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ART. II.—ERASTIANISM.

PART II.

FROM what has been said, it may be seen how the term ERASTIAN, historically connected with the German physician of the sixteenth century, has come to be used with a wide application to all who maintain the principle that "the Church" should not, in a Christian country, have any *coercive* power, independent of "the State," and that the civil authority must ultimately regulate all ecclesiastical jurisdiction. But it should not be forgotten that the controversy associated with the name of Erastus was but a local and specific phase of an older and larger controversy; one, which dates back to the fourth century, and necessarily came into existence directly that Christianity was recognized as the "State" religion of the Roman Empire. When this recognition was made, the whole question of the adjustment between "civil" and "ecclesiastical" authorities arose.

It being admitted that there was some sort of jurisdiction already exercised by Church officers, how was this exercise of discipline or direction of life, which was involved in the authority of these "ecclesiastics," to be combined or harmonized with the legal and magisterial functions of the officers of State? Were the jurisdictions to be kept entirely separate or co-ordinated, or was one of them to be subordinated to the other; and if so, which? Where was the *jus circa sacra* to reside, the *jus in sacris* being conceded to the clergy as holding a distinct and inalienable office?

Two tendencies exhibited themselves in the course of historical development; one, known by the name of *Byzantinism*, which predominated in the East, according to which the "Church" authority was distinctly subordinated to "State" rule; the other, that which culminated in *Papalism*, according to which the "Church" claimed to be superior to all secular or "State" authority. Hence arose in the West all those contentions, *inter imperium et sacerdotium*, which form so large a part of the historical process out of which different National Governments were evolved.

In this conflict and collision of claims there was truth on both sides: for "the Church" had its function to leaven "the State," and to sanctify law and government by high ethical and religious principles, whilst, on the other hand, "the State," with a wider sphere than the ecclesiastical organization of discipline and worship, had soon to face the difficult task of controlling clerical domination without repudiating religious sanctions, or refusing due respect to the "spiritual" independence claimed by "the Church." But the real problem all along has been to

perceive clearly wherein the proper independence of "the Church" consists. Various considerations make this problem a complicated one. The necessary admixture between "temporal" and "spiritual" interests in human affairs; the impossibility of keeping political rule separate from questions of ecclesiastical discipline, when that discipline touches the persons and properties of subjects; the difference which exists between the authoritative assertion of Christian doctrine and the authoritative enforcement of it; the twofold aspect of the clergy, as office-bearers in a Church and subjects in a State; the variability of the Christian element in the State, *qua* State—*i.e.*, as represented in its Government,—are all difficult points to deal with, both theoretically and practically. May we not say that the hierarchical view of the Church in the Middle Ages cast a strange and misleading glamour over the term—which means so much, yet is often so sadly misused—"the Catholic Church"? That view was too external and mechanical a one, and the growth of intelligence and of a profounder spiritual appreciation of Christianity gradually corrected it. And most of us can now at once recognize that the claims of *the* Church,—*i.e.*, of the whole body of Christian believers viewed collectively,—differ considerably from the claims of a *particular* Church, whose history has connected it with any particular national development. The former claims are, in a sense, universal, because they are spiritual, and they can only be regulated by Christ Himself, and by the Divine Law, the application of which is in many important respects entrusted to the ministers of the Word, although it is, ultimately, a matter *in foro conscientie* for each professed Christian. But the claims of a particular Church as connected with a particular State are necessarily limited in point of all coercive discipline by the historical circumstances of its position; and while it must distinctly refuse to sacrifice its defined doctrinal basis (without which it would not be a Church at all) to the behests of a political ruler or rulers, it cannot, without forfeiting its peculiar connexion with the State, and any attendant power, prestige, or privileges arising from that connexion, refuse to acknowledge the claims of the State, *qua* Christian, to have jurisdiction over its external regimen. In what way that jurisdiction may be best exercised, and how far the ecclesiastical office-bearers may be also officers of the State, or exercise a jurisdiction *circa sacra*, as well as *in sacris*, subject to an appeal to the sovereign authority of the State, is matter for mutual agreement between those who officially represent the Church and those who officially represent the State.

