Christian Democracy and Civil Society in Russia

RICHARD SAKWA

Introduction

In the heady early days of party formation in Russia, following the modification of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution in March 1990, Christian Democracy promised to become one of the great social philosophies and political movements under post-communism, positioned between, on the one hand, liberal individualist universalism, and, on the other, socialist collectivism. Rafael Caldera, the President of Venezuela, argued that:

The fall of real Socialism in the countries of Eastern Europe has opened up a new political space for Christian Democracy . . . the solution to the urgent problems of the region cannot be sought either in the old formulae of discredited Marxism-Leninism or in the ideas of unbridled liberal capitalism.¹

In the event, however, this prognosis turned out to be unjustified, and Christian Democracy in Russia failed to take root either as a mass movement or as an effective political organisation.

Reasons for the optimistic view, however, are not hard to find. Christian Democracy appeared able to generate a new synthesis of Russian social and religious philosophy represented by such thinkers as Semen Frank, Sergei Bulgakov and Nikolai Berdyayev, the traditions of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), modern liberal individualism and the social thinking of Western Europe. In particular, drawing on Russian political philosophy and earlier attempts to establish Christian Democrat oriented organisations,² the movement appeared able to adapt to Russian conditions thinking about the social market economy like that of Ludwig Erhard and the social thinking of the Roman Catholic Church from Rerum novarum (1891) through Quadragesimo anno (1931) to Centessimus annus (1991).³ Above all, the combination of indigenous Russian social and political thinking with western social philosophy seemed able to transcend the sterile conflict between Westernisers and Slavophiles through a new interpretation of the Russian tradition.

The Christian Democrat attempt to reintegrate Russia into Christian civilisation represented a distinctive approach to the reintegration of Russia into European and world civilisation. At the same time, Russian Christian Democracy had a specific view of the democratisation process in Russia, focused on the need to develop the sinews of civil society, and hoped to lead the process of rebuilding a new political and economic order after the collapse of communism, much as German and Italian Christian Democracy had done after the Second World War. In short, Christian Democracy explicitly tried to fill the spiritual and political vacuum after the fall of communism,
to generate and sustain a new hegemonic force and to imbue the new institutions of
democracy with a value system that could sustain them.

This was a heady mix and a powerful dream, but in the event the impact of Christian
Democracy on Russian politics fell short of expectations. The philosophical synthesis
was not translated into effective policies and political programmes. What went wrong,
or was the dream impossible in the first place? Or is it still too early to make a final
judgment, and are there grounds for believing that Christian Democracy in Russia may
surprise us yet?

The story of Christian Democracy is a useful case study of several key themes of
postcommunist development: the development of national identity and the search for
Russia’s place in the world; the emergence of parties and the problem of civil society
under postcommunism; and the whole notion of ‘transition’ politics associated with
the problematic of democratisation and attitudes to the life world of democracy. The
emergence of Christian Democracy in Russia, from the establishment of Aleksandr
Ogorodnikov’s Christian Democratic Union of Russia in August 1989 to the
disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, has been discussed in an earlier
paper. This article will take the story from 1992 to the elections of December 1993,
and raise broader questions about the nature of democratic transition and civil society
in postcommunist Russia.

The Evolution of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement

Christian Democracy was typical of the process of party formation as a whole in
Russia, with numerous organisations and frequent splits marked by the dominance of
personalised leadership. This was the case with one of the most important
organisations, the Russian Christian Democratic Movement (RCDM), established in
Moscow on 9 April 1990. By the end of the year the RCDM claimed to have 18 regional
organisations and branches in 96 towns and cities across the country, with a member­
ship of over 16,000, a number that had allegedly risen to 25,000 by mid-1991. The party
had significant representation in local soviets and six deputies in the Russian Congress
of People’s Deputies. One of its members, Fr Vyacheslav Polosin, was chair of the
Supreme Soviet’s Committee on Freedom of Conscience, Creeds, Charities and
Philanthropy, and its members played an active role in parliamentary politics. The
RCDM was also active in the Democratic Russia Movement (DRM), which
coordinated opposition to the decaying communist regime, and one of the RCDM’s
leaders, Fr Gleb Yakunin, was elected a co-chair of the DRM.

On 19 April 1991 the RCDM’s leading political figure, Viktor Aksyuchits, was the
initiator of a bloc called Popular Accord (Narodnoye soglasie) with Nikolai Travkin’s
Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) and Mikhail Astaf’yev’s Constitutional
Democratic Party (CDP) (Popular Freedom Party). Citing the result of Mikhail
Gorbachev’s 17 March 1991 referendum, which voted in favour of ‘a renewed Union of
Sovereign Republics’, Popular Accord argued in favour of a state that would change its
ideological essence but remain united, with some adjustments to its borders on a case­
by-case basis through plebiscites. It was over this issue that Popular Accord stormed
out of the Second DRM Congress on 10–11 November 1991, accusing the democrats
of being ‘left-wing radicals’, while their opponents labelled them ‘imperialists’. Aksyuchits accused Democratic Russia of ‘deliberately organising the
dismemberment of the country’. At issue was not only the fate of the Union, but that
of the Russian Federation itself, torn by powerful centrifugal regional and national
tendencies.
The RCDM had a well-developed ideology and one of the most literate and distinctive programmes; it was well organised with a network of fairly autonomous regional organisations and a strong centre; and it had numerous deputies active in soviets at all levels. The RCDM was at first given critical support by the Christian Democratic International (CDI), and indeed appeared to be part of a broader European movement for democracy and social Christianity. However, like many other parties in Russia, the RCDM gradually drew away from westernising policies and sought to root the exit from communism in Russian national traditions and interests. The RCDM increasingly called itself a ‘liberal conservative’ party, drawing on the ideas of such liberal conservatives as Semen Frank and Ivan Il’in. However, all non-communist conservative groups face a problem: there is little, from their point of view, to conserve in the devastated political terrain of postcommunist society other than the traditions of the imperial state itself. While the absence of a convincing social philosophy of the Christian Democrat sort in the British Conservative party propelled it from ‘Butskellism’ to neoliberalism, in Russia the problem has been the opposite: the absence of a social and political base for the very powerful political consensus in favour of Christian Democratic-type social philosophy has torn Russian Christian Democracy in two directions, either towards neoliberalism and exaggerated westernism, or to nostalgic Great Russian statism.

The major problem for the RCDM was to find a way of combining its patriotic ideology and commitment to the restoration of Russian statehood with democratic procedures and the growth of civil society. The RCDM sought to remake the ‘white’ movement of the early Soviet period, but this time combined with a commitment to democracy. Even before the fall of the old regime in August 1991 the RCDM had distinguished itself by its resolute opposition to partocratic power and by its equally resolute espousal of what it termed ‘enlightened patriotism’. This important concept rejected exclusive or ethnicised nationalism but sought to root postcommunist national revival in Russia in a broader spiritual context. This position gave the RCDM the confidence, perhaps exaggerated, to enter into tactical alliances with national-bolsheviks and others while trying to retain its own strategic goals.

This was not always clear to those within, let alone outside, the movement. On 18 August 1991 Yakunin, who in 1987 had been released from a 10-year sentence of corrective labour camp and internal exile for campaigning in defence of the rights of believers, left the RCDM, claiming that it had moved to the right and had adopted neo-imperialist positions. The Popular Accord bloc, however, condemned those democrats (including Democratic Russia) who urged Russia not to sign the Union Treaty (a ceremony which would have taken place on 20 August had the coup not intervened), and stressed that ‘consistently defending the ideals of democracy, we do not consider separatism to be among its intrinsic attributes’. Like Gorbachev, the RCDM insisted that the disintegration of the USSR would be disastrous but was avoidable. One of the main reasons for the split with Democratic Russia in November 1991 was the question of the Union, and at the same time the RCDM moved into opposition to President Boris Yel’tsin’s ‘government of reforms’, created in November 1991. Thus the ground was established for an alliance with the neo-communist and rightist nationalist oppositions, which was confirmed when the USSR fell and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created in December 1991.

Christian nationalists insisted that the dissolution of communism did not necessarily entail the disintegration of the USSR. As Mikhail Nazarov put it in the RCDM paper Put’, ‘No “objective laws” either demand or justify the breakdown of the country that took place after the August events’. Despite the typical
Gorbachevian flaws in the 17 March 1991 referendum on the USSR, Nazarov insisted that the vote should be used to declare the USSR the historical successor state to the Russian empire, with some adjustments of the borders. Above all, Nazarov and the patriots condemned the disintegration of the USSR along the lines of the arbitrary Soviet borders which separated, according to them, the three branches of one Russian people, the Little Russians, the White Russians and the Great Russians. 10

Aksyuchits argued that ‘power in Russia has been seized by a new generation of the international lumpen’, and insisted that ‘the creative responsible personality can develop only within the framework of a national culture’. He argued that the agreement in December 1991 on the creation of the CIS could ‘in its catastrophic results be an event of a thousand years’ duration’, allowing the emergence of ‘liberal communist’ regimes in the successor states and threatening the unity of the rump Russian state itself. The RCDM, he argued, demanded the ‘revival of traditional forms of Russian life and history’. 11 The RCDM was firmly in the camp of the statists (gosudarstvenniki), for a strong state at home and a vigorous policy abroad. The latter led many to suggest that the RCDM had thrown in its lot with the derzhavniki, those who espoused Russia’s role as a great power — derzhava being a word and a concept that for many was uncomfortably close to the concept of samoderzhaviye (autocracy).

As far as they were concerned, the failure of Yel’tsin’s ‘radical liberals’ to develop a programme of nation-building, and indeed their wilful destruction of what remained after the Soviet holocaust of national traditions by exposing Russia to degenerate western mass culture, condemned Russian state building to failure. Only a strong state could reverse the irremedial and final destruction of Russia and save the nation.

It is in the light of this analysis that the RCDM took the lead in establishing the opposition to Yel’tsin’s government. A statement issued by the organising committee of the Congress of Civic and Patriotic Forces of Russia, chaired by Aksyuchits, warned that ‘centuries-old Russian statehood is being broken up into a dozen separate principalities’, and condemned the ‘antinational and antistate policies’ of the ruling forces. 12 The congress, which met on 8–9 February 1992, was attended by the RCDM’s close allies, Astaf’yev’s Constitutional Democrats, and by such groups as Sergei Baburin’s and Nikolai Pavlov’s Russian All-Peoples’ Union (Rossitsky obshchenarodny soyuz, ROS), considered a national communist organisation; Nikolai Lysenko’s National-Republican Party of Russia (which used to belong to Pamyat’), whose paramilitary formations provided security for the congress; the Fatherland (Otechestvo) association; the Russian Party of National Renewal; the Change (Smena) faction in the Russian parliament; and the Union of Cossack Forces. The RCDM’s former ally, Travkin’s DPR, however, at the last moment refused to take part and its absence reflected the narrowness of the political spectrum represented at the congress, primarily patriotic and only marginally civic.

