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## ARTICLE VII.

## THE PRIMACY OF THE PERSON IN EDUCATION.

BY PRESIDENT HENRY CHURCHILL KING, D. D.

THE numerous inaugurations of college presidents in the last three or four years, have necessarily called out extended discussions of educational aims. A late-comer in the field hardly feels at liberty to ignore, and he certainly does not wish merely to repeat, what has been already well said. To a certain extent he *must* probably do both; for he can hardly contribute more than his individual viewpoint, and may, perhaps, count himself fortunate, if, taking advantage of the discussions of his predecessors, he can by a single degree advance to greater clearness the exact problem of college education.

But he may still find encouragement to believe that the task naturally set him is not wholly useless, when he remembers, that, in spite of a considerable consensus of opinion on the part of college presidents as to what a college education in general ought to be, the problem of the precise place of the college in our actual educational system has perhaps never been at a more critical stage than now. That at least an increasing number of thoughtful observers feel this to be the case there can be no doubt. President Butler only voices the fear of many when he says: "The American college hardly exists nowadays, and, unless all signs mislead, those who want to get it back in all its useful excellence will have to fight for it pretty vigorously. The milk-and-water substitutes and the fiat universities that have taken the place of the colleges, are a pretty poor return for what we have lost."

For the rapid changes that have taken place in college education in the last twenty-five years have carried with them, in many quarters at least, unforeseen and far-reaching consequences. The study of these consequences has brought to some of the most careful students of education, with whatever recognition of gain, a distinct sense of loss, most definitely expressed, perhaps, by Dean Briggs in his "Old-fashioned Doubts concerning New-fashioned Education."

Other changes in other departments of education have greatly complicated the problem of the relation of the different members of our educational system. Revolutionary changes, that seem almost if not quite to involve the elimination of the college, are soberly, even if reluctantly, suggested by distinguished educators. And other changes of relations that appear at first sight less serious, in which the colleges themselves are acquiescing, may in the end make any adequate attainment of the older college ideal equally impossible. The result of the entire situation, therefore, is to press to-day upon American educators as never before these questions: Has the American college a real function, a logical and vital place in a comprehensive system of education? or is it the blunder of a crude time and a crude people, an illogical hybrid between the secondary school and the university, that ought to hand over a part of its work to the secondary school and the rest to the university, and to retire promptly from the scene with such grace as it can muster? or, at best, is its older function now incapable of realization?

#### I. THE FUNCTION OF COLLEGE EDUCATION.

Just because these questions concern the place of college education in a system of education, they can be answered only in the light of a comprehensive survey of the entire problem of education.

The problem of education in its broadest scope may perhaps be said to be the problem of preparation for meeting the needs of the world's life and work. Much of the training belongs necessarily to the home and to the interactions of the inevitable relations of life. Much of it, probably, can never be brought into any organized system. But organized education must do what it can to insure, first, that no men shall lack that elementary training and knowledge without which they are hardly fitted at all for ordinary human intercourse, or for intelligent work of any kind in society, still less for growing and happy lives; second, that there shall be those who can carry on the various occupations demanded by our complex civilization, in the trades, in business, and in the professions; third, that there shall be investigators, scientific specialists, extenders of human knowledge, in all spheres. None of these needs are likely to be denied—not even the last; for our age has had so many demonstrations of the practical value of scientific discoveries, that it is even ready to grant the value of the extension of knowledge for its own sake. That, then, every man should have the education necessary to render him a useful member of society; that the necessary occupations should be provided for; that there should be a class of scientific specialists constantly pushing out the boundaries of human knowledge,—we are all agreed. And to this extent at least, the problems, first, of the elementary schools; second, of the trade, technical, and professional schools; and, third, of the university proper, are recognized and justified.

Our difficulties begin when we try to define more narrowly just what is to be included in our first group of schools. Exactly what education is indispensable that one may become a useful member of society? Virtually we seem to have decided that that indispensable education is covered in our primary and grammar grades; for the ma-

jority do not go further, and compulsory education does not require more. And yet, with practical unanimity, the United States have decided that the State is justified in furnishing, and, indeed, is bound to furnish, that smaller number of its children who are willing and able to take further schooling, opportunity to continue for three or four years longer in studies of so-called "secondary" grade. The State can justify this procedure only upon the ground that such further study prepares still better for citizenship, and that it is of value to the State that even a much smaller number should have this better preparation; or, also, and perhaps more commonly, upon the practical ground that the secondary education furnishes the knowledge and training which, if not indispensable to citizenship, is indispensable to many of the higher occupations and forms of service to the State. No sharp line, certainly, can be drawn between the studies of the grammar school and those of the high school. And we all recognize and justify the secondary school, and include it as practically indispensable to the State, if not to all its citizens, unhesitatingly in our first group of schools, to form the unified public-school system.

But it needs to be borne clearly in mind, that if the true justification of elementary and secondary education is the preparation of useful members of society, it cannot be regarded as merely intellectual. The moral side of the matter is, if there is any difference, even more important—the learning of order, of obedience, of integrity in one's work, of steadfastness in spite of moods, of the democratic spirit, of a real sense of justice, and of the rightful demand of the whole upon the individual. If these are not given in some good measure, then, whatever the intellectual results, in just so far, from the point of view of the State, public-school education is a failure. And yet no doubt it must be said, that since in America the school children

are all in homes, the American public-school teacher has, quite naturally, not regarded himself as primarily charged with anything but the intellectual training of the child. Other training has been largely incidental—taken up only so far as the order of the school demanded, or as it was inevitably involved in the situation. Even so, the moral training has been by no means unimportant. But it may be doubted if there is any change in public-school education so important to-day as that the teacher should plainly recognize that his real responsibility is to train his charges to be useful members of society, with all that that implies. Let the child and the parent and the teacher all alike understand that the State undertakes the free education of all its children just because it hopes thus to prepare them to be valuable members of a free people; and that whatever is necessary to that end, provided it does not violate individual consciences, is within the function of the public school. This means, of course, that it is the business of the public school to teach *living*, as well as studies.

But with this recognition of the broader function of the public schools, with the necessary acknowledgment of a real broadening even on the intellectual side of technical and professional courses, and with the present common admission of the danger of a specialism not broadly based, is the distinct function of the college clearer, or has it rather been taken on by the other members of the educational system? To a certain extent, no doubt, the latter is true and ought to be true.