Such State superintendence is regarded by the stricter Presbyterian theorists, and by some High Churchmen, as undue State interference, and as antagonistic to the liberties and independence of the Church. But provided that a doctrinal standard has

been antecedently fixed and agreed upon by representatives of the Civil Government and of the Church body, and provided that the distinctive clerical functions be guarded from intrusion of unauthorized persons, there is no unjust interference with the independent functions of a Church by the fact that a Christian Government exercises a general control over "Church legislation," and claims the right of appeal from "Church judicatories."

Theories of State control (call them Byzantine, or Anglican, or Erastian, which you please) may be pushed to a mischievous extreme, if the difference between the imposition of doctrine and the exercise of regulative restraint be forgotten. This was the case in the policy of Grotius and Barneveld referred to in a recent Article of the *Church Quarterly Review*,¹ as "hasty and ill-judged Erastian proceedings," which ruined them. "The dangerous and fatal error of attempting to solve religious controversies by lay interference" was committed. "The great error which they made, the grievous mistake of their political career, was the thinking it justifiable to set out a legal creed on [certain] topics, and to enforce it by civil power: for the State to intervene in religious questions *not merely as the ultimate court of appeal, but as the active director* of what was to be taught and believed." The attempt to enforce doctrine by Governmental edicts is, certainly, vain and wrong. *Non est religio cogere religionem*: and the Reviewer rightly reminds us that "so long as man's religious faith is his dearest and most sacred possession, so long will it be dangerous to attempt to constrain, direct, or regulate it by the lay authority, whether that authority be Republic, King, or Parliament." We must not, however, on this account run into the opposite error of supposing that our "religious faith" is best secured by blind submission to clerical authority; or in fear of being called Erastians, be led to conclude that by preferring an "Ecclesiastical" to a "Civil" tribunal, we are necessarily securing either Christian truth or Christian liberty.

Grotius, in his treatise *de Imperio Summarum Potestatum circa sacra*, of which Hallam speaks as "written upon the Anglican principles of regal supremacy,"² may be said to have formulized the Erastian theory of State control in Ecclesiastical matters, and he advocates a stringent view of the authority of the civil ruler in regulating the affairs of the Church. Erastus had pleaded earnestly for the liberty of the laity from clerical domination, in special view of the practice of excommunication. Grotius insisted strongly upon the supremacy of civil law over all clerical proceedings. The aim of the one was to remove the

¹ *Church Quarterly Review* for January, 1881. Art. IV.

² Hallam, "Lit. of Europe," Part III. c. ii.

ecclesiastical yoke from the shoulders of the laity; the aim of the other was to press the political yoke upon the shoulders of the clergy. Both, it must be recollected, assumed that the government was essentially *bond fide*, and professedly Christian, and that "the magistrate could alter nothing which is definitely laid down by the Word of God."

Before turning our attention directly to the bearing of the Erastian controversy upon the present condition of affairs in the Church of England, it will be well to state summarily what may be regarded as the main principles upon which Erastians insist. They are these: that there should be a large liberty in the permitted use of the external means of grace; that there should be a control over clerical causes and persons by the supreme civil magistrate; and that the clerical function should be regarded as spiritual and suasive rather than legal and coactive. As a protest against clerical arbitrariness and the abuse of the "power of the Keys" (whether the hierarchical claim be "sacerdotal" or "presbyteral"), these principles are good and wholesome. But they do not traverse the whole field which has to be measured in estimating the due relations between "Church" and "State." They are *critical* principles, not *constitutive* principles; and, although the existence of the Church and the Rule of Scripture are taken for granted in all the arguments of Erastus and Grotius, more modern Erastians have, in accordance with later and laxer views of what a Church is, and of what Scripture requires, put too much out of sight the dogmatic basis on which ministerial authority and the constitution of the Christian Church ultimately rest. Such Erastians in their extreme anti-clericalism err in two respects. They do not sufficiently recognize the value of the counterpoise which is constituted by the existence of the clergy, as an independent "spiritual" order, to the secular tendencies of worldly politics; nor do they estimate at its true worth the stability which is given to religion by the agreement of the clergy to maintain a definite Confession of Faith, such as may keep the fundamental lines of their public teaching in the continuity of traditional Christianity, and form a central standing-ground amid the fluctuations of temporary theological opinions and controversies. Clericalism may lead to a narrowness of view, and an arbitrary exclusiveness which will make the Church too small for the nation. Anticlericalism, unchecked, may lead to an utter vagueness of doctrine, and an indiscriminating inclusiveness which will call the nation a Church, when it has become only a congeries of persons holding every variety of religious sentiment. But if this were to be the case, it would be time for the "State-Church" to cease. Religious men, with deep convictions concerning the fundamental truths of Christianity, cannot be content with an utterly colourless State-creed.

