Modernisation, Religious Diversity and Rational Choice in Eastern Europe*

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Introduction
This essay presents a very brief summary of the secularisation thesis and of the ‘supply-side’ alternative associated with Rodney Stark. It identifies a crucial test which allows us to choose between the two and examines some of the available evidence. It concludes by considering the circumstances under which Stark’s model might be appropriate.

Secularisation
Four very general preliminary points should be made about the ‘secularisation’ approach to religious change. First, much confusion is removed if we recognise the limited claims that are made by its proponents. I do not believe that Weber, Troeltsch, Niebuhr, Wilson, Berger or Martin (to list those whose work has most informed my thinking) saw themselves as discovering universal laws comparable to the basic findings of natural science or expected their work to be taken as predictive. Curiously Berger has joined the ranks of those who accuse us of this vice. He has recently summarised the secularisation approach as implying that ‘modernity leads ineluctably to secularisation’. I have to say that, though he clearly saw secularisation as irreversible, I have never understood his classic works to be presenting global templates. Instead, I take the secularisation story, like Weber’s Protestant ethic thesis, to be an attempt to explain a historically and geographically specific cluster of changes. It is an explanation of what has happened to religion in Western Europe (and its North American and Australasian offshoots) since the Reformation. Whether any parts of the explanation have implications for other societies is an empirical matter and must rest on the extent to which the causal variables found in the original setting are repeated elsewhere. To highlight a major consideration, we can note that the explanation I am about to advance gives considerable weight to the role of egalitarianism and thus cannot be extended unadjusted to cultures which do not suppose that people are much of a muchness or to politics that are not fundamentally democratic. By highlighting the ‘all other things’ which are not equal, careful comparative analysis can shed further light on the secularisation approach, but of itself the fact that religion in Iran in 1980 or Chile in 1990 is not like religion in Belgium is neither

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Secondly, it seems clear to me, as someone who is often cited as a 'secularisation theorist', that the approach is much more coherent in the eyes of its detractors than in those of its promoters. As even my brief remarks below should show, at best secularisation is a broad paradigm.

Thirdly, despite the fact that, as far as I know, Berger, Wilson and Martin have never cited Comte, Freud or Huxley as intellectual progenitors, it is still common for critics to denigrate the secularisation thesis for the Comtian or humanist arrogance of supposing that religion has declined because people have become more sophisticated, clever, mature or well-informed. One can certainly find such views among some radical Christians, but the sociological tradition in which I place my work makes no judgments about the truth claims of religion or the maturity of believers. It supposes that true beliefs stand as much in need of sociological explanation as false ones. As I hope is clear from any reading of my detailed presentation of the secularisation approach, I have no commitment to any suggestion that secularisation can be explained by such value-laden notions as Progress or Enlightenment (or, indeed, anything which might take a capital letter!).

Fourthly, just as it is possible for armies which lose wars to win battles, a general secularisation approach need not deny, and is thus not necessarily refuted by, periods of religious revitalisation. Even in small culturally homogeneous societies the history of religious change will show peaks and troughs and, as I make clear in my longer treatments of this subject, the same forces which create long-term problems for the plausibility of religion can create increased short-term demand among particular social groups. This is only to recognise that explanatory models are always gross simplifications.

The basic proposition is that modernisation creates problems for religion. Modernisation is itself a multi-faceted notion, which encompasses the industrialisation of work; the shift from villages to towns and cities; the replacement of the small community by the society; the rise of individualism; the rise of egalitarianism; and the rationalisation both of thought and of social organisation.

Different scholars associated with this general proposition stress different elements of it. My own preference is to focus on the rise of egalitarian individualism, social changes such as urbanisation which fractured traditional communities, and the resultant increase in cultural diversity as people pursue their own lights. Where there was one religion, there are now fifty. Increasing diversity has both structural and socio-psychological consequences. Religious pluralism worked hand-in-hand with democratising forces to encourage the state to become increasingly neutral on matters of religion. As the modern nation-state increasingly saw the need for nationwide provision of education, social welfare and social control, the inability of the previously dominant religious tradition to provide or mediate such provision ensured that churches lost social functions that had previously provided considerable background legitimation for their beliefs and secured their place at the heart of their localities. It also called into question the certainty which believers could accord their religion.