But we might well argue for college education, in line with the more practical argument already made for secondary education, that the highest success in the great occupations of the world's work, including scientific specialism, requires an education preliminary to the technical training, more extended not only, but of a broader type than secondary education can furnish. This seems com-

monly granted now by the technical schools themselves. And this position is no doubt correct. But is this the chief reason for college education? It is not merely for the purpose of carrying on the world's work in this external sense that college education exists, nor does this sufficiently define its function. The college does not look beyond to the technical or professional school, or to the university proper for its justification; but rather is itself the culmination of the work that at least ought to be undertaken by the public schools.

We might, therefore, argue again and more truly, probably, for college education, in line with the other argument for secondary education; that the world needs pre-eminently the leadership of a few of greater social efficiency than any of the other types of education by their necessary limitations are able to offer. For when all is said that can possibly be said for elementary, secondary, technical, professional, and specialized training, what still does the world's life and work need? All these are necessary, but obviously, for the highest life of society, much more, and much that is greater, is demanded. Here are instruction and discipline, technical skill and professional training, and heights of specialized knowledge. "But where shall wisdom be found, and where is the place of understanding?" The elementary school saith, It is not in me; and the secondary school saith, It is not with me. It cannot be gotten for technical skill, nor shall professional success be weighed for the price thereof; it cannot be valued with the gain of the specialist, with his enlarged knowledge or his discovery. Whence then cometh wisdom, and where is the place of understanding?

One cannot answer that question by raising small inquiries of immediately appreciable gain. Let us ask, then, the largest questions and note their generally admitted answers. Assuming that the world and life are not

wholly irrational, what is the best we can say concerning the meaning of the earthly life? What is the goal of civilization? What is the danger of the American nation? What are the greatest needs of the individual man?

The wisdom of the centuries has not been able to suggest a better meaning for the earthly life, than that it is a preliminary training in living itself. The goal of civilization, our sociologists tell us, is a rational, ethical democracy. Our political students insist that the foremost danger of the nation is the lack of the spirit of social service. The greatest needs of the individual man are always character, happiness, and social efficiency. If these are even approximately correct answers to our questions, then the deepest demands to be made upon an educational system are, that, so far as it may, it should give wisdom in living, that should insure character and happiness to the individual, and that spirit of social service that should make men efficient factors in bringing on the coming rational and ethical democracy.

This requires that somewhere in our educational system we should attack the problem of living itself and of social service in the broadest possible way, and in a way that is broader than is possible to either the elementary or secondary school, though neither of these may legitimately shirk this task. Just this, then, is the function of the college: to teach in the broadest way the fine art of living, to give the best preparation that organized education can give for entering wisely and unselfishly into the complex personal relations of life, and for furthering unselfishly and efficiently social progress. As distinguished from the other forms of education, it has no primary reference to the earning of a living, or to the performance of some specific task; it faces the problem of living in a much broader and more thoroughgoing fashion; it does not specifically aim or expect to reach all, but seeks to train a

comparatively small self-selected number who shall be the social leaven of the nation.

If the task so set the college seems too large, let us remember not only that the admitted individual and social goals require no less, but also that the outcome of the maturest thinking upon man and his relation to the world, indicates that the best anywhere can be attained only through such breadth of aim.

For if we seek light from *psychology*, we are confronted at once with its insistence upon the complexity of life—the relatedness of all—and upon the unity of man. But these principles deny point-blank the wisdom of an education exclusively intellectual, and require rather, that, for the sake of the intellect itself, the rest of life and the rest of man be not ignored. Positively, they call for an education that shall be broadly inclusive in its interests, and that shall appeal to the entire man.

If we turn to *sociology*, we meet, if possible, an even stronger emphasis upon the complexity of life, and a clear demand that, back of whatever power the individual may have, there should lie the great convictions of the social consciousness, that imply the highest moral training, and set one face to face with the widest social and political questions. No narrow education can meet the sociological test.

And if we ask for the evidence of *philosophy*, we have to note that its most characteristic positions to-day in metaphysics and theory of knowledge—its teleological view of essence, its insistence that the function of knowledge is transitional, and that the key to reality is the whole person—all refute a purely intellectual conception of education and logically require a broader view of education than has anywhere commonly prevailed.

And if as a Christian people, professing to find our highest ideals in the Christian religion, we seek guidance from

its goal—that all men should live as obedient sons of the Heavenly Father and as brothers one of another—we are face to face again with that problem of the complex world of personal relations, that cannot be solved except through the training of the entire man.

In all these lines of psychological, sociological, philosophical, and Christian thinking, our theories are right; our practice in education at best lags far behind. Every line of modern thinking is a fresh insistence upon the concrete complexity of life and upon the unity of man, and demands an education, broad enough to meet both. Nothing justifies the common extraordinary emphasis on the intellectual as the one aim of education.

It is not, then, by accident that we speak of the necessity of a liberal education. For let us notice that even on the intellectual side, the most valuable and vital qualities cannot be given by rule or by any narrow technique. The supreme demand is for what we call sanity, judgment, common sense, adaptability—all different names, perhaps, for the same thing, namely, ability to know whether a given case is to be treated according to general precedent—by appeal to a general principle—or decided upon its individual merits; to know whether our problem is one of classification, or one of more thorough acquaintance with the particular. No rules or methods of procedure can make a reasoner or an investigator; for the vital point is to pick out of a *new* situation the exact element in it which is significant for the purpose in hand. The case cannot have been anticipated; the only help that education can give is through much practice in discrimination and assimilation, and through the bestowal of a wide circle of interests, æsthetic and practical, even more than intellectual. Interpretive power is similarly conditioned, and calls for the richest life in the interpreter. Even the scientific spirit, then,—the most valuable gift of a scientific

training,—is not merely intellectual. Still less are the historical spirit and the philosophic spirit intellectually conferred; they require at every turn the use of the key of the whole man.

And we certainly have a right to ask of education that it bring men to appreciation of the great values of life—what else does culture mean?—to æsthetic taste and appreciation, to moral judgment and character, to the capacity for friendship, to religious appreciation and response.

