canaanite myths, known to us from the Ras Shamra tablets. The victorious deity in them is Baal, and one of his foes is l-w-t-n (the vowels are uncertain), described as the ‘primeval’ and ‘crooked’ serpent  in Isaiah 27:1 this creature is ‘leviathan’, and equivalent descriptive adjectives are employed. Such Old Testament passages make it amply clear that the Israelites were not only familiar with pagan myths, but also perfectly willing to use them for their own purposes. All such passages are poetic, in any case, and highly figurative, so we should be foolish to take them too literally; but in fact the biblical writers have sometimes been careful to ‘demythologize’ these borrowings. The ‘leviathan’ is ultimately (Jb. 41) nothing more than a crocodile—scarcely a primeval foe of Yahweh! In several other instances, the foes are patently historical; in Isaiah 27:1 the conflict is indeed yet future, and ‘Leviathan’ is the Assyrian or the Babylonian empire (or both);  ‘Rahab’ (perhaps to be equated with the Babylonian Tiamat) is explicitly Egypt in Isaiah 30:7 (RSV) and virtually so in Psalm 87:4, and elsewhere occurs in contexts where the Exodus from Egypt is in view (cf. Ps. 89:10; Is. 51:9f.). Never once is there any clear statement that the foes of Yahweh were considered to be mythical deities of any sort. The sea itself may have been viewed as resisting Yahweh’s institution of cosmos (cf. Jb. 38:8-11); but such passages may rather indicate a certain fear and dislike of the sea on the part of the Israelites, which perhaps led them to feel that there was a measure of truth in the myths.  

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These passages, then, neither confirm nor deny the Genesis narratives. The major problem is whether Genesis 1 is contradicted by the following chapter. We may recall Sir James Frazer’s opening sentence in his three-volume work, *Folklore in the Old Testament*: ‘Attentive readers of the Bible can hardly fail to remark a striking discrepancy between the two accounts of the creation of man recorded in the first and second chapters of Genesis.’ At one time statements of this kind were common; they were frequently made in order to present to readers the strongest possible case for the separate authorship of the two narratives. Nowadays, however, when some form or modification of the Documentary Hypothesis is so widely accepted, such

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26 For Sumerian parallels to Gn. 2, cf. Kramer, *History begins at Sumer*, English edn., 1958, pp. 193-199. The Adapa Myth (cf. *ANET*, pp. 101-103) has some resemblances to Gn. 3; but that is a matter outside the scope of this paper.  
29 Cf. J. G. S. Thomson, ‘Sea’, in *NBD*. One gets the impression from the Old Testament (and also Rev. 21:1) that the Hebrews had no great love for the sea; on the other hand, it must be admitted that Israel did not neglect sea trade.  
30 For further discussion of these conflict passages, cf. Heidel, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-114.
assertions are rare, even though their effects remain. It is important to avoid confusing two distinct (though related) issues here. This paper is not concerned with questions of authorship, and variations in style and diction have little direct relevance; the fact that the Creator is called ‘God’ in Genesis 1:1—2:4a (which I propose to call Narrative A) but ‘Yahweh God’ in Genesis 2:4b-25 (Narrative B),
occasions no contradiction, nor are the anthropomorphic touches in Narrative B inconsistent with the data of A. These are matters of style. According to Frazer, whom we may perhaps treat as representative of this approach,

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the discrepancies lie in the order of creatorial activity: in Narrative A, animate beings are created in the order fishes, birds, animals, and human-kind (of both sexes), whereas reading B ‘we learn with surprise that God created man first, the lower animals next, and woman last of all’.

He omitted to mention that in A the creation of vegetation occurs before that of any animate being, whereas in B the reference to the planting of the garden and the introduction of trees occurs after man’s appearance but before that of the animal world.