In his opening address Aksyuchits warned that ‘the arbitrary frontiers are cutting across the vital interests of tens of millions of people’. He stressed that conciliarity (sobornost’) was the key to the Russian Idea, and noted that ‘Russia has never been a national, let alone a nationalistic, state’ but belonged to all the people living in it. 13 Aksyuchits argued that

The destructive activity of the dominant left radical rootless (bezpochvennyj) political forces threatens society with the influence of extreme right-wing ideologies and creates the conditions for a neocommunist reaction. This forced us to initiate the creation of a third force, a movement of statists and patriots fighting for the revival of a strong Russian state able to defend the rights, freedoms and dignity of the citizens of the country. 14
The Russian vice-president, Aleksandr Rutskoy, spoke at the opening of the congress but did not stay. His statist and patriotic views made him a natural ally of the democratic patriots like Aksyuchits. Quite apart from his heroic feats in Afghanistan, where as a fighter pilot he was twice shot down and captured by the mujahedeen, Rutskoy had formerly been deputy chair of the Moscow Otechestvo society led by the leading national-patriotic thinker Apollon Kuz'min. Rutskoy condemned the 'democratic experiment' now being imposed on Russia with the same destructive vigour as communism had once been built, often by the very same people, and he called for the introduction of an economic state of emergency. At the same time he praised the enormous achievements of the old Russian merchant class, while condemning the growth of corruption on a hitherto unprecedented scale in the higher echelons of power. He stressed that the key task was 'the question of Russian statehood, of preserving Russia as a single formation', but he warned against those blinded by a primitive patriotism who saw democracy as no more than a conspiracy to undermine the unity of the state. He stressed that the old prerevolutionary Russia had gone for ever, as had the totalitarian communist 'paradise', and that new ways had to be found to unite the great Russian fatherland as one that could encompass the sovereignty and independence of states and regions but without destroying the historic unity of the peoples. Parts of his speech were drowned by the barracking of extremists, displeased by his attempt to distinguish between patriots and nationalists.

Dmitri Vasil'yev, the leader of the main Pamyat' group, forced his way into the congress at the head of some hundred black-shirted storm troopers and would not leave until he had been allowed to speak. Aksyuchits had done all he could to keep him out and he held Arkadi Murashev, Moscow's police chief and one of the former leaders of Democratic Russia, responsible. Gleb Anishchenko, one of the RCDM's co-leaders and the editor of its paper Put', sought to calm passions, insisting that it was pointless to look elsewhere for those guilty for Russia's tragedy but that each person should admit his own responsibility. Against a background of heckling and shouts of 'Judas!' and 'Go and hang yourself!', Anishchenko warned that the greatest danger facing the participants was national-bolshevism, a tendency reflected in the work of the organising committee, and Anishchenko distanced himself from the nationalistic comments of Lysenko and Pavlov. Thus the 'liberal conservatives' like the RCDM were in danger of being swamped by movements for whom the very word 'democracy' appeared a betrayal of Russian traditions.

The declaration adopted by the congress noted that 'the struggle against the totalitarian regime became transformed into a struggle against Russian statehood' and condemned the attempt to create new states on the basis of 'fantastically arbitrary Lenin-Stalin borders'. The declaration insisted that Russia had not been the 'prison of peoples' but their defender, and went on to argue that only 'enlightened patriotism' could save the country by sustaining a civic ideology based on the combination of democracy and patriotism.

The congress established the Russian National Congress (Rossiiskoye Narodnoye Sobraniye, RNS). Its seven-point strategic programme broadly reflected the views of the RCDM and committed the RNS 'to the revival by political means of the unified and great Russian state within its historic frontiers'; 'the recognition of the RSFSR as the legitimate heir of the Russian Empire'; 'the non-recognition of anticonstitutional treaties and agreements that have led to the dismembering of the country and to the infringement of the interests of Russia as a nation state'; 'the preservation of the unconditional unity of the RSFSR and the reestablishment of the historical administrative and territorial state structure [in which] local self-government and the
national-cultural autonomy of each people in the new federation must be combined with the principle of the equality of all citizens regardless of nationality; 'the conformity of Russia's foreign policy to the national interest of the country'; 'the recognition of the primacy of individual rights over group, party or narrow national interests'; and, finally, 'commitment to the priority of securing the rights and interests of the citizens of Russia and of our countrymen abroad'.

The RCDM had long tried to forge a union between the democratic and the patriotic movements, and an earlier version had been the Popular Accord bloc, which existed from April 1991 until February 1992. The creation of the RNS was a logical continuation of this policy and an attempt to establish a coalition of patriotic movements to counterbalance Democratic Russia in a new synthesis of democracy and Russian statehood. The danger, however, was that many of the nationalist and national-bolshevik forces gathering under the patriotic banner had little in common with democracy, and rather than the RCDM directing the broader movement, the extreme nationalists were in danger of stripping the movement of its democratic aspirations. Travkin's DPR had refused to take part in the congress on the grounds that it could not ally itself with 'red-brownshirts'. The congress failed to attract civic forces, but drew nationalist forces like a magnet. Pavlov, one of the leaders of ROS, noted that the congress had revealed the absence of a generally recognised political leader of the patriotic movement, and neither was there a clearly formulated alternative programme. He stressed the differences with Aksyuchits, in particular over the Iraq war, but was willing to work with him. This goodwill was not to last for long, and the fragile unity built at the congress soon dissolved.

At the congress Astaf'yev had declared that the aim had been to establish a 'white' political movement as distinct from the so-called 'red-brown' opposition to Yel'tsin's reforms. It was clear that the convocation of the congress was a high risk strategy for the RCDM, and one that ultimately was to fail and discredit them in the eyes of a broad swathe of democratic, even patriotic, public opinion. The RCDM had taken one aspect of politics, Russia's statehood and its role as the core of a larger state, and absolutised it, and thus lost sight of the broader problems of democracy in the postcommunist revolution of nationalities. One of the leaders of Democratic Russia, Victor Sheinis, noted that 'I am afraid that Aksyuchits and Astaf'yev are playing at games that will end up defeating their aims. A right nationalist opposition is indeed emerging against Yel'tsin. . . . Nationalism in general is a very dangerous thing and can lead to the degeneration of leaders.' While democratic statists had come to prominence in Russian politics in 1992, with such figures as Sergei Stankevich advising Yel'tsin, the consolidation of a democratic patriotic movement appeared to be much more problematic.

Soon after the congress Aksyuchits developed his ideas on the pages of Den', a rabidly anti-Yel'tsinite nationalist paper edited by the 'nightingale of the [Soviet] General Staff', Aleksandr Prokhanov. Aksyuchits noted that 'Release from the years of the communist regime has not brought us freedom or renaissance because those forces who have now seized power represent ideals and forms of life that are alien to our people. The ideology of these forces is an anarchical utopia.' He condemned the Yel'tsin government as 'antinational and antipeople', and called for a coalition of statist-patriotic forces that might include cooperation with communist leaders.

The long shadow of 1917 hung over postcommunist politics in Russia. Understandably for a Constitutional Democrat, Astaf’yev condemned the contacts between the Kadets of 1917 and the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries. In an inverted reflection of the concerns of 1917 the slogan was now 'no enemies to the
right': the danger of right-wing extremism was underestimated. Astaf’yev’s own political development illustrated this most graphically: he became one of the most irreconcilable opponents of Yel’tsin’s liberal policies. Yet another apparent lesson of 1917 was that the weakness of the state had opened the way to the Bolshevik dictatorship, so all political forces from the centre to the right insisted that ‘without strong state power there can be no defence of the rights of the individual’.26

The RCDM increasingly became a national-patriotic party and its commitment to social Christianity was undermined. The alliance between the enlightened patriots and communists was probably an unnatural one, but was allegedly justified by their joint stand against the ‘fifth column of the USA’ in Russia, the westernisers.27 Liberal democrats attacked the alliance as part of the ‘red-brownshirt’ assault against democracy, and the popular press attacked them as antidemocratic nationalists. The notion of a red-brown alliance between right-wing nationalists and hardline neocommunists was first launched by Yel’tsin in December 1991 to attack Travkin when he was still part of Popular Accord. The RCDM found it increasingly difficult to prove its ‘whiteness’.

By mid-1992 conservative groups had moved into outright opposition to the government, and thus the process began whereby the RCDM linked its fate to that of conservative groupings in the legislature, however much it sought to maintain a critical distance from its de facto allies. The RCDM became part, and indeed one of the initiators, of the parliamentary bloc Russian Unity (Rossiiskoye yedinstvo) that emerged during the Sixth Congress of People’s Deputies in April 1992 as the successor to the earlier loose alliance of neocommunist parliamentary fractions. The RCDM thus moved out of the democratic camp into this new oppositional bloc.28 The drama of politics in the congresses depended on either of the two major tendencies, the democrats and the ‘red-white’ alliance, attracting the centrist groups and deputies to their positions on any particular issue. Aksyuchits argued that in parliament one could ally with almost anyone for short-term tactical points, but this did not mean uniting with them organisationally. He insisted that all that remained of communism in the ‘Communists of Russia’ bloc was the name. While well aware of Ruslan Khasbulatov’s personal characteristics (having voted against him for the post of speaker of the Russian parliament), they were nevertheless willing to work with him in his opposition to Yel’tsin’s policies. In the event, it was not clear who was using whom.

At the Sixth Congress the RCDM insisted successfully, after an epic barnstorming session at the microphones, on keeping a clause in the amended constitution that Russia should remain part of the USSR.29 Thus grounds were given for the possible impeachment of Yel’tsin, since he failed to observe the constitution but insisted on developing the institutions of a separate Russian state. The result of their ‘success’ was that the definition of Russian statehood was delayed. Even the conservative majority at the congress did not support the RCDM’s line. While ‘Soviet patriots’ like Aksyuchits and Astaf’yev, with the support of the ‘Communists of Russia’ fraction, were able to prevent the removal of references to the USSR from the constitution, an absolute majority were in favour of the CIS and fell only a few votes short of the two-thirds (700 votes) needed to make the constitutional changes removing the reference to the USSR. Some 694 deputies accepted the dissolution of the USSR and supported the creation of the CIS, 187 wavered and only 157 deputies were strong opponents.30 The strongest defenders of the USSR (some 81 deputies) were also the strongest opponents of the reforms, and the RCDM found itself among them.

In the whole 1,040-strong Sixth Congress there were only ten people who could be called ‘whites’ or ‘right patriots’ who opposed the CIS and reflected at least an
element of anticommunism, namely Aksyuchits and Astaf’yev and eight others. But they ranked only 540th on various measurements of the degree of their anticommunism (i.e. 539 deputies were more anticommunist). On the basis of his voting record the so-called Christian Democrat Il’ya Konstantinov was clearly an out-and-out communist. On such issues as land ownership, economic reform, freedom of speech and so on these deputies adopted neocommunist positions. The ‘white’ movement, therefore, had failed to take shape and instead the right simply ‘used a few exotic personalities from the former democratic wing of the congress to improve their political image’.31 The white movement of democratic patriots was an almost insignificant presence in parliament.

