In 1974 when new Marxist radicalism swept over Ethiopia, the military junta that took power removed both the Emperor and the institutions that were closely associated with the monarchy. These were the church and the small aristocratic élite, which were grounded in the old heartland of the kingdom but had not taken root or won much love in the more recently conquered areas. The new rulers lacked any well-defined doctrine or any fixed political programme except for the vague notion of Ethiopia Tiqdem (Ethiopia First). It was out of this nebulous concept that the choice of socialist doctrine was made. In practice, the Marxism advocated was no different from that of most developing countries: it was essentially nationalist in character, though its political slogans were of global import.

This article surveys the main factors which contributed to changes and continuities in the church-state relationship in pre- and post-revolutionary Ethiopia, putting them into their respective historical contexts. We shall show how the initial conflict, which arose out of political and ideological interests, subsided and gave place to a gradual rapprochement between church and state. This occurred as the issues of territorial integrity and nationalism became the main points of contention between the state and other national as well as religious groups.

Initially, the Orthodox Church was quite unprepared to adjust to such a vast change of fortune: the revolution caught it by surprise. It had flourished under imperial favour without the slightest element of independence from governmental control. Its economic position had rested upon the land it had been granted and additional large subventions from the imperial purse. The historical roots of such dependence went back to the very origin of Christianity in Ethiopia, and characterised its entire existence.

A quite different pattern emerged from that of the Graeco-Roman world, where Christianity was first accepted by the lower classes and only later by the ruling class. According to the available historical records, Christianity in Ethiopia was introduced first to the royal court and then
gradually spread among the common people. Since then, church and state have remained so intermixed that it is not easy to draw a line between them. The Emperor behaved as though the church were the temporal as well as the religious authority of the country. Just as his temporal orders were executed by his ministers and generals, so were his religious orders executed by the church. In practice, he was both Pope and King. To read the royal chronicles, both those from the Middle Ages and more recent accounts of the late Haile Selassie, is like reading the chronicles of the Old Testament: prophecies are fulfilled in imperial actions, miracles are performed in the royal court, the king's enemies are seduced by Satan. Conversion of the heathen was carried out less by the church than by imperial arms and edicts, and conquests have often been followed by wholesale forced conversions to Christianity. It was the Emperor who proclaimed the doctrine to be followed by the people, the church's role being confined mainly to consultation first, and later to threatening schismatics with excommunication. The monarch considered his role to be no less religious than political.

The church's dependence on the monarchy should not overshadow the equal importance of the church to the monarchy, both politically and ideologically. Politically, church support meant using the weapon of excommunication against insurgents and subverting the allegiance of a rebel's followers. Church support was thus as useful as the king's armies in repressing rebellion. Ideologically, the church provided the basis for legitimacy for the state, thus maintaining the status quo. Through its virtual monopoly of the educational machinery, it moulded the minds of the peasantry to respect the established authority and to pay taxes. The mutual support between the monarchy and the church was clearly demonstrated in the coronation service, when the Emperor swore to maintain the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and, in return, received the emblems of the authority and the submission of the patriarch in the name of the whole Ethiopian Orthodox Church. In the Constitution of 1931 and that of 1955, this state of affairs, initially based on tradition and customary law, was codified in modern legal form. The Constitution of 1955 reserved basic temporal matters to the monarch, but in practice his power was unlimited, thus continuing the historically symbiotic life of the church and the state. The situation was well expressed by Patriarch Thewophilos in an interview in 1969: "There is no state without the church and there is no church without the state. In Ethiopia church and state are one and the same" — a remark which would not have disgraced Cardinal Richelieu.

This unity was disrupted by the draft constitution of early August 1974, in which the separation of church and state was announced and the equality of all religions began to be increasingly emphasised. As a result, the revolution swept the church aside, putting it on the same level as other
religions and denominations for the first time in the country’s history, thus destroying its position as a state religion. Orthodox Christianity remained the major religion of the country, but purely as a matter of private conscience. This historical event was interpreted by one of the country’s leading newspapers as “a monument to the end of feudalism and the beginning of the ‘people’s government’”. The church reacted vigorously. However, a memorandum by Thewophilos with the full backing of the Ecclesiastical Synod made no impact on the constitution drafters, despite its threat of strong measures should his proposals be rejected. The memorandum attacked the decision to reduce the church to the same level as other religions on the grounds that “the people still support the church which has spread Christianity within Ethiopia. To suppress the Orthodox religion as the basis of government is to destroy that which the people cherish most and push it towards ruin.” However, the developments of the previous two decades and the more recent events, which took everyone by surprise, showed that Thewophilos’s position was untenable. They also demonstrated that the church hierarchy was not keeping abreast of the forces of change.

