In Search of Unity and Autocephaly: Ukraine's Orthodox Churches

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The Orthodox community in Ukraine is bitterly divided amongst three churches, two of which are supportive of autocephaly but divided by personal factors. Over six years into independence the largest Orthodox church in Ukraine remains subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate as an autonomous church. Attempts at creating a ‘state church’ during the Leonid Kravchuk era failed and served only further to divide the Orthodox faithful in Ukraine.

Although his successor, President Leonid Kuchma, radically changed religious policies and halted any government support for a national church he has accepted that the state has a role to play in regulating these questions during Ukraine’s post-Soviet transition. Although both Kravchuk and Kuchma back a united Orthodox Church there is little understanding as to how to attain this objective. The granting of autocephaly by Constantinople to a united Ukrainian Orthodox Church, as in Estonia in 1995, would lead to dangerous rifts between Kyiv/Moscow and Moscow/Constantinople.

Orthodoxy in Ukraine on the Eve of Independence

The Russian Orthodox Church went into decline and suffered many defections during the late 1980s, in particular in western Ukraine. Nevertheless, it still remained the largest church in Ukraine when Ukraine became an independent state and has continued to hold this dominant position. Two thirds of the parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Brezhnev era were located in Ukraine. Of these, half were in western Ukraine. During the last two remaining years of the former Soviet Union the Russian Orthodox Church had been forced to allow some semblance of ‘autonomy’ to counter the growth of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAPTs). The ‘autonomous’ branch of the Russian Orthodox Church was renamed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UPTs) in October 1990 and continued to be led by Metropolitan Filaret. Only the head of the autonomous UPTs, elected by the Ukrainian Sobor of the clergy and laity, needed confirmation by the Moscow Patriarchate. All other activities became the sole responsibility of the UPTs. The title of the head of the UPTs was changed to ‘His Beautitude’, ‘an address reserved for heads of autocephalous churches’.

The majority of former Catholic parishes which opted to remain Orthodox in Galicia initially joined the UAPTs during 1989–91 when it was vigorously portrayed.
as the ‘Ukrainian Cossack church’. The destruction of the UAPTs in the former Soviet Union in the late 1920s and the 1940s had prevented the growth of a UAPTs ‘catacomb church’; memories of it were therefore kept alive only in the Ukrainian diaspora (most UAPTs faithful in the diaspora are from the Volyn’ and Bukovina regions of western Ukraine). Patriarch Mstyslav, formerly metropolitan of the emigre UAPTs, had returned to Kyiv only on 20 October 1990, five months after he was elected patriarch by the Sobor of the UAPTs.

In eastern and southern Ukraine the Soviet authorities continued to block any advance of both the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (UHKTs) and the UAPTs, both regarded as ‘nationalist churches’. In Zaporizhzhia the city council had refused to allow UHKTs and UAPTs priests to open the ‘Chervona Ruta’ festival in August 1990. As one report described it, in villages in eastern Ukraine any advance of the UAPTs was blocked by a ‘troika’ which consisted of the ‘secretary of the raion (Communist Party) committee, the local militiaman and the Russian Orthodox church priest’. The connection of the Russian Orthodox churches (through the autonomous UPTs) to the ancien régime thereby worked in their favour. The interests of the state and its power ministries in Russian-speaking areas of Ukraine had a combined interest in blocking the emergence of Ukrainian nationally-conscious churches prior to 1991.

Some years later similar complaints about discrimination were raised by members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UPTs–KP) in the same city, while in Dnipropetrov’s’k the two UPTs–KP parishes still had no churches allocated to them. The UPTs–KP complained in an open letter to President Kuchma as late as summer 1996, five years into Ukrainian independence, that numerous religious properties remained either in state hands (for example, St Sophia Cathedral) or within the UPTs (such as the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves (Pechers’ka Lavra)). In addition, numerous requests for premises to be given to UPTs–KP parishes had not been acted upon, primarily in eastern and southern Ukraine, where the UPTs is strongest.

While discriminating against the UAPTs and UHKTs prior to 1991 the authorities supported the growth of the Roman Catholic Church, which primarily catered for the Polish and Hungarian minorities (in other words, it was not perceived as a competitor for the allegiance of Ukrainian souls). In Vinnytsia oblast’ there were more than 40 Roman Catholic parishes, but no UHKTs parishes were allowed to register. The UHKTs met with stiff opposition even from democratically controlled councils when it attempted to open parishes in Kyiv and in central and eastern Ukraine. The chairman of the Kamianets-Podil’s’k city council (Khmel’nyts’kyi oblast’), who was also leader of the local branch of the Party of Democratic Revival, supported the closure of UHKTs churches. In summer 1991 in Kyiv Cardinal Myroslav Myroslav Liubachivs’kyi, head of the UHKTs, was prevented from entering the Andrivs’kyi Cathedral to say mass. A demonstrator shouted to him that ‘this is an Orthodox city, we are a spiritual church and don’t want anything to do with your pope and your cardinal. If Liubachivs’kyi and you all want to leave this city alive, then you should go immediately.’ Liubachivs’kyi was also warned not to visit ‘Orthodox Bukovina’. In July 1993 a similar incident occurred in Kyiv when the UHKTs hierarchy attempted to bless the land where a future UHKTs cathedral is to be built. The construction of a Polish Roman Catholic cathedral in Kyiv had not been opposed in the same manner.

Calls for Unity

In an attempt to prevent divisive splits and unify the county in preparation for the
December 1991 referendum on Ukrainian independence the chairman of the Supreme Council (Rada) of Ukraine, Kravchuk, called for the holding of the first forum of religious leaders from all confessions in Ukraine. The ‘All-Ukrainian Religious Forum’ held on 13 October 1991 called for the return of confiscated church property to its original owners, a demand later written into law by President Kravchuk in a decree dated 4 March of the following year.

The Parliamentary Commission on Culture and National Revival also issued an appeal to all religious confessions in Ukraine in late October 1991, in particular to the UPTs, the UAPTs and the UHKTs. The referendum on independence required the unity of all Ukrainians with different religious beliefs, it stated, and therefore the appeal opposed attempts at artificially inciting religious conflicts. The heads of religious confessions should use their influence to ensure that Ukraine achieved independence peacefully in a unified manner. The appeal called upon all believers to tolerate other faiths and requested that a spiritual council of all churches be called under the banner of unity; it would be organised by a joint coordinating council which would attempt to remove religious conflicts.

The run-up to the December 1991 referendum also produced another surprising result. A three-day ecumenical council of the UPTs requested permission from Patriarch Alexi of the Russian Orthodox Church to appoint a separate Ukrainian patriarch and asked him to grant the church autocephaly. This was backed by a letter from the parliamentary chairman Kravchuk also requesting that the Russian patriarch grant the UPTs full autocephaly. Metropolitan Filaret, who had long had his eye on the position of Russian patriarch, had concluded that Ukrainian independence was inevitable. As late as 5 November 1991 Filaret had stated that they would never recognise as ‘canonical’ their then rival, the UAPTs. Filaret called upon ‘all those who call themselves the followers of the UAPTs who depart from church unity’ to return to the UPTs. Meanwhile any granting of autocephalous status to the UPTs and the elevation of Filaret to patriarch would not mean an end to relations with the Moscow-based Russian Orthodox Church, ‘which will remain our spiritual mother’. ‘It (the UPTs) does not separate itself from the Orthodox world, let alone the Russian Orthodox Church’, Filaret added. Although the November 1991 Sobor had demanded autocephaly from the Russian Orthodox Church little had in fact changed internally within the UPTs.

The UAPTs had already appealed formally to the UPTs to unite into one Orthodox Church in Ukraine prior to independence, but this proposal had then been flatly rejected by Filaret. Filaret believed that he would become either the Russian patriarch or, failing that, patriarchal head of a united, state-backed Ukrainian national Orthodox Church in alliance with the former national communists under President Kravchuk.