The RCDM had therefore apparently moved from enlightened patriotism to a form of neocommunist conservatism. However, it consistently sought to give content to the enlightened patriotic and democratic national element in its thinking.32 A joint conference organised by the RCDM, the Association of Culturologists and the Academy of Slavic Culture (founded on the RCDM’s initiative) on the theme of ‘Christianity and Culture in Contemporary Russia’, held in Moscow on 18–19 September 1992, sought precisely to deepen the philosophical basis of enlightened patriotism and develop further the notion of liberal conservatism.33 As far as the RCDM was concerned ‘it was not communism that was destroyed in Russia . . . but only one of its forms’, and hence the party moved into vigorous opposition to its alleged Yel’tsinite manifestation.34

The RCDM took an aggressive and indeed apocalyptic attitude to the successor states in what was now called the ‘near abroad’ (blizhnye zarubezh’ye), arguing that they were ruled by ‘national communist’ elites who had saved their skins by playing the national card. This was not the case with the Baltic republics, yet the RCDM took a robust approach to the withdrawal of Russian troops.35 Relations were particularly difficult in Ukraine, especially since the Ukrainian government supported attempts to create an Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and thus to take all the property and churches away from the Moscow Patriarchate. The former metropolitan of Kiev and All Ukraine, Filaret, after having been dismissed from his post in May 1992, went on to declare himself the head of an autonomous Ukrainian church. The seizure by the reemergent Greek-Catholic Church of Western Ukraine of Orthodox property was another source of tension between Russian and Ukrainian religious movements. In January 1993 Aksyuchits declared ‘I am absolutely sure that Belarusians, Ukrainians and Russians even today continue to belong to one great Russian nation, formed during our joint history on the basis of the Orthodox faith.’37

The RCDM supported the transfer of the Crimea from Ukrainian to Russian jurisdiction, and played up the horror stories from Trans-Dniester. In an address to Yel’tsin they argued that

in the circumstances of the mass liquidation of our compatriots it would be criminal to limit our actions to diplomatic measures, especially taking into account the complete helplessness of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in questions concerning the interests of our fatherland and your personal lack of competence in this sphere.

They insisted that the Russian government was treacherous (predatel’sky), and called above all for the resignation of the Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev.38 They also took a firm line against Estonia, accusing it of violating the human rights of Russian speakers in the republic. Often their facts were wrong or exaggerated, but always with sufficient justification to fuel their self-righteous indignation.
The RCDM came close to adopting the terrible theory of 'little blood' (*malaya krov*), the argument that a little bloodshed now would avert much more later. In making territorial claims against Ukraine over the Crimea, and supporting South Ossetian demands for unification with North Ossetia (part of the Russian Federation), the RCDM was perilously close to provoking war. Traditional pan-Slavism reared its head in uncritical and emotional support for Serbia in its war against other peoples in the former Yugoslavia.

The RCDM appeared to inherit many of the attitudes that had informed the Soviet attitude to the West. Like most of the Third World, Russian nationalists warned against American attempts to establish its own primacy under cover of the 'new world order', and insisted that the 'decency' of the 'free world' was an illusion. They insisted that the 'liberal communists' in power after August 1991 failed to understand the 'spiritual essence of Russia', and instead turned to the West as yet another utopian panacea, failing to take into account the catastrophic spiritual condition of the West, racked by materialism and pluralism. Aksyuchits asserted that 'Yeltsin's economic policies are leading to Russia becoming a source of raw materials for the industrially developed western countries'. Writer after writer insisted that the only way to approach Christian politics was through understanding 'Russia as a spiritual phenomenon'. Though the national-bolshevik roots of Russian Eurasianism repelled the RCDM, the element concerning Russia as a separate and distinct civilisation in the Eurasian landmass, with its own mission to fulfil in this vast area, allowed a certain objective rapprochement with reactionary nationalists.

One of the RCDM's leaders, Konstantinov, emerged as the forceful exponent of a broad alliance of the left and right opposition, including groups which the centrists in the RCDM found anathema. Aksyuchits and Anishchenko now insisted that the creation of blocs with neocommunists and ultranationalists like Prokhanov was inadmissible and that the RCDM should instead consolidate the non-communist opposition. The declaration adopted by the Sobor (Congress) of the RCDM on 20 June 1992 declared that 'we will defend the vital interests of society and fight against the regime of lies, coercion and poverty through all available legal means'. This sort of language, however, was open to misinterpretation and the RCDM warned that 'we declare in advance that all attempts to ascribe extremist demands and violent actions to us are nothing other than deliberate provocations against the opposition and society'. To underline the point, at a later meeting of the RCDM's Political Council Konstantinov's arguments in favour of entering a broad oppositional coalition of left and right were defeated by Aksyuchits's view that a Christian party should maintain 'sensible limits to contacts with the left opposition'. Nevertheless, some of the rump RCDM joined the extremist National Salvation Front (NSF) established in October 1992.

Despite the RCDM's protestations, its shift into the statist camp and association with unsavoury nationalists could not but undermine the credibility of its allegiance to democracy. It was at this time that 'the shift of the RCDM leaders into the nationalist-bolshevik part of the Russian political spectrum has transformed the organisation, for which Russia's most experienced experts had predicted a brilliant future, into a mediocre, dissent-riven, insignificant group with a solidly "red-brown" reputation.' Russian Christian Democracy, like the democratic movement as a whole, split over its attitude to Yeltsin and his reforms. There was a general consensus that Russia needed market reforms, but the divisions occurred over how they were to be achieved. The RCDM insisted that the naïveté of the government and its uncritical acceptance of neoliberal policies had itself become a destructive force. However, like most of the
conservative, patriotic and centrist criticisms of Gaidar's 'government of reforms', the RCDM's economic policy appeared to face both ways at the same time, towards the market as an ideal, but also towards a long transitional period of a state-owned economy. This was reflected in the wholly inadequate economic programme outlined by Vladimir Korsetov46 and incorporated into their electoral manifesto in late 1993.

The RCDM, like many other oppositional groups, greatly exaggerated the potential for unrest among groups disadvantaged by the reforms. To take advantage of the expected tide of revolt Konstantinov established the All-Russian Labour Conference (Vserossiiskoye trudovoye soveschchaniye, VTS) at a meeting on 6 June 1992 attended by 600 delegates from labour collectives, trade unions, strike committees and others to coordinate the defence of workers' interests.47 Konstantinov was elected chairman and under his guidance a resolution was adopted by the plenary meeting of VTS on 11 July 1992, which argued that Gaidar's reforms were being 'conducted in the interests of a narrow layer of mafia and corrupted elements'. The resolution called, inter alia, for: the establishment of state controls on prices for goods and services produced in the state sector; the establishment of a minimum wage, pensions and welfare benefits indexed to the cost of living; the cancellation of the presidential decree on the transformation of state enterprises into joint-stock companies; the suspension for a year of moves towards allowing enterprises to become bankrupt; the abolition of speculation in goods produced in the state sector; state subsidies to food enterprises; and the disallowing of the bankruptcy or forced liquidation of collective and state farms. In case these demands were not met the resolution warned that an all-Russian strike committee would be established which would prepare for a one-day warning strike on 7 September.48 The economic programme contained in these demands represented the reversal of moves towards privatisation and macroeconomic stabilisation, and demonstrated the capitulation of the 'liberal conservatives' to the economic programme of the neocommunists. In the event the warning strike of 7 September was a minimal affair, and the VTS soon faded away. Konstantinov went on to make his mark on the national political stage as a leader of the NSF and as one of the organisers of the armed uprising in October 1993.

The emerging nationalist and neocommunist alliance was convinced that the next change of government in Russia would represent a tilt towards more statist positions. The RCDM was a centrist party but found its alliance with some on the right increasingly influencing its own policies. The relationship between nationalism and democracy in postcommunist Russia was increasingly ambivalent once the common enemy, the communist regime, had disappeared. As the political crisis moved inexorably towards the denouement of the October events of 1993 democracy increasingly appeared to become the preserve of the liberal camp. While the nationalists (of both the Soviet and Russian types), as well as the neo-bolsheviks, had by mid-1993 begun to suggest non-democratic methods of struggle against Yel'tsin's government, the patriotic centre was increasingly tarred with the same brush.

In the final days of the old legislature Aksyuchits identified himself with many of the policies of the oppositional majority, but at the same time sought to distance himself from the Khasbulatov–Rutskoy alliance.49 This balancing act, while effective from a political point of view, did nothing to enhance the popularity of the RCDM. The RCDM's call in the referendum of 25 April 1993 for voters to condemn Yel'tsin and his policies went unheeded, but there was support for pre-term parliamentary and presidential elections. Yel’tsin's decree of 21 September 1993 dissolving the old legislature and announcing elections for a new Federal Assembly was denounced by the RCDM as 'a coup d'état', and the storming of parliament on 4 October was
condemned as 'the usurpation of the totality of power by Yel’tsin and the destruction in the country of the last remnants of constitutional legality of the Soviet period'.\textsuperscript{50} As a result of such unremitting hostility the RCDM found itself increasingly isolated, and now even condemned its former spiritual mentor, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who had supported Yel’tsin's decree.

\textbf{Splits in Christian Democracy}

The Christian writer Zoya Krakhmal'nikova argued that the RCDM was neither a Christian nor a democratic party.\textsuperscript{51} This was a view increasingly shared by many within the organisation itself, leading to a series of splits. In August 1991 Yakunin had left the RCDM because of its alleged imperialism. The problem, however, was not unique to Russia, and the divisive issue of national self-determination had provoked a split in the ruling Christian Democratic Movement in Slovakia in March 1992. The movement’s leader and prime minister of Slovakia at the time, Ján Čarnogurský, fought for the preservation of Czechoslovakia as a federal state, whereas a group led by Ján Klepac, the deputy chair of the Slovak National Council, broke away and demanded immediate independence for the country.\textsuperscript{52} The Christian Democrats lost the election to Vladimir Mečiar’s more virulent nationalists and were forced into opposition, and when Čarnogurský voted against Slovakia’s Declaration of Sovereignty in July 1992 he was condemned as a traitor.\textsuperscript{53}

On the very day that the Congress of Civic and Patriotic Forces ended, 9 February 1992, a meeting took place at the Moscow Soviet of the newly created Russian Christian Democratic Union (see below) with representatives of the Moscow organisation of the RCDM, where the latter condemned Aksyuchits’s and Konstantinov’s participation in the alliance with national-bolsheviks.\textsuperscript{54} The oppositional group within the RCDM argued that the regional organisations had not been consulted about the congress and that the movement as a whole had not been involved, and they called for an emergency Sobor of the RCDM.\textsuperscript{55} Their statement lamented the undermining of 'a colossal political potential and [destruction of] the prospects of emerging Christian Democracy in the most complex period of the political and economic formation of a new democratic Russia'. Instead of Russian Christian Democracy leading the reconstruction of the country, as achieved by German Christian Democracy after the war, 'all the electors see is not the unity of the Christian Democrats but organisational splintering and political dissonance'. They condemned the RCDM’s support for the revival of the USSR: 'To this end the use of force is seen as permissible, the transformation of the idea of patriotism into nationalism is obvious, and the seeking of contacts with national-bolsheviks is more and more pronounced.'\textsuperscript{56} The RCDM’s involvement with the provocative demonstration of neocommunists on Red Army Day, 23 February 1992, further alienated some of its members.