But if we have a right to demand from an educational system in any measure these qualities—judgment, adaptability, discernment, interpretive power, the scientific, historical, and philosophical spirit, and the culture adequate to enter into the great spheres of value—æsthetic, personal, moral, and religious,—it is evident that they can be given only indirectly and through the most liberal training. Do they not lie, in the nature of the case, quite beyond the limits of elementary, secondary, professional, or specialistic training, and constitute the great aims of college education? Is there anything else likely to take the place of the college in performing this greatest educational work?

It will hardly be contended by any, I judge, that technical or professional training, for the very reason that it does and must aim primarily at direct preparation for a particular calling, can give with any adequacy this indirect and liberal education.

And it is difficult to believe that any one who has measured with seriousness the greatness of the need of which we have just spoken, and the breadth of the education required to meet the need, will be able to think that the secondary school, even if extended two years, is, or can be made, sufficient to the task. For, in the first place, it is only reasonable that our educational system should somewhere recognize the special significance of the

transitional character of the period of later youth, and definitely provide for it. That period peculiarly needs the kind of separate training given by the college, with its increased call for independent action, and (as compared with the high school) its greater possibility of bringing all sides of the life of the student under some common and unified training. Is it too much to claim that the college, at its best, *has* proved an almost ideal transition from the stricter supervision of the secondary school to the complete individual liberty of the university proper?

Moreover, it is quite wide of the mark to argue, as against the need of the college, that the high-school graduate of to-day has often done as much work in many lines as the college graduate of fifty years ago. That may be true, but the real question is this: Is he proportionally as well prepared to meet the complex demands of modern life, as the college graduate of the older time, the conditions of the much simpler life he confronted? The question, in other words, is not one of absolute attainment, but of proportional preparation for life; nor one of amount of knowledge merely, but of adaptive power. In education, we are least of all at liberty to ignore the increasing complexity of modern civilization.

But the decisive reason, after all, why the secondary school cannot take the place of the college is this: that one has only to review the list of qualities required for the completest training for living, to see that the deepest of the interests involved simply cannot be appreciated at the secondary school age, even if extended two years. I have no desire to underrate the attainments of the secondary school graduate, but I cannot forget that the true scientific spirit, the historical spirit, the philosophical spirit, power of wise adaptation, and appreciation of the greatest spheres of value, are all plants of slow growth, and necessarily presuppose a certain maturity of mind. What does the whole

principle of psychological adaptation in education mean but just this, that you cannot wisely overhasten life's own contribution? It seems to me too often forgotten, that the two later years, which it is sometimes proposed to cut off from the college course are precisely the years, which, from the broader and deeper point of view, can least of all be spared. Generally speaking, you simply cannot make a philosopher of a sophomore. He has not lived enough. In like manner, the key to the greatest values of life is simply not yet held before the dawning at least of some real maturity.

Nor do statistics as to age seem to me greatly to affect the problem. With an advancing civilization, the period of youth for women certainly has been generally extended with real gain; probably it is wisely extended for both men and women. In any case, I see no reason for believing that the average sophomore is relatively maturer to-day than his compeer of the earlier time.

These considerations seem to me sufficient to show that we have no good reason to expect the secondary school to take the place of the college.

And we have still less reason to expect the university to take the place of the college, unless college and university are regarded as essentially interchangeable terms. If the university proper has any really distinctive function, so far as I am able to see, that must be regarded as the training of the scientific specialist. I am quite ready to admit and to assert, that even the university cannot wisely ignore the claims of citizenship; but just because its primary aim is specific and limited, its recognition of these claims must be almost wholly incidental—in spirit and atmosphere rather than in its proper training.

The university, then, properly so-called, cannot do the work of the college, first, because its aim is distinctly and entirely intellectual; and, second, because it assumes, with

some reason, that it is dealing with fully mature men, in whose case any imposition of conduct and ideals would be out of place, and this assumption accentuates still further its strictly intellectual aim. But, besides this, in the very nature of the case, in its exclusive specialism, the university lacks, necessarily, the breadth of aim required in the fullest training for living, and quite fails to make its appeal to the entire man; and so shuts out both indispensable interests and indispensable training. Even on the purely intellectual side, for the very reason that it looks to specialism in each line, it is likely quite to lack those general courses that even the specialist needs in other lines than his own. These three essential differences, then,—the purely intellectual aim, the assumption of the maturity of its students, and its exclusive specialism,—make the atmosphere of the university distinctly different from that of the college, and make it impossible that it should ever do the work of the older college.

In fact, it is hardly too much to say that the greatest losses that college education has suffered are due to the fact that the attempt has been mistakenly made to carry over the spirit of the university into the college. As American educators awakened only slowly to the true conception of the university proper, and then, with the natural enthusiasm of a new-found ideal, exaggerated the value of the university's function, the college and university ideals were naturally confused, and the true college ideal almost lost in the process. Many circumstances have favored this tendency. The confusion was real and honest. Colleges were growing into universities. Many changes in college education itself were necessary. But the greatest damage was done, simply because the colleges were cowardly in the face of unwise and ill-founded criticism made from the standpoint of the university, and were either ashamed to resist the exclusively intellectual trend,

or lazily unwilling to keep the increasingly difficult responsibility of the broader college training.

As a natural consequence, many of our colleges and universities have presented the anomalous condition of being filled with students who claimed both the liberty of men and the irresponsibility of boys. Naturally, too, aside from sham universities, those colleges have been in most danger in this respect of losing true college ideals, that have been in closest connection with the university, especially where the same courses and instructors and methods and discipline and aims have served both college and university. Courses admirably adapted for the exclusive specialist may be quite unprofitable as the chief pabulum of a college course: and a method of treatment, not only justified, but almost demanded in dealing with really mature men, may be quite inadequate and unwarranted for the student whose ideals are in flux, and the appeal of whose entire personality no instructor has a right to ignore. "Is not the life more than meat? and the body than raiment?" The college needs much more than a highly trained specialist in the teacher's chair; it can never spare without disastrous loss, the close personal touch of mature men of marked interest in the wide range of the life of others, and with character-begetting power. And it cannot spare a real training that is far more than intellectual. Indeed, if I understand President Butler aright, in his tentative suggestion of halving the college course, it is exactly the state of the universitized college that has made him regard the halving of its course as no great disaster. The suggestion would seem warranted, however, only if we must regard the cause of the college as already lost, and count it hopeless that either educators or the public should be again awakened to the priceless value of the work of the true college.

