The twentieth century lives, thinks and moves beneath the canopy of science, whose bold venturesomeness has turned "thick-coming fancies" into common-place realities of our era. Whoever stutters while stressing this debt to science, too little senses the changed conditions under which the human species exists in modern times.

Scientific knowledge fascinates us as the radiant mirror of the vexing behavior of our complex universe. In the dimension of power, science now rules space and time with commanding dominion. Its task seemingly scarce begun, science shapes one swift transformation after another of our mode of human life.

No Christian observer can view this vivid setting for day-to-day survival, however, without a feeling of dark anxiety as well as of deep appreciation. Science has now wrested from nature a sovereignty whose abuse could lead virtually to destruction of the physical world, heretofore considered the exclusive prerogative of Deity. Not only is science preoccupied with power, virtually usurping the throne of omnipotence, but many scientists more and more obscure Jesus Christ as Truth. No Christian century since the first has assumed more obviously than our scientific age the irrelevance of Jesus Christ to the space-time world. No strata of society binds its spirit to agnosticism more insistently than the scientific community. Nowhere have the assertive words of Jesus, "All power is given unto me," and "I am the Truth," fallen upon ears so unresponsive as among men of scientific pursuits. Could this exiling of Jesus Christ by men of science contribute to the growing misuse of truth and power by anti-Christ in the modern struggle between the nations of the world?

Now many scholars detect in some scientific circles a quite opposite tendency—if not a revival of spiritual faith and a return to supernatural religion, at least a decline of naturalistic dogmatism and a new openness to the theistic vision of the universe. Writing on "Science and Religion" in *Contemporary Evangelical Thought*, I noted this gratifying turn in contemporary philosophy of science. The existence of American Scientific Affiliation, composed of qualified scientists actively committed to a theistic world-view, is one of several considerations precluding any dismissal of the whole scientific enterprise as essentially anti-Christ. In the recent volume *The Evidence of God in an Expanding Universe* (John Clover Monsma, editor), 40 American scientists of varying prominence declare affirmative views on religion. Yet it is difficult to read Dr. Monsma's compilation without three distinct impressions. The evangelical scholar will approve its recognition in our scientific age of the legitimacy of supernatural religion—although not all the testimonials stand within the framework of biblical religion. Alongside this an uneasiness emerges over the divergent grounds by which these many contributors support their belief, and a feeling that at this level not a few participants cancel each other out. Finally, one is distressed that so few scientists sense that the scientific attitude today often carries a deadly threat to revealed redemptive religion which, unmet and unchallenged, may betray the new pliancy to a fixed agnosticism that strips scientific relevance and respectability from religious affirmation. So I propose to speak of this disturbing mood in science, and of its disposition to stiffen into a fixed disinterest in the Christian doctrine of nature, and propose to assess this mood from the standpoint of Christian theology.
I

Whoever views the scientific enterprise today must note several features especially characteristic of contemporary research.

1. The search for things has been replaced by the search for structure, a course already charted by some ancient Greek philosophers. Whether or not skepticism about the existence of “things” (by those who stress that we know “only form and structure”) is justifiable the “disappearance of matter” in the researches of physicists now involves their tacit recognition that matter is not the ultimate entity. The center of scientific interest has shifted to structural properties and logical relationships.

2. The older ground for certainty—the Law of Causality (which the nineteenth century postulated with sufficient dogmatism to outlaw the biblical miracles)—is now set aside. No longer do scientists predicate the absolute uniformity of nature. From the seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries the mechanical and causal view of events was championed as a legitimate generalization from experience. But now it is widely admitted that not scientific evidence but a metaphysical bent, or at least an emotional urge underlays this old confidence in a law of universal causality.

3. While the contemporary experimenter still assumes that his scientific colleagues will observe the same facts under the same conditions (research would otherwise be senseless), he no longer openly projects this assumed uniformity into a formal law sanctioning universal scientific inductions, nor does he seek universal by absolute results. Abandoning the “pretense” of knowing things and their behavior, he professes to borrow only personal incentive and comfort from this assumed constancy of nature.