A conference of the Moscow city organisation of the RCDM on 7 March 1992 severely censured the leadership for its alliance with 'right-wing' national-bolshevik and national radical groups. The signatories of the protest denied that the current crisis in the territory of the former USSR was anything like the Time of Troubles at the beginning of the seventeenth century, or that Yel’tsin's government was another type of provisional government, and observed that 'from these catastrophic premises they draw extremist conclusions'. They condemned the attempt to recreate a Russian state 'within its historic boundaries' as a successor to the USSR and the Russian Empire. They insisted that the stress on 'restoring order' and 'strong state policies' would
threaten freedom. They pointed out that while declaring support for economic reform, the RNS supported the strengthening of state socialist property and the collective and state farm system. Above all, in their bitterly hostile declarations against Yel’tsin’s government all the basic documents of the RNS were permeated ‘with the spirit of civil war’. The alliance of Soviet and Russian ultra-nationalists led them to undertake actions which encouraged chauvinism and populism, raised political tension and destabilised the political situation. The protesters concluded that ‘This “right” radicalism has little in common either with conservatism in the generally accepted meaning or with Christian Democracy in any sense.’ Aksyuchits’s leadership was condemned.

For their pains, on 19 March 1992 Dmitri Khanov, Pavel Zhukov and two others were expelled for ‘actions directed towards the disintegration and destruction of the RCDM as an organisation’. They considered their expulsion an act contravening the statutes of the RCDM itself, and argued that the RCDM had become a party supporting the personal ambitions of Aksyuchits and not the movement as a whole. Khanov and some of his colleagues went on to create a shortlived new political organisation, the Moscow Christian Social Union (see below).

Valeri Senderov, one of the leading intellectuals allied to the RCDM and one of the leaders of the NTS (Union of Russian Solidarists) group in Moscow, brusquely announced his departure, asserting that the RCDM had ‘betrayed the ideals of Christian Democracy’ and had become a ‘red-brown USSR-type political group’. Anishchenko responded in a thoughtful article, only provoking Senderov to riposte that ‘there is no conflict [with the RCDM] since things are much simpler: I simply have no desire to have any contact (especially polemical ones) with red-browns and their associates (poputchiki)’. He reiterated that communists were red and fascists were brown, and therefore there was no need for Anishchenko to get upset about the terms. As for the need for compromises with national patriots and communists, Senderov insisted that there was no compromise: there was a conspiracy (sgovor). He accused Anishchenko of failing to understand the concept of patriot any more, having allied himself with the likes of Pavlov and Baburin who could not by any stretch of the imagination be described as patriots.

The Moscow organisation of the RCDM split, several regional organisations left, and the RCDM began to lose its identity in the RNS. While Aksyuchits had hoped to use the RNS as a broader vehicle to advance the aims of the RCDM, at times it was not clear which was the dog and which was the tail. Attempts by the rabidly ambitious Konstantinov to take control of the RNS suggested that the RCDM could become a victim of its own creation. Rather than the RNS becoming a front organisation for the RCDM, the reverse was becoming the case. Many of the largest regional organisations, including Orel led by Aleksandr Romash, left the RCDM, and by mid-1993 membership was little over 5,000. By 1994 the remaining RCDM organisations in Moscow, Tambov, Voronezh, Perm', Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, Volgograd, Kaluga and St Petersburg retained a tenuous existence.

Regrouping of Christian Democracy

The Christian Democratic Union of Russia (Khristiansky demokratichesky soyuz Rossii)

Ogorodnikov had been arrested and imprisoned in 1978 for organising ‘seminars’ of Orthodox young people. Taking advantage of the opportunities offered by perestroika, on 4–5 August 1989 he organised the first Christian Democratic organisation in Russia, the Christian Democratic Union of Russia (CDUR). Within a few months four
of the five founders of the party had left, citing not ideological differences but difficulties in working with Ogorodnikov as the reason. Soon after, the Moscow group led by the Protestant Viktor Rott and the Leningrad group led by Vitali Savitsky split away, and in the spring of 1990 Aleksandr Chuyev departed after a bitter dispute over financial management.

Several CDU groups went on to form an Alliance of Christian Democratic Unions of Russia, and in the spring of 1991 some regional groups went on to become 'collective members' of the RCDM. In its attempts to find allies the CDU formed a so-called 'Centrist Bloc' with Vladimir Zhirinovsky's nationalist Liberal Democratic Party and some other nationalist organisations. The CDU gained few local council seats in the elections of spring 1990, though it claimed some deputies in the Moscow Soviet and the Dzerzhinsky raion Soviet in Moscow, where the party, numbering some 300 members from mid-1990, based itself. The CDU confined itself largely to social and charitable work, organising public canteens and schools and distributing western food and other aid.

Russian Christian Democratic Party (Rossiiskaya khristianskaya demokratischeskaya partiya)

In May 1990 Chuyev went on to establish his own organisation, the Russian Christian Democratic Party (RCDP), and the similarity in name with the RCDM led to some confusion and might well have been a deliberate spoiling tactic by the authorities and the KGB, active at that time in nipping party formation in the bud. The RCDP was a classic leader-dominated partylet, and Chuyev's own past was subject to much hostile scrutiny. In spring 1989 he had left the radical Democratic Union, and his recriminations against that organisation made him a suspect figure in democratic circles. Despite this, the RCDP was allowed to join Democratic Russia, endowing the group with a status incommensurate with its resources. Chuyev's group remained active politically, and while discounting a rapprochement with Ogorodnikov's CDU was prepared to work with the RCDU (see below).

Moscow Christian Social Union (Moskovsky khristiansky sotsial'ny soyuz)

The founding conference of this ephemeral organisation took place on 19 June 1992, with Khanov one of the leading figures. Its political declaration condemned the 'right radicalism' of the RCDM as well as the 'liberal radicalism' of the RCDU and sought to find a moderate path of consensus politics in a polarised society. It called for the convocation of a new Constituent Assembly to provide a legitimate and constitutional basis for revived Russian statehood and to put an end conclusively to the Soviet period. Lacking resources or a distinctive programme, the group soon disappeared.

Russian Christian Democratic Union (Rossiisky khristiansky demokratischesky soyuz)

The departure of Popular Accord from Democratic Russia and the RCDM's resolute stand against the disintegration of the USSR and the creation of the CIS prompted a regrouping of Christian Democracy in Russia. A conference in St Petersburg on 25–26 January 1992 brought together the Alliance of Christian Democratic Unions and regional organisations of the RCDM that refused to follow the patriotic line pursued by its leadership. The Alliance reformed itself into the Russian Christian Democratic Union (RCDU), which was promptly joined by several regional organisations of the
CDUR and RCDM, including groups from Moscow, St Petersburg, Tula, Kaliningrad, Tambov, Saratov, Samara, Nizhni Novgorod and Irkutsk, and soon afterwards Nesterov’s CDU group in Volgograd and the RCDM group in Ryazan’, as well as the NTS group led by Senderov. The RCDU represented a major regrouping of Christian Democracy in Russia but did not signal expansion.

The statutes adopted at the conference provided the RCDU with a highly decentralised structure, allowing its regional groups broad powers. The RCDU espoused the principle of regionalism in order to ensure that effective counterbalances were in place against a revival of state absolutism. The programme took up the Kantian slogan that ‘Man is the goal, not the means to achieve the goal’, and proceeded to elaborate a non-statist democratic system marked by solidarity, freedom and a social market economy. Three co-chairs were elected to lead the new organisation: Yakunin, a deputy to the Russian parliament and co-chair of Democratic Russia; Valeri Borschchev, a member of the presidium of the Moscow Soviet and chair of the soviet’s committee on freedom of conscience and faiths; and Savitsky, leader of the St Petersburg CDU and co-chair of the regional organisation of Democratic Russia. The RCDU applied to join the CDI and affiliated itself to Democratic Russia, with Borschchev becoming a member of the DRM’s Coordinating Council. The conference adopted a resolution sharply denouncing the line pursued by the RCDM, condemning the ‘policy aimed at the reconstitution by any means, including armed force, of a unified state within the borders of the former USSR’, and protesting against ‘the making of an alliance with imperial national-communist forces, on the pretext of creating a patriotic movement’. At a conference organised by the RCDU on 16 May 1992 on ‘Christian Democracy Today’, Igor’ Potapov, the secretary of the RCDU’s Executive Committee, stressed that ‘However formal the character of the borders drawn by Stalin between the republics of the USSR, they must be recognised by all states.’

The creation of the RCDU represented an ideological and political challenge to the RCDM’s preeminent role in Russian Christian Democracy. The leadership of the new party was undoubtedly liberal-democratic and suggested that postcommunist Christian Democracy did not necessarily have to take patriotic forms. Christian Democracy’s emphasis on subsidiarity not only suggests the maximum devolution of power, but at the same time embraces the view that some power should be retained at the national, and increasingly the supranational, level. Hence western Christian Democratic parties have been advocates of federalism, and this was supported by the RCDU. The RCDM and other patriotic groups, however, were in favour of the restoration of a unitary Russian state, though with devolution of power in that context. Thus regionalism, the so-called meso-level of government between the centre and the locality, was advocated by the RCDM instead of federalism.

The political challenge of the RCDU focused on the emergence of a new generation of charismatic leadership, with Savitsky sufficiently popular in St Petersburg to be elected to the State Duma in December 1993. However, the regional emphasis of the new formation meant that its impact on national politics was minimal. Savitsky, indeed, like many in the old capital, abhorred Moscow politics and politicians, undermining attempts to create a unified all-Russian movement. Petersburgers considered themselves more genuinely western-oriented than their Muscovite counterparts, and what in Moscow looked like the great strength of the RCDM, its attempt to root a modern-day political movement in the philosophical and religious traditions of the past, in St Petersburg looked like obscurantism and conservatism of the worst Russian kind.
The Christian Democratic International

The CDI provides a classic example of the role that international civil society can play in the development of indigenous social movements. The relationship it has had with Russian Christian Democracy, however, demonstrates equally the weakness and fractiousness of Russian civil society and Russia's ambivalent relationship with the West.

The first links were established with the CDUR, but following a decision of the Political Bureau on 17 March 1992 the CDI no longer accorded a special status to Ogorodnikov's party and the RCDU became the new 'privileged partner'. Relations with the RCDM were much more difficult, and links were broken off by the CDI on the grounds that Aksyuchits was guilty of 'pan-Russian and hegemonistic strategies'. The CDI, moreover, urged a more gradualist economic reform strategy and condemned the irrational belief in 'the magic effects of liberalisation'.

