

SAMUEL J. MIKOLASKI, D. PHIL.

On the Nature of Man

'I am a man and count nothing human as indifferent to me'.¹ What is it that I as a man assert myself to be? Answers given to this question are strongly influenced by the three major Western philosophical traditions.

To begin with, systems of Idealism generally maintain that the universe is pervaded by mind or is ultimately of the nature of mind. The tendency in Idealism to denigrate the physical world has largely passed, though the ultimate value of particular personality is usually denied.² Recent theology which is expressed in the idealistic categories of the Heidegger-Tillich-type questions that God can be meaningfully called personal. For them God is not personal in the sense of being one with whom we co-operate as we do with our fellows. God is the Ground of our Being. The relation of the human self to the Ground of its existence is not an interpersonal relation.

Non-personal or supra-personal language such as that God is our Ground of Being does not strike me as being either higher or more meaningful than personal language. The denial that God is personal seems to be an important implicate of Idealism in which He is usually thought of as the rationale of the cosmic process. I agree that the process gives evidence of an individualizing tendency but disagree that this should be thought of as the self-realization of the divine perfection in some way. Systems of Idealism are thought to be hospitable to Christian thought because of their stress on spirit as against matter and

¹ *Homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto.* (Terence, *Hauton Timoroumenos* I, 77).

² A. N. Whitehead attempts to give a scientific account of the world in terms of God making Eternal Objects (Ideals) available to Actual Entities which are developing in the cosmic process. Nevertheless, on their demise Actual Entities become food for other Actual Entities. Thus the discrete individual is not of ultimate value.

because they accept the reality of values. But at a critical juncture they jettison the ultimate value of personality. Personal existence is viewed as ephemeral or temporary as a means to some higher end.

Second, to my mind Naturalism is dominant in the ethos of our time. Its history from the time of Leucippas, Democritus and Epicurus is a consistent one. Everything can be accounted for by nature and its processes, including man and his values. J. H. Randall says of contemporary Naturalism:

‘It carries the idealistic emphasis that man is united to his world by a logical and social experience. But it rephrases the idealistic scheme of man’s activities and environment in biological and anthropological categories. While like the idealists it makes them all amenable to a single intellectual method, it formulates that method in experimental terms.’³

It is claimed by many that Naturalism is the only viable alternative in the scientific age which can develop a modern view of man for his future. Its advocates may be divided into two broad camps: (a) Behaviourists and (b) Humanists. The Behaviourist’s view of man is dominated by the premise that all human activity and human nature can be adequately accounted for by the stimulus response (S.R.). Strident voices have been raised against this on the grounds that man has been thereby mechanized and made bereft of any creative capacity. However, R. H. Thouless sees a subtle dilution of the absolute rejection of mentalistic language among some post-Watsonian behaviourists.⁴ Humanists like Arthur Koestler and J. Bronowski hold that there is a spiritual dimension to man as a creative agent which attests to his being more than a casually determined creature in all his activities.

Christians, I believe, can neither opt out of the scientific age nor concede the debate to Naturalism. The critical point for modern man is whether personality involves for essential human nature more than our discussing the function and dissolution of the body.

³ ‘The Nature of Naturalism’, in *Naturalism and the Human Spirit*, ed. E. Y. Krikorian. New York, 1944, p. 373.

⁴ R. H. Thouless (1963), pp. 15–16.

Konrad Lorenz's attempts to enter into more than ethological relations with animals have established a new trend in biological studies. Leonard Williams, who recently published a study of the Woolly monkey, says:

'Friendship and mutual trust that develop as a result of personal contact on a social plane yield a particular kind of knowledge, one that cannot be acquired through the bars of a cage, nor by field studies in the wild. It belongs to a dimension that cannot be experienced by the laboratory worker who is faced by a row of cages, or by the curator who makes his daily round of the zoo and shakes hands regularly with the orang-utan . . . I am concerned with the importance of personal relationship, as distinct from the attitudes of the scientific observer of the wild animal and the pet owner . . . intellectual affection, and the dread of anthropomorphism, of humanizing about animals, are stock ingredients of an immature sophistication which imagines itself to be representative of the scientific attitude.'⁵

This claim that personal relationship yields a certain kind of knowledge is an important divergence from received modern scientific tradition and one that the tradition will not be able to assimilate without important revisions of its outlook.

Based upon the biblical revelation, the third tradition is the Christian doctrine of the *creatio ex nihilo*. This implies that ultimate reality is of the nature of personal life and personal relations. The existence of the person depends on more than process; it depends on the divine sovereignty. For most Christians the doctrine of the *creatio ex nihilo* also implies that the world is not eternal as God himself is, but that it had a beginning.

There is an important relationship between the Christian doctrine of creation and the Christian view of personality. Neither the personal life of God nor the personal lives of human beings are transient modes in which a more real and enduring system of psychological patterns expresses itself. God and man should not be thought of as united in some more ultimate reality. This view is neither unphilosophical common sense nor anthropomorphic mythology but expresses a valid option about the reality of God and the individualizing world process which is under God's providential oversight. It is easier, I

⁵ Leonard Williams (1967), pp. 16, 53.

believe, to think that the will of the intelligent, purposing Creator is the source of all the personal and impersonal modes of existence in space and time than to entertain other alternatives.

From texts like Genesis i–ii, Psalm viii. and cxxxix. 13–16 we learn that man is the goal of the divine creative activity and the centre of God's interest. Empirical and theological duality appear noteworthy in the biblical teaching: (a) Man is aware of his biological or empirical origin. He is fashioned from the dust of the earth (Gen. ii. 7; iii. 19; Job xxxiv. 15; Ps. ciii. 14; Eccl. xii. 7). (b) Man is also made aware of his uniqueness in relation to God his maker within the context of the biblical revelation (Rom. i. 19–23). He is fashioned in the image of God (Gen. i. 26–27; ii. 7). In mind, in feeling and in willing, man is akin to God. He has his origin from God.

Given man's divine origin, what is his nature? The Hebrew word *nephesh* has a wide variety of physical and psychical connotations including throat, breath, sensation, emotion, desire, and even a dead body.⁶ Primarily it denotes 'life-principle' (Lev. xvii. 14) but can also denote all living creatures (*naphshim*, cf. Gen. i. 24, 30). *Nephesh* is the inner vital principle of the body and the body is the outward aspect of *nephesh*; nevertheless, it is distinguishable from its bodily vehicle (Deut. xii. 23; Is. x. 18). While it is predicable of both man and animals, in regard to man it also designates the person as a centre of self-conscious life, or as a living being. At his creation man became a living being, a living person, or a distinct spiritual reality (Gen. ii. 7; cf. Job xvi. 4; Is. i. 14). The term *ruach* (breath, wind, air) means spirit or breath of life (Gen. vi. 17, vii. 15). It denotes the energy or power of conscious life. *Neshamah*, the noun which corresponds to *nephesh*, and *ruach* occur together in Gen. vii. 22, 'all in whose nostrils was the *neshamah* of the *ruach* of life.' *Ruach* is used over the entire range of human and divine powers, including the personal influence of Yahweh's Spirit and the human person, whether of his intellectual, emotional, or volitional

⁶ A. R. Johnson (1964); cf. Eric C. Rust, *Nature and Man in Biblical Thought* (1953).

life, or of any one of these as representative of the entire person. Through these powers the vital, purposeful individual is known.