Nor do I believe that, with whatever losses, the college

has quite failed to give the liberal training required. Many a college teacher can confirm from his own repeated observation President Wilson's words: "Raw lads are made men of by the mere sweep of their lives through the various school of experience. It is this very sweep of life that we wish to bring to the consciousness of young men by the shorter processes of the college. We have seen the adaptation take place; we have seen crude boys made fit in four years to become men of the world."

Mistakes, no doubt, have been made, serious losses, sustained, and there are grave dangers to be guarded against in all our colleges. The utilities have been over-insistent; the aim has been too merely intellectual; specialism has claimed too much; the standpoint and method of the university have prevailed to an extent quite beyond reasonable defense; and, in consequence, at multiplied places the rights of the entire personality have been ignored.

But, on the other hand, no mere reaction to the older college is either desirable or possible. Men came to see that they were in a new world that required for wise and fruitful living a broader curriculum than the older college ever afforded. A change here was inevitable.

So, too, it can hardly be doubted that there was needed greater emphasis on a close and living and practical relation to the actual world; fuller recognition of the meaning of hard, honest, intellectual work, and of the sound psychological basis of the laboratory and seminar methods; a better adaptation to differing individuals; and, for the very sake of greater power in the more general courses, a real approach to something like specialism in at least one line of study. In all these important respects, the changes toward the newer college have been not only practically justified but thoroughly right.

Now, is it possible to combine the gains of the new with the indisputable advantages of the old? What

changes in the present situation are demanded, if the true function of the college is to be completely fulfilled? The present lack seems to me plainly to lie in the comparative neglect of the entire personality. How are these needs of the complete personality to be met in education? What are the means, and what is the spirit required?

The direct study of human nature in its constitution and in the relations of society ought to enable one to answer these questions with some precision. In other words, if college education has really the broad function that has been ascribed to it, it ought to be able to meet a psychological and sociological test. Modern psychology—with what seems to me its preëminent fourfold insistence, upon the complexity of life, the unity of man, the central importance of will and action, and the concreteness of the real, involving a personal and a social emphasis—has its clear suggestions. And modern sociology, too, with its demand for a social consciousness that shall be characterized by the threefold conviction of the essential likeness of men, of the mutual influence of men, and of the value and sacredness of the person, has its definite counsel. The proper fulfillment of the function of the college, this seems to indicate, requires as its great *means*, first, a life sufficiently complex to give acquaintance with the great fundamental facts of the world, and to call out the entire man; second, the completest possible expressive activity on the part of the student; and, third, personal association with broad and wise and noble lives. And the corresponding *spirit* demanded in college education must be, first, broad and catholic in both senses,—as responding to a wide range of interests, and looking to the all-around development of the individual; second, objective rather than self-centered and introspective; and, third, imbued with the fundamental convictions of the social consciousness. These are always the greatest and the alone indispensable means and condi-

tions in a complete education, and they contain in themselves the great sources of character, of happiness, and of social efficiency. The supreme opportunity, in other words, that a college education should offer, is opportunity to use one's full powers in a wisely chosen, complex environment, in association with the best;—and all this in an atmosphere, catholic in its interests, objective in spirit and method, and democratic, unselfish, and finely reverent in its personal relations. Such an ideal definitely combines the best of both the older and the newer college. And the colleges that most completely fulfill this ideal have, I judge, a work which is beyond price, and without possible substitute.

Before passing to the discussion of the means and spirit demanded in a true college education, a word further concerning the relation of the college to the professional training seems desirable. In this whole problem of the possible shortening of the college course for the sake of students looking to professional studies, several things need to be kept closely in mind if confusion is to be avoided.

In the first place, if the professional course is a full rigorous four-year course, this ought to mean, and usually does mean, that it has been laid out on somewhat broad and liberal lines, and not with reference to mere narrow technique. And the student who is to continue his study through such a course can more easily afford to abridge the time given to the two courses.

This same broadening of the professional course, moreover, makes possible an entirely legitimate adjustment to the coming professional study on the part of the college. In every broadly planned professional course of four years, there is quite certain to be at least a year of work of so liberal a character that it may justly be counted toward both the college and the professional degree. And the colleges which can offer such work of first quality for the

different professions can meet every legitimate demand for abridging the entire period of study squarely and strongly; and can then, in all probability, in the great majority of cases, render a better service to the student himself, to the professional school, and to society, by retaining the student in the atmosphere of the college through his full four years.

It is further to be noted that in any case this reason for shortening college courses holds only for such professional students. For the majority of college students, including almost all the women, such shortening is not called for, and would be only a calamity. Even the smallest real colleges, therefore, who can do very little in the way of adjustment to professional courses, and who may have to lose many, perhaps most, of those looking to professional work, would still have their former most important service to render for the majority of their students.

Moreover, it seems to me wholly probable that a good proportion of the very ablest and clearest-sighted of those going into the professions, will still choose not to deprive themselves of the very best the college can give them, and will therefore prefer not to specialize in college in precisely those subjects to which the larger part of all their later study in any case must be devoted. And, in specialization in other lines, such exceptional students will look forward confidently to a larger life and a higher professional success than could otherwise come to them. These wisest students will certainly not wish to sacrifice acquaintance with the natural great broad human subjects of the last year in college to professional specialization. And even those students who feel compelled to abridge their entire period of study, if they are wise, will so scatter their preliminary professional study through their college course, as to insure that at least a part of their maturest time in college may be given to those great subjects, like philoso-

phy, that require some real maturity of mind to be most profitably taken. I do not believe that the proper demands of both liberal and professional training can be met where it is attempted to cover both courses in six years. Even where the requisite subjects are all covered by brilliant students the value of the outcome may well be doubted. It is not to be forgotten that it is time, and some real sense of leisure, and opportunity to take in the full significance of one's studies and to knit them up with the rest of one's thinking and living—it is just these things that distinguish cramming from real education.

## II. THE GREAT MEANS IN COLLEGE EDUCATION.

A. *A Complex Life.*—And, first, the college must furnish a life sufficiently complex to insure to the student a wide circle of interests, and to call out his entire personality.