On 20 September 1992 a Christian Democratic Union of Eastern Europe (CDU EE) was established in an attempt to coordinate work in postcommunist Europe, although despite the name only the former Soviet Union was covered. The meeting, which brought together Christian Democratic and similarly oriented parties from five of the former republics, stated that the parties expressed 'the desire of our peoples, now freed from the yoke of communist totalitarianism, to return to the bosom of European culture and civilisation, and to proclaim our attachment to the priority of the human person and to our common Christian values: freedom, solidarity and justice'. The founding Declaration was adopted in Brussels in December 1992 and Savitsky was elected secretary general, declaring that the new union would be 'a partnership of sovereign and independent states'.

The CDU EE brought together Christian Democratic parties in Armenia, Georgia, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine as well as conferring associate status on various national democratic movements, including the Belarusian Popular Front led by Zenon Poznyak. The organisation insisted that human rights were to take precedence over national rights. The establishment of the CDU EE was in keeping with the CDI's strategic aim of maintaining international links between the nascent Christian Democratic parties of the former Soviet Union while reaffirming the independence and sovereignty of each of the republics. The CDI's general secretary, André Louis, noted that it would take decades for the East European CD parties to match those of Latin America or Western Europe. He observed that 'Christian Democracy in the former USSR is at a stage comparable to that in Western Europe between 1925 (the German Zentrum and Don Sturzo's efforts in Italy) and 1945 (the creation of the Christian Democratic parties in their present form). In other words, Russia was still only in the early stages, but it might be noted that it took the Second World War to provide the stimulus for Christian Democracy to become a mass political phenomenon in the West.

Christian Democracy and Orthodoxy

In Italy after the war a solid anticommunist alliance was forged between the Christian Democrats and the Vatican, whereas in Russia the relationship between the emerging Christian Democratic parties and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) remained much more distant and the church refused to endorse any specific political party. The RCDM, even though favourably disposed, failed to establish a working relationship with the ROC, while the RCDU pursued a harshly critical line. Yakunin had long been
a scourge of the patriarchate's involvement with the KGB, and following the failed coup of August 1991 he was appointed to the parliamentary commission set up to investigate the KGB's activities. His revelations about the scale of KGB penetration of the Orthodox hierarchy, alleging that up to 20 per cent of clerics worked for the KGB, caused a scandal. Yakunin now warned that the ROC’s fundamentalist tendencies could well lead to a new schism within the Orthodox Church. It should be stressed, moreover, that the ROC itself was increasingly challenged not only by evangelical, Protestant and Roman Catholic incursions on what it considered its own territory, but also by alternative Orthodox churches, notably the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA) and the True (Catacomb) Orthodox Church.

The legacy of collaborationism meant that the church was unable to benefit from the fall of Soviet power and suffered a ‘crisis of legitimacy’. The point that perestroika could only triumph once the architects of perestroika had passed from the scene applies with particular force to the Orthodox Church. Up to recent times advancement depended on a compliant attitude to the state authorities, and a whole generation of current office-holders will have to pass before the church can really feel itself free of the burden of the past. While denying any ambition to become the state religion, the ROC still has to find a role for itself. In particular, the absence of an Orthodox social doctrine, or even of attempts to define one, or an effective relationship with western Christianity and its culture, have undermined the authority of the church. It is not even clear whether the ROC has finally come to terms with the social thinking of philosophers like Berdyaev and Bulgakov, considered heretical by traditionalist Orthodox theologians. Aleksi II argued that Russia was moving away from its past and traditions too fast: ‘Christian Democracy in Russia, as everywhere else, is possible. But are we ripe for it?’ The hierarchy found common cause with nationalists in trying to keep the evangelising activities of western churches, including the Roman Catholic Church, at bay through legislation.

Persecuted throughout the Soviet era, the church might be expected to have a natural affinity with the dissident movement. Yet the hierarchy had learnt to adapt to life with the Bolsheviks, and indeed the organisational penetration of the church by the regime compensated for the absence of any serious ideological dialogue. The church’s own hierarchical and authoritarian structures paralleled those of the regime, and the same could be said of the church’s espousal of collectivist and communal approaches to social life, as distinct from western concepts of capitalism, civil society and individualism. The ROC, in other words, through such concepts as sobornost’ (conciliarity) set up an image of a form of democracy higher than the excessively pluralistic version prevalent in the West.

Rather than welcoming the rise to prominence of a religiously based organisation to give political expression to its views, the ROC regarded it as a challenge to its own binary relationship with the hierarchic structures of Soviet/Russian statehood. The conflict between church and state was internalised within Orthodoxy in the form of numerous cleavages, notably the ROCA, while the Sergian quisling tendency at home adapted itself to the regime and rendered unto the Central Committee valuable services which were rewarded by the preservation of the church’s privileged status. Not for the first time in Russian history, the ROC became an accomplice to its own theological desecration in return for political privileges.

Not only did the ROC have a difficult relationship with Christian Democracy, it also had an ambivalent relationship with believers in general and was not able to take advantage of the growth in their number. A survey in 15 Russian cities revealed that 22 per cent of the polled considered themselves Christians in 1990, 47 per cent in 1991 and
52 per cent a year later. Over the same period the number of declared atheists fell from 24 to 8 per cent. Less cheering news was that supporters of the Moscow Patriarchate fell from 46 to 9 per cent between 1990 and 1992, suggesting that the Russian public was wide open to missionary activity, faith healers and the like. They would be more resistant to political extremism, however, and among believers there were fewer supporters of communist and neofascist movements than among the population at large. While believers might well tend to be more patriotic, this did not convert into support for Christian Democracy.

The ROC failed to provide clear moral leadership in postcommunist conditions or to repent for its collaboration with the communist authorities. Once again it appeared that the ROC sought a privileged relationship with the state, if not to become the state church. While the RCDM sought to preserve a predominant role for the ROC in Russian society, and in particular to enhance the influence of Orthodoxy on daily life, all Christian Democratic parties were committed to the separation of church and state and there was little support for the ROC becoming the established church. While at the margins the church influenced the political views of individuals, it failed to wield as much direct power over the social agenda as did, for example, the Roman Catholic Church in Poland. The Orthodox tradition, in any case, tended to stress prayer, contemplation and inner spiritual development rather than political activism, and its social doctrine remained rudimentary. The public sphere in postcommunist Russia remained resolutely secular.

The Elections of December 1993

While the liberal principles of individual responsibility and rights might command much support in postcommunist Russia, liberalism as an organised political force is indisputably weak. By contrast, while the socialist principles of collectivism and centralised economic decision-making command little support, socialism in the form of neocommunism as an organised political force is indisputably strong. In other words, politics is characterised by a gulf between social beliefs and political organisation, and this was reflected in the parliamentary elections of 12 December 1993. Christian Democracy in Russia was one of the few political forces organised on a clear ideological basis. Christian Democratic views, such as the ideology of the person, the reconciliation of man and society, support for intermediate bodies and the principle of subsidiarity, were all in one way or another at the centre of most political programmes, yet in the elections Christian Democracy was in effect wiped out as an effective political force.

It might be noted that Social Democratic movements, with similar though more secular programmes, were also defeated. None of the six main traditional patriotic movements, or even the ‘moderate patriots’, were able to form alliances. The factionalism endemic to the Russian party system was compounded by the great speed with which the elections were organised, the ambitions of the leaders, personal conflicts and, apparently, an attempt by the Kremlin to ban commercial structures from supporting patriotic electoral blocs. The vigour with which the national-patriotic movement was persecuted following the October events led to numerous suggestions that this had been a conscious policy of Yeltsin’s regime. The patriotic movement disappeared as an organised force, leaving the door wide open for the success of Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party. Calls for the RCDM to boycott the election were rejected, and it compiled an impressive roster for the proportional part of the vote. The list was headed by the former Olympic weightlifter and now writer Yuri Vlasov, Viktor Aksyuchits and the
radio journalist Tat’yana Ivanova, and also included Vladimir Osipov, the leader of Khristianskoye vozrozhdeniye (Christian Revival), the sculptor V. Klykov and other writers, philosophers and representatives of the Union of Merchants, the Union of Cossack Officers and Dvoryanskoye sobraniye (the Assembly of Noblemen). The RCDM’s electoral programme condemned Yel’tsin’s government for ‘continuing the destructive traditions of bolshevism’, and called for the unity of Russia while allowing national and cultural autonomy, the restoration of legal continuity with Russian state power, ruptured in 1917, real guarantees of the rights of property owners, the reduction of taxation and the preservation of the state monopoly on raw materials, transport and communications.96 The party condemned Yel’tsin’s projected constitution, insisting that it would only provide a legal cover for the catastrophic state of affairs.97 The RCDM refused to ally itself with any of the communist successor organisations or with nationalist ‘extremists’ but sought to stand as a ‘moderate constructive opposition’.98

Despite expectations that it might receive between 6 and 8 per cent of the votes,99 the RCDM fell at the first hurdle and failed to gain the necessary 100,000 signatures to be registered by the Central Electoral Commission.100 The RCDM was supported by the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods (Soyuz pravoslavnykh bratstv) and Khristianskoye vozrozhdeniye even though Osipov had reservations: ‘For us monarchists the word “democratic” is not very much to our taste’, but the RCDM was the only party ‘standing firmly on patriotic, great power (derzhavny) positions’.101 According to Osipov, the RCDM failed to obtain the necessary 100,000 signatures because of the refusal of the Orthodox hierarchy to support ‘the only electoral bloc which strongly defended the Russian Orthodox Church’.102 The RCDM urged voters to support Mikhail Lapshin’s neocommunist Agrarian Party of Russia.

Aksyuchits, moreover, failed to gain the necessary 1 per cent of nominations from his own constituency in the old Russian legislature,103 and the same was the case for Anishchenko in Kaluga. The RCDM, hampered by poor organisation and the generally fearful atmosphere after the October events, was thus a non-starter in the elections and consequently failed to gain any representation in the new Russian parliament. The RCDM’s putative candidate, Vlasov, did become an MP, but he stood as an independent and was not actually a member of the RCDM. In addition, with the abolition of the Moscow and other soviets, the RCDM lost its representatives on local councils.

Ogorodnikov’s CDUR agreed to support Yabloko, the bloc led by Grigori Yavlinsky, Yuri Boldyrev and Vladimir Lukin, but gained no seats.104 Chuyev’s RCDP was accused of falsifying signatures in its nomination papers and was banned from participating in the elections. The RCDU did better, but was unable to stand as an autonomous force and instead its three deputies in the new State Duma entered under the patronage of other blocs. Borschchev entered on the party list of the Yabloko bloc, while (Fr) Gleb Yakunin went with Yegor Gaidar’s Russia’s Choice. Savitsky won one of the eight constituencies in St Petersburg.105 Members of the same party were in effect standing against each other.