Can this series of apparent discrepancies be resolved? It can be done by taking some of the details of chapter 2 as recapitulatory and others as a sequel to the events of chapter 1. One might argue that the vegetation and animal creation in chapter 2 are purely local (i.e. in the Garden of Eden), and subsequent to the general creation of both; but it is not easy to construe verses 5-7 in any other way than is made explicit in the RSV, where the passage clearly states that man was made before any vegetation appeared. The fact remains, however, that the two passages are not strictly parallel, for the first is speaking in completely general terms, while the second is dealing with a single locality and a specific pair of individuals. One can resolve the difficulties, then, by a judicious treatment, insisting on recapitulation here, sequence there, and denying a proper parallel elsewhere again. It would seem, though, that those who view Narrative B as chronologically inconsistent with A can at least claim the virtue of a simple, straightforward exegesis of chapter 2; the question of chronology must be treated later. On the other hand, if ex hypothesi an editor or redactor did take two contradictory accounts, he must presumably have failed to notice the inconsistencies. Indeed, in spite of Frazer’s remark, I venture to suggest that the ordinary reader of the Bible is still blissfully unaware of any glaring incompatibilities between Genesis 1 and 2: a fact which indicates how exaggerated the charges of inconsistency have been.

Perhaps, for the moment, an open verdict is to be returned.

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V. The Six Days

An interesting fact emerges from these considerations. Despite the widely diverse nature of the three attacks on Genesis 1, they converge on one single feature of the chapter, the chronological sequence of the creative acts. If we understand Genesis 1 as teaching exactly

31 According to the Documentary Hypothesis, my Narrative A is the P (or ‘Priestly’) Account, Narrative B the J (or Yahwistic) Account.
33 S. H. Hooke sets out the differences clearly, in tabular form, in *In the Beginning*, 1947, p. 21; see, too, his further discussion in Peake’s *Commentary on the Bible*, pp. 178f., and cf. A. Weiser, *Introduction to the Old Testament*, English translation, 1961, p.73.
how and in what chronological order the world was made, we shall always be liable to fall foul of scientific opinion; we shall be unable to avoid the uneasy suspicion that the Hebrew record may be indebted, however slightly, to pagan myth; and we shall have some difficulty in maintaining that Genesis 2 does not contradict it in detail. If, on the other hand, we decline to regard Genesis 1 in this light, the scientific attacks are robbed of their weight; it is no longer a matter of great concern whether or not the biblical writer borrowed his mere narrative framework, or part of it, from some other source; and finally there is no longer any need to spend time trying to reconcile the details of chapter 2 with the order of events in chapter 1.

So much for external considerations; but should we be justified on internal grounds in making an exegesis which sets chronology aside? J. A. Thompson, at least, so argues; he draws a comparison with the temptation narratives of Matthew 4 and Luke 4, which record the same temptations but in a different order. He concludes that we should ‘allow that Gn. 1 has an artificial structure and is not concerned to provide a picture of chronological sequence but only to assert the fact that God made everything’.  

The truth is that everything points to the fact that the sequence is dramatic rather than chronological, in both Genesis 1 and 2. The climax of Narrative A is not the Sabbath but the creation of man, and everything leads up to that: first chaos is resolved, then the denizens of the universe appear. (We might have expected the luminaries to precede vegetation, but probably plant life is here visualized as virtually part of the phenomenon of dry land—note that both appeared on the same day of creation.) That the narrative is to be taken as a whole, and not dissected chronologically has also the support of Isaiah 45:18 (RV), ‘Thus saith the LORD …. that formed the earth and made it …. he created it not a waste, he formed it to be inhabited’. 

Narrative B similarly presents a logical dramatic sequence: man and vegetation are closely linked, for the ground needs man to till it, and man needs vegetation to feed him. The climax of this story is the creation of woman; the animals appear in the intermediate position between man and woman for dramatic reasons, to indicate that they are not suitable companions for man. Frazer is surely perverse in stating that woman is the nadir of creation, the mere afterthought of the Creator, in Narrative B. One could with equal logic argue that man is the nadir of creation in the previous chapter. The truth is that the Hebrew story of woman’s origin shows much more respect for her than does any corresponding pagan story from the ancient world.