Aside from its psychological basis, justification for this prime emphasis on breadth in college education is everywhere at hand. For philosophy has practically to recognize, even when it does not theoretically and directly assert, that "to be is to be in relations." Science cannot forget that as the scale of life rises, there must be correspondence to a more complex environment. The philosophical historian finds the main safeguard against the retrogression of the race in an increasing self-control, due to the steady pressure of great and many-sided objective forces organized in institutions, laws, customs, and education. The supreme educational counsel, and the secret of full mental wakefulness both seem often to be found in concentration upon relations. Our follies usually go back to the ignoring of some relation or other of the matter in hand. And it is not difficult to show that our world, our experience, our sanity, our freedom, and our influence,—all depend in no small degree on the largeness of our cir-

cle of interests; while simple understanding of our complex modern civilization alone requires great breadth in training.

It cannot be denied that such breadth of education is attended by serious dangers of over-sophistication and pessimism through loss of convictions and ideals. And yet the breadth is to be welcomed; for the remedy is not in less breadth, but in more breadth. For breadth certainly does not mean the narrowness of ignoring the results of experience. It is a false liberality that treats with equal respect exploded and verified hypotheses. The entire lack of prejudice upon which some so pride themselves is curiously akin to stupid and obstinate folly. Some things have been proved in the history of the race.

Nor does breadth mean the abandonment of all discrimination in values—putting all values on a dead level. It is a strange reversal of scientific estimates, that turns unscientific lack of discrimination into science's broad openness to light. There *are* many points of view, but they are not therefore all of equal importance. The noble virtue of tolerance is not possible to such cheap and easy indifferencism. Only the man of convictions and ideals, with a strong sense of the difference of values, can be tolerant, for only he *cares*. The view of any single individual is no doubt limited; but the point of view which results from the gradual and careful cancellation of the limitations of many minds, is more than an individual view.

Nor, once more, does breadth mean a narrow intellectualism, for if we can trust the indications of our intellect, we ought to be able to trust the indications of the rest of our nature; and in any case the only possible key and standard of truth and reality are in ourselves—the whole self—and the so-called “necessities of thought” become, thus, necessities of a reason which means loyally to take account of all the data of the entire man.

Obviously, then, no attempt at mere reaction to simpler conditions will avail in education. Indeed, we cannot return to them if we would; though the temptation to do so is often real enough. But, even if the return were possible, it would mean nothing less than a declaration that our Christian ideals cannot conquer a complex situation. This would be really to give up the whole battle; for we have not only found reason fully to justify the greatest breadth on general grounds, but the ideal interests themselves suffer from any spirit of exclusiveness. Human nature certainly avenges itself for any attempted disregard of the wide range of its interests; and, in truth, the denial of legitimate worldly interests only limits the possible sphere of morality and religion. It is for just this reason that the separation of the sacred and secular is the heresy of heresies. The simplicity to be sought lies—not in environment—but in a spirit that, having great convictions and great ideals, clearly discriminates the greater from the less, and unhesitatingly subordinates all relative goods. This insures that singleness of aim that makes the genuinely simple and transparent life. It is a spirit that can recognize the full value of the material in its place, but with the clear vision that "a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth" will not allow itself to be absorbed in the "passion for material comfort." The simplicity of high ideals, consistently and resolutely pursued, is possible to any college in the very midst of the most varied interests. And only such a simplicity can conquer in the end.

The college, of course, must meet these demands for breadth of training by the wide range of its studies and of its interests. In its studies it aims to let the student share in the world's best inheritance in each of the great realms of human thinking. I need not repeat the often given argument for the different studies to be recognized in a lib-

eral training. It will include the older and newer studies, mathematics, ancient and modern languages and literatures, natural science, history, economics and sociology, philosophy, and physical training. And it seems to me hardly open to question that it ought to provide courses that shall prove valuable introductions to the intelligent appreciation of music and of art, as well as of literature. These studies will represent all the great classes of facts in the midst of which every man must live, and afford the full range of fundamental educational values. But liberal training need not mean necessarily, I think, large numbers of greatly detailed courses; nor for any one man acquaintance with *all* branches of natural science. The scientific spirit it must give, with the involved somewhat thorough knowledge of at least one science. The *study* of material objects has great advantages for the scientific spirit and method over the study of any other objects; but we are not at liberty to forget that our primary relation in *life* is nevertheless, not to things but to persons.

But in any case the interests of the college must be wider than the curriculum. It is only a part of our excessive intellectualism that it is so often assumed that the curriculum makes the college. Some of the most important interests in a liberal education can be best met only indirectly. Surroundings, organization, discipline, and atmosphere may here count for more than definite instruction. We have the needs of the entire man—physical, intellectual, æsthetic, social, moral, and religious—to meet in a truly liberal education. The intellectual needs can doubtless be met more easily and directly in the curriculum than any of the others; but none of them may be ignored without serious loss.

*Physical* education makes its rightful claim upon the college. The college must not only talk about the sound mind in the sound body, but do something really to secure

that sound body for its students. It must not only thoroughly recognize in its psychological teaching the intimate way in which body and mind are knit up together, the physical basis of habit, the critical importance of surplus nervous energy, the influence of physical training upon the brain centers, and the close connection of the will with muscular activity; but if it really believes these things, it must practically recognize them in the organization of its work. This means, not only, that there must be scrupulous care about sanitary conditions, careful supervision of the health of students by thoroughly trained physicians, and general hygienic instruction, but such scientifically planned and graded courses in physical training as shall deserve to count as real education on the same basis as laboratory courses. Unless our modern psychology is wholly wrong, such physical education that can be applied to all students, has a great contribution to make, not only in health and in the systematic development of the body, but intellectually and volitionally as well.

If athletics are to make their true contribution to the college life—and a most valuable contribution that may be—a wide range of sports must be encouraged that shall enlist a great portion of the students, and not merely a small number of specially athletic men; and the spirit of genuine play must be brought back into all college so-called sports. They have their most valuable office, it should never be forgotten, not as serious business or money-making enterprises, but simply as *play*. A relative good becomes a serious evil, when it is allowed to overtop greater values; but *in* its place it contributes to the sanity and health of all other interests. Such a contribution, I have no doubt, athletics have it in their power to make, and to a considerable extent do make even now; and physical education, as a whole, demands greater attention from the college.