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Breaks with the Moscow Patriarchate

By early 1992 Filaret was seeking real, and not fictitious, autocephaly for the UPTs. These attempts were at first successful because of his unlimited power within the UPTs and the support (and likely prompting) of Ukraine’s leadership. A newly independent state, President Kravchuk repeatedly stated, needed an independent ‘state church’.

Moscow’s response was prompt. The Ukrainian and Moscow press published materials discrediting Filaret as a ‘KGB informer’, under his pseudonym ‘Antonov’ (see later). Although Filaret’s KGB connections were not a secret, nor even the fact
of his marriage and children (which were uncanonical as Filaret is a monk), these were made public only after Filaret made moves in the direction of real autocephaly for the UPTs. The timing of the release of this information cannot therefore be regarded as coincidental. Nevertheless, these events had the effect of making Filaret 'more Catholic than the pope' (or more of a nationalist than the real nationalists). By spring 1992 Filaret had begun to argue that 'Orthodoxy in Ukraine wants to be independent. Once the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is independent we will reclaim our history. Kiev is the mother of Rus’ cities and Christianity started here, not in Moscow.' The Moscow Patriarchy must stay within Russia’s boundaries', Filaret added. In other words, autocephaly for the UPTs would return Russian–Ukrainian relations to those of the mid-seventeenth century prior to the transfer of the Metropolitanate from Kyiv to Moscow.

Although converted to autocephaly Filaret however rejected any ‘unilateral action to break ties with Moscow. We don’t want to go along the un-canonical path. We don’t want a schism.’ By June Filaret’s view had changed, for three reasons. Firstly, he was undoubtedly under pressure from his national communist supporters to break with Moscow. Secondly, Filaret, in turn, convinced the Ukrainian leadership that he could deliver the goods; namely, that the majority of the bishops of the UPTs would side with him against the Russian patriarch. This was a crucial blunder. Finally, events were beginning to unfold against Filaret himself and his position was becoming untenable. His support for the unification Sobor in June could therefore be understood as a counter to the putsch organised against him within the UPTs by the Russian Orthodox Church after his refusal to resign.

This widespread criticism of the refusal by the Russian Orthodox Church to grant the UPTs autocephaly was backed by Kravchuk who accused the Russian Orthodox Church of hostility to Ukrainian independence, a theme picked up by the Ukrainian media and parliament. Kravchuk accused the Russian Orthodox Church and its autonomous UPTs of acting as a ‘disintegrative, destabilising factor in society’, because ‘beyond our borders operates a centre which is attempting to activate anti-Ukrainian policies in the sphere of religious life’. Although Kravchuk argued in favour of separating the church from the state and against favouring one church over others there is no question that the UPTs–KP was singled out as the embryo ‘state church’ during his presidency.

In this policy he was enthusiastically backed by those national democrats in the Congress of National Democratic Forces (KNDS) and radical right nationalists in the Ukrainian National Assembly who supported cooperation with the former national communist ‘party of power’. Those who opposed such cooperation on the centre-right (Rukh) and the radical right (the Congress of Nationalists (KUN) and the State Independence for Ukraine Party (DSU)) backed the UAPTs and the UHKTs, remaining critical of Filaret’s background (as they were of Kravchuk’s). For Mykola Porovs’kyi, a leading member of KNDS and an Orthodox activist from the Volyn’ region, backing Filaret was however the only way to remove the Russian Orthodox Church from Ukraine. In Porovs’kyi’s view

For Ukraine a specificity [of its history] is that nearly always religious centres under whose jurisdiction the Ukrainian Church is placed are based outside its territory, which prevents the development of state self-consciousness and promotes a political dependency for the nation. The level of development of a national church is also a sign of health of the state-creative forces of the nation.
At the Sobor of the Russian Orthodox Church held in Moscow in early April 1992 Filaret was sharply criticised by those present. Filaret then agreed to convene the UPTs Sobor in Kyiv and announce his resignation as head of the UPTs, as demanded by the Sobor of the Russian Orthodox Church. Meanwhile the question of the granting of autocephaly to the UPTs was postponed since, according to the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church, the UPTs could not be placed in the ‘dirty hands of Filaret’. The autocephaly of the UPTs would theoretically be discussed at a later full Sobor of clergy of the UPTs and the Russian Orthodox Church (in 1995, when the Russian Orthodox Church returned to this question, it again postponed any decision). Nevertheless upon returning to Ukraine Filaret backtracked and did not resign from his position of metropolitan of the UPTs.25

Indignant at this turn of events, several UPTs bishops met in Zhytomyr later that same month and demanded that Filaret follow through on the decision of the Russian Orthodox Church Sobor to resign. Filaret promptly declared this meeting to be ‘illegal’. A Bishops’ Sobor was also then held on 27 May 1992 in Kharkiv with the blessing of the Russian patriarch which ‘dismissed’ Filaret from his post as metropolitan of Ukraine. In his place they elected the metropolitan of Rostov and Novocherkassk, Vladimir (Volodymyr) Slobodan (who, ironically, is from western Ukraine).26 This decision was approved by the Russian patriarch and by a local Sobor of the clergy and laity in the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves in June 1992. All of these actions against Filaret were technically illegal and violated the statutes of the autonomous UPTs. According to these statutes Filaret was elected for life and only he could convene meetings of the UPTs governing bodies. Volodymyr Slobodan, chancellor of the Moscow Patriarchate, was not a member of the UPTs episcopate and therefore not eligible to be promoted to the position of metropolitan of the UPTs, which should have gone to the next senior member of the UPTs hierarchy. These actions by the Russian Orthodox Church therefore made a mockery of the alleged autonomy of the UPTs.

These moves by the Russian patriarch forced Filaret to think and act fast, as he stood to spend the remainder of his life either in a monastery or as a layman. His response was to hold a unification Sobor of that section of the UPTs which backed him together with the UAPTs (with, or without, the blessing of its emigre head, Patriarch Mstyslav). The urgency and panic surrounding the unification Sobor were reflected in its doubtful legality in both state and canon law and the lack of preparation preceding the event. The refusal of the Russian Orthodox Church to grant the UPTs autocephaly, something which it had traditionally always refused to grant, was the prime catalyst in this chain of events. If autocephaly had been granted there would have been no need for the hastily-convened unification Sobor or the later resultant three-way split within the Ukrainian Orthodox community.

One National Church?

Should Ukraine have one national or state church? And if so, should the state support this church as an additional contributor to the building of state and nation?

The Ukrainian media have debated these two questions on a systematic basis since the early 1990s without necessarily finding an answer. After all, as one author noted, ‘Even in the event of the unity of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church into one [church], this question, of course, will remain problematical. After all, not all the population of Ukraine is religious and not all religious believers are Orthodox.’27 Tremendous changes have occurred during this century in Ukraine’s religious life and
contrary to popular belief (or the wishful thinking of some people),
Ukraine is not a land of one or two national religions. ... Ukraine is now a
nation of many religions, Christians and non-Christians (Jewish, Muslim),
as well as a country in which a large segment of the population does not
profess any religion.\textsuperscript{28}

A national church would need to satisfy the needs of the majority of the population,
introduce the national idea into its teachings and support a revival of culture,
language, traditions and the consolidation of society. Most Ukrainian authors would
agree with Shuba that 'Unfortunately, in Ukraine today there is no church which
would be able to fulfil these requirements.'\textsuperscript{29} Every church in Ukraine carried with it
a 'certain ideological and political baggage'.\textsuperscript{30} It would therefore be difficult to
choose which one could play the role of this 'state church'.