4. The task of science is now widely envisioned as the mere arrangement of experimental facts in symbols whose mechanical significance is unknown and unsought. The claim of provable knowledge of the world is now placed in the framework of logic or the generalizations from the observable sequences of many variables arranged in functional dependency. The exclusiveness of causal mechanics, not necessarily its utility, is now doubted. Nature is said not to be mechanically intelligible. The modern theory of scientific truth, Johnson reminds us, “leaves us agnostic as to any universal premise of induction or any deification of a universal law to be called Causality” (p. 109). The criterion of truthfulness, dislodged from the need to track a causal mechanism, in view of the inaccessibility of causal sequences, is associated merely with structural pattern. The search for causes gives way to the search for equations to represent space-time events—and this communicable equation is knowledge or truth.

This shift by physicists in defining the nature of truth followed partly from the difficulties encountered in their explanation of the electron, which defied construction of a law of nature out of a selection of mechanical hypotheses. Having properties of both matter and radiation, the electron vacillates between particle laws and wave laws, each of which has a mechanical meaning independent of the other. This situation contributed to the physicist’s indecisiveness over “truth” and blurred the borderline between hypothesis and law. At different stages of science, it was said, different methods are useful in assigning meaning to truth, therefore much that was essential to earlier scientific method is now dispensable.

In this way communicable patterns of relations now furnish the content of scientific truth, in contrast with natural law attested by mechanism and causal sequence. No longer does the physicist seek a sharp line transition between the tentative and the certior, or between hypotheses and laws of nature. Rather, the aim is scientific enthusiasm for “probable conclusions” resting on a probable premise. Such probability never reaches certainty. But it leads to the solution of problems and, highly important, is productive of inventions and gadgets, and it yields self-congratulation that the widest transformations for the equations are “progressively more comprehensive” over all physical events and that experiments verify “a probability tending toward unity. Alongside utility as the test for truth, some scientists are prone to stress the coherence of the logical structures coordinating observed quantities. To borrow a definition from Science and the Meanings of Truth, truth is “a coherence scientifically are tempted to regard the notion of truth internal to their science as alone competent to establish validity, and to think that every other proposed avenue of knowledge is illegitimate. What truth means in physics thereby yields a revisionary influence on the totality of knowledge.

Inasmuch as our present concern is with the revelation of God in nature, we need not at length sketch the case against seeking truth in theology and ethics by the same mode and means the scientist applies to nature. Universal extension of so-called “logico-empirical” analysis presupposes, of course, the very bias that it presumes to vindicate, that knowledge consists of statements about observable phenomena, and that all else is symbolic language loaded with emotion. Let it simply be said that this very definition cannot be validated by the criteria it proposes, and that the actual emotive basis of this claim should astonish scientists who propound and promulgate it.

We shall deal more fully with the meaning of truth now widely current in physics, that is, the limitation of knowledge to communicable propositions about the relation and structure of events. An earlier view validated truth in physics by a different canon of validity and, in fact, sought a different dimension of truth based, as we have noted, on mechanical treatment of motion and causality, and on the assumed uniformity of nature. In the absence of explanation and verification by such mechanical and causal determinism, the modern work plan simply groups the generalizations from the observable sequences of many variables arranged in functional dependence. The exclusiveness of causal mechanics, not necessarily its utility, is now doubted. Nature is said not to be mechanically intelligible. The modern theory of scientific truth, Johnson reminds us, “leaves us agnostic as to any universal premise of induction or any deification of a universal law to be called Causality” (p. 109). The criterion of truthfulness, dislodged from the need to track a causal mechanism, in view of the inaccessibility of causal sequences, is associated merely with structural pattern. The search for causes gives way to the search for equations to represent space-time events—and this communicable equation is knowledge or truth.