That the days are secondary to Narrative A is perhaps further indicated by the fact that though the days of creation are six, the acts of creation number eight. In other words, the days are connected with the Sabbath rather than with the events of creation. The lesson of the Sabbath

34 Cf. NBD, p. 271 (article ‘Creation’).
35 Wiseman’s chief objection to the ‘Artificial Week’ theory is that the Sabbath is not explicitly mentioned in Gn. 2 (cf. Creation Revealed in Six Days, pp. 28f.). However, the use of the verb š-b-t±° in connection with the seventh day is as clear an allusion to the Sabbath as one could wish for. The Artificial Week interpretation should not, at any rate, be dismissed solely on account of the critical views of some of its proponents.
36 Frazer, op. cit., pp. 3f.
37 Cf. Thompson’s table, NBD, p. 271. On the other hand, land and vegetation, and animals and men, may have been viewed respectively as virtually one. But this is doubtful, for man is clearly distinguished from the three classes of ‘animals’ in Gn. 1.2 The word translated ‘rested’ in Gn. 2:2 means simply ‘desisted’; cf. E. J. Young, ‘Sabbath’, in NBD.
is, of course, a literal one for man, but the parallel must not be pressed too far, or we shall find ourselves depicting the Almighty as weary after His labours.\(^{38}\)

An interesting hypothesis of recent years is that Narrative A was used liturgically.\(^3\) Enuma Elish, to be sure, was recited annually at the Babylonian new year festival, but we have no way of telling whether Genesis 1:1—2:4a was ever similarly used, or indeed ever had a separate existence from the rest of the book. If the passage was written to serve liturgically, the seven-day scheme could well have been incorporated for that reason. But there is no compelling reason to believe that this scheme was a super-imposition on the narrative. The motif of divine rest is shared with the Babylonian Epic, as we have seen, so that the Sabbath itself is by no means out of place in the Hebrew account; and the preceding six days are in turn natural corollaries of the Sabbath. Whether the seven-day framework was primarily liturgical is open to doubt, then; but it is at least as likely that the scheme was dramatic or theological as that it was historically chronological.

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VI. The Nature and Purpose of Genesis 1

If the first chapter of the Bible was not designed to teach us that God created the universe and everything it contains during a period of six 24-hour days, and in a certain strict order of events, we are obliged to ask just what the narrator’s purpose was. It has been generally recognized for many years that some of the early biblical narratives are aetiological rather than historical. In other words, they were designed to explain why such-and-such was the case rather than to relate historical events for their own sake. It has been assumed far too frequently that an aetiological narrative is completely unhistorical, but that is not necessarily true at all; on the contrary, the best explanation of present circumstances is presumably the true facts about how they arose. Aetiological narratives, then, are not \textit{ipso facto} historically untrue; but they do have quite a different emphasis, and they may contain as much parabolic as historical material. This will explain why Genesis 1-11 presents a kaleidoscope of events rather than a connected history; the earliest stories are concerned to expound the origin of sin and its consequences, the relationship of man and woman, and above all the relationship of God and man, rather than to outline the lives of Adam and Eve. Narrative B, with its sequel in chapter 3, is certainly aetiological. But does Narrative A fall into the same category? If its sole function was to explain the origin and importance of the Sabbath, then it was aetiological, simply; but as has already been remarked, the creation of man forms the true climax to the story. We may,

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however, admit the presence of didactic features; ‘didactic’ may be a more suitable and neutral description.

The liturgical hypothesis is plausible—obviously Narrative A would have been most suitable for liturgical use. But there are too many imponderables surrounding this theory. Even if we could be sure that the passage was so used, we should still not know to what exact use it was

\(^{38}\) \textit{Cf.} S. H. Hooke, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 33-36.
put. Hooke contends that it was employed at a new year festival when the kingship of Yahweh was celebrated and His creatorial acts and powers rehearsed. But it is still far from certain that any such ceremonies ever took place among the Israelites, despite the popularity of this thesis. In any case, who can say whether the passage was written for liturgical purpose or was adopted (and adapted?) to that end at a later date? For the sake of argument, let us agree that Hooke is right; then liturgical requirements could have influenced the form of the narrative, and perhaps led to the inclusion of certain details. But we are still left with the underlying material, with its theological content—theology precedes liturgy, it does not follow it. In short, if the liturgical view of Genesis 1 is valid, it does not by any means fully explain the chapter’s contents.

The other Old Testament passages concerning creation which may be of some relevance are Psalm 104 and Isaiah 40:12-31. The aim of these passages is much more easily discernible than is the case with Genesis 1. The Psalm is patently liturgical, a hymn in praise of the Creator, while the prophetic paragraphs have an explicit didactic purpose. Psalm 104 has a special interest, for many scholars have held that it is in part an adaptation for Israelite worship of an Egyptian hymn to the sun-god Aten. There are certain similarities; apparently the Hebrew writer—if indeed he did borrow from the Egyptian source—felt that many of the sentiments expressed there could be applied to the true God, Yahweh, with few changes.