The majority of the participants in the Ukrainian debate on this question concluded
that Ukraine inherited a polyethnic and polyconfessional society which would make
the creation of any 'state church' a 'utopian' attempt at present.\textsuperscript{31} As one Ukrainian
newspaper warned, 'In the current situation any kind of haste to resolve the question
of autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine could only sharpen interconfes­sional conflicts.'\textsuperscript{32} Opinion polls held on public attitudes to the establishment of a
national church backed up this pessimism. In one opinion poll only 25.6 per cent of
all believers backed the creation of a national church while 41.4 per cent were
opposed to it. Those who backed it comprised 37.1 per cent of ethnic Ukrainians and
18.5 per cent of ethnic Russians. Most of the supporters of the creation of a national
church were Orthodox believers from central and western Ukraine. The most nega­tively disposed to the idea were respondents in southern and eastern Ukraine, whose
percentage reached as high as 95 in Donets'k and Zaporizhzhia.\textsuperscript{33}

It is not surprising therefore that the attempt on the part of the Kravchuk leadership
during 1992–94 to create a 'state church' through the attempted reunification
of Orthodox churches proved a failure that served only to worsen inter-Orthodox rela­tions. This attempt at creating a national church also failed because of its reliance
upon the discredited and highly unpopular Filaret, metropolitan of the Russian
Orthodox Church in Ukraine until early 1992, deputy patriarch between 1992 and

\textbf{Towards a Ukrainian Orthodox 'State Church'?}

The backing received by the UPTs–KP from the authorities was open and visible
during the Kravchuk era.\textsuperscript{34} The state authorities acted in the old Soviet manner,
believing that the bishops would follow Filaret, who was backed by the government.
But they had mistakenly believed that the old methods would still work in a society
which had seen all the old pillars of the Soviet state (for example, the KGB, the
armed forces and the Communist Party) collapse. It was no different within the
Russian Orthodox Church. As one Ukrainian Orthodox historian pointed out, 'unfortu­nately, the old methods and old policies no longer worked'.\textsuperscript{35} The bishops in
Ukraine had a further reason not to follow Filaret: their personal dislike for him (see
later).

Not surprisingly, the Ukrainian leadership backed Filaret in his conflict with
Moscow. The Council for Religious Affairs openly supported the UPTs–KP (to the
detriment of relations with all other churches, including the UHKTs and the UAPTs)
and 'a war was declared on the Muscovite Church'.\textsuperscript{36} But the Ukrainian authorities
persisted. The significance of the creation of the UPTs–KP was repeatedly stressed by Ukrainian commentators: ‘The creation of a Ukrainian Patriarchate – equal to the Moscow Patriarchate – has a great significance for the establishment of the Ukrainian national idea and the influence of our state in relations with Orthodox churches, especially in the former USSR.’

The Council for Religious Affairs under the Ukrainian government issued a statement supporting Filaret and the autonomous UPTs. The statute of the UPTs was registered with the Council for Religious Affairs, attached to the Cabinet of Ministers. Thereafter the Ukrainian government would recognise only those church decisions made within the confines of canon law, that is those supporting Filaret. The Presidium of the Supreme Council of Ukraine also issued a statement supporting Filaret’s legal stand and condemned the Kharkiv Sobor, which ‘has led to discords and conflicts within the UPTs. The Ukrainian state does not interfere in church affairs but it also does not permit actions contrary to the statute of any religious institution registered pursuant to Ukrainian law.’

Despite the backing of the Ukrainian state behind Filaret the majority of the bishops in the UPTs remained within the anti-Filaret camp. In Kyiv, for example, only two parishes remained faithful to him. Meanwhile a Bishops’ Sobor of the Russian Orthodox Church was held in Moscow. Filaret asked his bishops not to attend it, but a majority nevertheless did so (18 out of 23). Filaret excommunicated them. In turn the Moscow Sobor excommunicated and defrocked Filaret, accusing him of a variety of sins. All those clergymen continuing to work with Filaret were threatened with excommunication as well. Although uncanonically removed as metropolitan of the UPTs, Filaret was henceforth technically a myrian (layman) who could no longer hold any position within a church.

The bishops opposed to Filaret were not unanimous in their views, however. The Moscow Patriarchate reported that ‘among the participants at the Sobor there were bishops demanding that the UPTs be granted autocephaly as soon as possible’. In other words, many of the bishops who opposed Filaret were still pro-autocephaly despite the fact that they had left the UPTs–KP to join the UPTs. Again, as on many other occasions, the question of Filaret’s personality and background remained the main obstacle to obtaining support from many Orthodox clergy.

Filaret still controlled the purse-strings and the property of the UPTs. But the UPTs was now divided into two camps: one with funds and property, and the anti-Filaret faction with only those churches which opted to continue to recognise the Moscow Patriarchate. Filaret began consecrating new clergy to take over the posts made vacant by the mass excommunications of those priests that had supported him.

Meanwhile the state began to mobilise its resources behind Filaret. A Committee in Defence of Ukrainian Orthodoxy was formed in mid-June 1992. The members of this Committee included the UPTs, the UAPTs, political parties and civic organisations (the latter mainly from the Congress of National Democratic Forces (KNDS), the centre-right bloc which supported former President Kravchuk’s derzhavnyk state-building and state-first policies). The Committee condemned Moscow’s interference in the internal affairs of Ukrainian Orthodoxy and argued in favour of the unification of all Orthodox believers into one church under a Ukrainian patriarch, which, they argued, was only a matter of time.

On 25–26 June 1992 an All-Ukrainian Orthodox Sobor took place which voted unanimously to unite the UAPTs with those within the UPTs who had backed Filaret’s demands for full autocephaly from Moscow. The patriarch of the ‘Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate’ (UPTs–KP), as the new united church was
called, was named as Mstyslav, emigre leader of the UAPTs. In June 1990 Mstyslav had been elected to the post of patriarch of the UAPTs, a church which was registered in October of that year. Filaret was elected his deputy. The post of 'deputy patriarch' is unusual in the Orthodox Church and existed in the UPTs–KP only between 1992 and 1994 to accommodate Filaret. As soon as he became patriarch in October 1995 the post was abolished. The UPTs–KP became the legal successor to all the finances, property, monasteries and seminaries of both the UPTs and the UAPTs.

The only problem was that somebody may have deliberately 'forgotten' to invite Patriarch Mstyslav, who was resident in the USA at the emigre centre of the UAPTs in New Jersey. Indeed, it was not clear whether Mstyslav actually backed the unification of the pro-Filaret UPTs and the UAPTs. These issues are still shrouded in confusion and subject to debate. What is certain is that Patriarch Mstyslav was openly attacking Filaret and the united UPTs–KP by November of that same year, that is only five months later. Mstyslav then refused to attend the Sobor of the UPTs–KP on 15 December 1992.

Yevhen Sverstiuk, editor of the UAPTs newspaper Nasha vira and certainly no friend of Filaret, claimed that Mstyslav did initially back the unification Sobor which created the UPTs–KP as the legal successor to the rights and properties of the UAPTs and the UPTs. The resolution and other documents of the unification Sobor were published in Nasha vira. Mstyslav signed a decree appointing Filaret deputy patriarch and Metropolitan Antonii his Ukraine-based administrative superintendent of the unified church.

Other reports disagreed, though. They claimed that Mstyslav only discussed the unification Sobor and promised he would give his answer later, after returning to the USA. These reports also suggested that Mstyslav had quietly demanded, as the condition that he support the unified church, the removal of Filaret and Antonii (which there is no doubt he openly demanded after November 1992). The reports also alleged that Antonii, Mstyslav’s representative in Ukraine within the pre-June 1992 UAPTs, began negotiations with Filaret about unification without Mstyslav’s blessing.