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between functional dependences rendering communicable the structure of relations observed between measurable and especially temporal qualities” (p. 141). Yet it is soon evident that the workability of propositions alone establishes their coherence, so that utility becomes the real test of knowledge. Not only has the physicist’s interest shifted from truth as propositions beyond need of revision, so that he does not seek to transcend the hypothetical character of propositions, but he equates truth with “forms and structures” which he constructs to express a merely functional dependence. “If the differential equations and the appropriate transformations provide predictions quantitatively checked by experiment, we measure the degree of understanding which is desired for those aspects of Nature interesting to physics” (ibid., p 60).

This coherence of alterable patterns or structures, it is then affirmed, alone screens the physicist from complete agnosticism about the external world of nature. The dual limitation of scientific knowledge—that is, to qualified assertions about the future behavior of nature, and to merely functional statements about nature—is depicted as in every sense a gain for science. It strips away the deistic assertion that only predictable interactions will be encountered in experience. This larger agnosticism, moreover, is widely hailed as disallowing a materialistic metaphysics (the view that mind, value, spirit are simply manifestations of the atoms and fields with which science deals); since science must confine its comments to the world for which its methods were devised, physics “imposes no materialism upon the most general interpretation of total experience” (ibid., p. 109). The same requirement of agnosticism equally deprives physics of any relevance for a theological interpretation of nature. As Dr. Johnson puts it, physics “has no more of a positive than a negative attitude to the mental or the spiritual.”

Now if the scientist’s only knowledge of the external world is his experimental procedure for control of nature, the Christian view of the world is seriously compromised. For the biblical view is that the universe itself is to be comprehended as a revelation of the glory and power and will of God. If therefore nature is not “truly” grasped in terms of mechanical and impersonal causal determinism, neither is it “truly” grasped in terms of reversible mathematical constructions functionally serviceable only to facilitate man’s control of the world. The contemporary emphasis on this latter index to the world as exclusively authentic involves the scientist in more than agnosticism; we shall see that it involves him also in idolatry.

This idolatry is apparent from the physicist’s attitude both toward nature and toward the supernatural. In the Anglo-Saxon world, at least, most physicists seem not to deny (though many do) the existence of non-physical entities, nor do they insist that their method has exclusive rights, nor that only experiences measurable and describable in physical terms are significant. But by vocation the physicist prizes quantitative measurement as the only objective fact or truth. He fights shy—and, in fact, prides himself upon its avoidance—of any philosophy designed to cover the whole of experience, in order to protect the priority of quantitative measurement in physics. He assumes that if this method does not give us “the truth” about the universe, only nonscientific and antiscientific explanations remain. Thus he often comes perilously near the logical positivist view—even when he would disclaim it—that all scientific propositions, or propositions with a claim to objective truth, must contain only perception terms as predicates. For no questions can be addressed to science except those that can be answered by a system of symbols in designation of our experiences, or by statements of pointer readings. Only perceptive experiences are taken for granted, and abstract symbols become the means of relating these. He may readily admit the reality of other realms—memory and imagination, aesthetics, morals and religion—but none of these is allowed a significant role in deciphering the external structure of nature.

Reluctant though he may be to venture illegitimate conclusions about non-physical verities, the physicist is prone nonetheless to dismiss every non-quantitative conviction as subjective. A scientific theory of knowledge, keyed to quantitative judgment about the objective world of nature, can say nothing about the subjective world of values. As Dr. Johnson would have it, “Only concerning the QUANTITATIVE can statements be made on which there is any decision as to whether two scientists agree or disagree. Contrast with physics, for example, the impossibility of agreement between two art critics, or between two followers of different religions, because their judgments, although very important, are essentially QUALITATIVE and not expressible in terms of verifiable measurement” (Johnson, op cit., p. 55). In fact, the limitations of physical theory are made to justify a skeptical view of knowledge, surrendering both the search for finality and for consistency and comprehensiveness of explanation. “In a philosophy of science we may well learn caution from physics itself . . . to recognize that more than one self-consistent explanation may co-exist, for instance the wave-theory and the particle-theory both simultaneously applicable to limited aspects of the nature of electrons and the nature of radiation. Each is ‘truthful’ by a coherence test, within the domain in which the appropriate concepts have experimental significance. The caution is worthy of extension—in very few arguments is one theory ‘right and therefore all others wrong’” (ibid., p. 140).