The universally recognized demand of the *intellectual* in college education needs no argument.

The fact that man is as truly an æsthetic being, as physical and intellectual, the college has less often sufficiently recognized. But if it is the mission of a liberal training to produce the man of culture, it can hardly refuse to furnish, in some form, ability to appreciate the great æsthetic realms of literature, music, and art. What it already does in large measure for literature, it ought also to do for music and art. We must not forget the kinship of the æsthetic with the still higher values, and its own large contribution to the sanity and happiness of life. The college cannot wisely ignore this need of man. Doubtless, the real need cannot be fully nor perhaps chiefly met in courses or in their equipment. The college needs to be able to put its students to such extent as is possible in the presence of the best in these realms, and to permeate the common life of each student with something of the beautiful. It is no small service, which is so rendered. Music has certain great advantages in this respect, especially in a co-educational institution.

And certainly, unless one denies the legitimacy of the very aim—social efficiency—with which either the state or the church enters upon the work of education at all, the place of the *social and moral* in college education cannot be questioned. Men may differ as to the best way of meeting these needs; they can hardly differ as to their imperative claim upon any education that is to be called liberal. No let-alone policy here is enough. The moral in its broadest scope should be a clearly recognized part of college education—to be most wisely and considerately done, no doubt, with all possible recognition of the moral initiative of the pupil—but to be done, nevertheless. Much talk upon this point seems to make the most singular assumption that the only real necessity in that finest and

most delicate of all worlds, the world of personal relations, is moral backbone; and that a situation that tends to develop that is doing all that can be asked for moral education. But what of aims and ideals and wisest means in all this? What of that sensitive moral judgment, and creative imagination, and deep sense of the meaning of life, without which no high moral attainment can be made? What right have we indifferently to let things take their course here? This is nothing less than to give the student a shove downward; for other influences do not keep their hands off in the meantime. What else is the object of education, but to make a man all around a better man than he would have otherwise naturally become?

And, once more, unless one is ready to deny altogether the value of the function of religion in the life of men, the *religious* need also deserves recognition in some way in any education that is to be called complete. Any ideal view of life, such as a broad education must itself assume, virtually implies a faith in the rationality of the world which is practically religious. It is shallow thinking that imagines that religious faith is a matter of small concern, and easily to be set aside. If, as Emerson tells us, any high friendship transfigures the world for us, certainly there is no such contributor to peace and joy as a real faith in God. And ethical earnestness and social efficiency, no less than happiness, surely find their strongest support in a religious faith. Why should the man of ethical earnestness believe that he is more in earnest to be honest and kind than the Source of all whence he has come? Is man indeed himself the Highest? And what rational defense has any man for the enthusiasm with which he throws himself into either his own calling, or into work for social progress, who cannot believe that in both he is working in line with the eternal forces, and that a plan greater than his own encircles all his plans and makes effective all the bits of his

striving? None of us are going seriously and enthusiastically to attempt to dip out the ocean with a cup. And if we really believe in the value of our calling, or of our own social endeavor, whether we recognize it or not, our belief is at bottom a genuinely religious faith. Man is inevitably a religious being. For this very reason, too, a peculiar responsibility is laid upon education. For this means that some kind of religious life and thought every man is bound to have; the only question is, whether that religious life and thought shall be well considered and adequate.

Either the function of religion is much less than the great majority of the more thoughtful of mankind have always thought, or the religious need of men deserves to be met in education without apology and with an effectiveness seldom found. It concerns a people to know whether its educational system is helping to an intelligent and genuine religious life. So great a need as this will not take care of itself. Where is it being adequately met to-day? Few things are more discouraging than the large amount of surprisingly unintelligent Christianity in supposedly educated men. How many of our college graduates have really awakened, for example, to the significance of the serious self-limitation of philosophy in its setting outside its field the great facts of Christian history?

It is a chief aim of a liberal education—is it not?—to bring a man to true culture—to ability to enter into all values with appreciation and conviction. And all values—all the marvelous content of literature and music and art—we may not forget, are but the revelation of the riches of some personal life. All values go back ultimately to persons. And the highest achievement of culture is the understanding and appreciation of the great personalities. And the Christian religion, therefore, makes its rightful appeal to the truly cultivated man in the tran-

scendent person of its Founder. May not the college be asked to send out men sufficiently cultured to be able to appreciate that transcendent person of history?

Doubtless, in many of our institutions the use of anything like definite religious instruction and motive by the institution itself is necessarily excluded. Even so, it means a limitation in the education, which is to be made good so far as possible by other agencies. The necessity of these situations is, however, by no means to be made into a prescription for all others. And the teacher may well rejoice, who, in the midst of his teaching, is free to give utterance to his deepest and most significant convictions.

In general, those colleges will best meet the demands for breadth in education, that are most free and best organized to meet the entire range of human interests. The advantage here lies in part with the larger and in part with the smaller institutions.

In all cases, with whatever inevitable limitations of situation, it must at least be demanded that the spirit pervading the college should be heartily, though discriminatingly, catholic. There should be, certainly, no vaunting of our limitations. And this discriminating breadth of view, it should be noticed, in its recognition of the complexity of life, and of the unity of man, if truly interpreted, itself affords moral support; for it furnishes a motive against mere impulse, and helps directly to that deliberation which is the secret of self-control; and, because it believes that all life is so knit up together, is also strenuous counsel against deterioration at any point.

Beyond this breadth in interest and appeal, the great reliance of an education that is to meet the needs of the entire man must be, as we have seen, upon making all possible use of expressive activity on the part of the student, and of personal association.

B. *Expressive Activity.*—And, first, if the “voluntaristic trend” in modern psychology has any justification, if in body and mind we are really made for action, if for the very sake of thought and feeling we must act, then any soundly based education must everywhere make much of the will and of action, must in all departments of its training of the individual—physical, intellectual, æsthetic, social, moral, and religious—specifically seek expressive activity.