From the 1960s onwards a growing number of the country’s intelligentsia called repeatedly for a total separation of church and state. This climaxed on 20 April 1974. A large rally of 100,000 people, organised jointly by Muslims and Christians, requested parity of religious status and the complete separation of church and state together with the secularisation and democratisation of the state. The lower clergy boycotted a counter-demonstration called by the capital’s ecclesiastical hierarchy and five hundred clergymen attended a rally earlier, on 12 March 1974. This showed that the collapse of the myth was imminent: the church itself was shaken by the new events and the higher clergy could no longer claim to be talking in the name of the whole church.

For the revolutionaries, the rift within the structure of the church made their task easier and the prospect of concerted ecclesiastical reaction against their reforms was quite remote. In the circumstances, it was no wonder if Patriarch Thewophilos’s retaliatory threats remained unheeded and none of his demands were answered. However, it did not take long for the patriarch himself to change sides and support the changes. In his customary broadcast on New Year’s Eve, instead of eulogising the Emperor and the royal family, as had been the tradition for centuries, he blessed the revolutionaries and defined the emerging political forces as “a holy movement”. In the meantime, amidst a growing attack on the monarchy, regarded by some as “an expensive and unnecessary luxury”, another Orthodox clergyman for the first time had the temerity to challenge the Emperor’s claim to be a descendant of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, thus paving the way to “de-mythicisation” — which contributed to the monarch’s eventual removal.
The deposition of the Emperor and the consequent abolition of the monarchy went hand in hand with a vitriolic attack against the most cherished imperial prerogatives and the ideologies that underpinned them, and the church’s role in maintaining and giving legitimacy to the state apparatus became redundant. With the collapse of the monarchy, the church was marginalised.

Another way in which the church was seriously affected was in the nationalisation of its lands, both urban and rural. To be sure, not all church lands were affected by the decree to the same measure. It concerned mostly those lands where the church’s alliance with the monarchy and aristocracy was conspicuous. These consisted of lands generally known as gult, that is fief land, largely controlled by the two elite ecclesiastical institutions, dabr (abbey) and gadam (monastery). Lands in the hands of the gattar (parish) clergy, sited mostly in the northern regions, were unscathed. Land was the life-blood of the church, for it ensured the continuity of its cultural and spiritual life. Although the priesthood was not hereditary, the recruitment of the clergy was inextricably linked to the mechanism of land succession. The gattar church formed a basic unit of the ecclesiastical organisation and it was there that the church’s power historically resided. Notwithstanding local and regional variations in the right of ownership of land, the gattar clergy in the north were as a rule well-known farmers and their lifestyle differed very little from that of the average peasant in the area. The gattar priesthood was often indistinguishable from its parishioners. They were therefore distinct from their southern counterparts. In these recently conquered areas, the church appeared to be nothing but an institution of the northern landowners, and the gattar clergy held the land as gult. They were usually worked on a share-cropping basis. As a practising Christian northern governor once pointed out, the ecclesiastical landlords, though they had an outward commitment to the humanitarian cause, as a general rule treated their tenants in such a way as to make them dread the establishment of a church gult within a particular village, which they saw as punishment by God. In the south, peasants working on these lands were often not Christians but they had to surrender between one fifth and one third of the crops they produced. In addition there were a variety of taxes and personal services. Nationalisation abolished the church’s status as a landowner and freed the peasants from all their traditional obligations towards it. However, its traditional position, particularly among the northern rural communities, remained undisturbed. In some places a substantial number of newly formed Peasant Association members, including a sizeable proportion of its leadership, were clergymen, and many of the boundaries and names of the Peasant Associations themselves were identical to those of the local parish.

Another setback that the church had to endure was in the field of its
religious holidays. The new government, echoing the attitude of the early pre-revolutionary critics, denounced them as obstructive to the social and economic development of the country and nationally divisive. On 17 January 1975 official holidays were re-defined. The most interesting aspect of this re-definition was the inclusion of three Muslim holidays, so that Islam was on the same footing as the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.