Thus seen, man is a self-conscious spiritual reality. Spirit as a constituent element of personality occurs in Job xxxii. 8; I Sam. xvi. 14; and Ps. civ. 4. The Hebrew term *basar* identifies the flesh, and its equivalent in Greek is *sarx*. Many parts of the body are commonly used as representative of the whole, but these are primarily the face, hand, reins, and heart.⁷ The body and its parts are instruments of the self, denoted by the Hebrew and Greek pronouns 'ni, 'noki, and *ego*.

In both the Old and New Testament the heart is uniquely the centre of self-conscious life and psychical activity (cf. Ps. 51; Rom. x. 9-10) and is therefore equivalent to the mind or self. In Greek the immaterial part of man is the *psyche* (soul) and the *pneuma* (spirit).⁸ Whether these are synonyms or two distinguishable yet vitally related aspects of the person continues to be vigorously debated. The biblical terms are nowadays usually understood to denote aspects of a unified bodily life, through which man is aware of himself, his environment and God. The uniqueness of man's spirit centres upon his being created in the image (*tselem*) and likeness (*demuth*) of God.⁹ Both terms occur in Gen. i. 26 and v. 3, *tselem* in ix. 6, and *demuth* in v. 1.

What the biblical terms mean for a modern Christian psychology and theology of man is uncertain. We are urged, properly I believe, to think of man as a psycho-physical whole. Nevertheless, I question that we have a sufficient theological grasp of the truth of the biblical terms for a modern understanding of man. It is not legitimate to intrude modern notions of personality into ancient patterns of thought, but the fear of doing this may be preventing us from seeing that ancient

⁷ Other parts so used are the flesh, head, mouth, eye, nostrils, forehead, internal parts, marrow, blood, and belly (cf. A. R. Johnson, 1964).

⁸ All three Greek terms occur in I Thess. x. 23, while soul and spirit occur together in Heb. iv. 12.

⁹ The later Greek and Latin equivalents are *eikon* and *homoiosis*, and *imago* and *similitudo*, respectively.

people thought of themselves as being individually personal much more fully than we have supposed.

We who stand within the Christian tradition tend not to fully appreciate how much its teaching has transformed our thought patterns on personhood. Nirad Chaudhuri says that the British brought new richness of life to India beyond economics and politics through concepts which were previously unknown in Sanskrit and among Hindus. Of the six he cites, three are: (a) the Christian idea that God is personal, (b) the idea that man as a personality is a thing of value in himself, and (c) the idea of love as a relationship between two people which is more than lust.¹⁰

If human personality originates in the creative act of God, awareness of our nature has grown within the context of God's self-revelation to men. Those times and places where men sensed that God was speaking and acting, especially when they were called to be his chosen instruments, are the classic instances through which the unique nature and destiny of man have been gradually more fully grasped. These occasions serve as the pattern of our understanding that a personal relation between God and every man is the divine intention through grace, and that this relation carries with it the truth of the unique spiritual nature of man as a personal being. Key instances of God meeting man in the Old Testament include Abraham (Gen. xvii. 1-8); Jacob (Gen. xxviii. 13); Moses (Ex. iii. 6, 13-14); Joshua (i. 1-9); David (I Sam. xxiii. 4); Elijah (I Ki. xix. 9-18); Isaiah (vi.); and Jeremiah (i. 4-6). 'I am the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob' expresses this, not only for each of the patriarchs in succession, but also for the whole of Israel and ultimately for the whole human race.

That God is personal is for Christians best shown in the Incarnation of the eternal second person of the Trinity, which throws light not only on the triune nature of God but also on the nature of man under God. As one ponders the mystery of Christ's life it is possible to infer that the divine image for man is freedom, which is consistent with the idea of a conscious

¹⁰ *The Listener* 78.2017, p. 664 (Nov. 23, 1967). The other three are patriotism, a purifying concept of Nature and the idea of physical beauty.

purposing spiritual reality. The inference may also suggest that an important goal of God's working in creation, providence and redemption is freedom, i.e., a community of free good persons who live in fellowship with God and share his work.

Far from being simply an abstraction, freedom is historically revealed in the life of Jesus Christ who as the 'second Adam' or 'last man' is the divine paradigm, analogue, or pattern for man (Rom. v. 12-21). Christ exhibits in his life the true freedom of God's man which he brings us through his life, death, resurrection and gift of the Spirit. He says, 'you will know the truth, and the truth will make you free . . . so if the Son makes you free, you will be free indeed.' (John viii. 32, 36 R.V.). When this is coupled with 'lo, I have come to do thy will, O God' we have the heart of freedom. It is exemplified in the Old Testament figure of the pierced ear of the voluntary slave (Ex. xxi. 1-6). This image is carried forward to Ps. xl. 6-8 and Heb. x where it forms a bridge to the New Testament so as to show the inner Christological unity of the Bible. The pierced ear is the mark of the slave who has publically and voluntarily pledged life-long devotion to his master.

Two preliminary points seem to be inferences from the biblical data. First, each man is a personal being who enjoys a self-conscious existence and is capable of purposeful action.¹¹ He is a thinking, feeling and willing creature. We cannot

¹¹ Boethius (d. 525 A.D.) defined *persona* as 'an individual substance of a rational nature' (*naturae rationalibus individua substantia*). *Individua substantia* is the latinization of *hypostasis*. I take it that Boethius' definition of *persona* converges upon two points, namely, individuality and rational nature. It should not be thought that language like *substantia* and *hypostasis* when applied to creatures ignores the world seen as developing process and that it expresses a static cross-section of it. The Cappadocian fathers were well aware of the danger of lifeless categories and they qualified their use of the ancient terms by dynamic concepts, including *energeia*. Thus the classical terminology is not necessarily materialistic, and we should not read back modern associations of the word substance into the classical and patristic uses. More recently Leonard Hodgson's definition of man parallels that of Boethius but it more realistically takes account of man's bodily life. Hodgson says, 'to be human is to be the conscious subject of experiences mediated through a particular body in space and time.'

arrive at a definition of man through a concept of his undifferentiated unity nor by reducing the distinctions within his nature to one or other of them, but neither dare we allow the distinctions to grow into divisions of man's nature. In the life of Christ we note his own self-conscious relation to the Father: 'I come' is the correlative of 'thy will'. We can get nowhere in Christian theology unless individual selfhood is a permanent and non-reducible reality.