This goes without saying in physical education, and it is just at that point that physical education has its greatest contribution to make to all other training. And the educational value of earning one’s way in college is not to be overlooked just here. It is easy to overdo the amount of direct financial aid to students. It is not the ministry alone, as seems often gratuitously assumed, that suffers in this respect. In spite of the temptation of a short-sighted competition that sets colleges to bidding against one another for students, it remains true that no college that aims at the highest results can afford to ignore social axioms in giving its beneficiary aid. Care by the college in providing opportunities for self-help is the very best form of aid. For such aid does not pauperize, but calls out useful active service from the student himself. But the possibilities of development in this direction depend very largely on the fidelity of students. Each student generation holds a trust in this respect for the next generation.

The principle has already been widely recognized in intellectual training in many of the changes of the newer education—in the introduction of laboratory and seminar methods, and in the extension of these methods so far as possible to all subjects of study, and specifically in the revolution of the teaching of English composition. But this principle of the fundamental need of expressive activity deserves ever-widening recognition, as a real guiding prin-

ciple even in intellectual teaching. The pupil's own activity is to be called out at every point; the fullest, clearest, and most accurate expression of his thought in speech, in writing, and, wherever possible, in action, is to be sought. Even our ideas are not ours until we have expressed them, and they are more perfectly ours, the more perfect the expression. The old-fashioned recitation, when well conducted, had a real ground of justification, and no lecturing by the teacher can fully replace it.

In æsthetic education the same principle holds. Some actual attainment in each of the arts is no doubt a real aid to intelligent appreciation. And no art lends itself more easily than music to such attainment, even quite outside the work of the regular curriculum. No doubt the main dependence in this matter of æsthetic education must be upon the molding influence of the best in these realms, so far as the college can furnish this. To a considerable extent this is possible in all the arts, if the necessary means are granted. But if these influences are to do their full work, it should be noted, there must be some real response on the part of the student, made possible directly through courses intended to introduce to the arts, and indirectly through the less systematic but not less stimulating suggestion of a wide-spread interest in the atmosphere of the college.

And æsthetic education has not done its full work until it has brought the student to the recognition of the demands of the beautiful in all his work and in all his surroundings, and to the cherishing, as a permanent aim, of the ideal expression of the ideal life.

But it is in the realms of the social, moral, and religious that expressive activity is most imperatively demanded. If men are to be saved from mere passive sentimentalism they must put their desires, aspirations, and ideals into act. The very employment of the student in bringing

him continually face to face with noble sentiments, peculiarly subjects him to this danger. That which is not expressed dies. A man can be best prepared for moral earnestness, social efficiency, and a genuine religious response in life only through active expression in each of these spheres. Men are best trained for society by acting in society, for the responsibilities of a democracy by taking their part in a really democratic community, for the best fulfillment of personal relations by honest answer to the varied personal demands—human and divine. The student life should not be a hermit nor cloistered nor exclusive life. The more natural and normal the personal relations, both to men and women, in the midst of which the student lives, the better the preparation for the actual life that awaits him. And let his relations to the community life, civic and religious, so far as possible, be those of an ordinary law-abiding citizen, and let him *act* as such a citizen, so far as such action is open to him.

Wherever the college calls for the attainment of definite ends, wherever it sets tasks to be faithfully done at given times, wherever it calls out the will of the student in the larger liberty its life affords him, it is doing something for the development of his moral and religious character. But its responsibility cannot end with these means. The atmosphere of a college should be such as to enlist the enthusiasm of the students in valuable causes—and there are a great variety of them—in which they may already have some share. The naturally self-centered life of the student peculiarly needs such enlistment in objective causes. In the midst of a life permeated with a democratic, unselfish, and reverent spirit, he should find increasingly such a spirit called out from him. Living in personal relations which may well be among the closest and richest of his life, he is to learn the capacity for friendship in the only way it can be learned, through some form

of actual useful service. So far as college traditions are in conflict with such an ideal, they lag behind any really Christian civilization. Certainly the college should itself afford the best opportunities for the students' own initiative and expression in both the moral and religious life. And as—apart from personal association—it can best help the moral life by an atmosphere permeated with the conviction of the social consciousness, so it can best help the religious life by making dominant a conception of religion that shall make it real and rational and vital for the mind that really gives it attention. By such a conception, the student's own response is most naturally called out.

C. *Personal Association.*—But it is called out even so, not so much by the teaching as by the spirit of the men back of the teaching. And we are thus brought to the greatest of all the means available in an all-around education—personal association—already necessarily anticipated in part. I make no doubt that the prime factors in a complete education are always persons, not things, not even books. It would not be difficult to show how powerful is personal association in all the lines of education, even in scientific work; but it is, of course, most indispensable in moral and religious training.

The inevitable interactions of the members of a cosmopolitan student body are themselves of the greatest intrinsic value. The great fundamental social convictions—of the likeness of men, of the mutual influence of men, of the sacredness of the person—are developed in a true college life almost perforce. And the more genuinely democratic the college, the more certain is its ability to make socially efficient citizens. For the sake of its own highest mission, it can afford to stand against the aristocracy of sex, against the aristocracy of color, against the aristocracy of wealth, against the aristocracy of the clique, against the aristocracy of mere intellectual brilliancy. And it can

safely carry this democratic spirit very far into all its organization and working.

Beyond these inevitable social interactions of the college life, it is a great thing for the development of a man to be surprised into really unselfish friendships. And the college, by its great community of interests and its natural atmosphere of trust, has peculiar power in bringing about just such unselfish friendships. The contribution which it so makes not only to character but also to happiness, the college man knows well.

But either in morals or in religion we know but one royal road to the highest life—through personal association with those who possess such a life as we ought to have, to whom we can look in admiration and love, and who give themselves unstintedly to us. There is no cheaper way. Even so high a service is often rendered to one student by another student; but it is a wholly just demand to make upon a college that that service should be rendered in pre-eminent degree by its teachers. Whatever may be true in other parts of the educational system, the college teacher must be one from whom the highest living can be readily caught. In the interests of simple honesty, the college teacher must be thoroughly prepared to teach what he professes to teach. We cannot begin in character-making with a fraud. And for the same reasons, professing to teach he should be able to teach. He must have sanity, too, and tact—real wisdom, for the insights of only such a man will be sure to count with others. And, as a man who must stand as a convincing witness for the best, he cannot be excused from the requisites of the effective witness—undoubted character and conviction, genuine interest in the deepest life of others, and that power in putting the great things home, that should belong to his teaching ability. His highest qualification is character-begetting power—power to inspire other men to their absolute best.