Given this approach, the exposition of a theology of all that exists quite understandably becomes an impossible task, an insatiable craving for a “neat and tidy” universe foredoomed as a pursuit of overcomprehensiveness. Embarrassed by their own past dogmatisms, scientists of this stamp are now prone to reject all comprehensiveness and finality, dismissing such larger explanations as efforts to bolster some personal credo that the expositor thinks necessary to the wellbeing of mankind (and without self-application of this rule by the scientist to his own standpoint). The attempt to “systematize” the universe under a single term, not alone as a venture of speculative metaphysics, but as a task of theology also, is viewed as finite man’s sacrifice to an inordinate urge for imagining we can see all that exists, including ourselves, as products of one kind of thing” (ibid., p. 113). The biblical view that “all things were made by” the Logos, and that “in him all things consist,” is waved aside, being assimilated to the speculative traditions to which Samuel Alexander, J.M.E. McTaggart, or Edgar S. Brightman in our own century are viewed as supplying a last bold gart or Edgar S. Brightman in our own century are viewed as supplying a last bold credo or even in our own century are viewed as supplying a last bold credo or even in our own century are viewed as supplying a last bold credo or even in our own century are viewed as supplying a last bold credo or even in our own century are viewed as supplying a last bold credo. 

Conclusion: whatever is permitted, on the trunkline of truth, from physics to metaphysics (naturalistic or spiritualistic), because the logic of physics essentially precludes this. Thus pure science is regarded as destructive of a comprehensive world-life view, whether the ultimate explanatory principle be theological or philosophical. “There is not to be a science of theology,” Dr. Johnson insists, “in the sense in which I have been investigating the possible meanings of scientific truth” (ibid., p. 176).

One is therefore not surprised in the least when Dr. Johnson later invokes his quantitative preoccupation as the basis for a subtle attack upon larger theories of knowledge. We are informed that permanent and universal truth is inadmissible; in Dr. Johnson’s words, “There is no permanent truth covering all situations” (ibid., p. 93).

Most physicists readily admit that quantitative language is not the dialect for expressing moral and religious judgments, and with this Dr. Johnson agrees. Man does not live by sensations alone. Moral judgments are not meaningless because of
the impossibility of expressing them in wave lengths. But qualitative judgments of
theology, ethics, and aesthetics are cushioned with a covering of agnosticism sur-
passing the physicist’s agnostic approach to nature. Subjective constructs may be
degnified by noting, even emphasizing, that science for its own existence requires mental
constructs seeking to picture physical reality in mathematical and logical forms. “The
subjective . . . only presents itself to metaphysical speculation with the status of an
imaginative construct” (ibid., p. 159). But physicists should have the honesty “to
recognize that the ultimate conceptual objects of physics, and even much which under-
lies common perception, have logically no firmer status” (ibid., p. 160). So it is
that science becomes exact—at least, so scientific relativism assumes—as it succeeds
in rejecting an objective truth basis for the spiritual. “Any pictured external world
is an erection containing much that is beyond logical verification, or that could claIm
constructs...” There is nothing whatever in... scientific truthfulness of accounts of...
The demand that psychology be pared to the limits of physics. With the content of science thus arbitrarily restricted, the argument no longer proceeds to nature's Beyond from nature itself, but from and to the scientist's tentative correlations of his carefully circumscribed curiosities—which may in fact disclose more about the essential character of the scientist than about nature and nature's God.