The most striking difference is that the local interest, i.e. in Egypt and the Nile, is altogether absent from the Psalm; it is not paralleled by a Palestinian interest. There is a clear recognition that Yahweh is the universal Creator, in fact. Turning to Genesis 1, we note a similar universalistic approach, in contrast to Enuma Elish, which exalts the city of Babylon. But Genesis 1 is far more divorced from Enuma Elish than Psalm 104 is from the Hymn to Aten. There is one obvious reason for this—the Egyptian work is monotheistic in tone, whereas the Babylonian is patently polytheistic. But other factors too may be involved. The Psalm and the Aten Hymn are liturgical, simply; their statements about the deeds of Yahweh and Aten respectively are really expressions of wonder and gratitude and worship. But the statements of Genesis 1:1—2:4a concerning the creatorial work of God cannot be so simply explained. Such a verse as 2:3 makes it clear that the narrative has a didactic motive. In other words, Narrative A of Genesis has a purpose to some extent comparable with Isaiah 40:12-31, though it lacks the searching questions posed so characteristically by the prophet. It was written in a much calmer mood, no doubt. An interesting suggestion made by Cassuto in 1934 was that Genesis 1 emanates from ‘wisdom circles’. Whoever was the writer, it is true that the passage bears certain resemblances to the Old Testament Wisdom literature. First, there is the quiet didactic tone. Then I would suggest that the mode of revelation is the same. The historical books bear witness to God’s revelation in history; but the wisdom books show us

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40 Cf. ANET, pp. 369ff.; DOTT, pp. 142ff.

41 Close linguistic parallels seem few; but it is true that the Hebrew Psalm and the Egyptian hymn express very similar sentiments, although this fact does not necessarily indicate that the one borrowed from the other. K. A. Kitchen argues strongly against any direct link between the two. See NBD (p. 348), s.v. ‘Egypt’.

42 This much is true, whether or not the Aten cult itself was strictly monotheistic. Cf. DOTT, pp. 143ff.

that in some spheres God’s truth may be known by man’s shrewd observation and deduction; particularly where natural phenomena are concerned. The first chapter of Genesis seems to fall into the latter category to this extent that its conception of the universe is both phenomenological and geocentric; the sun is simply a light, for example. It is the conception of

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God rather than the understanding of the natural world which bears the marks of more direct revelation.

Several exegetes have remarked that Genesis 1 has been purified of mythological traits, or ‘demythologized’. This is open to doubt, as it stands; but von Rad goes further, and states that here and there the chapter is distinctly anti-mythical. This suggestion seems to me well worth following up. If this is the case, the writer has not borrowed and adapted ancient myths, such as the Babylonian; under God’s hand, he has written the story of creation to counter the polytheistic myths with which the Israelites must have been familiar (as biblical allusions to Leviathan and Rahab testify). That is why the sun, moon and stars are not treated in the scientific terms of present-day astronomy, but are degraded to the status of ‘lamps’, thus attacking both Egyptian sun-worship and Babylonian astrology. Another remarkable contrast with Enuma Elish is apparent in the concept of divine rest. In the Babylonian story, man is created for no other purpose than to give the gods relief from menial tasks; but Genesis 2:2f. links Yahweh’s rest with the Sabbath, so that God’s rest is seen to be shared by man. Here again, we may well have a deliberately different treatment in the Bible. The menial and unpleasant side of man’s labours is in the Bible due to his sin (cf. Gn. 3:17f.), not to Yahweh’s own need and desire to rest.

If the biblical writer was intending to counter pagan myths, it is easy to see why there are some minor points of contact with them, and yet, at the same time, such a vastly different treatment. It is noteworthy that Isaiah 40, which has close parallels with chapter I of Genesis, has a transparently anti-pagan approach.

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This whole question of the nature of Genesis 1 is a highly subjective matter, and any conclusions reached are bound to be tentative. But it is at least certain that the chief interest of the chapter is theological; it gives a doctrine of a Creator rather than a doctrine of creation. And the theology is totally different from that of Israel’s ancient neighbours.