Second, the spiritual reality of the self seems to imply a psychical realm which includes God and spirits and which transcends the physical realm. The human parallel concerns the duality of mind and brain which some recent neurological opinion allows.¹²

God is Creator of both body and mind and He has sanctified both. The doctrine of the resurrection shows what value is placed by the Christian faith upon the body. The doctrine of the Christian life corroborates this truth because the bodily life of man is the material of which the spiritual life is built. The Christian view of man is not to be ultimately free of the body, but the daily self-offering of the whole man to God and the ultimate redemption of body and spirit together.

Human personality involves the activities of thinking, feeling and willing, but none of these occurs without involving the others. I suggest a four-fold way of understanding human nature. Man is a self, an intelligent self, a valuing self, and a purposing self, within the context of a bodily life.

¹² Note: J. C. Eccles (1953 and 1966); Ian Ramsey (1965), p. 161; Wilder Penfield in *Control of the Mind* (ed. S. M. Farber and R. H. L. Wilson, 1961); W. H. Thorpe (1961); R. H. Thouless (1963); and Sir Cyril Burt, 'Mind and Consciousness', in *The Scientist Speculates* (ed. I. J. Good, 1962). In each of these works argument is developed against the mechanistic or physicalistic view of man and in favour of postulating an agent other than the mechanism itself. The tripartite view of man has recently come back into discussion in the work of H. H. Price, Ian Ramsey, and J. R. Smythies. The latter expresses this division as body (extended), mind (partly extended, e.g., visual and somatic sense-data and images and partly not, e.g., auditory and olfactory sense-data and images) and spirit (i.e., Pure Ego, the Witness, which is not extended at all but which is the essential core of the human personality), in *Biology and Personality*.

I. Man is a Self

To be a personal is to be a self which the pronoun 'I' expresses as a commonplace of language. It would be wrong to make the commonplace incomprehensible. I take the self to be a non-reducible reality which we know ourselves and other selves to be by an immediate intuition. A person is not simply a unity of conscious experiences but the subject of that unity. He is a spiritual agent.

The scientific study of human behaviour tempts some to reduce mind to functions of the brain and the total person to functions of the body. Important advances have been made in exploring and charting the working of the human brain. Physiologically, thinking is based upon the patterned transfer of electro-chemical energy in the cerebral cortex and other related regions of the brain. Human behaviour when analysed at a given instant is a highly complex and multi-level reality, not only as to its complexity at a given close, but also as to the anterior processes which have produced it. These include thinking of which a person is consciously aware and also activity in the deeper parts of the brain and in the central nervous system which are not part of a man's conscious awareness. While many facts about the operation of the central nervous system are now known, we are no closer to being able to give a scientific account of self-conscious life. In the following extract W. Russell Brain describes perception as a physiological process:

"The neurologist observes the brains of animals and of other people. From the behaviour of both and from the answers which patients give to his questions, he discovers that when an object is perceived, a series of events occurs successively in time, beginning with an event in the object and ending with an event in the subject's brain. If the series is interrupted at any point between the object and the cerebral cortex (brain surface) of the subject, the object is not perceived. If the relevant area of the cortex is destroyed, the object again is not perceived. But if the relevant area of the cortex is electrically stimulated while the subject is conscious, sense-data of the kind aroused by an object are perceived by the subject. Thus it is held that the event immediately preceding, or perhaps synchronous with, the perception of an object is an event of a physio-chemical kind in the subject's cerebral cortex. The cortical neurones are normally excited in the way

just described from the external world, but if they should exceptionally be excited in some other way – for example by electrical stimulation or by an epileptic discharge – the appropriate sense-data would still be experienced. The only independently necessary condition for the awareness of sense-data, to use Broad's term, is thus an event in the cerebral cortex.¹³

What is the status of mind in the light of such a scientific statement? Some recent views are: (a) Traditional dualism maintains a single, fundamental barrier between mind and body which view, Bertrand Russell¹⁴ remarked, does have a basis on certain data of our experience. The modern dynamic view of matter and the neurological study of the brain have encouraged those who lean toward non-Cartesian dualism to discover ways in which mind and brain interact.¹⁵ (b) Bertrand Russell himself postulates two kinds of space, that of physics and that of perception, though he understands man's nature in wholly materialistic ways.¹⁶ (c) Further variations of materialism are Behaviourism, like that of J. B. Watson who rejected mind as an unnecessary element in describing human nature similar to William James's rejection of consciousness, and Gilbert Ryle who reduces mind to predictable activity and jettisons the inner world of private perceptions. (d) Arthur Koestler postulates the ego-environment dichotomy in a serialistic not single way so that at its upward end the hierarchy is open-ended or infinite.¹⁷ (e) W. Russell Brain holds a monistic view. He sees mind and brain as two aspects of one reality and expresses the faith that new knowledge will likely be able to explain mental activity in terms of physics and chemistry.¹⁸

¹³ W. Russell Brain (1951), p. 4; cf. p. 72–73.

¹⁴ Bertrand Russell, *Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits*, 1948, p. 217.

¹⁵ cf. J. C. Eccles (1953 and 1965), J. R. Smythies (1956) and H. Kuhlentbeck (1961).

¹⁶ Bertrand Russell, *Op. cit.*

¹⁷ Arthur Koestler (1967), pp. 208–19. cf. J. Bronowski (1967), p. 17.

¹⁸ W. Russell Brain (1966), pp. 79–80, cf. pp. 51, 97–98. Lord Brain discusses consciousness and the unconscious briefly (pp. 70–72, 74–76, 78), but I have not found a discussion of the meaning of self-consciousness in this or in his earlier books.

Does a neurological account of perception furnish an adequate statement of the nature of mind and by implication of the self? I do not think that we can ever escape from the reality of the self or ego as a primary datum of experience. My conviction of this truth is reinforced by the logic of scientific accounts such as the one which I cited from Lord Brain. Some comment on this is needed.