With these revolutionary moves, the church's political, economic and cultural supremacy was weakened and the main link between the church and the state was broken. Yet the church, despite its bitter internal divisions and its overthrow from its traditional power base, was still a force to be reckoned with. Because of its historical position it has always been so, and therefore it was essential for the new revolutionary rulers to gain control. In the early years of the revolution an ad hoc committee was set up consisting of about 18 people who had mostly been educated in the eastern churches' theological establishments. It was headed by the second highest man in the revolutionary Council, Colonel Atnafu Abate, who was said to be a practising Christian and, though at variance with him, a close relative of the patriarch. Despite its obvious intentions, the committee's declared objective was to investigate the church's resources and the implications that the nationalisation of church property had for the church, and thus indirectly for the country's cultural and historical sites, almost all of which were the outcome of past church-state relations. In addition to this, the committee had to purge the unwanted and corrupt elements closely associated with, or "undemocratically" imposed by, the ancien régime, and to promote the group within the church that was favourable to them. This idea seems to have been the brain-child of Colonel Atnafu and a few disgruntled religious elements. Atnafu's position on the role to be assigned to the church under the new regime was at loggerheads with that of his arch-rival, Colonel Mangestu Haile Mariam, although they agreed on certain practical matters. Their differences, to a degree, were a reflection of their social and political backgrounds. The conservative Atnafu, born in Gojjam, was said to have perceived the church as an institution deeply ingrained in the nation's life and as a result he believed that it had to play a significant role. Mangestu, a southerner of humble origin, saw the church, as did most southerners, as no more than an appendage of the northern aristocracy. He was more interested in creating a new power-base by including various hitherto neglected nationalities and religious groups whose importance derived from the number of their population and from the size as well as the resources of the territory they inhabited. But events favoured Atnafu. The Ogaden war, the Afar revolt and the continuing insurgency in Eritrea, including the emergence of various liberation movements, particularly of the Oromo Liberation Front, frustrated Mangestu's ambition to enlist or co-opt the support of the Muslims and other
Revd Gudina Tumsa, General Secretary of the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus, who was abducted in 1979 and has not been seen since. The most recent information about Mr Tumsa suggests that he is now dead. See article by Mikael Doulos on pp. 134-47.

(Photo © LWF.)

The only missionary hospital in Addis Ababa, formerly owned by the Seventh-Day Adventists. Its board of management was forced to hand it over to the Provisional Military Administrative Council in 1975. (Photo courtesy Keston College.)
Mujahideen, including the famous guerrilla leader Ahmad Shah Massaud, praying in the Panjshir valley, Afghanistan. See article by John Anderson on pp. 172-79. (Photo © Gamma.)

Afghan students being taught the Koran, in the refugee village of Reghagan, North-West Frontier Province (Pakistan). (Photo by S. Errington, © UN Photofile HCR.)

Afghan refugee children in the village of Haji Abad, North-West Frontier Province (Pakistan). (Photo by S. Errington, © UNHCR.)
nationalities at the expense of the church. In the face of a growing threat of secession in the north and the east, the church was found to be a rallying ground for national survival. As a quid pro quo, the church gained important financial concessions which, to a certain degree, increased the church’s subservience to the state. It received an annual subsidy of two million pounds as salary for its 1,729 patriarchate workers and a monthly allowance of eleven thousand pounds was to be paid by the Ministry of Finance to its higher officials, a figure roughly corresponding to the pre-revolutionary income that the church had gained from a variety of sources. (Although the Muslims have requested a similar allowance, it has not yet been granted to them.) However, the church’s twenty thousand parishes were told to feed their own clergy. Atnafu was deposed for, among other things, “his collusion with imperialism and ecclesiastical feudalism”. However, the gains he made for the church remained, and the church was brought into the limelight as a rallying point for Ethiopian nationalism during the Ogaden War. In contrast to some of the missionary churches, which the Derg, the governing revolutionary military council, criticised because of the sympathy that some of their members had for national liberation movements, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church regarded national unity as sacrosanct. This was based on its concept of the “fatherland”, another version of the Derg’s own slogan of “motherland”.