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44 An anthropomorphic approach is only to be expected, whether the story is a spoken record to Adam or a written record to Adam’s posterity. Cf. Wiseman, op. cit., pp. 39ff.
47 Babylonian horoscopic astrology was not developed until the fourth century BC (cf. A. Sachs, ‘Babylonian Horoscopes’, in Journal of Cuneiform Studies, VI, 1952, pp. 49-75); but interest in omens and astronomy obviously goes back to much earlier times, as Enuma Elish itself testifies.
48 Cf. the Creation Epic, Tablet VI, lines 5-10 (DOTT, p. 12).
49 See note 2, p. 18.
VII. Primitive Features

The anti-mythical approach of von Rad will not commend itself to all scholars, chiefly because many of them find in Genesis I primitive polytheistic traces. This view rests mainly on verses 26f. To whom is the Creator speaking when He says, ‘Let us ...’? To the radical critic, Yahweh is here addressing the assembly of gods; the scene is just like the assembly over which Marduk, god of Babylon, presided in the Epic. On the other hand, many conservative exegetes have found in the use of the plural an allusion to the Trinity. An intermediate position is that the heavenly court of angels is being addressed. But it is important to take words in their context; and there is no suggestion in the passage that anyone but Yahweh is present to be addressed. It seems preferable, then, to take the Hebrew verb as a plural of deliberation or of majesty, or else as a figure of speech (as also in Gn. 11:7), an anthropomorphism, used perhaps for reverential reasons.

The ‘imago Dei’ of these two verses is the other chief allegedly ‘primitive’ feature of the narrative. A number of scholars have argued that man’s physical make-up is here likened to that of the Almighty.\(^{51}\) Now it is true that time and time again the Old Testament speaks of God in human terms, but nowhere is it clear that a biblical writer actually believed that Yahweh possessed a human form. Can it be true that such is the intention of the writer of Genesis 1? A large number of scholars have denied it, at any rate, insisting that man’s spiritual nature is the point of the comparison.\(^{52}\) A few other writers have maintained that body and spirit are inseparable, and that the author of Genesis 1 taught that man as a whole, considered both physically and spiritually, was made in the divine image.\(^{53}\) In support of the purely physical interpretation, the fact can be noted that the Hebrew word ṣelem (‘image’) has generally a concrete, literal meaning elsewhere in the Old Testament. Moreover, Genesis 5:1-3 seems to imply that the relationship between God and Adam was identical with that existing between Adam and his Sons. (Even here, though, it is not certain that physical relationship is the ‘likeness’.) On the other hand, those who insist on the spiritual nature of the comparison maintain, reasonably enough, that ‘crude anthropomorphisms’ are foreign to this chapter. Is there any way out of this dilemma?

One or two preliminary remarks should be made. In the first place, it is self-evident that the writer is not attempting to deny a physical resemblance, whether or not he is asserting one. This fact may explain the ambiguity. Secondly, the important question from a linguistic standpoint is not so much what the word ṣelem means elsewhere, but what it means in the context. The immediate context of 1:27 puts the image of God in parallelism with ‘male and female’. Frazer was working on sound linguistic lines, therefore, when he argued that the bisexuality of the Godhead was taught by the verse; but obviously his conclusion was fatuous.

\(^{51}\) E.g., Frazer, Gunkel, Hooke.

\(^{52}\) E.g., Ryle, S. R. Driver, Rowley, Whitehouse. This view is corroborated by the suggestion of T. C. Mitchell (in *Vetus Testamentum*, xi 2, 1961, pp. 177-188) that man’s breath (ʾršāmāh) was the special and distinctive divine feature implanted by God in man; there is no certain instance in the Old Testament of the word being used of animals.

\(^{53}\) E.g., Dillman, Skinner, von Rad.
exegetically. He seems to have overlooked the fact that Hebrew parallelism is not always synonymous, but can be antithetic or climactic. The point of reference to male and female is surely that both sexes alike shared the divine image, not just males, an additional witness to the lofty Hebrew conception of woman’s status. On the contrary, this very parallelism renders doubtful any physical interpretation of selem, in view of the differing physical structures of man and woman.