Alarmed by the murderous events attending the storming of the White House on 3–4 October 1993, the ROC sought to distance itself from parliamentary politics. On 8 October the Synod decreed that clergy were not to stand in the forthcoming elections, and on 3 November, even before he was officially registered as a candidate, Yakunin was defrocked.106 In an open letter on 19 January 1994 to Patriarch Aleksi, Yakunin noted that in the Fourth State Duma before the Revolution there were dozens of Orthodox bishops and clergy, the patriarch himself had been a deputy in Gorbachev’s parliament and, it might be noted, the Holy Synod of 1917–18 took the view that
political life was part of the religious vocation. 107 Aleksi, however, stood firmly by his decision, and in a letter to the new speaker of the State Duma, Ivan Rybkin, insisted that ‘Yakunin's activity is directed towards a split (raskol) in the Russian Orthodox Church', that he abused the hierarchy by calling them a 'clerical nomenklatura', that his activity had led to a 'mass protest by clergy and laity' and that citizen Yakunin in no way represented the ROC in parliament. 108 Quite apart from anything else, Yakunin's links with the ROCA did not endear him to the domestic hierarchy. As might have been expected, Yakunin did not give up the struggle to remain a cleric, and once again on 11 February wrote an open letter justifying himself to the patriarch. 109

Many factors explain the failure of Christian Democracy to make an impact in the first fully free elections in Russia. Centrist parties as a whole did very badly, and thus Christian Democracy, if it is seen as essentially a centrist movement, shared in the general defeat. Another argument would be to suggest that the sort of conservative politics usually associated with Christian Democratic parties are wholly inappropriate for postcommunist Russian politics, where the conservatism that is in evidence is not that of a stable bourgeois middle class but of the bureaucracy and the newly democratised nomenklatura. Moreover, the factionalism of Christian Democracy, like that of the Social Democrats, was punished by the electorate. While a large proportion of the population is oriented towards the preservation of the welfare state, as voters they do not see either Christian or Social Democracy as the best vehicle to preserve institutionalised social concern. The institutional weakness of the various Christian Democratic parties might suggest that their defeat was organisational rather than ideological.

The various parties were unable to become the leaders of a mass movement. This was owing both to the poor leadership and extremist strategies pursued by the significant Christian Democratic parties, and to the weakness of social organisations and institutions. In contrast to the norm in Western Europe, Christian Democracy in Russia is non-denominational and thus one of the few solid, if weakened, social institutions in Russian society, the Russian Orthodox Church, failed to place its weight behind the new parties. Russian Orthodoxy lacks any equivalent lay organisation to Catholic Action in Italy. Christian Democracy in Russia has not been able to convert the growth in the number of believers into votes. The opposite effect, indeed, is equally significant. Christian Democracy can repel those inclined towards secularism or non-Christian faiths as much as it can attract those disposed towards social Christianity.

**Christian Democracy and the New Politics**

Christian Democracy offered a distinctive synthesis of western and Russian traditions peculiarly appropriate for postcommunist conditions. Its emphasis on social solidarity and condemnation of Anglo-American ultra-liberalism, its belief that the enterprise is a 'human community', its stress on the role of 'intermediate bodies' acting as effective counterweights to the state and its espousal of subsidiarity (the view that the maximum amount of power should be left to those structures closest to the people, with higher bodies intervening only in a subsidiary enabling and arbitrating capacity) all went to the heart of the problem of building a new political order on the ruins of the communist project. However, rather than the pluralistic personalism and communitarianism of Christian Democratic political philosophy triumphing, much darker clouds were gathering on the Russian political horizon.

The elections of December 1993 signified the partial rejection of the global democratising project, which had become identified with uncritical westernisation
and the destruction of effective statehood in Russia. In its place the ideology of an allegedly more discerning approach to democratisation took its place which drew for inspiration on the works of Ivan Il’in, and in particular his *Nashi zadachi (Our Tasks).* Many of the 1960s generation of church intelligentsia took this path as they became part of the national-patriotic insurgency against total westernisation. Typical of the critiques of the ‘masquerade’ of reforms since August 1991 was Vlasov’s insistence that shock therapy had led to economic chaos benefiting only the ‘comprador bourgeoisie, mafia structures and corrupt bureaucrats’, while Russian statehood was undermined and the rest of society was sunk into poverty. In these circumstances the new constitution would only ‘provide the legal basis for the destruction of Russia’.

The ideology of Russian exceptionalism in the hands of the patriots appeared to justify a turn against the West and a condemnation of the cosmopolitanism of liberal democracy. Osipov stressed that ‘Russian civilisation differs qualitatively from that of the West… If Russia betrays its type of civilisation it will lose not only its great power status but also its character.’ Another former ‘dissident’, Ogurtsov, went further and insisted that the power of the democrats in Russia was ‘ephemeral’, and he called for the ‘total mobilisation of the people on a patriotic basis’. As Igor’ Potapov had noted earlier, ‘The thesis of the national uniqueness of Russia’s political structure inevitably leads to the reproduction of yet another authoritarian structure and to political idolatry. Despite all its liberationist rhetoric, Russian nationalism always turns out as a justification of this autocracy and as an apology for empire.’

The antiwestern attitude of the RCDM was exacerbated by its difficult relationship with the Christian Democratic International, and the ambiguities in the RCDM’s political programme now became even more stark. While stressing its commitment to a ‘social market economy’, the RCDM took a virulently hostile line to Yel’tsin’s marketising reforms from January 1992. Similarly, their commitment to democracy was tempered by the view that while democratic forms in Russia might be useful for the transition, only a Council of the Land (Zemsky Sobor) or some other national assembly could legitimately decide which was the most appropriate political form for the governance of Russia and most in keeping with national traditions.

The growth of antiwestern attitudes among the Russian political elite from mid-1992 took an ever sharper form, accompanied by accusations of an anti-Serb bias by the western powers. Just as the ROC was firmly opposed to the ecumenism so typical in western churches, so too Russian patriotic movements condemned the cosmopolitanism of western democracy. Nazarov, until recently one of the leaders of the NTS, now criticised its prowesternism and support for Yel’tsin’s ‘neo-February’ regime, which like the Provisional Government in 1917 was able only to deepen the crisis because of its incompetence and lack of understanding of Russian traditions. He stressed Russia’s spiritual difference from the West and noted that ‘concerning democracy, even many of its former supporters, finding themselves in the West, realised its spiritual falsity’. The West consciously betrayed the White movement in Russia to allow ‘western banks, or more accurately Jewish capital, financing all opponents of the Russian monarchy… to dechristianise and cosmopolitanise Russia’. He noted that ‘fascism was a general European reaction to the victory of such a democracy’, a democracy in practice marked by the rule of money. Thus the wheel had turned full circle, and communism’s critique of capitalism was now supplanted by fascism’s, both in the name of Russian exceptionalism.

At the special conference of opponents of the presidential draft of the new constitution on 3 December 1993, Oleg Rumyantsev, earlier the secretary of the Supreme
Soviet's Constitutional Commission, noted that the main problem was the absence of civil society in Russia. Yuri Korinets, however, insisted that

It is known that with the disintegration of empires it is not civil society that arises but at first only states with the concept of a people and popular sovereignty, state borders and absolutism, and the development of power at the local level. To demand that democratic freedoms flourish in these conditions is unhistorical.

He characterised Yeltsin's regime as a dictatorship which was 'pro-American, colonial and anti-Russian', and stressed that 'we are against a colonial dictatorship but for a national authoritarian regime'.

Thus democracy was now bracketed with communism as destructive of Russian traditions and sovereign statehood. Such views did not pass unchallenged in the RCDM. Oleg Mramornov, the deputy editor of Put', insisted that the question was not whether democracy as such was a good or bad principle, but 'what sort of democracy there will be in Russia, since there is no reason to doubt the inevitability of democracy'. He admitted, however, that democracy would remain weak until it corresponded with 'organic-natural and profound national intentions, ideas and needs'. He refused to accept that democracy was unnecessary for Russia, and that all that democracy did was 'to destroy what socialism, for good or ill, had conserved of Russian traditions by shielding them from destructive western influences, and that with its fall Russia would finally be ended'.

Following the election the RCDM called for a second Congress of Civic and Patriotic Forces to coordinate opposition to Yeltsin's regime. Once again the party sought to take the lead in creating a broad front of oppositional patriotic forces. As far as Aksyuchits was concerned, the main task was 'the restoration and strengthening of Russian statehood'. He did not appear to have learned from the disastrous experience of the RNS, which soon became dominated by extreme nationalist and chauvinist ideas. Although after some hesitation in mid-1992 the RCDM came down firmly against proposals to ally itself with neocommunist organisations, the damage was done and some of the odium attached to the NSF (in which one of the former leaders of the RCDM, Konstantinov, was prominent) fell onto the RCDM.

The Failure of a Dream?

Christian Democracy in Russia had been uniquely placed to develop a new humanism for the postcommunist world, learning from the failures of Marxist utopianism and the inadequacies of western secular humanism. While Christian Democracy might have achieved the core goal of any political party, namely organisational survival, on all other indices, such as the pursuit of votes, gaining office and influencing policy, the record is poor. Only the RCDM might claim to have influenced policy, both within the old legislature and in the national context, towards a more assertive Russian statism, but this achievement might be considered a mixed blessing. Its 'success' in preventing the adoption of the constitution at the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies in April 1992 must raise the question of its contribution to the bloodshed of 3–4 October 1993, when the constitutional struggle for power exploded into armed conflict. By 1993 the RCDM could no longer credibly be considered a Christian Democratic party. Its emphasis on state building made it more of a national patriotic movement, and its commitment to democratisation as a set of social and political values was in doubt. Movements that remained in the Christian Democratic fold, however, like the RCDU
and the CDUR, were weak and politically insignificant. Krakhmal’nikova was dismissive of all these movements and argued that ‘the first attempt to establish Christian Democracy ended in demagogy and hot air’.122

How can we explain the weakness of Christian Democracy in Russia? One of the most detailed analyses is provided by A. Shchipkov. He takes issue with those who try to find elements of continuity with such organisations as Ivan Prokhanov’s Christian Democratic Party of 1917, and insists that postcommunist Christian Democracy in Russia is a qualitatively new phenomenon, with few links even with dissident organisations of the 1960s like Ogurtsov’s VSKhSON.123 According to him, Christian Democracy’s initial appeal was as part of the broader democratic struggle against communism, but once this negative impulse gave way to the need to find a more positive programme, Russian Christian Democracy was found wanting.