It is, however, to historical facts and not to mere abstract theoretical considerations that we must look if we would duly realize what our present ecclesiastical difficulties mean, and what our duty is as citizens of a country that still makes a public profession of Christianity, and still possesses a National Church.

The problem which a National Church must be always working out is to harmonize Christian law with Christian liberty. And this is a problem, not a theorem. It is a historical development, not a logical process. The introduction into the world of the Christian religion by Jesus Christ produced "the Church"—*i.e.*, a body of believers in Christ whose commission was to be witnesses unto HIM, "both in Jerusalem, and in all Judæa, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth,"¹ and to make disciples of "all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost."² This "Catholic Church" is—to use the epithets employed by a speaker at the Plymouth Church Congress, in 1876—*supernatural* and *supernational*, if we regard it in its ideal aspect. In this sense, the Church is an *ab extra* organization, independent of the State. On the other hand, when a particular nation, acting by its representatives, the civil ruler or rulers, accepted Christianity as the religion which was to be recognized throughout the region subject to the sway of such ruler or rulers, and when it placed the official teachers of Christianity in a position of authority, a relation was formed in which the right of sovereignty necessarily rested with the national ruler; and *the particular Church*, thus formed, maintaining its independent spiritual basis and spiritual functions, took its place as an integral ingredient of a *Christian State*, and, in proportion as it did its work properly, leavened with good influences, and exalted by high ideals, both the Law and the Life of the nation. But such a particular local Church was not infallible, and could not claim to be "supernatural" or "supernational" with any more justice than the haughty Church-State of Rome could arrogate to itself the Vicarship of Christ. Such a Church has, indeed, a supernatural deposit of truth to guard, and a connexion which, if it be faithful to the truth, is kept up with the "Catholic Church," which is independent of all State organizations whatsoever. Yet, as a particular Church in historical and temporal relations with a particular State, it is human, liable to error, and corruption, and variation, and needing occasional readjustments and reforms, like the State itself.

A rapid retrospect of the principal stages in the development of the Church in England will serve to remind us that the

¹ Acts i. 8.

² Matt. xxviii. 19.

relations between Church and State have varied with the progress of the national history; that however deplorable incidental mistakes may be which have arisen either from ecclesiastical or civil policy, the essential fact of the connexion between Church and State has been beneficial to the nation at large; and that the *mutual interdependence* of ecclesiastical and civil authorities in a friendly and reasonable adjustment of rights and duties is the object to be aimed at by all patriotic Churchmen who desire to steer between the Scylla of ecclesiastical domination on the one hand, and the Charybdis of an extreme "Erastianism" on the other. If this interdependence cannot be maintained, and this adjustment became impossible, then Disestablishment must come, and its occurrence will be one additional illustration of the adage that a house divided against itself cannot stand.

It can hardly be necessary to state that the union between Church and State in England never resulted from any deliberate and formal compact between civil and ecclesiastical rulers. There is no definite date, or act, whereto we can assign the formulating of a contract or treaty between the Church, as a body of Christians, and the State, as a body of citizens—the former being the advocates of the Christian religion, the latter the promoters of National Government. We see a relation between the moral and religious obligations involved in the idea of the Church, and the legal and social obligations which are involved in the idea of the State, at once and readily acknowledged, as soon as Christianity comes into connexion with those in civil authority. Augustine, when he lands on the shores of Kent, pays due respect to the authority of King Ethelbert. Ethelbert, after his conversion, recognizes the spiritual functions and positions of Augustine. Oswald of Northumberland makes it his "first princely care to provide pastors to instruct his people in Christianity;" and the good Bishop Aidan, whom he fetches from Iona, finds in King Oswald a royal interpreter of his sermons, while as yet he was not perfect in the Northumbrian language. We find throughout the history of the gradual formation of the realm of England in the Anglo-Saxon period the civil and ecclesiastical administration blended in a simple, inartificial manner. The "incorporation" of Church and State is seen to be a natural growth. The moral element of government and of society is specially evoked and guided by ecclesiastical regulations to which civil rulers give the force of law.