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But when we turn back to verse 26, we do find a helpful parallelism, in the dominion over creation given to man. Psalm 8:5ff. surely alludes to this verse, and stresses that this is where man’s similarity to God chiefly rests. This understanding of the ‘imago Dei’ is very ancient, but scholarship has tended to reject it or ignore it. More recently, however, Engnell and others have recognized that Adam ‘is described in royal categories’, and is a prototype of the sacral king. This recognition gives the ancient hypothesis fresh support; Engnell seems to me inconsistent when he goes on to say of the ‘imago Dei’ that ‘the conception is “naïvely” anthropomorphic’. It is a very natural procedure, when treating this problem, to argue back from what we know of man’s nature and being to what the writer must have understood God’s to be. But logically, we should first examine God’s nature as depicted in the chapter, to find out in what way man was thought to resemble Him. Now it is not explicitly stated whether God was viewed as having material form or not; but the fact that He is portrayed as wholly outside the material universe, and as prior to its existence, implies that His nature was not really physical, in the normal sense of the word, to the author. What is explicit is that God was the One who spoke and commanded and made (not necessarily or always ex nihilo) and brought order; He was not only the Creator but the Controller of His world. And this is precisely how man is depicted in verse 26; it was man’s destiny to subdue and rule the world, ordering and controlling it. To this extent man was made in the divine image. Proverbs 8 indicates that wisdom is another aspect of deity shared by human beings; and wisdom is an indispensable attribute of the (sacral) king.

Those who demand a physical interpretation are bound to base their arguments on the word selem. That it usually refers to material objects cannot be denied; but in normal usage the word does not mean simply a material representation, it means specifically a pagan idol. The parallel word demūt (‘likeness’) means an idol in Isaiah 40:18. The writer of Genesis 1, then, may have been using a cultic word to express another deliberately anti-pagan sentiment: the other nations of his world made idols in the image of man, or woman, or even animal; Israel rightly appreciated that the truth was the reverse, that man (of both sexes) was himself made in God’s image. If it is permissible to press the analogy, we may note that idolatrous images were not of the same substance as their models, nor possessed of the same powers (cf. Is. 44:9ff.).

54 Frazer, op. cit., p. 3.  
57 Ibid.
Above all, the Hebrew narrative expounds the essential transcendence of God and dignity of man. The contrast with the details of Enuma Elish could scarcely be greater—and again one wonders whether the contrast is deliberate. In the Epic there is a multiplicity of deities, who exhibit all the failings of humankind; while man is a ‘lowly, primitive creature’, to whom is relegated every menial task too humiliating for the gods. This Babylonian outlook sets in sharp relief the biblical picture of man in God’s image; no afterthought he, but the crown of God’s creation.

The transcendence of the Creator is also apparent in the mode of creation. The ancient world, in its efforts to understand how all things began, generally made the first principle of the universe either chaos (or ocean) or else sex, or sometimes a combination of both, as appears in Enuma Elish. Both concepts are essentially dualistic, seeing the world in terms of chaos and cosmos or of male and female. A sort of Logos doctrine occasionally appears—even in Enuma Elish, briefly. But undoubtedly the most sublime treatment is that of Genesis; the transcendent theology can brook no trace of dualism, no hint of a God who has to exert Himself in the way of men.

VIII. The Coherence of Genesis 1 and 2

The narrative beginning at Genesis 2:4b is not strictly a creation story, although it does of course deal with the appearance of

woman on this earth. Basically it serves as an introduction to chapter 3. In contrast to the first chapter, chapters 2 and 3 are full of imagery. This contrast explains some of the apparent discrepancies between the two narratives. We have remarked earlier that superficial inconsistencies may be due to differing didactic aims. Thus in Narrative A, man and woman are spoken of as if created simultaneously; the didactic interest concerns the relationship of human-kind to God, and underlines that woman is no whit inferior to man in this respect. But in B, the mutual relationship of the sexes is under consideration; hence the quite different treatment. As for man’s contact with the animals in B, the theme of his dominion over them is continued from Narrative A; it is only the ‘chronology’ that differs.

A subject of constant interest and discussion where Narrative A is concerned is the question whether or not the creation was *ex nihilo*. The word *bārā*’ (‘to create’) itself carries no such import; it is reserved in the Old Testament for divine activity (a fact which may have no particular significance), and appears to have the connotation of some brand-new action. But it is true that in Genesis 1, as in Proverbs 8, the total absence of mention of pre-creation material seems to imply a *creatio ex nihilo*. However, metaphysical speculation is no part of the Old Testament revelation; the silence of Genesis 1, if it has any positive purpose, presumably teaches a theological lesson, that God is not dependent on anything material.