The scientist thinks of untruth in his experiments simply as error, and not as falsehood. The idea of a misrepresentation of nature, or of a revolt against the Logos revealed in nature, is sidestepped by definition. In his reaction to the external world there may be a false start, but not a falsehood, let alone a false god. Whatever coordinates separate explanations into a connected theory is approved as advancing his aesthetic satisfaction or facilitating the control of nature—and that is "good" rather than "true" or "false." The concern of science is only with "problematic truths" of enlarging generality. The idea of science as a pursuit of truth is on the wane. The idea of "truthfulness" finds an awkward tenure in scientific experiment, since a growing flux is evident in scientific circles as to what "truthful explanation" means. Yet the scientist cannot really separate his judgments of form from judgments of fact embodied in true or false propositions, unless he surrenders all connection between his judgments and the objective world of reality.

Doubtless the control of nature can be hastened through a mere concern for form and pattern, without demanding any verdict of truth or falsity on declarations about the constitution or cognizability of the real world. But both the rationality of physical science and the rationality of culture, let alone of the scientist himself, seem threatened if the inquiry into reality is permanently compressed to these limits. Much as the scientist may wish to emphasize his creative contribution to progress, his own revisionary character or his projections about nature, of course, carries always an innert demand for replacement. The more the logic of science is integrated with the psychology of the scientist's mind, moreover, the more insistently the question of inherent rationality asserts itself. Are the physicist's patterns merely transcripts of his own mentality, something shaped only by the mind's activity and in no sense given, or do they have something in common with the external world? Is reality a universe of unknowable relations, so that science is faced by uncertainty except for whatever structure or order or system the scientist himself imposes? Is this coherence of abstract propositions a mere projection of inquiring minds, or is it in some respects drawn from a world of logical forms? Is the abstract structure of relations between logical terms simply a coordination on the knower's part or does it mirror a universe of mathematical properties? Since different mathematical properties can be used in different experiments, must we not view science as simply a series of guesses as to what might work?

The mere communication of truth-claims already implies that truth is not simply a property of knowledge possessed by one individual, since it elevates truth-claims beyond chaotic individualism to an awareness of other minds. Beyond communicability, moreover, the demand for coherence remains as the essential test of truth. Although many physicists emphasize that the nature of the external world is unsure, they seem sure nonetheless that the mind apprehends its order in particular patterns and forms, that is, that Nature is Intelligible. Can the scientist's sheer postulation of intelligibility really clarify the meaning of knowledge and truth? The lack of interest in the logical status of the laws of nature represents not merely their flight from reason to experience, but a different attitude toward them. Unless this search for knowable structures and patterns — distilled from the unknowable actions of unknowable things — strengthens the confidence that nature and life are ultimately intelligible, does any point remain in seeking to make sense of our observations of the external world? To answer "yes — it produces jet travel and curbs cancer!" evades the real issue. For modern science has shaped our technological materialistic age with its pursuit of gadgets and survival alongside indifference to truth and goodness, and without objective standards of morality civilization swiftly disintegrates.

The physicist often expresses an attitude toward the world that is not simply restricted and arbitrary, but wrong and even wicked. Whenever his outlook toward nature, in his role as scientist, at the same time dictates a way of life, scientism becomes destructive of objective values and promotive of relativism. He recognizes in nature simply a challenge to his own sovereignty, rather than a mirror in which the Creator publishes his divine sovereignty over the universe. Science is removed from the sovereignty of God and only the scientist's creative capacity is emphasized. In our technological and military age the consuming passion is to master observable phenomena and to put nature into our service. In this way the ministry of nature is joined to the whims of immoral man and smothered from moral accountability and its spiritual intention by creation. Since the answerability of science — and hence of scientists and their inventions to the moral order and to the sphere of truth is frustrated, the passion for control becomes serviceable to the totalitarian ambition for sovereign control over both men and things.