Shchipkov divides the movement into two branches, with the ‘prowestern’ tendency represented by Ogorodnikov’s CDUR, Chuyev’s RCDP and Yakunin’s and Savitsky’s RCDU and marked by a commitment to western values and liberal democracy. They appealed to people of all faiths, and indeed atheists, who shared Christian Democrat political principles. This was the problem, according to Shchipkov, since the religious base of CDU organisations was not the committed Orthodox believer but various neophytes, evangelists and Protestants, repelled by the monarchism and statism apparently inherent in Russian Orthodoxy. The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad was more to their taste, untainted by KGB collaboration and Russian great power ambitions. The lack of a theological basis to these movements drove them ever further into the ranks of the ‘radical democrats’, and the absence of a social or ideological base in the main religion of the country, Orthodoxy, forced them towards ecumenism and thus Protestantism.124

The second tendency was the right wing of Christian Democracy represented by the RCDM, which attempted at first to find a new synthesis of the democratic idea with Christianity in general and Orthodoxy in particular. Aksyuchits was elected a parliamentary deputy in March 1990 not as a Christian Democrat (this was nowhere mentioned in his electoral literature) but as part of the general anticommunist democratic movement. Since its foundation in April 1990, however, the RCDM has been consistently patriotic and in favour of an expanded notion of Russian statehood, and this led to the break with the so-called democrats over such issues as the proposed Union Treaty of August 1991 and the creation of the CIS in December of that year. The creation of the RNS led to the break with the final democratic ally, Travkin’s DPR, and thereafter relations between democracy and patriotism in the movement were strained and the RCDM’s self-definition as a Christian Democratic party was in doubt, and indeed it now preferred to call itself a liberal conservative organisation. The RCDM’s social base differed from that of the westernising Christian Democrats, being dominated by practising Orthodox believers and the lower ranks of the intelligentsia. However, as the party moved to the right and the national-patriotic camps little recruitment took place and the organisation began to wither away.125

Thus, according to Shchipkov, Christian Democracy in Russia lacked its own ideological doctrine and theological base, its social thinking was derivative, and it lacked traditions and support from the ROC hierarchy. If it became more democratic, it moved away from the only serious source of social support, the church; but if it moved towards Orthodoxy it lost its democratic colouring and become a national-statist party. Either way, the movement lost its Christian Democratic specificity. Shchipkov’s view is clearly an extreme one, and in certain respects mistaken. Russian history is marked by numerous proto-Christian Democratic movements, and thus
there was a ‘usable past’ on which to build. There was, moreover, a strong tradition, albeit cut short, of attempts to develop an Orthodox social philosophy. The whole notion of ‘Christian socialism’ was at the centre of the thinking of Semen Frank, and this was reflected by the RCDM. Moreover, Christian Democratic movements from the late Gorbachev years did have strong links with the old dissident movement, notably in the persons of Osipov and Ogurtsov.

While Shchipkov has raised important points, the failure of the first wave of Christian Democracy needs to be placed in the larger political context of the struggle for nation and state building and the development of the economic bases of sovereignty. Lacking sufficient western support, the attempt by the regime between August 1991 and December 1993 rapidly to modernise and internationalise its economy was undermined and in its place the advocates of the development of Russian national capital and vigorous great power statehood came to the fore. In the absence of serious attempts to restore the command economy or to establish a liberal market economy, the transition itself was liable to become the new social formation. The liberals as much as the patriots were in danger of becoming marginalised by the emergence of a new social order benefiting from the intermediate world, appealing to nationalistic sentiments and ready to apply protectionist and isolationist policies. Trapped between two worlds, a hybrid and corrupted civil society might well emerge.

In the West, Christian Democracy sought to reconcile Catholicism and democracy, and to a large degree (though imbued with a ruthless pragmatism) the project succeeded. In the East the reconciliation of Orthodoxy and democracy is no less urgent but it remains an open question whether Christian Democracy here will be able to play the same role. The centrality of religion and faith in a modern secularising context is, in any case, highly problematic. The key issue is whether the ROC is the cornerstone of the development of Russian life, or just one element among many. The RCDM insisted that the separation of church and state was only part of a larger programme in which Orthodoxy could play its part in the renewal of Russian culture and traditions. This was a historical view shared by Dmitri Likhachev, for example, who argued that the Orthodox Church, despite its schisms and subservience to the state, was one of the highest and most beautiful expressions of Christianity and, through Byzantium, was Russia’s cultural and linguistic link with the Eastern Mediterranean and European cultures. His was a pan-Europeanism that rejected the anonymous cosmopolitanism of Anglo-American culture but located Russian uniqueness within a broader cultural context. His condemnation of great Russian nationalism, of anti-Semitism and theocracy, was based on his view that ‘nationalism is a manifestation of the weakness of a nation and not of its strength’, and in its place he extolled the virtues of inclusive patriotism.

The writer Nataliya Narochnitskaya, the co-chair of the First World Russian Congress (Moscow, 26–28 May 1993), took these ideas further and insisted that the ‘Russian Idea’ in the interpretation of the new Slavophiles, the ‘new and extremely aggressive “Westernisers”’ (who call their opponents red-browns) and the new Eurasianists, all miss the point: ‘One can understand Russia’s significance and role in world history only through realising its Christian interpretation and meaning.’ The Orthodox Christian community was at the basis of this view of Russian statehood. This was very different from the nationalists’ view, with its stress on the expansive great power aspects of the Russian state.

The RCDM refused to join in the general assault occasioned by the revelations about relations with the KGB, and in many respects the political attitudes of the RCDM and ROC coincided, but the RCDM ultimately failed to establish an effective relationship
with the church. Patriots may well support the Russian Orthodox Church, but the church did not necessarily support the patriots. The RCDM’s obsession with making an impact on high politics led to its neglect of broader processes of social reconstitution, education and charity and the patient development of a constituency.

The trajectory of Russian Christian Democracy, from bright promise to extremism and marginalisation, reflects the weakness of civil society in Russia. Christian Democracy, and indeed democracy in general, has had major difficulties developing in countries in the Orthodox tradition. Not only is Christian Democracy associated with alien Roman Catholic concepts and the West in general, but it is very much part of a sophisticated tradition of social self-organisation within the framework of civil society. Indeed, Christian Democracy has flourished where the state has been weak (as in Italy and Central America), and the implicit antistatism of the movement runs counter to Orthodox traditions and the postcommunist project of resurrecting Russian statehood.

The church is both part of the public order and a private organisation, but in Russia the former role has tended to predominate. The ROC is one of the most important bodies in civil society today, but it is associated with patterns of behaviour that undermine civil society. The Orthodox tradition lacks an effective political vocabulary to distinguish between the separate spheres of state and society. The ideology of Russian exceptionalism, such as the commitment to sobornost’, undermines the distinction between state and society that is at the heart of modern liberal democracy, and the notion is often counterposed both to democracy as a process and to liberalism as the expression of the egoism of civil society.

Liberalism is subversive of ideals of human community, and its commitment to association is instrumental and restricted to contract. The emergence of Christian Democracy was an explicit response to Marx’s critique of capitalism and sought to temper the divisiveness of civil society. Like ecologism and nationalism, Christian Democracy is a Gemeinschaft ideology, but at the same time it accepts the imperatives driving society towards the anonymity of the liberal Gesellschaft. This is not the place to discuss the contradictory faces of western Christian Democracy, claimed at different times by both left and right and seeking to combine elements of liberalism with organicist conservatism, devotion to moral truth with the pragmatic pursuit of power, but these ideological tensions have been cruelly exposed by the intense pressures generated by postcommunist Russian politics. The westernising Russian Christian Democrats have stressed the liberal elements, while the statists have found the commitment to social market principles and the ideal of a moral community more to their taste. In both cases the delicate balance within Christian Democracy between Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft tendencies has been exploded, and Christian Democracy as an autonomous force destroyed. In other words, Russia has demonstrated that communism does not work and it now appears to be doing the same for Christian Democracy.

The problem of party formation in Russia reflects more acutely the crisis of parties in general in European politics. It might well appear that Christian Democracy (and perhaps Social Democracy too) has had its day, that it was a phenomenon of the late nineteenth to the late twentieth centuries and is inappropriate to the challenges facing the world on the eve of the twenty-first century. Christian Democracy was a response to modernisation, industrialisation and the onset of mass society and reflected resistance to the market economy and the secularisation and individualisation of social life. The apparent triumph of liberalism has left it without an anchor. Both Christian and Social Democracy were reactions to the transition to a liberal market
Christian Democracy and Civil Society in Russia

In Russia, of course, where the liberal social formation is only now emerging, their critiques might well still be relevant, but it appears that both in politics and in economics Marx's dictum that 'the country that is more developed industrially only shows the less developed country the image of its future' remains justified.

In mid-1992 a commentator wrote that 'the Christian-democratic organisations are becoming increasingly noticeable in Russian politics', but this was accompanied by the view that 'it is especially regrettable when Christian Democrats split into ever small factions, fencing themselves off from one another and denying one another the right to be called Christians simply because they hold different views on the possibility of the former USSR being resurrected.' The tendency of Christian Democracy in Russia to fracture was typical of party formation in postcommunist societies in general. Movements divided with amoebic regularity characterised by the predominant role of personalities leading to sectarianism.

Christian Democracy seeks to combine civil society with a commitment to solidarity, and its failure has opened the door to the notion of community inherent in nationalist ideologies. In postcommunist conditions the only future for Christian Democratic parties if they wished to act decisively in the political arena, as the experience of Čarnogurský in Slovakia appeared to confirm, was to act as Christian nationalist parties. This had already been one of the marked elements of the RCDM from the first, and it thus found itself with a ready programme after the dissolution of the USSR. The RCDM had always been unambiguous in distinguishing between patriotism and nationalism. The concept of enlightened patriotism considers all national traditions and patriotisms as of equal worth, and thus links this thinking with western pluralism and ecumenism, and at the same time distances it from more conservative forms of Russian nationalism and Slavophilism which stress the superiority of Russian culture and religion. The organic collectivism inherent in notions of patriotic statism was distinct from the mass principles espoused by nationalists, let alone communists, and sought to combine the individual with the larger community. The RCDM's patriotism stressed identification as a citizen of the state rather than the nationalist claims on membership of a particular ethnic group.

Nevertheless, the statism of the RCDM suggests a lack of appreciation of civil society. The RCDM had become a statist party in two senses: in relations between the various republics and the Russian state; and in relations between state and society within the reborn Russian polity. The former is concerned with the politics of patriotism which exulted the traditions of Russian statehood and stressed that the destruction of communism did not necessarily entail the destruction of the state itself. The democrats had allegedly identified the state with communism and proceeded to demolish both, while the nationalists sought to maintain a strong state but in the same form that had oppressed Russia for 74 years. The patriots, however, demanded a strong state but one rooted in pre-1917 traditions of statehood. In this context, the ambiguities in the prerevolutionary development of civil society were likely to be reproduced.

In his analysis of Chilean Christian Democracy Michael Fleet notes that 'Christian Democratic thought has failed to give the movement an adequate ideological foundation ... neither of the sources from which it is drawn, i.e., contemporary papal encyclicals and Catholic social philosophy, provide such a base.' Christian Democracy in Russia, too, ultimately failed to build a movement combining Christian Democratic political thought and Russian social and religious philosophy. Neither the westernising nor the indigenising branch of Russian Christian Democracy was able to
sustain a genuine and viable democratic alternative to the neoliberal policies pursued by the government, or indeed to generate a convincing counterhegemony to ‘joining western civilisation’ or ‘becoming normal’.