First, we note the frequent occurrence of personal pronouns as the subject of actions. In my judgment this points to the self as an existing reality which can grasp the meaning of things in the manner described by Lord Brain and which is also able to initiate courses of action purposefully. In *The Nature of Experience* (1959) Brain says, 'what I have just been giving you is a scientific account of what goes on in the nervous system when we perceive something.' (p. 8). To me such language shows how difficult it is to escape from the truth of the reality of the person who is more than the observable phenomena. The self intrudes into language patterns not simply out of habit, but because it is impossible to speak humanly without the reality of our personality showing itself. The intrusion is not simply verbal but logical. The matrix calls for it; indeed, the sense would vanish without the reality of the self.¹⁹

¹⁹ 'I used to regard the gulf between mind and matter as an innate belief. I am quite ready now to admit that I may have acquired it at school or later. But I find it more difficult to regard my ego as having such a second-hand basis. I am much more certain that I exist than that mind and matter are different.' E. D. Adrian, in J. C. Eccles (ed.), 1966, cf. also D. M. MacKay, *Ibid.*, pp. 252-253; W. Kneale (1962); John Beloff (1962); J. R. Smythies, in I. Ramsey (ed.) 1965; and H. Kuhlenbeck (1961), pp. 1, 114-115, 122. A. J. Ayer makes the personal subject 'literally identical with that to which we also attribute physical properties. If we ask what this subject is, the only correct answer is just that it is a person.' He admits that no solution has yet been found to the problem of how discrete experiences which are separated in time are nevertheless the experiences of the same self. The logical difficulties one faces when attempting to avoid that the discrete self is not identical with the physical attributes may be illustrated also from his language, 'these particular experiences can then be identified as the experiences of the person whose body it is.' (Italics mine. *The Concept of a Person* (1963), pp. 85-86, 113-114, 117).

Second, the foregoing is reinforced by the fact that Lord Brain uses the term 'subject' in more than one way. To speak of interrupting a series of events which occur between an object and the 'cerebral cortex of the subject' is a different use of the term subject from that where he talks of an object 'perceived by the subject.' In the first, 'subject' is used in the sense of a creature who is the object of scientific study and in this sense the use is indistinguishable whether it be of an experimental animal or of a man; whereas in the second, 'subject' is used in the sense of the conscious person. This difference is also shown by the distinction implicit in his opening remark where he says that the neurologist observes the brains of animals and people (here they are both objects of scientific study so far as their behavioural responses are concerned); and then adds 'and from the answers which patients give.' This last is a statement about and data of the reality of the self as more than the behavioural responses. I feel that the term subject is used by Brain in the sense (a) object of study, and (b) discrete personal reality.

Third, Lord Brain refers to the production of sense data and motor responses by artificial electric stimulation of certain cortical areas. Although the sense-data can be artificially produced they are nevertheless experienced as the appropriate sense-data. Does this furnish a sufficient account of mind and personality as extrapolated solely on the basis of electro-chemical discharges in the brain? The experiments conducted by Wilder Penfield of McGill University in Montreal yield important qualifying data.²⁰ Using conscious patients, Penfield has artificially stimulated selected areas of the cerebral cortex by means of low-voltage currents. Because the cortex is insensitive, the patient does not feel the current, but he is aware of the movements which the current causes him to make. Penfield says:

'When the neurosurgeon applies an electrode to the motor area of the patient's cerebral cortex causing the opposite hand to move, and when he asks the patient why he moved the hand, the response is: 'I didn't do it. You made me do it.' . . . It may be said that the patient thinks of himself as having an existence separate from his body.'

²⁰ Wilder Penfield in *Control of the Mind* (eds. Farber and Wilson, 1961). Cited by Arthur Koestler, *The Ghost in the Machine* (1967), pp. 203-204.

Then follows an attempt by the patient to regain control of those motor responses which were not his own:

'Once when I warned such a patient of my intention to stimulate the motor areas of the cortex, and challenged him to keep his hand from moving when the electrode was applied, he seized it with the other hand and struggled to hold it still. Thus, one hand, under the control of the right hemisphere driven by an electrode, and the other hand, which he controlled through the left hemisphere, were caused to struggle against each other. Behind the 'brain action' of one hemisphere was the patient's mind. Behind the action of the other hemisphere was the electrode.'

Penfield concludes on his demonstration as follows:

'There are, as you see, many demonstrable mechanisms [in the brain]. They work for the purposes of the mind automatically when called upon . . . These mechanisms that we have begun to understand constitute part, at least, of the physiological basis of the mind. But what agency is it that calls upon these mechanisms, choosing one rather than another? Is it another mechanism or is there in the mind something of different essence? . . . To declare that these two things are one does not make them so. But it does block the progress of research.'

Thus when Lord Brain says that 'mind is the function by which the living organism reacts to its environment,'²¹ one feels compelled to qualify this statement by his other comment that personality comprises a pattern like other energy patterns in nature but in some mysterious way it possesses a life of its own.²²

My fourth comment departs from Lord Brain's paragraph. The conscious subject with its freedom of choice and sense of responsibility for choices is a primary datum of experience which has no valid alternative in our limited attempts to apprehend man's essential nature. When we jettison the personal reality to which personal language points we end up with curious results. The full-fledged application of the behaviourist motif to human nature as a rubric into which the personal

²¹ W. Russell Brain (1966), p. 80.

²² W. Russell Brain (1951), p. 70.

reality and purposive intention are telescoped as mechanical reflexes, produces a highly comic effect. What would be gained, Williams asks, by saying:

'The Bavarian peasant made the emotive sound of "Ich liebe dich," or "George displayed the pre-copulation ritual to Bill's mate, but was inhibited by Bill's appeasement posture."' ²³

Koestler also cites the lengths to which behaviourist predilection can go when accounting for the language of the self. The following is from a contemporary American College textbook and it is offered by the authors as the essence of the scientific approach to the nature of human discourse:

'Once the psychologist discovers the principles of learning for simpler phenomena under the more ideal conditions of the laboratory, it is likely that he can apply these principles to the more complex activities as they occur in everyday life. The more complex phenomena are, after all, nothing but a series of simpler responses. Speaking to a friend is a good example of this. Suppose we have a conversation such as the following:

He: 'What time is it?'
 She: 'Twelve o'clock.'
 He: 'Thank you.'
 She: 'Don't mention it.'
 He: 'How about lunch?'
 She: 'Fine.'

Now this conversation can be analysed into separate SR units. 'He' makes the first response, which is emitted probably to the stimulus of the sight of 'She'. When 'He' emits the operant, 'What time is it?', the muscular activity, of course, produces a sound, which also serves as a stimulus for 'She'. On the receipt of this stimulus, she emits an operant herself: 'Twelve o'clock', which in turn produces a stimulus to 'He', and so on . . .

In such complex activity, then, we can see that what we really have is a series of SR connections. The phenomenon of connecting a series of such SR units is known as *chaining*, a process that should be apparent in any complex activity.²⁴

²³ Leonard Williams (1967), p. 54.