Eventually the fragmentation of culture poses a threat to all forms of knowledge as we respond to the conflict inherent in diversity by becoming more and more relativistic. We gradually lose faith in the possibility of truth or of authoritative understandings and instead settle for the practical attitude that what works for you may not work for me, that what is true for you may not be true for me. Relativism now poses a threat to rational thought and to science but it first posed a threat to
religious beliefs systems because, to simplify massively, it exposed the human origins of religion.

When the oracle spoke with one voice, it was possible to believe it was the voice of God. Once the oracle spoke with twenty discordant voices, we were tempted to look beyond the screen. Of course this did not prevent people believing in religion. Some people respond to uncertainty by becoming shrill voices for their beliefs. Others deploy various invidious social stereotypes to explain why ‘that’ sort of people can believe such nonsense. In the days of empire it was quite plausible to view primitive (that is non-Christian) religions as quite well suited to the evolutionary levels of black people and hence no cognitive threat to good British folk. But the same social forces which create pluralism also undermine the social stratification (national and international) which make such defensive strategies viable for the bulk of the population of modern societies.

As Berger neatly expresses it in explaining the title of his book The Heretical Imperative, there is all the difference in the world between participating in a taken-for-granted way in a largely homogeneous all-pervasive culture which includes beliefs about the supernatural, and being a modern believer in a world where you are constantly aware of alternatives and where, though you may believe in God, it is clear that you have chosen God, rather than the other way round. Cultural diversity encourages cultural relativism.

Unfortunately for both the proponents and the critics of the secularisation approach life is complex. The same social forces which undermine the traditional religion of preindustrial societies also create conditions which encourage new forms of religion and which give new life to old forms. Hence my first proposition needs to be elaborated as follows: modernisation undermines religion except where the latter finds important work to do other than mediating the natural and supernatural. The very wide range of such circumstances can be summarised under the headings of cultural transition and cultural defence.

I will mention the former only briefly and then pass on to the latter, which is central to the argument of this essay. What I have in mind as the social functions for religion in cultural transition can be seen in the frequently observed phenomenon of a migrant minority drawing heavily on its religion as a resource for overcoming the anomic consequences of migration. For Irish Catholics settling in Boston in the nineteenth century or Pakistani Muslims settling in Birmingham in the twentieth, religion as a social institution provides practical and ideological assistance in making the transition from old to new world. In particular it offers a viable combination of rejection of, and accommodation to, the often unwelcoming new world. The old religion allows the creation of a social space in which people who feel devalued in the new environment can reassert their self-worth. But because the oppositional subculture is largely confined to matters which modern societies tend to regard as optional, it does not prevent the migrants making their way in the public worlds of work or the polity. As with retaining the mother tongue as a second language, maintaining the old religion allows contact to be maintained with the past without too much hindering accommodation to the future.

Of more importance for this essay are those social functions of religion associated with cultural defence. Where an ethnic group or nation sharing one religion finds itself in conflict with an ethnic group or nation of a different religion (and here I include the theoretical atheism of Marxism–Leninism) then many of the secularising dynamics will not operate. The continuing conflict between Catholic Irish nationalists and Protestant Ulster unionists means that religion in Ireland, and especially in
Northern Ireland, has such salience that many of the changes we associate with modernisation (and see in other parts of the British Isles) have not occurred. The Churches retain the loyalty of their people because their people are at war with people who have other gods.

**Rational Choice Theory**

While there have been many empirical criticisms of the secularisation approach, the most elaborate and consistent theoretical challenge comes from rational choice theory. The US economist Gary Becker believes that the basic propositions of economics not only work well for economic activity but, with a little finessing, should work for non-economic areas of life. We begin by assuming that people maximise or economise. If we can buy an identical packet of soap powder in two shops, one more cheaply than the other, we buy the cheaper one. From this a variety of theorems are developed. If the price of a commodity goes down, then the demand will go up. If there is a free market in the production and distribution of some product, let us say cars, then competition will produce an increasing diversity of cars which in turn will increase the take-up of cars.

Laurence Iannaccone has accepted Becker’s challenge and attempted to prove that rational choice models work well for explaining religious behaviour. Iannaccone’s early work was taken up by Rodney Stark and, with various associates, they have published a large number of papers in the last decade.