It is unlikely that Mstyslav did not attend the unification Sobor because the organisers had been unable to reach him in time. It is true, as noted earlier, that the organisers were in a hurry; but in any case they probably did not want Mstyslav present: they knew full well his detestation of Filaret and wanted to present him with a fait accompli. Antonii’s motives were probably careerist: he no doubt hoped that after the death of Mstyslav (who was very old and frail at the time and actually died a year later) he would become patriarch of the unified UPTs–KP, with Filaret as his deputy. Instead, Volodymyr Romanuik was elected patriarch in October 1993, and this led to the defection of Antonii with three bishops to the UPTS. One can only deduce, therefore, that Antonii’s motives all along were certainly not patriotic or pro-autocephalous, but personal and connected with his own career ambitions.

After the unification Sobor a Church Committee was formed which included leading church personalities and three KNDS members of Parliament, Vasyl’ Chervonyi, Oles Shevchenko and Porovs’kyi. The Sobor annulled the 1686 act which transferred the Kyivan Metropolitanate from Kyiv to Moscow. (This act was later annulled by the Patriarch of Constantinople as well.) Metropolitan Volodymyr, who was dispatched to Ukraine to take over from Filaret as head of the autonomous UPTs, ‘was left as a general without an army. Ukrainian Orthodoxy became united and independent.’ The united UPTs–KP would use the statute of the UAPTs until a
new one was adopted. A religious epistle to Orthodox believers in Ukraine stated that the new church was the rightful heir to the old Kyivan Metropolitanate of Kyiv Rus' and to the Church of Grand Prince Volodymyr the Great who christianised Kyiv Rus' in 988. An appeal to the Supreme Council of Ukraine also condemned the intrusion of the Russian Orthodox Church into the internal affairs of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.

Commenting on the unification Sobor deputy patriarch Filaret said that

I know that UPTs believers eagerly supported our Sobor where we proclaimed the merging of our two churches. The unification process is under way regardless of the fact that several bishops still remain faithful to Moscow. However, this does not mean that they represent the whole Ukrainian nation which expressed its will at the referendum of 1 December 1991 and voted for independence. Such a nation cannot be against an independent UPTs.

Other commentators gave more sober reasons for Filaret's backing of the unification Sobor. In the view of Sverstiuk, editor of Nasha vira, 'Filaret has united with a church that he has fought against all his life. He has done so to increase his power, to control the cash-box and to administer the Church of St Volodymyr in Kyiv.'

Although Filaret and Kravchuk were both by then converted to Ukrainian independence and Orthodox autocephaly, their personal motives for making this step were a mixture of local patriotism and other more suspect reasons.

Growing Divisions Among Ukrainian Orthodox

Meanwhile, on 20 June 1992 the Bishop's Sobor of the UPTs met in the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves under Metropolitan Volodymyr. Their attempts to take over St Volodymyr's Cathedral and the metropolitan's residence were prevented by the Ukrainian People's Self-Defence Forces (UNSO), the military arm of the radical right Ukrainian National Assembly. UNSO also attacked monks in the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves on 19 June 1992 and attempted to capture the father superior's house, but were repulsed by Berkut riot police.

The jubilation at creating one state-backed Ukrainian national Orthodox Church was, however, short-lived. The path towards Ukrainian autocephaly and a united Orthodox Church has proved to be neither as quick nor as simple as those who forced through the unification Sobor believed it would be in summer 1992.

When Patriarch Mstyslav arrived in Kyiv in early July 1992, a month after the unification Sobor, he took charge of the newly unified church by appointing new bishops and approving amendments to the UAPTs charter (which had been adopted by the UPTs–KP) and, most importantly, at first agreed to his election as head of the unified church. The UAPTs–KP monopolised state-run Ukrainian television and radio where its larger rival – the UPTs – was denounced as an assemblage of 'Muscovite agents'. Mstyslav's flirtation with the UPTs–KP proved short-lived, however. He defrocked Metropolitan Antonii and Bishop Volodymyr for having allied themselves with Filaret. Only four months after the unification Sobor Patriarch Mstyslav denounced it as 'uncanonical' and 'illegal' for two reasons. Firstly, it had been convened without his sanction, and secondly, he had allegedly never agreed to Filaret becoming his deputy. The real cause of the new disunity in the UPTs–KP was Mstyslav's dislike for Filaret, a view he shared with many others in the Ukrainian Orthodox community. It was also believed that his ill health, age and declining faculties could have influenced his decision to issue edicts denouncing the unification Sobor.
tion Sobor (which were not sanctioned by his US or Kyiv offices).

Nevertheless, support for the UPTs–KP continued at first to be widespread. In December 1992 a conference of the Brotherhood of St Andrew the Apostle endorsed the unification Sobor; only two regional branches dissented against this decision. On 15 December 1992 a Sobor of the bishops of the UPTs–KP adopted a resolution confirming the legality of the unification Sobor held earlier that same year. It also ‘expressed full confidence in the leadership of the church elected by the Sobor’.

In other words, the Sobor rejected the demands raised by Patriarch Mstyslav to remove ‘discredited hierarchs’ such as Deputy Patriarch Filaret and Metropolitan Antonii. The resolution also appealed to Patriarch Mstyslav to not exceed his jurisdiction, thereby denying him the right to make statements about the UPTs–KP without the consent of the Bishops’ Sobor and the signature of the Patriarchal Chancery in Kyiv.

Metropolitan Filaret added that ‘the Kyiv Patriarchate will follow its own course in creating a single Orthodox Church in Ukraine, no matter what position Patriarch Mstyslav chooses to adopt.’

A large number of bishops of the UAPTs continued to refuse to back the unification Sobor and only approximately 300 of the 1300 parishes initially merged with the UPTs. Instead, after the death of Mstyslav on 11 June 1993 they began a campaign to ‘relegalise’ the UAPTs. Of the 1600 parishes that technically belonged under the jurisdiction of the UPTs–KP over 500 (nearly all in Galicia) refused to accept the unification Sobor of June 1992 after they learnt of Mstyslav’s open hostility in November of that same year. Nine UAPTs bishops gathered in L’viv on 22 January 1993 where they denounced the Kyiv patriarch, expressed their faith in Mstyslav, confirmed Archbishop Petro (Petrus’) of L’viv as Mstyslav’s new locum tenens (his Ukraine-based representative, a position previously occupied by Antonii) and condemned Filaret as acting uncanonically (he had been defrocked). Mstyslav then demanded that the UAPTs be legally reregistered (it had ceased to exist in June 1992 after it had united with the Filaret wing of the UPTs to form the UPTs–KP).

The situation within Ukrainian Orthodoxy continued to deteriorate throughout 1993 and 1994 after the death of Mstyslav in summer 1993. The policies of the Ukrainian leadership under President Kravchuk had, in effect, produced a three-way split within the ranks of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. ‘Support by the authorities for the UPTs–KP’, wrote one newspaper, ‘is good grounds to argue about the growth in Ukraine of a state church. Its “architects” – Chervonyi–Skoryk–Shevchenko – were well placed in the Supreme Council, with parliament and television, to inflame hatred and conflict on the basis of religious beliefs.’ The number of UAPTs parishes which refused to join the UPTs–KP grew, a factor which worried the authorities and led to repressive measures against the revived UAPTs.