²⁴ F. J. McGuigan, 'Learning, Retention and Motivation,' in *Psychology* (ed. A. D. Calvin, 1961), p. 375. Cited by A. Koestler (1964), pp. 603-604.

The unity of the self is made up in part of the linkage by memory of its conscious states and by the preservation of the continuity of that awareness through a lifetime, which includes spanning periods of unconsciousness due to sleep, anaesthesia, and other causes. The self is known in the immediacy of one's own intuition and in personal relations where there occurs reaching out to the personality of another. The self cannot be observed in the way in which ordinary phenomena are observed. The mind is a private world but it is nevertheless one which can be made public by the agent himself. It is the public character of the agent's communication about his external world, as well as of his inner life including his purpose to act, which given to the self its empirical status and which demands for it recognition as a fact of experience. The self furnishes its own empirical criteria which are a part of its being truly known.

Most Christians agree that so far as we know a human self is complete only in a bodily life. A person is a spiritual agent which term points to the powers of his bodily life to act, and acts have to be somewhere. While he is spirit, this does not imply for man the goal of escaping embodiment in matter. On the contrary man is called upon by God to spiritualize his bodily life, i.e., to conduct it in accordance with conscious, intelligent, and beneficent purposes. An aspect of this bodily life is its affective side. The feelings are not a segment of personality or divisible from it, but function as perceivers of the mind through the brain, and from the mind to the brain and body as expressions of kindly or other feeling. Consciousness includes awareness of one's self as existing. Our emotional and perceptual experiences include this same awareness at successive stages of remove from this immediate intuition. We are aware of our self in emotional states such as love, happiness, or anger; or, as a self of having sensations of discomfort such as a stomach ache or a headache. But contact with objects, or with conditions or changes in our environment yield the awareness that the things we sense are not ourselves. Awareness of the self is a different awareness than awareness of objects which are beyond us, and in being aware of objects we are aware also of the self being aware of objects.

The various forms of relation point to a dynamic conception of the self and of the image of God for it. We experience relations which are to varying degrees personal: (a) a mutually impersonal relation is like that of stone striking stone; (b) a one-sidedly personal one is like that of a man striking a nail; and (c) a mutually personal one is like that of two persons conversing. But persons are to varying degrees personal depending upon their relationship to God as well as to one another. We have a distinctive character that is an index of our self-identity, but for Christians the pattern for this character is given historically in the Incarnate Lord who in the perfection of his spirituality knew fully what he did. In Christian faith is involved a heightening of personal distinctness and awareness not the absorption of personality, as the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity imply.

II. Man is an Intelligent Self

While rationalism is obviously not the basis of the biblical revelation, this trite saying obscures that the biblical message is everywhere a rational appeal to intelligent beings. To be sure, it is more than this. It is a moral and emotional appeal as well; none the less, it cannot be less than an appeal to creatures with minds.

In the Old Testament the wisdom literature, especially the Book of Proverbs, is a well-known example of this. It appeals to common sense and understanding (Prov. i. 2-6) as much as to spiritual insight which derives from God (v. 7). These are two sides of one coin. To many theologians Wisdom in Proverbs viii. is a double *entendre*: it has the force not only of spiritual insight, but also personal or messianic overtones analogous to the Logos figure of the Fourth Gospel. The historical and other material of the Bible are equally an appeal to the mind. Elijah's satirizing of the Baal prophets on Carmel indicts the irrationality of idolatry (1 Ki. xviii. 27). An identical satirical take-off on the illogicality of idol making and worship

is found in Is. xlv. 14-18. My point (which needs no defence or justification because it is obvious) is made in Is. i. 3, 'the ox knows its master, and the ass its master's crib; but Israel does not know, my people does not understand.' What animals know instinctively, men ought to grasp better because they are creatures having intelligence. This neither makes revelation and reason antithetical nor does it base revelation upon reason; it simply states that man is a creature capable of rational thought. The revelation is addressed to creatures who are rationally capable of grasping it.

In the New Testament a parallel to Is. i. 3 is Lu. xii. 56-57, 'you hypocrites! You know how to interpret the appearance of earth and sky; but why do you not know how to interpret the present time? And why do you not judge for yourselves what is right?' It is reasonable to conclude that power and authority to forgive sins is equivalent to power and authority to heal (Lu. v. 23), Jesus points out. While Paul argued in a rational fashion about justice, self-control and future judgment Felix became convicted in his own heart (Acts xxiv. 25). The inference one draws from seeing a house is that it had a builder (Heb. iii. 4). Paul's attack upon the wisdom of the world in I Cor. i. 2 is in no sense an attack upon intelligence but upon the abuse of reason. The wisdom of the world and the foolishness of God are conflicting viewpoints, but the foolishness of God in the Cross comprises an intelligible whole which reflects God's wisdom when seen in its true light.

Behaviourists vigorously oppose philosophical rationalism, but this attitude spills over into denigration of intelligence which is expressed in highly rationalistic ways. For them habit-formation not intelligence is the essence of mental progress. Novel ideas do not occur as insights grasped by creative minds, but are simply lucky hits among random tries, which are then repeated because they are useful, usually in a biologically satisfying way. Nevertheless, most naturalists today hold to the primary role of intelligence for man's contemporary life and for his future.

We may regard the brain as a machine which operates in accordance with the known laws of physics and chemistry, but the machine view of the brain does not adequately account for

the mind which is the spiritual agent or self. We do not know nature of mind, nor how the brain affects the mind in perception nor how the mind affects the brain in willed action. However, Eccles thinks that the delicate and complex neuronal net of the brain in which a very tiny impulse can be inherently accelerated and magnified in the network is the kind of system with which such interaction could take place.²⁵

A logical condition of defining intelligence is circularity: we cannot define it without employing it in our definition, just as we cannot even commence thinking rationally about our universe without assuming that it is a universe in which things make sense. Intelligence is the power of rational thought. It is our ability to deduce or to induce conclusions from evidence. It is a process of thought by which truth is grasped. It is the power of mind capable of adapting rational acts to ends and is in this sense an ability, more or less, which man shares in common with other creatures. Aristotle comments that Anaxagoras was like a sane man in relation to the haphazard comments of his contemporaries because he was the first among the ancient Greeks to introduce the concept of mind into philosophy.

Thinking is not a simple, uncomplicated process. The role of the unconscious as the seedbed of new ideas has yet to be more fully investigated. We are all swamped by restricting habits of thought which must somehow be by-passed. The inspiration of a novel idea often comes like a flash of insight. Even in abstract disciplines such as physics crucial theoretical advances occur as the result of intuitive creative imagination rather than by deduction. Examples can be cited, including the work of Max Planck.