At the Norman Conquest an important change took place. The separation between ecclesiastical and civil jurisdictions instituted by William the Conqueror led to momentous results in the national development. For a contrast and a conflict arose between the legal element and the sacerdotal; and this

latter being mainly upheld by Papal power and interference (an interference in some instances wisely and humanely exercised, but more often unwisely obtruded, and for selfish and ambitious purposes), a national spirit of independence was nurtured into strength, and the distinction between National and Papal interests in ecclesiastical matters came more and more clearly to light. During the period between the Conquest and the Reformation the relations between Church and State were rather those of "alliance" than "incorporation." The hierarchy formed a separate caste and order in the land, and their power and their possessions were such as to show the great need of State control, and of confining the ecclesiastical authority within the limits of national rule.

In Henry VIII.'s time the revolt against the authority of the Pope culminated in the emphatic assertion of Royal *versus* Papal supremacy. With emancipation from Papal discipline came an emancipation from mediæval errors and superstition, and, in God's good Providence, a combination of religious, literary, and political influences "re-formed" the National Church, and in the great disruption of external Christendom which took place in the sixteenth century England became a Protestant nation, and her Church a Protestant Church. As in other Protestant States, the Civil Power became stronger, and more defined, and the *Lay* element of national life and progress was brought into prominence.

In the Elizabethan and Stuart period the relations of Church and State were thoroughly tested. The endeavour to enforce uniformity, first on the Episcopalian, and then on the Presbyterian, platform, brought out the fact that free inquiry and diversity of individual conviction in religious subjects were henceforward to be important factors of the nation's social development, and therefore important matters for consideration by rulers in Church and State. The rise and spread of Congregational principles and the multiplication of Separatists manifested the growing power of Individualism. And although, at the Restoration of the Monarchy, the reaction against military rule and dissatisfaction with the vagaries of religious fanaticism produced for a short period a state of things in which penal enactments against Dissenters characterized the national policy, the idea of Toleration had taken root, and could not be suppressed.

By the Act of Toleration in 1689 a new state of things was inaugurated. The modern period of the relations between Church and State began, in which Dissidents from the National Church obtained a legal status; and although the Civil Power still recognized in the Church the authorized national organ of religious teaching and worship, it gave up the idea of demanding

uniformity of religious worship and discipline. It was therefore no longer possible for the Church of England to be regarded as conterminous with the State of England; and yet the Church remained part of the legal constitution of the realm, and was not severed either from the privileges or the obligations of its constitutional connection with Crown and Parliament.

We must not pursue our historical survey into further details. The brief retrospect I have attempted will suffice to impress upon our minds the desirability of maintaining the union between Church and State by a due reverence for fixed religious principles combined with a wise adaptation of external machinery to the exigencies of the age. In the early period of our national progress we see the union of religion and rule effected by a simple blending of ecclesiastical and civil authority. In the pre-Reformation period we see the Ecclesiastical Power predominant, modified by Regal and Legal action. In the post-Reformation period, up to the latter part of the seventeenth century, we see the Civil Power predominant, but modified by the progress and effects of the Puritan movement. In the modern period since the Revolution settlement, we see a gradual working out of the idea of Toleration. Through all the periods, the Church's connexion with the State has been maintained; and the intermingling of the clerical view of social problems with the political view, and the constant correction of each by the other, has resulted in a larger and more comprehensive national policy than could have been possible if that close connexion and interdependence had not existed.

Assuming the fact that the bulk of the nation do not wish for the Disestablishment of the Church of England, or the cessation of its organized work, and the substitution for it of the varied and sporadic operations of different denominational sections of Christians, let us ask wherein lies the stress of what has been termed the present Church crisis?

The difficulty of our present position arises partly from the preponderance of the lay and secular influences in a heterogeneous Parliament, and partly from the clerical extremism of a certain section of Churchmen who exaggerate the difference between the ecclesiastical and political aspects of Law as applied to Church matters. It has been well said that in the mutual dependence of the rulers of the Church and of the State there are two main sources of danger:—

There is a constant tendency in pastors and theologians to confound their own traditions with the essentials of Christianity. They are thus in danger of hazarding the peace of society, the union of the Church, and the influence of religion, from zeal for points of doubtful expediency, in which no law of Christian duty is really involved. Mere statesmen, on the other hand, are too apt to think that nothing is firm

or stable in Divine truth, that religious creeds have weight and value merely from the number of those who hold them; and that whether doctrines are true or false, and practices right or wrong, the favour publicly shown to them should be determined by statistics and motives of expediency alone.¹