Rodney Stark had previously argued against the secularisation approach with an exchange theory which led him to suppose that because supernatural religions had an unrivalled advantage over secular belief systems and therapies in providing compensation for the problems of this life, and problems would always be with us, then religion must always be with us. Thus secularisation was impossible. Put at its simplest, this suggests that demand for religion should be in steady state. If demand is something like constant, then fluctuations in the fortunes of particular religions are to be explained by changes in the supply of religious goods. The value of the rational choice approach for Stark is that it is consistent with his early exchange theory perspective and shifts attention from demand (because the economistic approach takes preference as given) to features of the environment in which people exercise their rational choices.

**Diversity and Religious Vitality**

The beauty of the way the argument has developed is that it allows a very clear formulation of a testable hypothesis which bears on the centre of the debate. What are the consequences for religion of diversity? On the one side one has the view of sociologists from Durkheim and Parsons to Berger which stresses the part which being firmly embedded in a believing community plays in reinforcing the plausibility of religion. In this view religion is at its strongest when it is taken for granted and at its least compelling when believers have to choose between a large number of competing alternatives. On the other side we have the claim that religious diversity, by reducing the costs of religious commitment and by providing a wide variety of alternatives, increases the amount of take-up. Just as competition and diversity in the production and distribution of cars means that more cars are bought, so competition and diversity in religious goods increases the amount of religion that is consumed.

To put it another way, the secularisationists believe that what we are witnessing is...
a decline in demand for religion (which can be explained along the lines indicated above). The rational choice theorists believe that demand for religion is stable and that the key variable is supply. What explains levels of religious vitality is the structure of the religious economy.

The Evidence

In one sense there is nothing new about the rational choice model. Although his use of the language of economising and markets was loose and metaphorical, the nineteenth-century commentator Alexis de Tocqueville observed both the vitality and diversity of American religious life and, in comparing it with that of Europe, used the latter to explain the former. In 1985, Caplow revived the argument.9

Some of de Tocqueville's observations were insightful. I have no argument with the idea that the close ties between the Catholic Church and state in Europe undermined the appeal of religion for some groups. I am less persuaded by the weight which diversity is required to carry in the overall explanation of religious vitality because it seems clear that the dominant characteristic of both ends of the contrast – the diversity of American religious life and the homogeneity of religion in some European countries – has been exaggerated.

While the United States as a whole (and some urban areas) might exhibit considerable religious diversity, most places in America do not. Large tracts of America are religious monocultures. The historian Edwin Gaustad defines as domination the circumstance where more than half the population belongs to one denomination. In 1906 half the states of the USA were so dominated by one denomination; a pattern he found repeated in 1950 with the more refined unit of counties.10

One might note that this measure distorts the picture by treating all states or counties as being of equal importance, when clearly there are huge differences in size. For this reason, Stark and associates have used more refined statistical techniques in searching for correlations between diversity and church membership in such sources as the 1906 US Census of Religious Bodies. They claim to find a strong and positive connection. Others who have analysed the same and similar data sets come to a very different conclusion. Blau, Land and Redding conclude that 'the effect of religious diversity on participation is strongly negative in the United States in spite of diversity'.11

One reason to be suspicious of the diversity argument is that apparent religious diversity may conceal an absence of choice. As Stark and his associates have recently conceded (but without weakening their own commitment to the general theory) it is wrong to suppose that a town which has a Swedish and a German Lutheran Church and a black Baptist church and a white Baptist church offers four alternatives. Any member of those four language or racial groups has only one choice.12 Precisely because the USA is a migrant society many religious organisations were or still are closely associated with a particular linguistic or ethnic bloc and hence are not seen by people outside those blocs as a viable option.

A further problem is that the index used to measure diversity in the early publications of Stark and his colleagues was arguably tautologous. Like Gaustad's measure of domination, the index actually measured the extent to which people were distributed across a range of options rather than the simple number of options available. The index is \[1 - \frac{(a/z)^2 + (b/z)^2 + (c/z)^2 + ...}{z}\] where \(z\) is the total number of adherents and \(a, b, c,\) etc are the numbers in any particular denomination. The closer the number is to 1, the greater the diversity. The problem is that this elides what it
purports to explain (the popularity of religion) and what it offers as an explanation (religious diversity) by producing a higher diversity score when a number of competing organisations are equally successful in recruiting than when a large number of options are unpopular. Imagine Dogsville, a city whose population is evenly divided between five denominations. That gives a diversity rating of 0.80. Now consider Catsville, where one denomination accounts for half the population, three each have 10 per cent and four others each have 5 per cent. That gives a diversity rating of only 0.61. So the second example is less diverse than the first, although it has a wider range of options – 8 rather than 5 – on offer.