The fate of Christian Democracy in Russia is a microcosm of the development of political life in the country as a whole. In the first half decade of postcommunist political development Christian Democracy, like democracy itself, was unable to fulfil the hopes vested in it. Above all, it failed to synthesise Russian traditions of social and political philosophy with the demands of late twentieth-century postcommunist political development – something no other social movement was able to do either. Yakunin noted that ‘democracy in Russia – though it has only taken its first steps – is in crisis’, and he stressed that ‘if the struggle for democracy in Russia is to continue, a political movement faithful to Christian ideals is necessary. Thus Christian Democracy in Russia is indispensable and – I believe – has a bright future.’ The failure of the first wave does not deny the importance of Christian Democracy in Russia, nor does it mean the failure of the democratic dream in its entirety.

Notes and References

1 ‘The specificity of Christian Democracy’, Khristianskaya Demokratiya: Bulletin of the Christian Democratic International, No. 20, July–August 1992, p. 8. Caldera stressed, moreover, that ‘it is not possible, for example, to transfer the institutions of the developed countries of Europe to the developing countries of Latin America. Each country has its own responsibility, its own duty.’ These were very much the sentiments of patriotic Christian Democrats in Russia.

2 The article ‘Milestones in Christians’ political life in Russia’ argued that Christian Democracy was not a new idea nor a concept imported from outside but drew on a long tradition in Russia, beginning with the Society of Kirill and Methodius in 1845–7 and ending in the Soviet era with the All-Russian Social Christian Union for the Liberation of the People (VSKhSON), led by Igor’ Ogurtsov in the 1960s. Khristianskaya Demokratiya, No. 21, September–October 1992, pp. 13–14.

3 André Louis, general secretary of the Christian Democrat International, condemned the liberal view that ‘the market will of necessity generate the welfare of humanity’, and insisted: ‘as for us, we say: the market is a tool for the pursuit of the welfare of humanity’. ‘Christian Democracy in the world’, Khristianskaya Demokratiya, No. 20, July–August 1992, p. 9.


5 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 November 1992, p. 2; see also his comments in Russkaya mysl’, No. 3904, 15 November 1991, p. 6.


7 KhIAG khristianskiye novosti, No. 40, 1 September 1991, p. 11.


10 Nazarov, op. cit., p. 2.


12 Obozrevatel’, No. 1, January 1992, p. 3. The organising committee issued four declarations; two were marked by ‘enlightened patriotic’ sentiments while the others were more nationalistic. One of the latter stated: ‘All national and social forces of Russia must be mobilised to preserve her unity and the indivisibility of her territory. We intend to reconstitute the Russian state as the foundation for the consolidation of the peoples of the
old historic Russia. In this connection we aspire to the reincorporation into Russia of adjacent territories and former republics of the Union.'


14 Aksyuchits, op. cit., p. 3.


18 Ekspress-Khronika, No. 6 (236), 4–11 February 1992, p. 4.


22 Soon after the creation of the RNS a convention of the Slavic Congress (Slavyansky Sobor), meeting in Nizhni Novgorod on 15–16 February 1992, formed the Russian National Congress (Russky natsional'ny kongress – RNS) headed by Major-General A. Sterligov, the governor of Sakhalin, Valentin Fedorov and the writer Valentin Rasputin. This major split in national-patriotic ranks was only the first of many.


24 Obozrevatel', Nos. 2–3, 1992, p. 3.


26 Mikhail Astaf'yev, 'Nel'zya prenebregat' natsional'nymi chuvstvami russkikh lyudei', Obozrevatel', No. 1, January 1992, p. 3.

27 Nazarov, op. cit., p. 2.

28 Russian Unity brought together four fractions: Rossiya with 58 deputies, Otchizna with 60, the Agrarian Union with 109 and Communists of Russia with 63, a total of 290 deputies. The democratic ‘Coalition of Reforms’ had 294 deputies at this time, with another 233 deputies in centrist fractions like the Industrial Union, and 269 in no fraction at all. A. A. Sobyanin (ed.), VI s”yezd narodnykh deputatov Rossi: politicheskiye itogi i perspektivy (analytichesky otchet o rezul’tatakh poimennykh golosovanii na VI S”yeze narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii (6–21 Aprelya 1992g.)) (Moscow, Organisational Department of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, 1992), p. 11.


32 The evolution in the RCDM’s thinking is reflected in the second collection of its documents, based on the work of its Second Congress (Sobor) of 20 June 1992: Vozrozhdeniye Rossi: Khristianskaya demokratiya i prosveshchenny patriotizm (Moscow, Vybor, 1993).


37 The Independent, 26 May 1993.

38 Telegrams from the Moscow organisation of the RNS, chaired by V. V. Selivanov, Put’, No. 8 (21), 1992, p. 5.

39 Nazarov, op. cit., p. 2.

40 Viktor Aksyuchits, op. cit., p. 3.

41 Nazarov, op. cit., p. 2.

42 This debate was aired during the appearance of Viktor Aksyuchits, Gleb Anishchenko and Il’ya Konstantinov in the television programme ‘Oppozitsiya’, broadcast on the Russian Television Channel on 17 August 1992.

43 Put’, No. 7 (20), 1992, p. 3.
Richard Sakwa


Put’, No. 7 (20), 1992, p. 10.


The RCDM rejected accusations that it had been ‘pro-Khasbulatovite’, and insisted: ‘Our position was determined, above all, by the attempt to restrain the impetuous modernisation of the country, threatening to lose its own character, the loss of the historical, national and spiritual specificities of Russia. The deputies were not a brake on the reforms but, especially in the last year, a constructive restraining factor allowing the maintenance of a necessary historical pause, not allowing a new revolutionary wave once again to throw Russia into a wave of revolutionary expediency.’ Put’, Nos. 8–9 (29), 1993, p. 2.

Zoya Krakhmal’nikova, ‘Dvoiniki’, Stolitsa, No. 50 (160), 1993, p. 7; for a comment on her views, see Put’, No. 1 (31), 1994, p. 5. Krakhmal’nikova belongs to the ROCA.


The declaration was circulated during the congress and was signed by M. Ivanchikov, V. Kovrigin, D. Antsiferov, D. Khanov and others, mimeo.


Rezolyutsiya gorodskoi konferentsii Moskovskogo ob”yedineniya RKhDD, mimeo. The resolution was signed by P. Zhukov, M. Ivanchikov, A. Mishin and D. Khanov. For the bitterly critical meeting of the Moscow RCDM organisation, see Ekspress-Khronika, No. 13 (243), 1992, p. 7.

Put’, No. 3 (16), 1992, p. 3.


Ekspress-Khronika, No. 27 (257), 1992, p. 5; Put’, No. 5 (18), 1992, p. 2.


In September 1992 the Orel organisation accused the RCDM’s leaders of getting too close to Russia’s ‘red-brown opposition’, RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. No. 37, 18 September 1992, p. 77. These charges were rebutted at a meeting of the RCDM’s Political Council on 2 October 1992, Put’, No. 10 (23), 1992, p. 2 and p. 3.


Yakunin and Savitsky, op. cit., p. 15.

See, for example, Put’, No. 1 (31), 1994, p. 5.

Uchreditel’naya politicheskaya deklaratsiya, mimeo.

The Russian Ministry of Justice delayed registering the new party until 1993 because of objections lodged by Ogorodnikov about the similarity in the names of the two organisations.

Anthony de Meeus, op. cit., p. 6.

Ustav RKhDS (St Petersburg, 1992), mimeo.

Printsipl’naya programma RKhDS (St Petersburg, 1992).


Khristianskaya Demokratiya, No. 20, July–August 1992, p. 25.

Roanne Thomas Edwards, ‘Russian Christian Democracy from a regional perspective: the

77 Results of ‘Round Table’ in Zelenogorsk, 20 September 1992, mimeo. Anthony de Meeus was the CDI’s political adviser in Eastern Europe and played a leading part in the creation of the CDU EE.

78 Results of ‘Round Table’ in Zelenogorsk, Appendix 1.

79 Results of ‘Round Table’ in Zelenogorsk, p. 2.


81 Khristianskaya Demokratiya, No. 22, November-December 1992, p. 3.


84 The main national-patriotic organisations were: the Russian Popular Union (ROS) led by Sergei Baburin; the Otechestvo alliance of patriotic and Cossack groups; Astaf’yev’s Constitutional Democratic Party; the National-State Party (which had split from ROS); and, on the more patriotic ‘liberal conservative’ side, the RCDM and the Union for the Revival of Russia led by Dmitri Rogozin. Some of these cooperated in preparing a patriotic draft constitution, but expectations that this would be the basis for an electoral bloc proved mistaken. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30 June 1993, p. 1.

85 There are many suggestions that the authorities hindered the signature campaign, amid allegations that the police detained a number of Christian Democrat activists and confiscated the signatures that they had managed to collect. The reasons for the RCDM’s
failure were analysed by Aksyuchits at a meeting of the RCDM’s Political Council on 30 November. *Put*, No. 1 (31), 1994, p. 3.


103 Aksyuchits’ failure is hardly surprising since 75 per cent of the poll in his Cheremushinsky constituency in the referendum of 25 April 1994 endorsed Yel’tsin and his policies, one of the highest votes of support in the country. Aksyuchits, however, was unrepentant and explained the gulf between his position and that of his constituents by asserting that ‘I’m afraid they are very mistaken. This referendum has nothing to do with democracy.’ *The Independent*, 1 May 1993.


105 *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 28 December 1993, p. 3.

106 For Yakunin’s protest against what he considered was an anticanonical act, see his open letter to Patriarch Aleksi II, *Russkaya mysl*, No. 4016, 10–16 February 1994, p. 9.

107 *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 19 January 1994. The Synod of 1917–18 added the proviso that while every cleric had the right to participate in politics, political activity was not to be undertaken in the name of the church.


109 loc. cit.


114 Obozrevatel’, Nos. 2–3, 1992, p. 3; see also his interview with Petr Palamarchuk, *Den*, No. 49 (77), 6–12 December 1992, p. 5.


117 *Put*, No. 1 (31), 1994, p. 11. All quotations from this page.

118 Yuri Korinets, ‘Proyekt konstitutsii i problemy oppositsii segodnya’, *Put*, No. 1 (31), 1994, p. 10. All quotations from this page.


122 Krakhmal’nikova bitterly condemned Aksyuchits’ role in the events of October 1993, even though she conceded that he had consistently called only for peaceful means of political struggle. ‘Dvoiniki’. *Stolitsa*, No. 50 (160), 1993, p. 9.


124 *ibid.*, pp. 18–20.

125 *ibid.*, pp. 20–2.

126 See, for example, Kirill Fotiyev, ‘Pravda o zemle’, *Put*, No. 6 (19), 1992, p. 10.

127 *Put*, No. 3 (16), 1992, p. 11.

128 Ogurtsov allied himself with the RCDM; see, for example, the interview with Ogurtsov in *Put*, No. 9 (22), 1992, p. 2; see also *Put*, No. 2 (15), 1992, p. 2.


I am grateful to Vladimir Moss for stressing this point to me.