After the removal of Patriarch Thewophilos and three other bishops, the increasing rapprochement between church and state was put on a solid basis following the election of the new patriarch, abuna* Tacla Haymanot, a man to the regime’s liking. Since his controversial election in April 1971, Thewophilos had had a sizeable number of opponents, and his indulgence in nepotism was an open secret. Yet open criticism was unusual until a “fever of demonstration” suddenly inspired five hundred clergymen employed by the central church administration. Claiming to speak in the name of their “oppressed” fellows nationwide, the “little priests” sent a document entitled “The Voice of the Clergymen” to the patriarch. The document contained both demands for higher salaries and retirement pensions and serious political indictments against the church hierarchy. As a result the deep resentment and tension between the lower and the higher clergy, observable as early as the mid-1960s, came into the open. They accused Thewophilos of nursing political ambitions to become the “Archbishop Makarios of Ethiopia”. They denounced the “privileged fellows” in Addis Ababa and other cities for their luxurious lifestyle, attained by embezzlement of church property and oppression of “the serfs of the clerical hierarchy”, the peasants: whereas the clergymen’s own salary was a bare Ethiopian $3-$15 monthly.**

*Title given to bishops and other higher church hierarchy. Its original meaning was “our Father”— Ed.

**At that time Ethiopian $2 were equivalent to US $1 — Ed.
document called for the confiscation of the bishops’ property and their demotion. Subsequently similar points were made by, in particular, church-affiliated institutions. The media made capital against the church out of the events of 12 March 1974, and the discordant response the church authorities made to the clergy’s demands highlighted the widening rift within the hierarchy. The revolutionaries grasped this providential opportunity to secure their grip on the church’s central organisation. Before his deposition, Thewophilos performed his last and most important political action, when he called upon two prominent Derg members, Colonels Mangestu and Atnafu, who were engaged in a pitiless power-struggle, to forget their differences and work together for the good of the country. However, he enraged the new leaders by attempting to make the church independent from government control, for example, by consecrating new bishops without notifying and, some say, even defying, the political authorities.

In February 1976 Thewophilos was dismissed amidst accusations which included, amongst other things, total silence concerning the injustices of the old regime, tax evasion and misappropriation of enormous wealth by dubious means. His collusion with the “old order”, which transformed the church into a “cave of exploiters”, allegedly made him unfit to administer it. The new patriarch, apparently the appointee of the ad hoc committee, was a man of humble origin. Acclaimed by state-controlled media as a “man of the people” and contrasted in many ways with his predecessors, the new leader is undoubtedly an apolitical, submissive and uneducated man who combines rigorous ascetic practice with selfless philanthropism. He was an ideal choice for those in power, for he is a man in but not of this world.

Yet the support for the new modus vivendi and for the regime’s policies was not universal. Some clergymen criticised it, but their number was so insignificant and their action so disorganised as to make no impact on the general public. The government was able to get rid of them quite easily by imprisoning some and passing the others over to “revolutionary justice”, while the patriarch, aided by revolutionary enthusiasts, silenced synodical opposition to the new course of cooperation by dismissing controversial figures.

At the regional level, the province of Gojjam has been a source of protest. But as bastions and custodians of Ethiopian Christianity, the Gojjamese equated socialism with atheism. In any case Gojjam has traditionally been hostile to the central government and has always been resistant to the influx of new ideas. As usual, after an interval for a show of strength by each side, the Gojjamese were forced to toe the government’s line.

Only the group known as bahtawi were capable of arousing people’s emotions. They were a kind of social outcast who lived an unstructured
life in a secluded zone far from human contact. Having voluntarily renounced the world in order to pursue a strict ascetic life, they were often defiant of authority, for they had very little to lose. Normally, these hermits wielded great influence because of the weight which the people gave to their opinions and utterances as they were universally accredited with possessing a very holy character. They included people from varying social and economic backgrounds. Historically they played God’s fool, and wandered from one place to another wearing rough animal skins in the same fashion as St John the Baptist. On important religious occasions they took advantage of mass gatherings to voice in public underlying discontent and opposition to the regime and its policies. During the time of the late Emperor Haile Selassie, many of them languished in prison cells as did many of his ecclesiastical opponents. The Revolutionary Military Government banished them to the “rehabilitation” centre at Lake Zuway, to a place built as a religious seminary under the previous regime with financial assistance from International Church Aid. The government’s action can hardly be called a success as no more than three of the five hundred bahtawis forced into this “religious training” camp endured to the end.