The same able and earnest writer says in another place:—

A National Church Establishment, in its healthy condition, requires the harmonious union of three separate elements. The rights of conscience, the authority of Church rulers, and the claims of the Kingly office or Civil power have all to be reconciled. The first alone, when the claims of authority are cast aside, can lead only to anarchy and vice, as in the days of Gibeah. The dominion of the State when the Church becomes a mere tool of the Civil Power, and liberty is stifled, answers only to the bondage of Egypt and Babylon. Church authority in its turn, when unrestrained by Royal authority and the rights of conscience, tends to Antichristian tyranny and idolatrous corruptions of the faith. The balance of these three powers, in our imperfect world, is the best security against the abuses to which they are separately exposed.²

Of these three powers, the harmonious operation of which is essential to the well-being of a National Church, ecclesiastical authority was emphasized in Mediæval times, State authority was emphasized at the Reformation period, and the claims of Individual liberty are emphasized in the modern period of our national development. Our Church must take account of all three, if it would live and be healthy. And what is it which may form the centripetal force to bind together, in a comprehensive orbit of duty and of continued usefulness, Individual liberty, rightful Church authority, and righteous State law? Generally speaking, we might answer, a sincere attachment to the Holy Scriptures as a revelation of Divine Truth, and a rule of faith and practice. But speaking more particularly, with reference to "the Protestant Reformed religion established by law" in our country, which the Sovereign, at coronation, solemnly swears to maintain—*i. e.*, our National Church—we say that such a restraining and combining force is to be found in loyal adherence to the doctrinal position of our Church as defined in the Articles of Religion, honestly and reasonably interpreted, and finding concurrent expression in the Liturgy.

These lay down a position which is both Catholic and Protestant in their dogmatic utterances, and are at once definite, comprehensive, and practical in the range of their regulative statements. The substantial adhesion to a standard of Christian doctrine and duty which, while it does not profess to be a com-

¹ Birks' "Church and State," pp. 368, 369.

² *Ibid.*, p. 386.

plete creed, but the confession of faith of a particular Church, rests upon Scripture and the Catholic Faith, and repudiates mediæval errors, will save us from the danger of utter vagueness which I have spoken of above as characterizing modern Erastians, and which is a feature of our anti-dogmatic age.¹

Such loyal adhesion would also save us from those tendencies to desert and even to revile Reformation principles which have unhappily prevailed in a certain section of the Church. One great *raison d'être* of the National Church in England would be taken away were it to cease to protest against the errors condemned in the Thirty-nine Articles, as superstitious accretions which overlaid and corrupted the simplicity of the primitive Christian faith.

The questions which are now considerably agitating the Church (though we may rejoice that much practical work is being done by clergy of all parties, independently of the "vexed questions" of which we speak) are indirectly connected with doctrine, but directly with Church discipline, and ritual, and procedure. The principal ones may be briefly noted as (1) *the liberties of the clergy*, sometimes termed "the liberties of the Church;" (2) *ecclesiastical jurisdiction*; (3) *ecclesiastical legislation*, or the claims of Convocation, and how far this assembly can be, and should be, reformed or enlarged.

There are some Churchmen who, without being Ritualists, plead for toleration of divergence of ritual in consequence of "the uncertainties which have been widely thought to surround some recent interpretations of ecclesiastical law," and in consideration of "the peculiar character of parishes and congregations placed in the most dissimilar religious circumstances;" and practically ask the Bishops to exercise "a dispensing power," instead of administering the law. A demurrer to this plea was made in the Dean of Llandaff's sensible resolution, moved, but unfortunately rejected, in the Lower House of Convocation in the Southern Province. He wished the House, "while recognizing to the full the right to promote by all constitutional means the adoption of any changes in the law of the Church which he may think expedient," "to record its opinion that it is

¹ It will not be sufficient to speak of "a common ground and common purpose which all communions faithfully admit" ("Principles of National Church Reform Union"), and to leave out any definition of "the common ground" on which persons propose to co-operate, and of the Church constitution which they purpose to recognize. Such vagueness finds its source in the desire to conciliate, but unless there be some definite dogmatic basis laid down and recognized as the limitations within which the Church body is to shape its authoritative teaching, the results of a policy of mere comprehension might be to attenuate truth rather than strengthen it, and dissipate rather than make a practical concentration of religious forces.