The revived UAPTs went ahead anyway without the backing of the emigre UAPTs and held its own Sobor on 7 September 1993 in Kyiv where it elected its own patriarch, Dmytro (Yarema). The newly-revived UAPTs then began a campaign to be reregistered by the Council for Religious Affairs. In November 1993 the authorities suppressed pickets and open-air religious services to support the call for the reregistration of the UAPTs, an action which was widely condemned at the time as evidence of the state’s ‘protectionism’ of the UPTs–KP. Various political parties and civic groups supported the right of the UAPTs to be re-registered, while condemning ‘state protectionism towards the UPTs–KP and the de facto attempt by the state authorities to destroy the UAPTs’. The UPTs–KP provided the media with the alleged KGB aliases of Yarema and Archbishop Petro, claiming that they had been KGB collaborators in the former
USSR (thereby ironically using the same tactics that the Moscow Patriarchate had earlier used against Filaret). Certainly, like the June 1992 unification Sobor, the Sobor of the UAPTs in September 1993 was rushed, and representatives of the UPTs–KP were barred from attending. Proposals by the UPTs–KP and the Council for Religious Affairs for negotiations to resolve differences with a view to finding a path towards unity were rejected out of hand.\(^5^9\)

Another problem faced by the UPTs–KP was the refusal by Constantinople to recognise its autocephaly. Historically the process whereby new Orthodox churches are granted autocephaly has always taken a long time — 141 years in the case of the Russian Orthodox Church. The existence of two patriarchs and the jurisdiction of another over Ukraine confused the issue because Orthodox canons do not allow the existence of more than one recognised church on the same territory.\(^6^0\) On the eve of the UPTs–KP October 1993 Sobor Mykola Zhulyns’kyi, then deputy premier, visited Constantinople to ask for the recognition of the UPTs–KP by the world Orthodox leadership, but the ecumenical patriarch again repeated the same precondition: namely, that all three Orthodox churches in Ukraine should first unite into one church. The pro-autocephaly churches in Ukraine and the diaspora were placed under the patriarch of Constantinople until this precondition was fulfilled.

Filaret has described the UPTs–KP as an ‘autocephalous’ church, and there cannot be two ‘autocephalous’ churches in one country. UPTs parishes which favoured using the title ‘autocephalous’ were however also allowed to register in such a way if they so wished. In addition, the fact that the Kyiv Patriarchate comes under the jurisdiction of Constantinople, which never recognised the forceful transfer of the Kyiv Metropolitante to Moscow in 1686, also gives strong historical legitimacy to Ukrainian autocephaly in the event of Orthodox unity being achieved in Ukraine.\(^6^1\)

With the death of Mstyslav the UPTs–KP held its own Sobor on 21 October 1993 where it elected Volodymyr Romaniuk, a former UAPTs political prisoner from western Ukraine, as its new patriarch.\(^6^2\) The Sobor was held in St Sophia Cathedral where Romaniuk obtained 69 per cent of the votes of the 150 delegates present. The opening ceremony was presided over by Filaret, already with an eye himself on the post of patriarch. The title newly bestowed on Romaniuk was that of ‘Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus’-Ukraine’, a title meant to signify its claim to the thousand-year-old inheritance of Kyiv Rus’ (and thereby deny it to the Russian Orthodox Church). The Sobor also confirmed that the newly-elected patriarch was the spiritual archimandrite of the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves, currently the seat of the UPTs.\(^6^3\)

The Sobor allocated to the patriarch as his headquarters the metropolitan’s residence opposite St Sophia’s Cathedral. Besides appeals to Ukrainian Orthodox faithful in Ukraine and the diaspora the Sobor also adopted appeals to President Kravchuk, the parliamentary chairman Ivan Pliusch and the faithful of the UPTS.\(^6^4\) The Sobor noted that unlike the UAPTs it had the support of the Ukrainian Orthodox diaspora, representatives of which attended the ceremony. The new patriarch hoped to unify the UPTs–KP with that portion of the UAPTs which had still refused to accept the 1992 unification Sobor because, as Bishop Antonii noted, ‘there is really no difference between the two churches and it seems absurd to have two patriarchs’. ‘The time will come when we will all be united into one church, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the national church of the Ukrainian people’, Patriarch Volodymyr added.\(^6^5\)

Dissension, though, continued within the ranks of the UPTs–KP. In January 1994 five hierarchs of the UPTs–KP announced in an open letter their intention of defecting to the UPTs, stressing that ‘We are patriots of our independent state and are
striving toward an independent Ukrainian church. By our prayers and intense efforts we are trying to accelerate the granting of independence to our Ukrainian Orthodox Church." They also attacked Filaret for abusing church canons and failing to secure canonical recognition for the UPTs–KP. Meanwhile two tendencies were continuing to manifest themselves. Firstly, the UPTs continued to attract defecting clergy who remained faithful to Ukrainian autocephaly. Some Ukrainian media reports claimed that even Metropolitan Volodymyr, head of the UPTs, was himself a supporter of autocephaly. Secondly, a major cause of disunion and defections within the UPTs–KP continued to be the antipathy felt towards Filaret, both towards his murky past and his contemporary managerial methods. Ukrainian Orthodoxy continued therefore to remain divided between ‘russophiles, pragmatists and nationalists’ where each group wants its world view to define the Ukrainian national identity.

The Filaret Factor

The Filaret factor has remained a thorn in the side of Orthodox unity in Ukraine. In a startling revelation in 1992 two sources reported that they had proof that Metropolitan Filaret, and other Russian Orthodox church leaders, had worked for the KGB. The credibility of the Russian Orthodox Church was severely damaged by these revelations. The articles argued that it was time for church leaders to come clean on many issues and that Filaret could save his reputation by doing so.

The authors were surprised to find that Filaret took no action in response to the newspaper articles, and continued to work as usual. The authors had expected to be taken to court, accused of slander. But Filaret ‘pretended that nothing had happened’. In the meantime, the authors began to receive many letters from Ukraine from people with whom they had spoken claiming that Filaret had begun to harass them. People were physically threatened; ‘evidence emerged that he was like a dictator, he never displayed love towards people’.

The public timing of the release of these revelations was no coincidence. During the Soviet era the entire hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church – and not just Filaret – had collaborated (willingly or not) with the authorities. As Filaret openly admitted, ‘Our whole society was in the same situation, in the same system. If you are accusing the Church of collaboration, you have to accuse other organizations and other people as well.’ Consequently, as one expert on the Russian Orthodox Church has pointed out, ‘The revelation that the highly active Filaret and Pitirim were, in fact, KGB agents comes as no shock to students of contemporary Russian Church politics.’ Filaret was in fact no different from others within the Russian Orthodox church hierarchy during the Soviet era.

No official evidence has been published giving the reasons for Filaret’s sudden emergence as a champion of ‘Ukrainian autocephaly’ in 1991–92. Undoubtedly those from the former high-ranking Soviet nomenklatura in Ukraine who had defected to the nationalist cause after the failed putsch of August 1991 sought to take Filaret with them. In order to ‘persuade’ Filaret to move with the times his highly unreligious activities as a former KGB agent and his sexual promiscuity were no doubt used. These were no doubt well documented in KGB files now in the hands of the newly established Security Service of Ukraine. No other reason could explain Filaret’s abrupt turn towards autocephaly, except the highly suspect belief that he had been converted to the nationalist cause and autocephaly through personal conviction. Filaret had, after all, opposed autocephaly for the UPTs until November 1991 and unity with the UAPTs until spring 1992.
In addition, President Kravchuk probably struck a deal with Filaret, as he did with most of the top echelons of the ancien régime, that they could maintain their privileges and positions of power in return for their support for independence. Filaret's daughter Vera, who returned to Kyiv from Latvia in mid-1992, admitted to her father's 'long-standing friendship' with Leonid Kravchuk. It was also the case that 'Filaret is linked to Leonid Kravchuk by bonds of old co-operation, dating back to when the latter headed the ideological department of the CP (Communist Party) of Ukraine Central Committee.'