When one tries to measure the power of even one or two such men in a college community, he begins to see at last what the one indispensable factor in a college is, and how much is at stake in the choice of a faculty. Nothing, let us be sure, so certainly brings about the deterioration of the college, as carelessness in the selection of its teachers. A few compromising appointments here may easily make impossible the maintenance of the college's highest ideals or best traditions. The spirit of a college cannot go down in its buildings or grounds or forms of organization. If its best continues at all and grows, it must continue and grow in persons; and the petty and ignoble cannot carry on the work of the great and worthy. We seem to be in the midst of a great awakening to the over-weighting importance of moral and religious education, and the movement comes none too soon; but let us not for a moment imagine that any change in courses or methods or organization can ever take the place of the one great indispensable means—the personal touch of great and high personalities. And if they are not found in our colleges, where may they be sought?

### III. THE REQUISITE SPIRIT IN COLLEGE EDUCATION.

And when one turns to characterize the *spirit* of the true college he must parallel, as we have seen, the great means of a complex life, of expressive activity, and of personal association, with the demand for a spirit—heartily but discriminatingly catholic, thoroughly objective, and marked by the great convictions of the social consciousness. In the discussion of the means, the spirit needed has been in no small part implied. I certainly need not say more concerning the catholicity that must unmistakably mark the true college.

But it does deserve to be emphasized that, if psychology's insistence upon the importance of action is at all justified,

then our normal mood, the mood of the best work, of the best associations, and of happiness itself, is the *objective mood*. The great means in education, of using one's powers in an interesting and complex environment, even for the very sake of the ideal, itself demands the mood of work. And this needs to be particularly remembered in moral and religious training. The student life in any case is quite too prone to be self-centered, and therefore needs all the more the objective emphasis. But aside from this peculiar need of the student life, the introspective mood itself has a smaller contribution to make to the moral and religious life than has been commonly assumed. Just so much introspection is needed as to make sure that one has put himself in the presence of the great objective forces that lead to character and to God. When this is determined, the work of introspection is practically done. The dominant mood should be objective through and through.

And one chief and good cause of reaction, no doubt, from some of the older methods of moral and religious training in college, has been the lack of this objective spirit. This does *not* mean any underestimation of the significance of personal religion, but a wholesome sense that no man may come into right personal relations with God without sharing the life of God, and that life is love; and love cannot be cultivated in selfishness and self-absorption.

But if the college looks preëminently to social efficiency, and if its greatest means is personal association, its spirit must be, above all, permeated with the great convictions of the *social consciousness*. Nowhere should the atmosphere be more genuinely and thoroughly democratic, charged with the strong sense of the likeness of men in the great essentials; nowhere a more evident setting aside of all artificial and merely conventional standards in the

estimate of men. No small part of the value of the college education lies in bringing a man steadily to the test of the worth of his naked personality. And when convention rules, the very life of the college has gone out.

And the college must add to its democratic spirit the spirit of responsibility and service. Its life must be permeated with the conviction that men are inevitably members one of another, and that responsibility for others, therefore, is inescapable; that, moreover, much of the best of life comes through this knitting up with humanity in many-sided personal relations, and, in consequence, this mutual influence of men is not merely inevitable, but desirable and indispensable. Surely, a true cosmopolitan college must be able to send out men marked by the sense of responsibility and of the obligation of service.

But no high development is possible in personal friendship or in society without a deep sense of the value and sacredness of the person. What even the golden rule really demands of a man, depends upon his sense of the significance of life, of the value of his own personality. And if even the sense of the likeness and of the mutual influence of men is to bear satisfying fruit, it must be informed throughout by reverent regard for the liberty and the person of others.

And nowhere is this reverence for the person more needed than in moral and religious education. For the very aim of such education is to bring a man to a faith and a life of *his own*. This requires at every point the most careful guarding of the other's liberty, the calling out everywhere of his own initiative. There can be, therefore, in the nature of the case, no mere imposition upon another of any genuine moral and religious life. And more than this is true. What you will do, what you can do, for another will be measured by your sense of his value. If men are for you mere creatures of a day with but meager

possibilities, nothing can call out from you the largest service in their behalf. Nor is this all. With the sense of the value, the preciousness, of the person, comes a genuine reverence, that not only sacredly guards the other's moral initiative, but understands that the inner life of another is rightly inviolate; that in any high friendship, nay, in any true personal relation, there can be only request, never demand. The highest man stands with Christ at the door of the heart of the other, only knocking that he may come in, by the other's full consent alone.

And, if the college is to grapple in any effective way with moral and religious education, it must, beyond all else, have a spirit instinct with such reverence for the person. On this very account, indirect methods here may be really more effective than direct methods. Some wise instruction undoubtedly is desirable, and even imperative, but it must be given by men who have a delicate sense of what personality means; and the spirit that pervades the college is here more effective even than the instruction; and it would not be difficult to overdo definite instruction in this field. Character and religion are always rather caught than taught.

I cannot doubt, then, that a second important reason for reaction from the older college in its moral and religious education has been because it too often forgot the supreme need of reverence for the person of the pupil. The dispute into which the so-called "paternal" methods have fallen implies as much. But is it not worth our while to remember that the name—paternal—is falsely given in such a case? The highest characteristic of the true father is a deep sense of the value and sacredness of the person of his child, not the desire to dominate. And no moral and religious education worthy of the name is possible in a college where such reverence for the person does not prevail; for that reverence, deep-seated and all-pervading, is

the finest test of culture, the highest attainment in character, and the surest warrant for social efficiency.

And these great ends—culture, character, and social efficiency—the true college must set before itself. The great *means* to these ends are unmistakable: an environment sufficiently complex to give acquaintance with the great fundamental facts of the world and to call out the entire man; the completest possible expressive activity on the part of the student; and personal association with broad and wise and noble lives. The *spirit* demanded is equally indisputable—broadly but discriminatingly catholic in its interests; objective in mood and method; democratic, unselfish, and finely reverent in its personal relations.

In all—means and spirit—the primacy of the person is to be steadfastly maintained. All that is most valuable in college education exists only in living men. “God give us men.”