The scientist's supposed humility in the presence of nature involves him not simply in agnosticism, but in costly spiritual rebellion. In the climate of eighteenth century deism, scornful of the biblical miracles, science trusted mechanistic theory to supply answers to all questions. The collapse of mechanical science precipitated some decline of faith in scientific method. Contemporary science stresses the revisionary character, and functional rather than ontological significance, of its index to nature. But the factor that inevitably will contribute most to a decline of faith in scientific methodology is the detachment of science from ultimate considerations and, in fact, the scarring of these. The real crises in science, or in the scientific conception of nature, exists at this level. The limitation of human knowledge to "useful fictions," or the reduction of the idea of revelation to functional rather than objectively rational categories, provides a professional "justification" for both scientific and spiritual agnosticism. The lesson of modern science is that the loss of God as the source and support of the universe more and more obscures the external connection between events and encourages their subjective interpretation along arbitrary lines. The determination to resist any "inimination of spiritual factors" into science is forged from the standpoint of an unnatural exclusion of the spiritual. The extension of this attitude to the whole scientific enterprise is not required by the scientific ideal of simplicity of explanation and, moreover, not only promotes tension between science and the Spirit, but by the same token sets science in needless conflict with truth, morality and the soul.

Contemporary science will need to take larger account of the influence of the physicist's mind and will, and to recognize inadequacies in the psychology of his attitude toward his environment.

The influence of the scientist's subjective preferences is seen in the myth-making tendency that co-exists alongside his biased statement of the meaning of truth and his truncated view of nature. By way of consolation for his lack of omnipotence touching the physical world, he exacts a sort of vengeance from the spiritual world by placing it beyond reason's accessibility and hence conscience's answerability. Yet alongside the agnosticism he affirms about the objects of perception, he speaks of unverifiable concepts of values, mind, spirit, God. These he dis-
cusses as the ultimate insight of poetic vision. Profess incompetence though he may to delineate religious and moral ultimates, the scientist despite this asserted agnosticism often betrays a propensity for positing some absolute to which he relates the processes of nature. The absolutizing of the Law of Causality was a striking example of this inner demand for a cosmic god. The Ether of the nineteenth century, or Samuel Alexander’s Space-Time in the twentieth, and other abstractions not directly perceived, appeared as alternatives wedged into the vacuum left by the overthrow of the Causality postulate. Some scientists now import a kind of “Free Will” ascribed to electrons in interpretation of Heisenberg’s physics.

In his preoccupation with form and structure, instead of settling for an abstract logical neutrality—which the scientist never really attains—he exaggerates his own creative contribution. Concealing the true scientific task of “thinking God’s thoughts” he even seizes on the “error of invoking ‘Mind’” premise is none-the-less prone to the subtle self-creation of ultimate entities. Impelled by a secret recognition — some scientists in fact adopt it openly and insist on it — that the universe of reality is broader than the abstractions of physical theory, the scientist himself exceeds the arbitrary restriction of his truth-claim to functional structures, and projects an artificial spiritual order by way of compensation for his earlier denial of the concrete Logos. In view of divergent metaphysical assertions by scientists, one can understand this bridge-building from unpredictability to “Free Will,” from mathematics to “Mind,” and so on, and can sympathize with warnings against “seduction to metaphysical theory.” While the exasperated positivists protest this religiously inspired metaphysics in the name of “purely scientific observations” as barriers to the progress of physics, the evangelical scholar will find here a reflection of the corruptible dispositions of man who, having evaded his response to the revelation of the Logos in nature, now compensates for his divestment of reality by fashioning autonomous alternatives to the self-revealing God. Having mentally shorn nature of its givenness, he becomes boldly creative touching it. Realizing that the unification of science is to be achieved only by the elimination of what the Logos revealed in nature.