**Kuchma Rejects the Concept of a State Church**

During the presidential elections in the summer of 1994 the two main candidates – Kravchuk and Kuchma – were backed by the UPTs–KP/UAPTs and the UPTs respectively. The UHKTs, Jewish and Muslim clergy also backed Kravchuk. Patriarch Filaret told his faithful that 'It is better to keep the president we have now. He is experienced and a guarantor of Ukraine’s independence. Our Church appeals to its parishioners to vote for Leonid Kravchuk.' Kravchuk knew that he had the UPTs–KP in his pocket. However, he had to try and mend fences with the UPTs, which still controlled the largest number of parishes in Ukraine, by offering it the legal title to the Monastery of the Caves. This was similar to Kravchuk's tactic of promoting Vitalii Masol to the post of prime minister in May 1994 in an attempt to win support from the radical left. Had Kravchuk gained his support from UPTs believers and the radical left it could have conceivably won him the 1994 presidential elections; but both attempts failed.

After Kuchma's victory he openly expressed his gratitude for the support of religious believers in the course of the elections. The blessing by the primate of the UPTs, Metropolitan Volodymyr, 'was a particularly good omen at the beginning of my activity in the post of the head of the state'. Kuchma’s hostility towards Filaret and the UPTs–KP was dictated by the close personal links between Kravchuk and Filaret and his own refusal to back the creation of one 'state church'.

Kuchma showed his gratitude to the UPTs by disbanding the Council for Religious Affairs, which had been an instrument of the state working openly in favour of one 'state church', the UPTs–KP. The Council for Religious Affairs, according to Kuchma, had 'embarked on the path of harming freedom of conscience, interfering in the internal affairs of the church, supporting some churches while prejudicially treating others'. The Council for Religious Affairs had actually 'instigated some instances of confrontation' which had led to a worsening of inter-Orthodox relations. Over a year later, Kuchma went back on these words and reestablished the State Committee for Religious Affairs to promote dialogue between Ukraine's religious denominations.

Kuchma outlined his policy of separating the church from the state in reality, and not just on paper, as had been the case under Kravchuk: the state would no longer support only one church at the expense of good relations with other denominations. But the policy of doing the exact opposite to Kravchuk – namely, instead of openly interfering in Ukraine’s religious life to avoid any involvement with it at all – also proved to be mistaken. Kuchma increasingly understood that he needed to find a middle ground between these two extreme policies.

Interestingly, despite Kuchma's initial hands-off policies both the UPTs and the UPTs–KP continued to complain about lack of access to the media, hostility to the UPTs–KP (presumably because of its links to Kravchuk and the national democrats)
and lack of state support for Ukrainian Orthodox autocephaly. Levko Lukianenko, a prominent national democrat, complained on the eve of the fourth anniversary of independence that ‘Four years ago we declared an independent, democratic country, but our leadership is godless, speaks Ukrainian badly and does not fulfil the ideals we heard from our forefathers.’ In October 1995 56 members of parliament formed a pressure group ‘For a Single Church Community’ to agitate for state support for a unified Orthodox Church, calling the existence of three Orthodox churches ‘unnatural and destructive’. Although both Kuchma and Oleksandr Moroz, the socialist chairman of parliament, welcomed the initiative to lobby for one Orthodox Church, Moroz remained critical about the involvement of members of parliament in religious affairs. It was noticeable that the bulk of the deputies belonging to this group were either national democrats or nationalists. The group is led by Liliia Hryhorovych, a member of parliament from Ivano-Frankivs’k, western Ukraine.

On the fifth anniversary of Ukraine’s independence in August 1996 President Kuchma returned to the theme of religion, which his critics had accused him of neglecting. Religion, he stressed, did not play the role it should – and could – in consolidating the Ukrainian people. Religion, which was important for the ‘spiritual and moral health of society’ and as an incubator of patriotism, was wrecked by internal quarrels and Ukraine’s traditional churches were threatened by the ‘spiritual aggression of totalitarian cults’. The rise of the White Brotherhood doomsday cult and the Aum Shinrikyo Japanese sect in 1994-95 showed the danger in not formulating an official policy towards religion. Kuchma instructed the State Committee for Religious Affairs to ensure that Ukrainian citizens were protected ‘from spiritual aggression’ by ‘active foreign missionary organisations and totalitarian sects’.

The failure to articulate a middle-ground policy towards religion which rejected both extremes of interference and neglect was graphically seen in the disturbances surrounding the funeral of Patriarch Volodymyr on 18 July 1995. Although Romaniuk had been elected patriarch of the UPTs–KP in October 1993 he had been, in effect, merely Filaret’s puppet, consigned to a one-room attic in the former metropolitan’s (now patriarchal) chancellery. As noted earlier, Filaret’s objectives had been to become, ideally, the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church or, failing that, at least the patriarch of the UPTs–KP. According to Taras Romaniuk, former Patriarch Volodymyr’s son, Filaret concealed the true causes of his father’s death, which was officially said to be due to a ‘heart attack’. One month before his death Patriarch Volodymyr had asked for protection after he had received death threats from Filaret’s supporters. Volodymyr had confronted Filaret with accusations about money-laundering, ties to organised crime and funding the radical right Ukrainian National Assembly. On 4 May, only a short time before his death, Volodymyr had issued a decree relieving Filaret of his post as deputy patriarch ‘for insubordination’. The Kyiv prosecutor’s office meanwhile denied any foul play, citing expert medical investigations on the cause of death. Nevertheless, suspicions remain about the ‘natural’ causes.

With the death of Romaniuk as patriarch of the UPTs–KP the way was open to Filaret to achieve his ambition. Many bishops warned Filaret not to allow himself to be elected patriarch, a warning he refused to heed. After his election as patriarch at the UPTs–KP Sobor on 20–21 October 1995 he promptly abolished the post of deputy patriarch. Filaret’s rise was however marred by defections to both the UAPTs and the UPTs, both of whose parishes have since grown in number at the expense of the UPTs–KP. By 1996 the UAPTs and the UPTs–KP had approximately the same number of parishes.
The funeral of former Patriarch Volodymyr in July 1995 led to Ukraine's worst outbreak of civil strife since the disintegration of the former USSR. The acting justice minister, Vasyl' Onopenko, resigned in protest at the illegal use of force which he described as 'the country's most tragic event since the Chornobyl disaster'. A poll of Kyiv residents found that 54 per cent blamed the authorities for the crisis and 38 per cent backed the burial of Volodymyr in St Sophia's Cathedral.

The Ministry of Nationalities, Migration and Cults accused national democrats and the radical right of attempting to use the funeral to promote their policy of one state-backed, united Orthodox Church. The national democrats and Filaret, meanwhile, accused Kuchma and pro-Russian forces of attacking Ukrainian autocephaly. In an appeal Patriarch Filaret blamed the incident on those who were opposed to the UPTs-KP 'as the national church of the Ukrainian people which is making every effort to unite Ukrainian Orthodoxy in a single Ukrainian Orthodox Church'.

Kravchuk, Filaret's long-time ally, blamed the incident squarely on 'the inconsistent, illogical and unprofessional policy of the present leadership, particularly in such a delicate sphere as religion and spirituality'. Kravchuk, like Filaret, accused the Kuchma leadership of openly backing an outright attack on the pro-autocephaly churches. Filaret, Kravchuk and the national democrats thus questioned Kuchma's patriotic credentials.

President Kuchma meanwhile hit back and condemned both sides for overstepping the mark, accusing the militia of being 'unprofessional' and using an 'unjustifiable' level of force.

There is little question that Filaret had also wanted to use the funeral for his own purposes. On the Friday preceding the funeral he had agreed to the official proposal to bury former Patriarch Volodymyr in a monastery near Kyiv. Over the weekend he had changed his mind and again demanded that Volodymyr be buried in St Sophia Cathedral, as a means of exerting pressure on the authorities to transfer this cathedral to the UPTs-KP: since 1934 it had been a state museum. President Kuchma had issued a decree in early 1996 which would have turned over the Monastery of the Caves to the UPTs (a decree which was later withdrawn after being met by widespread hostility). Filaret could have been attempting to upstage this proposed transfer by taking control of the key building associated with east Slavic Orthodoxy.