We cannot ignore the role of conditioning in mental processes, which establish frames of reference as habits of thought in terms of which we see the world as a coherent and meaningful pattern. Habituation and the functions of the lower human brain in relation to the upper parts of the brain must be taken into account but they become meaningful only to a personal

²⁵ J. C. Eccles (1953), pp. 281-285.

intelligence. Intelligence is not solely cold, deductive reasoning. It is a highly fluid and imaginative activity.

The importance of imagination to human progress in the creation and development of the arts, and in the discovery of new ideas in science and philosophy is firmly established and widely acknowledged. But imagination can never be sheer flight of fancy else it ends in fantasy. Mankind has been led into grievous errors by his flights into unreason. History shows that imagination uncontrolled by reason has propelled mankind into tragedy, as in the irrational religious mythologies of the ancient civilizations or in the more recent doctrines which have shaped social, religious and political life such as the divine right of kings, the infallibility of the Pope, the Marxist theory of the relentless course of history independent of the human will, or the Nazi doctrine of the master race.

Imagination is crucial to human creative activity because no progress is made by purely logical steps, essential as these are. In the drama or novel the author mirrors life. The people and events which he creates by his imagination are often not real, or they are only partly historical, but the effect is of real life which can be rationally apprehended. The scientist is confronted by a vast array of facts which must somehow yield a frame of reference but no pre-set rules exist on how to arrive at the key-feature of the pattern. Nevertheless, the solution is not an irrational one. He must sense in at least a tenuous or preliminary way an intelligible pattern which yields an hypothesis to account for the pattern. This he proceeds to test. Literature is not simply a factual enumeration of the details of life and neither is science a simple listing of the facts of nature. They both demand the imaginative ordering or grouping of facts into intelligible patterns which involves a strong personal element. But this is a process of reason not of unreason for the creative flights of imagination are functions of intelligence, though they may easily fall into unreason.

Intelligence involves a free ranging activity of observing one's own life and the world around. Intelligent activity is exploration, observation, noting and taking account of what is around us. The higher primates and man have the capacity to be visually and dextrously curious about factual detail and

not primarily olfactorily, as are dogs. Correlation of hard, factual work and free-ranging imagination is a part of all creative achievement. Between the two occurs a period of incubation in which is generated the flash of inspiration. The whole creative process is a struggle of intelligence which often is guided by what seems to be only a hunch or an aesthetic sense of beauty or harmony somehow to be achieved.²⁶

To speak of intelligence as the crown of man should not be understood as deification of reason. I do not say that one develops skill in understanding or in living simply by the acquisition of logical tools. It is dangerous to leave any one of us alone with a discipline so that it becomes a distorting obsession. As thinking beings we are concerned not only with creative advance or new discoveries about nature, but also with the logic of life, with imaginative insight as to how all that we create can be used. There is a connection between morality and our apprehension of truth because to grasp truth is not a purely intellectual act but a moral act also. Scientific progress depends upon moral commitment to truth. To be a good scientist a man must be an honest scientist, as the Piltdown Man hoax points out sharply. In his well-known aphorism P. T. Forsyth remarked that the truth we see depends upon the men we are. Response to evidence involves a moral commitment to the truth and to act on the basis of the truth involves a moral commitment to do what is right. In the New Testament the natural man who is conditioned by the wisdom of this world is contrasted not with a Christian who is intellectually obtuse but with the man of the Spirit who has the mind of Christ (I Cor. ii. 16; cf. Eph. i. 17-18; Col. i. 9).

III. Man is a Valuing Self

It sounds odd to argue that man is a moral creature in the sense of being responsibly moral or responsible to the moral

²⁶ John Beloff thinks we cannot ultimately reduce mind to cybernetics, though he sees this as the most serious challenge to mind, because of three reasons: (a) lack of plausibility with respect to the facts of creative originality, (b) inadequacy to account for meaning and intention, and (c) inability to do justice to the unspecifiable component of human thought (1962, pp. 124-125).

law in view of the profound revolution on morals which we are undergoing in western society. In our time man is viewed ethologically in terms of mores not morals. This trend is based upon a powerful surge of naturalist sentiment. When one presses beyond inflammatory clichés like 'Victorian morality' and 'otherworldly ideas' which are contrasted with an allegedly scientific view of man, one discovers a fundamental rejection of any theistic premise and of its corollary, normative ethics. Is man not only biologically but also morally no different from other creatures, or does selfhood include a moral dimension which makes of him a valuing creature in a sense beyond that of values being motor affective responses? Present trends are generating a resurgence of egocentric behaviour which is articulated in behavioural-biological terminology.

In his address to the British Psycho-Analytical Society in 1965 the chief justice Lord Devlin said:²⁷

'There is no doubt, surely, that a sense of guilt about some things at any rate, exists in most human minds. I imagine that a great part of the time of psychoanalysts is spent in tracing mental aberrations back to irrational feelings of guilt. It is something that exists as a fact, and it is with its existence as a fact – something that exists in the human mind – that I want to deal here. There are those who hold that as there is no such thing as free will, there can be no justification for a sense of guilt.'

The sense of guilt depends on a sense of right and wrong and I believe that when we talk about a common sense of right and wrong we mean more than *mores*. I refer to the moral law which is a condition of personal life in the world. To talk about the moral law is not the same as to talk about traditional morals, though these two things are related. There is a moral order which determines the nature of human selfhood and which, for Christians, comprises the life blood of the community of persons in which God and man share their lives.

The rejection of normative morality derives not only from the behaviourist oriented approach to human nature but also from the depth approach associated with the name of Freud. Mowrer, a recent president of the American Psychological

²⁷ *The Listener*, 25th March, 1965, p. 438.

Association, challenges the Freudian reversal of the meaning of conscience which has profoundly influenced pastoral psychology studies for a generation:

'At the very time when psychologists are becoming distrustful of the sickness approach to personality disturbance and are beginning to look with more benign interest and respect toward certain moral and religious precepts, religionists themselves are being caught up in and bedazzled by the same preposterous system of thought as that from which we psychologists are just recovering.'²⁸

Mowrer contrasts 'guilt' and 'impulse' theories of anxiety as follows. Freud's theory, in brief, holds that anxiety derives from evil wishes which the individual would commit but which he dares not commit. Mowrer's alternative is the guilt theory of anxiety, namely, that it derives not from acts which the individual would commit but dares not, but from acts which he has committed but wishes he had not.²⁹ Later he wonders whether we have lost faith in God because we have lost faith in conscience.³⁰ Thus a new look is being taken at distortions of the nature of sin and guilt.

At issue is more than relative standards of traditional moral behaviour. The ethological approach to human conduct is an indispensable tool to our enlarged understanding of man. The question is, can all that man is be accounted for ethologically? Is man a moral creature and related to his fellow men and to God in moral ways which are more than habit formed reactions to stimuli?