a primary duty that the ministers of the Church, pending the introduction of such changes, should set an example of ready obedience to the admonitions of their ecclesiastical superiors and the decisions of the existing tribunals." Evangelicals who oppose the prayer for such "toleration" do not deny that there may lawfully be considerable divergence of ceremonial and differences in the Church ritual at different localities, but they oppose what is the professed object of certain vestments and symbols which is avowedly "exponent of doctrines not in accord with the plain intention of the Articles and Formularies of the Church of England." This question is one of clerical independence. Is the clergyman to disobey the law laid down, and plead conscience as contravening any admonition or penalty that may be inflicted on him? There surely can be no doubt that the "liberties of the laity" must be supported as against autocratic setting aside of legal decisions by the clergy, and that the law of the Church, which is also the law of this realm, should limit this clerical claim.

But, we are told, the ecclesiastical courts are not ecclesiastical enough, and that somehow there is an encroachment of "the State" upon "the Church" in the appointment of Judges, and methods of procedure. The Erastian would say, "Have no ecclesiastical courts at all." According to the Anglican system, however, there is a retention of ecclesiastical administration of the law, subject to an appeal to the Sovereign. The Royal Commission on Church Courts will probably help us to see through some of the complications which at present beset the subject of the Church judicature in its technical aspect.

The most important question, and that to which minds of all Churchmen anxious for the interests of the Church of England as an organized Church body have been much directed in recent years, is that of Church Legislation. Convocation is confessedly an inadequate representation of the clergy; and although some good work has been done in it since its "revival," it does not command much influence in its present limited form. Yet it is doubtful whether any reform of the Convocation could be effected (as the Bishop of St. David's says in a Charge, quoted in *THE CHURCHMAN* of March), which would "make it more influential than it is, or enable its resolutions to carry greater weight with Parliament or with the country, which has not the effect of converting it from what it is, according to its present constitution—viz., a Convocation of the Clergy—into a mixed assembly of Clergy and Laity." The Bishop believes that if such a reconstruction could be effected, "the Convocation would be armed with such influence that its decisions upon the purely internal matters of the Church would generally be accepted by Parliament without question."

On such questions as these, and on the whole situation indi-

cated by them, the Erastian controversy, as we have traced it, has a significant bearing. That controversy, as we have seen, was really a controversy between *clerical* claims and *lay* claims in a Christian community. It was itself a phase of the larger controversy which has been working itself out in Church History since the time of Constantine the Great, as to the relations which should exist between ecclesiastical and civil authorities in a Christian State.

In the historical Church of England, what we have termed Erastian principles have their place, as *limiting* principles, connected with, and supplemented by, more positive ideas of the constitutional authority of Church Rulers as distinguished from, though not independent of, the Civil Power. And so we have impressed on our minds the importance of the *mutual interdependence* of clerical and lay power of which we have spoken. A triple lesson may be connected with our thoughts on the whole subject.

A lesson of *moderation*. By this I mean, not that Churchmen, clergy, or laity, should give up their own convictions, but that they should give fair consideration to the opinions and convictions of others. Not that there should be made the attempt to *equalize* all opinions, or stifle free discussion by the futile cry of "No Party!" but that there should be earnest endeavour to avoid bitterness of party spirit, and to take an *equitable* view of controverted points—treating the two Memorials, *e.g.*, in an earnest but self-controlled manner, not as party weapons, but as materials for consideration and judgment, so as to arrive at an honest conclusion.

A lesson of *large-mindedness*. We need to take broad views of what is for the interest of the Church at large, and not to fret ourselves as to petty technicalities and points of procedure and form, if substantial justice and equity can be done to all parties concerned.

A lesson as to the need of being *practical* in Church politics. We should be ready to sacrifice symmetry of theoretical adjustment to what is practically the best adjustment. Not losing sight of any high ideal that may guide or animate us, we should yet always remember that in earthly affairs, whether of Church or of State, friction must be allowed for, and that the clever *doctrinaire* is not necessarily a good statesman.

Let us hope that the Church of England, passing through this "crisis," as she has through many others aforesaid, will emerge—not weakened by too much bickering concerning minute points of legal rights and claims—to treat wisely and effectively with that other larger crisis, of which Dr. Vaughan spoke, "in which Infidelity is the foe, and Christianity the defendant."

WM. SAUMAREZ SMITH.