It was never established who had taken the decision to use violence against the funeral marchers, numbered in their thousands. One theory which gained widespread support at the time was that it was an attempt at discrediting the patriotic credentials of then newly promoted prime minister Yevhen Marchuk, who is popular among national democrats and nationalists. UNSO, the paramilitary arm of the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA), had provided bodyguards and stewards during the funeral procession (as noted earlier, their association with Filaret stretches back to 1992). This fact was used as an excuse to ban the UNA in summer 1995 and to refuse its reregistration by the Ministry of Justice in autumn 1996. The real reason for the ban and the refusal was however more to do with the wish to remove a political force and paramilitary group which had longstanding links with the Kravchukite 'party of power' (as well as with Filaret), and which was also hindering normalisation of relations with Russia. After a year under the pavement outside St Sophia's Cathedral the remains of former Patriarch Volodymyr were reburied next to the cathedral in a memorial monument at the cost of $71,000 paid by Kyiv city council.

Towards a Future United Orthodox Church?

The Ukrainian Orthodox community remains important to the Moscow Patriarchate:
it is large, rich and well endowed with property, and there are longstanding historical and spiritual links. Any attempt to separate an autonomous UPTs from the Russian Orthodox Church, similar to the attempt with the Estonian Orthodox Church in Spring 1996, would almost certainly lead to another schism between Constantinople and Moscow. The patriarch of Constantinople, leader of world Orthodoxy, has agreed to recognise the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – on condition that its three branches unite into one church.

The adoption of Ukraine’s first post-Soviet constitution in June 1996 may usher in a new era for religion in Ukraine. The approach of the new constitution was greeted with an appeal signed by the UPTs, UPTs–KP, UHKTs, Protestant–Baptist churches, Muslims and Jews welcoming it as a sign that church and state would now be separated and that all churches in Ukraine would henceforth be equal. Article 35 of the new Ukrainian constitution outlines the separation of church and state while stressing that ‘no religion shall be recognised by the state as compulsory’. This is a clear rejection of the previous policy of attempting to create a state-backed national Orthodox church under Kravchuk.

It is noticeable that in the dispute between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Estonian authorities the pro-autocephaly churches in Ukraine, particularly the UPTs–KP led by Patriarch Filaret, strongly backed the autocephaly of the Estonian Orthodox Church and supported the Ecumenical Patriarchate, arguing that the Moscow Patriarchate had pushed the Orthodox Church very close to a schism as alarming as that of 1054. Patriarch Filaret has claimed that the ecumenical patriarch is now willing to grant autocephaly after the unification only of the two pro-autocephaly churches in Ukraine (the UPTs–KP and the UAPTs) – and not necessarily of all three, including the UPTs.

Conclusions

The failure to create a unified Orthodox Church can be squarely placed on the shoulders of the Ukrainian leadership during 1991–94. The Kravchuk leadership was in too much haste and did not do enough to persuade the hierarchy and clergy of the UPTs of the advantages of autocephaly. Few positive arguments were put forward for autocephaly (such as the promotion of historical ties with the spiritual legacy of Kyiv Rus’ or the revival of national traditions). The state’s policies were built around Filaret, a largely discredited figure with close ties to Kravchuk. As an alternative they could have been built around Mstyslav, who could not have been defrocked by the Russian Orthodox Church and had no skeletons in his cupboard. Finally, the authorities could have imitated the newly independent Ukrainian state in January 1919 by introducing a law on autocephaly imposing sanctions on those bishops who refused to break their ties with Moscow.

President Kuchma’s policy of staying neutral vis-à-vis religious divisions within Ukraine was initially an extreme response to the interventionist policy of the Kravchuk leadership. Neither a ‘hands-on’ nor a ‘hands-off’ policy has worked, however. A middle ground between the two needed to be found. The reestablishment of the Council for Religious Affairs in 1995 as the State Committee of Ukraine for Religious Affairs was tantamount to recognition by Kuchma that the state had no choice but to act as an arbitrator in the disputes within Ukraine’s religious denominations (primarily amongst the three Orthodox churches). The Ukrainian authorities (both Kravchuk and Kuchma) do – and will continue to – support the unification of the three Ukrainian Orthodox churches into one church.
and the granting of autocephaly to it. But there is little support for its then becoming a ‘state church’. This process of the coming together of Ukraine’s Orthodox churches and their eventual autocephaly is thought likely to be a drawn-out process, as much a product of domestic nation-building and the full normalisation of relations with Russia as of manoeuvring between the churches. It is also unlikely to happen without further conflict between Kyiv and Moscow and between Moscow and Constantinople. The autocephaly of the Estonian Orthodox Church and the creation of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church in 1924 and of the Georgian Orthodox Church in 1943 were all strongly opposed by the Russian Orthodox Church.

Five factors rule out the granting of autocephaly to the UPTs by the Russian Orthodox Church, at least in the short term. Firstly, the UPTs still accounts for approximately one third of the parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church. Secondly, autocephaly of the UPTs could cut off Moscow’s ties to the historical legacy of Kyiv Rus’ (the millennium celebrations of Orthodox Christianity among eastern Slavs were held in 1988 in Moscow – not in Kyiv).[15] Thirdly, a united autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church would be pro-Constantinople, which never recognised the uncanonical transfer of the Metropolitanate in the late seventeenth century from Kyiv to Moscow.[17] Fourthly, Slavophile and pro-Russian views permeate some of the clergy of the UPTs. The Orthodox Brotherhoods of Ukraine (allied to the UPTs), for example, called on the eve of the December 1991 referendum for a vote against Ukrainian independence because ‘the Slavic peoples of Russia and Ukraine have one history, one fate’. Finally, the Russian Orthodox Church and the bulk of Russia’s political leaders find it difficult to accept the borders of the Russian Federation. In the same manner as in tsarist Russia and the former USSR, the Russian Orthodox Church aims to maintain its spiritual empire throughout the CIS. A central plank of this policy is to hold on to the UPTs in Ukraine. The Russian executive recognised Ukrainian political sovereignty in the treaty signed with Ukraine in May 1997. How long will it take for the Russian Orthodox Church to follow this important gesture and recognise Ukrainian religious sovereignty?

Notes and References

1 The transliteration system used in this article is based upon the Ukrainian Legal Terminology Commission’s decision number 9 (19 April 1996) which outlined an official English–Ukrainian transliteration system. The system was adopted at the initiative of the Ukrainian Language Institute of the National Academy of Sciences. The decree noted that transliteration should be done directly from Ukrainian into English without the use of intermediary languages. Some traditional names for well-known regions (for example, ‘the Crimea’ and ‘Transcarpathia’) have been used rather than their Ukrainian transliterations (‘Крым’ and ‘Закарпаття’). The names of Ukrainian regions and cities are no longer transliterated from the Russian into English (for example, ‘Київ’, ‘Львів’, ‘Харків’, ‘Одеса’ and the ‘Донбас’ instead of ‘Кiev’, ‘L’viv’, ‘Kharkiv’, ‘Odessa’ and the ‘Donbass’ respectively). A complete listing of the transliteration system for each Ukrainian letter into English can be found in The Ukrainian Weekly, 20 October 1996.

2 See Pravoslav’ie na Ukraini (Tovarystvo Ukraina, Kyiv, 1985).


4 See Metropolitan Vasyl’ Lypkivs’kyi, Vidrodzhennia Tserkvy v Ukraini 1917–1930 (Dobra Knyzhka, Toronto, 1959).

5 See David Marples and Ostap Skrypnyk, ‘Patriarch Mstyslav and the revival of the


15 See the appeal by the UKHTs in response to this incident in *Meta*, 25 July 1993.


19 *Nasha vira*, no. 6, 1991.