Let us approach this question from within the citadel of the naturalistic perspective on value in order to ascertain how normative values like goodness and love are handled. For John Dewey thought and valuation arise only in problem situations.³¹ They originate in the biological matrix of the

²⁸ O. H. Mowrer, *The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion* (1961), p. 52.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 37. He quotes A. T. Boisen, 'my observation is that the patient who condemns himself, even to the point of thinking he has committed the unpardonable sin, is likely to get well. It is the patient who blames others who does not get well.'

³¹ John Dewey, *Theory of Valuation* (1939).

organism's relationship to its environment where intellectual activity and valuation are instruments for securing satisfaction of need. Values relate to means employed to achieve ends. Hence, that is good which promotes or furthers a course of activity, and right in the sense of being inherently connected with that which is needed. The converse meaning is applied to the meanings of bad and wrong.

R. B. Perry's argument is similar. He defines value as interest, which expresses for him the motor-affective responses of organisms. Interest includes instinct, desire, feeling, will, and all their states, acts, and attitudes.³² After examining various combinations of value and interest, Perry concludes that value is 'any object of any interest'. Value is the motor-affective response of the organism to objects of interest in its environment, so that a sufficient account of value requires a precise account of interest. At this point Perry introduces a scale which norms interest but which cannot derive from the motor-affective response base from which he professes to work. He says that interest should be judged by its correctness, intensity, preference, and inclusiveness. He defines moral good in terms of comprehensiveness or commensurability of interest. It is achievement of an all-inclusive harmony of interests. Personal interest must be submerged to universal benevolence which works toward universal harmony.³³

How can the interest of others become one's own interest in a system where value is simply the motor-affective response of organism? Unresolved tension between egoism and altruism remains. Perry pleads that a situation where one outsider and the million are happy is better than just the million being happy. A harmonious society is to be found in love or benevolence.³⁴ Similarly Dewey was deeply concerned about the needy millions of people in India. How does one move from the egocentric behaviour of an organism natively satisfying its needs from the environment to the premise that it ought to be concerned about the interests of another organism? This

³² R. B. Perry, *General Theory of Value* (1926), p. 27.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 669.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 676.

is to ask again whether ethics can be built successfully upon a non-ethical footing. Naturalism does not furnish a rational justification of altruism on its behaviour-biological view of man and of value.

In saying that man is a moral self I mean that we share a common sense of right and wrong and a common sense that it is always better to do right than to do wrong. The sense of guilt depends upon our being affected by the difference between right and wrong. Can we conceive of a situation where men organize a society on the basis that it is always better to do wrong rather than right? To re-define the words 'good' and 'right' and 'bad' and 'wrong' to mean respectively what is useful to satisfy me or not is thereby to pre-empt the words of meaning which remains none the less. 'Good' and 'right' stand for values which are above my interests and modes of satisfaction. Can anything be wrong with genocide on the naturalist's premise? If that is 'right' which conduces to satisfaction of my need then men are expendable to the achievement of that satisfaction as the Nazis claimed, and genocide therefore becomes 'right'. I agree with Lord Devlin that a sense of guilt is indispensable to maintaining order in human society and would add that guilt is established by the moral law which is an essential constituent of the world order under God. Without it we would cease to be human. Lord Devlin says:

'I would therefore conclude that a sense of guilt is a necessary factor for the maintenance of order, and indeed that it plays a much more important part in the preservation of order than any punishment that the state can impose. If, with the wave of a psycho-analytical wand, you could tomorrow completely abolish the sense of guilt in the human mind, it would cause, I think it is no exaggeration to say, an almost instantaneous collapse of law and order.'³⁵

I can illustrate this from the contemporary Marxist, Milovan Djilas. In his novel *Montenegro* he grapples with the problem of the collapse of his own political ideal. Despite his naturalistic assumptions he cannot escape the moral issue and the force of

³⁵ *The Listener*, 1st April, 1965, p. 480.

moral good. Djilas puts the following words on the lips of the key character, Milos, who tomorrow morning will be hanged as a Serbian patriot by the Austrians:

'The footsteps continued to drip. In books there is always a dripping of water before an execution. And the beating of drums. They'll beat for me, too, to announce my death, to measure out the time, the time of our emergence onto the stage of Europe and the world, the time of my hanging.

But I have not many sins. I use the word 'sin' as if I were religious. But the expression isn't important. We atheists, for that matter, haven't yet invented a substitute for it. The idea is important. It is important what I think – if I can still think. I don't really believe in sin, yet I remember mine as if I were a believer, and a devout believer at that. My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me? Christ on the Cross in his last moments. Ha! I may become a Christian yet.'³⁶

The moral law is described in Scripture as the righteousness of God. God's holiness is first his majestic, transcendent separateness from his creatures (Is. vi. 1–3; Hos. xi. 9). He is the Holy One of Israel. Second, it means his ethical perfection as the moral law-giver of the universe (Is. v. 16; 1 Pet. ii. 9).

The righteousness of God is more than moral rectitude or justice because it includes grace. Jesus summarized the meaning of the divine righteousness as more than justice (Mt. v. 20). Justice is an essential and fundamental demand of the law, but God's own righteousness, which according to Paul is 'apart from the law', includes justification of the sinner. In Romans i. 16–17 the power of the Gospel of Christ saves men through righteousness working by grace. This dimension of love as a part of righteousness is what makes the Christian message so distinctive. Christ did not merely fulfill the law. To be sure, he did fulfill it perfectly, but his righteousness surpassed that of an eye for an eye, or love reciprocating love (Mt. v. 38, 46). It did not give to men what was their due rectorally but absorbed judgment through grace so that they might receive justification through forgiveness (Rom. iii. 21–26). The righteousness of God is the norm which must judge men

³⁶ London, 1964, p. 245.

rectorally (Rom. i. 18-19; iii. 19-20). It is the condition of moral, personal life. But in the Christian revelation it includes the freedom of God to love and redeem the sinner by means of grace which exhibits the unique character of that righteousness.

That man is a moral creature does not diminish the importance of his ethological study, it rather magnifies that importance. But a distinction needs to be made between moral law and mores, between righteousness and traditional morals. The conscience more or less accurately attests the moral law. Conscience gets its content from outside itself, hence it can be developed and conditioned in various ways even to approving of evil. But it recognizes a universal moral order to which it stands related. The moral law is a condition of discrete spiritual life's existing. It is the foundation of the ethical relations among men and of those between man and God. The moral law has its life in God. It derives from God but does not stand above Him. If we reject the moral law then the meaning of right and wrong collapses and, for Christians, such concepts as righteousness, sin and forgiveness are rendered meaningless. The final sanction of conduct is that it represents a righteousness unto God.