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58 See note 4, p. 22.
59 It is strange that many ancient cosmogonies, while degrading man, glorify cities and localities, as Enuma Elish does Babylon. This feature is entirely absent from Gn. 1.
60 Tablet IV, lines 19-28 (*DOTT*, p. 9).
61 However ‘historical’ the narrative as a whole, it undoubtedly has its pictorial or parabolic elements.
62 The Piel, or intensive form, of this verb appears several times in the Old Testament with a human subject. In these instances it means ‘to cut’, not ‘to create’, however. On the other hand, the consonantal text could as easily support simple (Qal) as intensive vocalization in all cases.
other words, an anti-dualistic point of view is the explanation of the treatment in Narrative A. The statement of Genesis 2:7, on the other hand, is phenomenological; man’s physical composition is noted as being ‘dust’, *i.e.* the state to which it returns when life departs *(cf. 3:19).* It is life, with all that it implies, that is seen to be God’s special and mysterious gift. The creation of woman later in the chapter is related in equally pictorial terms, but with quite a different purpose.

Whatever the apparent inconsistencies, and whatever the explanation of them, it is at any rate clear that Genesis 1-3 forms a clear unity. Hooke, Rowley and Engnell, while they all see a diverse literary history behind these chapters, emphasize the theological unity in them. Says Hooke, ‘[The Priestly writer’s] conception of the nature of God is in full agreement with that of the Jahvist; for both there is but one sole supreme God, by whose act and word order was established out of chaos, and upon whom man is dependent for his existence and his place in the order of created beings’. Rowley stresses that both narratives emphasize the twin ideas of obedience to God and fellowship with Him; in both, ‘man is a creature capable of enjoying the fellowship of God and made to serve Him’. Von Rad lays little stress on the unity of the chapters, but he does remark, ‘The position of both the Jahvist and the Priestly document is basically faith in salvation and election’. Finally, Engnell does a service by reminding us that neither Genesis 1 nor Genesis 2 stands alone. The two chapters have their individual teaching, but they are integral to the Book of Genesis and indeed to the whole Pentateuch. So the second chapter ‘forms an organic transition to the story of the Fall’ in the following chapter. It agrees with chapter 1 in its picture of man as of kingly rank; and as a narrative, it is certainly a sequel to that of Genesis 1, for God’s creative dealings with the whole universe are linked by it with the early history of man, specifically the progenitors of Israel. Hence ‘the man’ (*ha…a…d±¬a…m*) of chapter 1 gradually becomes Adam, who passed on to his descendants, however imperfectly, the image of God *(cf. Gn. 5:1-3).*

IX. Summary and Conclusion

An examination of Genesis if., then, reveals that the biblical creation story is self-consistent in all essentials; that despite minor agreement concerning natural phenomena, the biblical account is theologically not only far different from, but totally opposed to, the ancient Near Eastern myths; and thirdly, that its information relates to the transcendence of God and

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65 Op. cit., p. 44.
67 Engnell emphasizes that the portrayal of Adam as a gardener does not demean him—the unpleasant side of his duties is not seen till after the Fall, outside the Garden of Eden. His dealings with the animals and the mention of gold (Gn. 2:11), for instance, reveal his royal character, and the two Hebrew verbs at the end of Gn. 2 15, ‘*ābad* (*to dress*) and *šamar* (*to keep*) both have cultic associations. Adam, then, is as much a sacral king in chapter 2 as in chapter 1. Cf. Engnell, op. cit., pp. 112f. Engnell goes so far as to apologize for calling Narrative B a ‘variant’ of Narrative A (p. 109).
The regal nature of Adam is also discussed by M. G. Kline, in the *Westminster Theological Journal* for May, 1962; I have not had access to this article.
dignity of man, God’s purposes and man’s destiny, doctrines which modern science has neither the function nor the power to dispute. Genesis 1f. thus withstands these various challenges, and in turn throws out its own challenge, demanding man’s faith and obedience, that he should confess, ‘Worthy art thou, our Lord and our God, to receive the glory and the honour and the power: for thou didst create all things, and because of thy will they were, and were created’. 68

68 Rev.4: 11, RV.