24 *Holos Ukrainy*, 23 October 1996.

25 See the open letter to the patriarch and Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church from Metropolitan Filaret in *Holos Ukrainy*, 29 May 1992.


29 Shuba, op. cit., p. 140.


In Search of Unity and Autocephaly


For examples of the debate on this question see: Serhii Zdioruk, ‘Tserkovna polityka i neokonfesiini interesy’, Viche, August 1993, pp. 84-94; P. Kosukha, ‘Ukrains’kyi ekumenizm chy ideia yedynoi natsional’noi tserkvy’, Holos Ukrainy, 8 September 1993; and M. Rybachuk, ‘Ne yedyna natsional’na tserkva, a yedyna natsional’na ideia’, Viche, April 1994, pp. 135–44.

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Andrew the Apostle condemned Mstyslav’s letter and pointed out that he had himself signed decrees appointing hierarchs to the UPTs–KP (Ukrainian Television, 5 November 1992).


The Ukrainian Weekly, 20 December 1992. This was confirmed by a resolution of the Sobor of the UPTs–KP: Uriadovyi kurier, 26 March 1993.


See the critical article by Liudmila Vansovs’ka, head of the All-Ukrainian Committee for Defence of Human Rights, “‘Berkut” pochynae i vyhrae’, Holos Ukrainy, 26 November 1993, and the protests by the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine in Shliakh peremohy, 4 December 1993.

Mykola Rybachuk, ‘Ne yedyna …,’ Viche, April 1994, p. 140.

Interview with Deputy Patriarch Filaret in Ukrains’ke slovo, 4 December 1994.


Ukrains’ke slovo, 31 October 1993.

The Ukrainian Weekly, 31 October 1993.


See Volodymyr Chopenko, ‘Blazhennyishyi Volodymyr (Slobodan) – poet i “natsional­alist”’, Respublika, 24–30 April 1993. Vechirnyi Kyiv (20 November 1992) reported that the laity of the UPTs had considered an appeal to the Russian Orthodox patriarch for autocephaly. Allegedly, Metropolitan Volodymyr did not rule out the possible merging of the UPTs and the UAPTs.


The Ukrainian Weekly, 26 April 1992.


Filaret had been living for decades out of wedlock with his ‘housekeeper’, Yevgeniya Romanova, who had borne him three children. See Aleksandr Nezhny, ‘Yego blazhenstvo bez mitry i zhezla’, Ogon’yek, nos. 48 and 49, 1991, pp. 8–10 and 20–22.


Moscow News, no. 19, 1992. As Pospielovsky has noted, ‘Filaret had been an insider to the Ukrainian Party ideological establishment when Shcherbitsky was the first Central Committee Secretary, Kravchuk was the second in charge of the ideology which included Central Committee supervision over the church and Kolesnyk, the chairman of the Ukrainian Council for Religious Affairs worked directly with Filaret.’ Pospielovsky, op. cit., p. 236.
In Search of Unity and Autocephaly

78 Uriadovyi kurier, 4 August 1994.
79 See Kuchma's speech on the fourth anniversary of Ukraine's independence, Holos Ukrainy, 28 August 1995.
80 The complaints of the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods of Ukraine (allied to the UPTs) were published in Uriadovyi kurier, 23 September 1995, while complaints by the UPTs can be found in Lida Poletz, 'Ukraine church says government hurts independence', Reuters, 23 August 1995, and Ukrainian Independent Information Agency 'Respublika' (UNIAR), 26 October 1995.
81 Reuters, 23 August 1995.
82 The launch of the group is covered by Chas, 20 and 27 October, and Holos Ukrainy, 21 October 1995. The comments by Kuchma and Moroz were reported by Ukrainian Independent Information Agency 'Novyny' (UNIAN), 13, 19 and 30 October, and Holos Ukrainy, 1 November 1995.
83 Uriadovyi kurier, 29 August 1996.
84 See Stewart Hennesey, 'Fallen angel', The Times Magazine, 24 June 1995. In February 1996 the leaders of the White Brotherhood were sentenced to four years' imprisonment by a Kyiv court (Reuters, 9 February 1996).
87 See Olena Bondarenko et al. (eds.), Bila Knyha 'Chornoho Vivtorka' (Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy, Kyiv, 1995).
89 A short biography of Volodymyr Romaniuk can be found in Vechirnyi Kyiv, 18 July 1995. One of Romaniuk's last interviews was given as 'Nam brakue derzhavnykh krokiv', Uriadovyi kurier, 27 May 1995.
90 Most of those bishops who warned Filaret not to stand were from western Ukraine. See Kyivs'ki vidomosti, 18 August 1995.
91 On the election of Filaret after Romaniuk's death see Mykola Khmil'ov's'kyi, 'Na Sobor ta dovkola n'oho', Chas, 19 January 1996. See also Holos Ukrainy and Vechirnyi Kyiv, 24 October; Molod' Ukrainy, 24 and 26 October; Chas, 27 October; Shliakh peremohy and Ukrains 'ke slovo, 29 October 1995.
92 Such strong words were also used by the Ukrainian Committee 'Helsinki-90'. See Klych, no. 3D, 1995. Photographs of confrontation between funeral participants and the Berkut riot police were published in The Independent and The Daily Telegraph, 20 July 1995.
93 Narodna armiya, 27 July 1995. The poll was conducted by Democratic Initiatives.
94 Conversation with an official, who wished to remain anonymous, in the Ministry of Nationalities, Migration and Cults, Kyiv, 31 August 1995.
95 See the statements of the Conservative Republican Party (Klych, no. 30, 1995) and the Republican Party (Samostiina Ukraina, no. 27, 27 July–3 August 1995).
98 A rebuttal by the Cabinet of Ministers is in Holos Ukrainy, 23 August 1995; it explains the reasons for not granting permission for the burial of Volodymyr in the grounds of St Sophia Cathedral.
100 The transfer of St Sophia Cathedral to the UPTs–KP or the UAPTs, as well as other church buildings in the hands of the authorities and designated as 'museums', had been a longstanding demand of these two churches. See the resolution of the conference 'Nezalezhnyi Ukraini – natsional'nu tserkvu' in Nasha vira, no. 7, 1992, which demanded the transfer of St Sophia Cathedral, the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves and the
Pochaiv Monastery in Ternopil' *oblast*.


On the debate surrounding ownership of the Monastery of the Caves see Dmytro Stepovyk, chairman of the Ukrainian Society in Defence of Historical and Cultural Monuments, 'Kyivo-Pechers'ka Lavra – sviatynia ukrains'ka', *Uriadovy kurier*, 23 March 1995. The author was against transferring this property to the UPTs.


On the relationship between the UPTs–KP, Filaret, Kravchuk and the UNA–UNSO, see *Komunist*, nos. 30 and 31, July and August 1995.


### Appendix: Religious Communities in Ukraine (1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Orthodox</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (UPTs)</td>
<td>6,564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UPTs–KP)</td>
<td>1,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAPTs)</td>
<td>1,209</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Russian Orthodox Churches</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Catholic</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (UKHTs)</td>
<td>3,079</td>
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<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>694</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Protestant</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Various Baptist/Protestant Churches</td>
<td>3,994</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>National Minorities</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian Reformed Church</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krishnaites</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Evangelical-Lutheran Church</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Apostolic Church</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armenian Catholic Church</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Methodist Church</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Evangelical-Lutheran Church</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhists</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Vechirnyi Kyiv, 2 October 1996 and Ukrains’ke pravoslavne slovo, nos. 7–8, 1996.*