IV. Man is a Purposing Self

An individual personal reality man is capable of conscious, free, purposeful action. This action utilizes both the casual dependability and the contingency which we observe in the world order. Plato said that man is a self-moved creature who acts in relation to certain ideals. Man's nature and actions register the use of qualified freedom but for the Christian they point to more perfect freedom where all man's acts will be under the control of a morally and spiritually oriented intelligence.

The doctrine that man's mental development is the result of successful random tries is a derivative of the doctrine that man and all other organisms respond to their environment by conditioned reflex activity. In this view the initiative derives from the environment. The organism's chief end is to develop passive-response techniques which keep it in a state of problem-

free euphoria. The cycle is repeated endlessly every time the equilibrium is disturbed. Needs or problems generate response. Some organisms adapt effectively, others fail to do so. By natural selection those which fail to adapt are weeded out. In this way the myths of freedom and of purpose are discarded.

In his novel *Walden Two*, B. F. Skinner develops the theme of a behaviourist utopia. The mythical community is set in the American north-east and furnishes for its inhabitants a completely controlled environment, including their thoughts, habits and satisfaction of needs. Recourse to individual initiative therefore is regarded as harmful. Skinner has made his point crystal clear: he looks forward to the creation of a society where the idea of freedom will be only a bad dream, if it is allowed to be remembered at all. Skinner aims to control and predict all human behaviour just like natural phenomena.

We are, I believe, compelled to allow for contingency and freedom as real aspects of our experience and of the world order. All sane men assume that they have the ability to control or to modify their own actions by willing to do so and that they have the power to exercise control over the direction of events under given conditions. There is no scientific basis for denying the freedom of the will, which must be assumed if indeed we have the power to investigate our world intelligently and to act in purposeful ways. There is a difference between unaware habituated activity and sources of inspiration of which we are not fully aware which quicken creative activity. Habituated acts derive from constant repetition or pressure from above which establishes patterns of electro-chemical response. These can be simple or complicated such as the skill of driving a car or of touch typewriting. But in creative activity there is pressure from within the mind to break out through and beyond the barriers which conditioning has imposed upon our ways of acting and of seeing things. This is far different from habituated patterns of even skilled activity.

I should not be understood as being opposed to the principle of habituation but only to its misuse in mechanizing man and denying to him freedom and creativity. Our experience I believe demands a view which will combine the idea of a dependable world order (expressed roughly in the idea of cause

and effect) with the reality of contingency and the resultant place for freedom which contingency affords. To be sure, Christians have tended to ignore the force of the habituation principle as an explanation for certain kinds of behaviour, but I do not think that this charge can be laid against certain biblical teaching, notably its doctrine of sin. If, on one side, sin involves the conception of freedom and moral responsibility for the use of that freedom then, on the other, the doctrine of sin reinforces the conception of a dependable world. The habituating effects of sin on the body and on the spirit of man are everywhere warned against in Scripture. Paul says, 'all things are lawful to me, but I will not be brought under the power of any' (I Cor. vi. 12).

Personal life spiritually qualified has a capacity for purposeful creative activity. Sheer intellectual brilliance, as in the case of a child prodigy who is a mathematical wizard, is not the apex of manhood's achievement. This is expressed better by a concept of the capacity for creative imagination combined with a feeling for life. It is to know the nature and value of life and to harness the powers of life for good. Related to this is man's ability to grasp the meaning of time and to make it his own. Man is able to think out of time, out of the present moment to the past, and to relate both to the future.

To be personal includes the power to choose between kinds of action, i.e., whether to choose to act with increasing freedom or to choose to act in such ways as increase habituation and hence limit freedom of action. One can also opt for habituated acts which constitute an increase of freedom. The higher the spirituality of personal life the less causally predictable are its choices, because as the spirituality of life increases its choices refer less to the antecedents of action and more to moral goals in relation to which decisions are taken.

The terror of our moral life is that we are responsible for the ways in which we condition ourselves. The terms 'thy law' and 'my heart' in the Christologically interpreted text to which I referred point in part to the causal and volitional elements of our experience. The dependable world of which we are a part is real, and our choices which can determine whether things go this way or that are real. We are responsible for

the right use of life but once we have made choices we cannot always control the course of events which ensues. This is due to our inability to see the ends of our actions fully and clearly.

For men as spiritual beings the world should become increasingly transparent to thought. Then we will know more fully what the effects of our choices are and will therefore be able to make them with greater freedom. In our Lord's life we note his self-conscious purpose to do the Father's will: 'neither came I of myself, but he sent me' (John viii. 42; vii. 28-29). This purpose issues from an inner core of righteousness where knowledge of the will of God and positive response to that will unite: 'my meat is to do the will of him that sent me, and to finish his work' (John iv. 34). Our Lord's life powers and the powers of the world around him were put into captivity to the will of the Father. He knew fully what he did: 'the works which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me' (John v. 36; ix. 4).

The Christian doctrine of grace is relevant to our discussion at this point because grace means that the relations between God and the world are personal and moral. Through grace God remains God and man can be free. The Christian revelation claims in part that God is fashioning a race of free men and women who in co-operation with their Maker will maximize goodness in the universe. Men are value-creating creatures. Their acts should increase not decrease freedom.

The uneasy tension between man's lower and higher self will not, I believe, be cured by chemical means alone, though we look forward to the day when more is known and more can be done about man's brain and some of his tendencies. Fundamentally, man needs a transformation of his inner life. In Christ this redemption is provided by God not only through the death on the Cross but also in the perfection of our Lord's normative humanity. To be truly spiritual involves the capacity to decide rightly. Put into common language it means knowing fully what one is doing. This calls for an increase of our scientific knowledge of the world as well as for the redemption and re-direction of our capacities and interests so as to use all our knowledge according to God's will.

Conclusion

The individual person exists only in community with other persons. Our personality is in part the product of interpersonal relations, therefore our liberty must be subsumed under the laws of God to have regard for the use of the world and of our relations with others for the highest ends. This is in part the significance of the one and the many in the Church conceived of as *ecclesia* and as *soma*. In the New Testament there are no granular Christians because they are all members of a body which functions under Christ its head. The same applies to the highest levels of interdependent family life (Eph. v. 22–33). Interdependent personal life is expressed in Scripture ultimately in the trinitarian life of God which life Christians are called to share. The prayer of our Lord in John xvii. concerns distinct selves in the unity of interdependent life. Here I find the clearest biblical definition of unity which also demands full recognition of the ultimate value of discrete personal life: ‘I in them and thou in me, that they may be perfect in one . . . that they may all be one; as thou, Father, are in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us’.

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