One could defend that result by arguing that the relatively large presence of one denomination in Catsville means that the unsuccessful alternatives will seem deviant and their lack of popularity will reduce their appeal. But this defence rests on the sorts of assumptions made by Wilson, the early Berger, Wallis and me about the social sources of plausibility and is precisely the sort of approach which Stark and his colleagues are keen to replace.

If the De Tocquevillian case and its modern elaborations can be contested on the grounds that the diversity of the religious life of the US is exaggerated, it can also be challenged from the other end of the contrast: it exaggerates the religious homogeneity of the Old World. Or, more precisely, it may accurately describe the situation in Catholic and Lutheran countries but it misunderstands the religious history of non-Lutheran Protestant countries.

Britain is often used in the diversity argument as a prime example of a religious monoculture: it is because Britain has a state church that levels of religious participation have declined so drastically. This is simply not the case. Although the UK in 1800 had state-supported religion, it actually had four different state churches and, in addition to a large Catholic presence, it had representatives of almost all non-Lutheran forms of Protestantism. By the time of the great 1851 Census of Religious Worship over half of those people in England and Wales who went to church did so in some organisation other than the state Church of England. Whatever explains the decline in religion in Britain, it was not a lack of diversity. The options were there but few people could be bothered supporting them.

Stark, Finke and Iannaccone have tried to apply their model to England and Wales in 1851, using the Census of Religious Worship data. For all that they begin with unusually personalised criticisms of my work, they admit that ‘Bruce is correct in his claim that the cities and towns of England and Wales do not reveal the predicted positive impact of diversity on religious participation.’ They suggest that, both for a variety of technical reasons and because religion was supposedly less contentious there, Wales alone provides a better test than England and Wales together. They then show that they find the expected positive relationship between diversity and church attendance for the Welsh registration districts. Whatever the technical advantages of treating Wales alone, to claim that religion was not contentious is entirely to misunderstand Wales in the nineteenth century. The political and cultural struggles over land ownership, the Welsh language, and general English domination made religious affiliation an extremely contentious matter. The battle between chapel and church, between the nonconformist denominations and sects and the Episcopal Church in Wales (and, in a minor key, between pro-Welsh and pro-British factions within Episcopalianism) made Nonconformity a ‘religio-national’ opposition movement similar to those found in Eastern Europe in the twentieth century. Religion was more popular in Wales than England, not because of greater apparent diversity, but because of the role it played in the wider ethnic conflict.
To summarise, rational choice theorists have posited a relationship between diversity and religious vitality which runs counter to that expected by many of those associated with the secularisation approach. Although Stark and his associates have produced a large number of empirical studies which support their work, others have failed to replicate them, and there remain good reasons to be suspicious of the ways in which diversity is operationalised in this body of research.

Secularisation in Europe

What I wish to do is to consider what light, if any, the supply-side model sheds on the recent history of religion in Europe. This simplifies, of course, but it seems reasonable to describe the major trends in European religion as falling into two broad camps – some societies have given up religion; others are fighting about it – and to suggest that the explanations of the changes will owe more to questions of cultural defence, national sovereignty and political stability than to the structure of the religious market.

Where the history of nation-building has left a stable nation-state the sovereignty of which is not in question, religious vitality has declined and it has done so whether the nation is religiously diverse (Great Britain), religiously homogeneous (Scandinavia, Belgium or France) or religiously ‘pillarised’ (Holland). There is no obvious connection between diversity and religious vitality. Of the five settings mentioned, Britain had the greatest diversity but it also had the first and most secular culture. Although the trajectory of decline varies, Scandinavia, Belgium, France and Holland have all followed Britain in the decline of indices of religious involvement.