Despite these exceptional cases, the church’s role was one of unconditional loyalty to the state and its policies; it praised its revolutionary achievements and rectified its political wrong-doings at national and international forums. Recently, however, attention has focused on the government’s harsh dealings with some of the missionary churches and on a leaked document which allegedly reveals the regime’s insidious political tactics for the gradual elimination of religion “through skilful propaganda of materialism in a carefully-orchestrated campaign”. The document, which bore the stamp of the Ministry of Information and National Guidance and was published for political cadres, seemed to confirm the suspicions of those who interpreted the government’s harsh measures against the foreign religions as a prelude to “systematic persecution”. They appeared to have all the traits of the “artichoke operation” which characterised the so-called “creeping coup” against the former regime: skilful elimination of minor religions before the core one was gradually stifled. The document outlines a series of specific actions which were to be taken initially against the Christian church, to be followed later by a similar campaign against the Muslims.

Important churches and monasteries were gradually to be converted into museums “from which the oppressed masses could draw valuable lessons”. Important religious books at the churches and monasteries, since they contained an ideology that made feudal exploitation possible, should be confiscated. In addition, the document advocated the destruction or transfer to “friendly countries” of old and valuable ecclesiastical objects or works of art since “their public display during
church services and ceremonies is a calculated insult to the oppressed masses”. It called for the skilful manipulation of the patriarch in order to make him an “unwitting instrument in the anti-religious campaign” and to surround him by carefully-selected clergymen and church workers who “can be counted on to spread the illusion of compatibility between Christianity and communism”. To this end, and with the aim of subverting the church from within, the document envisaged the infiltration into the abbeys and monasteries of cadres trained in communist-bloc countries and posing as ecclesiastics “who would commit obscene acts with the nuns and monks” in order to expose them in public. As a possible counter-measure against the alarmingly increasing number of church-goers, it suggested that financial incentives coupled with threat of withdrawal of ration permits and dismissal from employment be used.

It is as difficult to dismiss the document as spurious as it is to prove its authenticity. What is clear, however, is that it did not form part of the government’s official policy, for this consisted more of ad hoc measures than of any defined programme. If some of its actions did fall within the pattern of actions advocated by the document, it was from sheer coincidence and not as the result of a sustained policy. The government’s policy was to cooperate with the ecclesiastical authorities, and it intervened on behalf of church officials who protested against measures taken by some individuals dubbed as “fanatics”. This, combined with the almost unanimous consensus of church leaders that there was no “systematic nationally-sanctioned persecution”, contradicted claims made by some Ethiopian political and religious circles abroad as well as by a few western religious organisations. This is not to deny that within the government are people who would like to see the churches disappear and who work towards that end. The document may be considered either as the work of a few individuals who had been responsible for some isolated incidents of harassment against the churches, or as a major policy discussion paper, possibly prepared by political hardliners and, later, in all probability, prevented by intervening events from becoming a policy.

Among the foreign religions, it was what commonly came to be known as the mate (new-comer) religions that bore the full brunt of the revolutionary junta’s savage attack. This term described the so-called “Splinter Pentecostals”, three denominational groups known respectively as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Full Gospel Believers and Pentecostals, all believed to have been introduced into Ethiopia as recently as the 1960s. Their message gained a widespread following amongst the youth and the military, most of whom were adherents of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Because of certain novel religious practices, their alleged moral laxity, and their firm stand against military service and national defence, they alienated the church and the people. The public regarded them as foreign agents and gave them the label of
“enemies of the motherland”, while the Ethiopian Orthodox Church defined them as “anti-patriotic” and “anti-social religions, bent only on destabilising the country and weakening its national church”. One of the grounds on which the church attacked the draft constitution was its alleged leniency, which “allowed freedom of religious association even to the extent of encouraging the coming of new sects” that contaminated the Ethiopian people with their evil and unholy ideas — a clear reference to the mates. The government, hard-pressed by the secessionist war in the northern and southern regions, watched with growing concern the infiltration of these denominations into the army. When it finally took drastic measures against them, the church and the public were behind it in much the same way as, a few years earlier in 1972, they had been behind the actions of Haile Selassie’s regime, instigated by the church, against these same groups.

Even the tensions existing between the state and the so-called “established” (missionary) churches, which include the Lutherans, Catholics and Anglicans,* give little support to the view that the government’s behaviour is part of an integrated philosophy directed against religion as such. The situation can easily be interpreted within the framework of national issues rather than being seen as symptomatic of an impending far-reaching religious policy. It is more a case of tensions between the political centre and the periphery, where the activities of the established churches are based, than a concerted effort to eradicate these religious institutions.