The scientist’s fragmented approach to nature perpetrates the lost unity of nature, society, and culture. This situation poses no challenge to the popular fallacies that the unification of science is to be achieved only by the elimination of metaphysics, and that only functional connections contribute to that unification. And it allows the Communist philosophy to make one-sided headway on materialistic premises, with the emphasis that the laws of physics are derived ultimately from the same source as the laws of society. Recognizing that a single explanatory principle assures the rational integration of life’s experiences, Communist speculation wrongly derives this from the dialectical principle that quantitative changes eventually become qualitative changes. The lack of a coherent exposition of the evangelical alternative by default bequeaths unchallenged influence to the Communist claim. It is incumbent upon the evangelical scientist, in his vocation as scientist, to show that science ultimately derives its right to life from the same common principle to which religion and culture are answerable.

IV.

What is specially disconcerting is that the identical assumption, that metaphysical backgrounds have no relevance for science proper, is today often reflected in professedly evangelical writings. Not simply neo-Kantian and neo-Thomist expositors of nature, but the treatment of the scientific sphere by some evangelical interpreters also, shows little if any reason for distinguishing them from the neo-positivists. Scholars of this class do not object to an iron curtain between theology and physics, or the other sciences, and they virtually grant that objective truth is restricted to similarities between sense impressions. Instead of challenging the demotion of metaphysical affirmations from statements that may be considered “true” or “false,” they simply gloss over this restriction, without explicitly challenging the idea that a coherent world-view is impossible, being content to add a private testimonial to religious faith. There is no direct confrontation of the Soviet view that scientists are arbitrary if they speak of creation by spirit, and that “truth” must be judged only by its observable and practical social consequences. Thus they unwittingly aid and abet the illusion that to attack the positivistic interpretation of science is tantamount to rejection of the scientific viewpoint itself. To the positivists, who have rejected the God of the Old and New Testament alike is that the Living God revealed in nature, not merely above it. . . . Nowhere does the Bible soften
its stress that the space-time world confronts the scientist continually with evidence sufficient for the acknowledgment of the Living God . . . .

"The revelation in nature therefore includes much more than is disclosed by laboratory experiments . . . . The cosmic Christ already confronts the scientist in his day-to-day interaction with the created universe.

"The general revelation, moreover, does not stop with this divine confrontation of man (the scientist included) in external nature. The scientist is faced not only by light from the outside, but by an inner light; the Logos is manifested in the conscience and mind of man, not simply in nature and history. And this inner and outer revelation interact and agitate each other constantly, supplying the silent background of all human thought and action. Even before the scientist comes to decision about nature . . . he is enmeshed in inner spiritual tension as a responsible moral agent. No scientist ever reaches his verdict about nature and nature's God without a previous spiritual case history—indeed, a history of moral revolt against God. The scientist is a sinner in revolt against light, both the interior and exterior light of the Logos . . . .

"The scientist's verdict passed upon nature, therefore, is no mere logical-rational verdict; it is a religious, an ethico-spiritual verdict, which he passes equally upon himself. For he is constantly bracketed, even in the twentieth century, by multiple evidences—for an almighty mind and will, in nature; for a sovereign good, in conscience; for a gracious Redeemer, in the Bible; and for a divine renewer of the souls of fallen men, in the living witness of the regenerate. If he turns aside from these—from the witness of conscience which hales men constantly to moral judgment, and from the anthem of the stars in their courses and of the earth and its movements of life, then the twentieth century scientist will stand inevitably in an adverse relationship to nature and to nature's God . . . .

"That the final cause of redemption is also the final cause of nature, that the universe is a revelation of the righteousness and love of God as well as of the power and wisdom of God, indeed that the meaning of creation which manifests the invisible Logos is inseparable from the manifestation-in-flesh of the Logos as Redeemer of fallen man—these great Christian beliefs maintain their vital relevance to our confused century. They bear relentless testimony to a unitary principle of creation, of redemption, of sanctification, of judgement."