Interestingly for the supply-side model, the decline of the old traditions, which should lead to greater diversity as new religions find it easier to enter the market, has not led to a growth of involvement in religion. As one report on the Netherlands notes, the collapse of the ‘pillarised’ divisions has served to diminish both religious mobilization and subjective faith among the Dutch. The old faith was on the wane and no major new suppliers appeared in the open market to take their places. The old mobilization practices had lost their political function and ideological support; in the new context, the churches had to compete with more than each other and could not achieve the results supply-side consultants would have promised.\[14\]

Where the history of nation-building created an unstable nation-state the sovereignty of which remained in question or where ethnic and national groups struggled to create a state and failed, then religion remained vibrant to the extent that the ethnos or nation shared a religion which defined it against its enemies. Ireland and Poland remained two of the most actively religious parts of Europe because, until the struggles for national liberation succeeded (fully in the case of Poland; only partly in the Irish case), the Catholic Church served as one of the main repositories of national identity.

The Baltic states are interesting. Take Lithuania. Despite four decades of state-sponsored communist propaganda and harassment of the Catholic Church, between 50 and 80 per cent of Lithuanians were practising Catholics and the Church was heavily involved in the independence movement.\[15\] Comparison with Latvia is instructive (see Table 1). In its short existence as an independent democracy between the wars Latvia was Lutheran with a substantial Catholic and a smaller Orthodox
Table 1. Baltic States: Religious Vitality, Religious Composition and Cultural Defence

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<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
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<tr>
<td>Church Membership 1996 (%)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least monthly church attendance 1996 (%)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious Composition</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>72% Catholic</td>
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<td>3% Orthodox</td>
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<td>1% Lutheran</td>
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<tr>
<td>15% Catholic</td>
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<td>8% Orthodox</td>
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<td>20% Orthodox</td>
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<tr>
<td>1% Lutheran</td>
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<td>14% Lutheran</td>
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<td>Religio-Ethnic Bond</td>
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<td>Weak</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic Cohesion (% Titular Ethnicity 1989)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialisation (%)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanisation (%)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP per capita $ (1990)</td>
<td>2,710</td>
<td>3,410</td>
<td>3,810</td>
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minority. Like Estonia, Latvia was planted with Russians during the Soviet era. Like Estonia, Latvia industrialised and urbanised faster than Lithuania. In neither setting was the Church a symbol of the nation, though some reports suggest that in Latvia the failure of the Lutheran Church to oppose Russian plantation led to defections to the Catholic Church. Untangling the linkages between social, political, economic and religious change is too complex a task to be done here. But I do not need to. For my purposes it is enough to note that, of three countries with in many senses similar recent histories, Lithuania is markedly more religious than the other two and it is the one with the most homogeneous religious culture.

Static versus Dynamic Comparisons

One weakness of the existing tests of rational choice theory is that the evidence they use is static while the theory is dynamic. The rational choice argument is that change in the supply of religious products will affect consumption. As a market becomes more diverse, so more people will consume more religion; if it becomes less diverse, consumption will decline. So the theory is about how change in X will cause changes in Y. But in all the existing tests, including my own, what we have done is compare diversity and religious enthusiasm in different places at the same time. So Stark compares the church attendance for towns and counties that are more or less diverse in 1851 in England or in 1906 in the United States. A far better test would be to observe what happens in one setting as the structure of the religious market changes. I do not have time to cover all the predictions that Stark and his associates make but I want to look closely at one which illustrates very well the inability of simple models such as rational choice to deal with the complexity of human life.

The rational choice theorists believe that state control of the religious market suppresses diversity by inflating the start-up costs for new religions. Thus the relaxation of state control should lead to increased diversity of religious products and then to increased consumption. If this is the case, then we should see many examples
of this in Eastern Europe. As the grip of the Soviet Union on its constituent parts and on its neighbours relaxed, and as the power of the Communist Party collapsed in country after country, there should have been a proliferation of religious initiatives and an increase in religious vitality.

I do not have either the space or the expertise to survey all the evidence, and look forward to other scholars taking the argument forward, but it does not seem to me that what has been happening in the last decade fits the expectations of the supply-side model. Of course, the relaxation of state control on religious activity has permitted foreign (largely American) missionaries to evangelise openly in former communist states. Protestant sects and new religious movements are offering a new ‘supply’ of religious goods and part of their appeal is that they also offer a variety of nonreligious goods. However the gains made by these new suppliers have to date been slight and have made little dent in the basic pattern of religious adherence being closely tied to ethnic identity.