The revolution did not directly attack the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, because the church itself did not raise a finger against it, nor did it challenge the regime’s new authority. Nevertheless, policies that tended to undermine the church’s presence in society were actively promoted. The much-criticised school curriculum on morals was replaced by compulsory Marxist-Leninist political education which openly taught that religion is “the opium of the people”. People were constantly galvanised into joining mass organisations that happened to compete with, or were meant to replace, the traditional voluntary associations whose life revolved around the church. There were political and economic inducements making membership of the state organisations more attractive. But rather than being weakened, the church, after the initial disarray and confusion, reached a remarkable degree of accommodation to the changed situation and gained a new impetus in the process. In the circumstances it owes as much to the government’s abysmal failure to meet the public expectations that it itself had created as to the people’s quasi-superstitious tendency to regard the disappointment of their expectations and the consequent intolerable backlash upon their daily life.

*The Anglicans did not in fact establish their own churches in Ethiopia (apart from a few chaplaincy churches for expatriates), but worked through the Ethiopian Orthodox Church — Ed.
as sent by providence. No wonder then if the churches, to the government’s chagrin, are filled to capacity and interest in the Bible is growing.

Internally, the church’s central organisation has been strengthened at the expense of rival local institutions which had blossomed under the patronage of the imperial court, which had actively promoted them as part of its policy of checks and balances. The key development was the formation of over twenty thousand parish councils which enhanced the church’s contacts with its grass-roots. Both as a channel for exchange of ideas between the church and the ordinary believer, and as a mechanism for influencing events and shaping opinion, the parish council, if adequately developed, will be an institution of considerable interest as it will undoubtedly constitute a challenge to similar grass-root government organisations.

Even the two major changes forcibly imposed upon the church have seemed to have had a beneficial effect in the long run. The separation of church and state left the church’s options, to a certain degree, open and independent of the vicissitudes of the state. The nationalisation of its lands freed the church from the fetters that had inexorably tied it to an outmoded agrarian economic order. This had been both a source of its wealth, accumulated by dubious means, and a subject of spirited controversy.

The profound transformation in church-state relations has only just begun. Even though at present the church offers unquestionable support to the regime and its policies, there are a number of forces at work that in the long term may profoundly modify and even alter the situation. The most important among these is the revival of Islam, which is viewed as the traditional enemy of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. In the past, Islam was confined to political limbo. This was due both to its inability to provide institutional expression at national level for its numerous and widely-distributed ethnic groups, and also to complex political and economic mechanisms skilfully designed to arrest its advance and influence. De-establishment has meant that Islam has been on the same footing as the Ethiopian Orthodox Church since 1974. It has made remarkable headway in political as well as organisational fields, for example, in the formation of the Islamic Higher Council, whose role is to articulate the needs and aspirations of the nationwide Muslim community. At present, Islam’s energies and resources are concentrated on consolidating its gains. In the long term, however, one must not rule out conflict developing because the state’s political organs will feel threatened by a strong Islam on one hand, and by a rejuvenated Ethiopian Orthodox Church on the other. If it turns out that such circumstances make a major confrontation with the state inevitable, is it not possible to envisage a new situation in which the traditional enmity
between Islam and Christianity will disappear in a united front opposed to the threats of the revolutionary Marxist regime?

At present only one thing is certain: the Revolution of 1974 has unleashed a new chapter in church-state relations. For the first time in the history of Christian Ethiopia a rift between church and state not only exists but is actively promoted by the state. One can scarcely expect such a situation to be reversed. In the circumstances, the church's survival as a credible institution hinges not only on its ability to build a new organisational structure compatible with the changing conditions of the country but also on its willingness to adjust its way of life, so hopelessly obsolescent but so immensely rich, to the imperatives of the new era. This is the only way to re-establish its weakening influence on modern youth, who are the builders of tomorrow's political and social world.

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**Advance Notice**

**Keston College Open Day**

is to be held on  
Saturday 11 October  
from 10.30 a.m. to 4 p.m.  
at Keston College  
Visitors are warmly welcomed to attend for all or part of the day.

**The Annual General Meeting of Keston College**

is to be held on  
Thursday 20 November  
at 6 p.m.  
In St. Paul's Church (Portman Square), Robert Adam Street, London W1  
Members of Keston College are invited to attend.

*Further details about both events will be sent to all RCL subscribers in September.*