In Hungary under communist rule there was a slow but steady growth of Protestant Churches that were too small for the state to bother to regulate. The weakening of communism gave the Catholic Church the chance to reestablish its national organisation, to reclaim its privileges, and thus threaten the advances made by the Protestant Churches. Church attendance rose from 8–10 per cent in 1973 to 12–16 per cent in 1993 but this growth was almost all in the Catholic Church. In Latvia, Estonia and Ukraine the relaxation of state control has led to open disputes among the major Churches, associated with major ethnic groupings. Insofar as there has been an increasing interest in religion, it has come about not through competition among suppliers leading to the creation of new markets but by the traditional customers becoming more committed to their traditions. In the former Yugoslavia, the collapse of the state has greatly increased religious vitality but, again, this has come about by competing ethnic groups mobilising their competing religious identities as part of their struggles for land and political power.

Further to the point made at the start of this section, however, we need to distinguish between war and peace. The very broad contrast between the fate of religion in stable Western European societies and in the chaotic societies of the former communist world can be repeated on a smaller scale for societies within the former communist world. It will be some years before we can be sure of the trends but there are signs that the Catholic Church in Poland is declining in popularity (as it is in Ireland, for similar reasons). Now that the constitutional issue has been settled and Poles have their freedom, previously submerged lines of division are emerging. Perceptions of the Church are changing. It is no longer the sole defender of Polish national integrity: it is now the representative of a particular religious ideology and a particular set of social mores. Now that it is possible to be a Pole without being a Catholic, many Poles will exercise that option.

Conclusion

To summarise, I see little going on in Europe that fits the rational choice model of religious behaviour. In affluent stable democracies of the West, religion is in decline. In parts of the East, it is alive and kicking but not for any of the reasons Stark and his associates would predict. Religion is flourishing, not in diversity, but in adversity and ethnic conflict.

Many readers who are not social scientists will find my case against the rational choice model persuasive and will also condemn the secularisation alternative. Both
will be rejected on the grounds that the simplifications of such models do much damage to the historical record. Although I have often argued against the specific propositions both of the Stark–Bainbridge exchange theory approach and of the rational choice model, I have remained convinced that there is intellectual value in attempting to identify and explain broad patterns of social change. Even if it were possible, it would not be helpful to eschew grand theory entirely; that would just leave us with that parody of history as ‘one damn thing after another’.

In concluding, I want to return to Gary Becker’s claim that the principles of economics deserve to be extended to new areas of human life because they have worked well in their previous domain.17 What can we infer from the example of car production and purchase about the conditions for the principles of economising and subsidiary hypotheses? It would appear that free market models work well when there is high and widespread demand for the general product; when attachments to any particular brand of the product are weak; and when such attachments are not constrained by norms deprived from membership of some large social unit. Most of us can see the appeal of cars but few of us are strongly committed to one particular model and no one gets ‘cleansed’ from their village for the disloyalty of changing from a Ford to a Chrysler.

Translating this into religion, for the free market model to work we need a society where people are strongly religious but are not strongly attached to any particular church, sect or denomination, and where there are not strong ethnic loyalties which constrain ability to choose from a range of options. Clearly very few societies (if any) in Europe fit the bill. In Europe we have secular societies and we have societies with strong religio–ethnic identities. We have clear evidence that where the bonds between religion and ethnicity are weakened, religion declines. We have clear evidence that where ethnic identification declines, religion declines. We do not have anything which looks as if it confirms the expectations of rational choice theory.

I have never found a textual source for this and it may well be apochryphal but in the version of the tale I heard, Dwight Eisenhower is reported to have said, in describing what qualities he would look for in a vicepresident: ‘I want him to have a religion but I don’t mind which one’. Although it may have been intended originally as a slight on the intellectual powers of the bluff old soldier-turned-politician, that sentiment neatly captures American attitudes to religion and illustrates why, insofar as it works at all, the supply-side model of religious behaviour may work for the United States while it patently fails to work for Europe.

Notes and References


A collection of essays by the leading proponents of the supply-side or rational choice approach has recently been published and it provides a comprehensive bibliography. See Lawrence A. Young, *Rational Choice Theory and Religion: Summary and Assessment* (Routledge, New York, 1997). Unfortunately it includes almost no mention of work critical of the approach.

The case was made in a very large number of papers but it is summarised in Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, *A Theory of Religion* (Peter Lang, New York, 1987).


