years, which in its turn has an astrological-chronological foundation in the numeration of seven hours, seven days, seven weeks, seven years and seven year-weeks. The Jubilee period when repeated ten times gives a phœnix era. If we should take the Phœnix-period, again, as a unity and regard it as a week of the great cosmic year, 52 cosmic weeks of 500 years make the great cosmic year of the precession consisting of 26,000 common years. We have, however, no support in the sources to justify us in recognising this relation of the Phœnix-period to the great cosmic year as the completion of the chronological system.

JOHANNES LEPSIUS.
Helena Ramsay trans.

PERSONALITY AND GRACE.

III. AUTONOMY.

As certainly as piety insists on absolute dependence, morals insists on absolute independence. The singular, the unique quality of the personality, from the moral point of view, is its autonomy. It differs from all other things in not being driven by forces *a tergo*. If it is, it ceases to be a moral personality. Before any influence can become a motive, it must become part of ourselves. Events outside of that circle have no direct moral significance. Their influence upon us may be great. They may create situations we have to deal with morally. But they are not themselves moral situations.

First, the moral personality must be self-conscious. Only within that self-consciousness can there be moral action. This means that the world I deal with is my world. All the situations and all the motives upon which morality has to act come from it. Till it is my situation, no moral pro-

blem can arise. We often speak as if we could be driven like a ball by mere might of impulse. But that is an illusion. Acknowledged or unacknowledged, we always act on what Kant calls a maxim. No motive can do more than attract us by the idea of its satisfaction. To do that it must take a place in our self-conscious world. Then with reflection or without it, it must have its value fixed among other motives, other ways of self-realisation. The hand is not put forth to steal by the force of hunger, but by our conscious acceptance of the course of action which the satisfaction of hunger involves. We must bring our whole self-consciousness either up to the level or down to the level of every moral or immoral action. To attain perfectly to total absence of fear of them that kill the body would be victory over all material impulses. In that very true sense to offend in one point is to offend in all, for the whole world of our self-consciousness is related to it.

From this purely moral point of view Fichte regards our whole self-conscious world as built by the soul as a gymnasium for its own moral task. It should be our world, under our feet. Nothing will satisfy the moral demands except a victory which overcomes it. We must be masters in our whole self-conscious existence.

Hence our self-conscious world has in it a moral dualism which requires moral endeavour. It is for us and also against us. When we conquer it, it is our friend ; when it defeats us, it is all the more our foe that it continues still to be our world. It is ours to rule, and when it rules us it is like fire, a bad master, the worse that we can at no moment escape it.

Second, the moral personality must be self-directing. There must be autonomy of conscience as well as autonomy of mind. The self must legislate for itself. Even if an action is not otherwise wrong, it is less than right, unless

we ourselves, out of our own hearts, judge it to be right. In that sense, whatsoever is not of faith is sin.

Conscience can be educated, but it may not be instructed. Even moral education should not consist in telling us on authority what we ought to do. Its business is to make us see for ourselves the thing that is right. If constraint is used, it can only be of moral value, if it is like a barrier in a wrong road to encourage the traveller to seek the right one. To direct the conscience is to ask for non-moral action which may easily become immoral action, for it is always easier to meet the hardest casuistry provided for us by another than to lay ourselves open to the demands of our own consciences. The mere fact that our judgment of right is heteronomy, that is, moral legislation by other people's consciences, not our own, places us in a wrong moral attitude to life and duty.

Even God may not legislate for us morally except through our own sense of right. Though no judgment of conscience is infallible, a moral faith in God as the moral lawgiver is identical with the belief that, in so far as we see right, we find His will, and that His purpose with us in life, is not merely to exact His will, but to enable us in freedom to make our will one with His. If we are to be persons not things, God must govern us through our own conscience of right. Obeyed in any other way, He is not morally served. Otherwise, our certainty of God and our certainty of the moral order would not be identical.

Thirdly, the moral personality must be self-determining. It requires not only autonomy of mind and autonomy of conscience, but autonomy of will. It acts within its own self-conscious world; it directs itself by its own self-legislating conscience; and, finally, it has its power in its own self-determined action. What it ought to do, it can do. That fact all sense of duty insists upon. Doubt cast upon it is,

from a moral point of view, mere juggling with moral issues. To justify ourselves by weakness of will is to fall into an immoral fatalism.

What kind of free-will that implies, we need not delay to discuss. Perhaps only our ignorance speaks of liberty of indifference. But it is certainly not any determinism we know, even by the character, for, as has been already said, we may be determined by our character in such a way that our character itself is improved, and in another way so that our character degenerates.

Any idea that the will is merely a vehicle for some outside force, even if we call that force God, is an end of the idea of moral responsibility. On the same grounds the force might be matter, for, if we could admit that it was an alien force, personality would have no part in it. In that case it might in all that concerns morals as well be a direct material force as a direct Divine force. In either case will effects nothing, and to suppose that it does is only to imagine that the shadow moves the body, and responsibility is at an end.

Our sole reason for disbelieving in a mechanical control of the will is the assurance that no experience is so close to us as the experience that will comes direct out of our personalities, and that, when it comes, things are actually done. Probably that experience mediates all other experiences. Our self-consciousness over against the world, and our self-legislation over against the mere law of cause and effect depend upon the reality of our experience when we set ourselves against the world, and do not merely exist in it but are active in respect of it and actually work changes in it.

When it is denied that such action is free, the nature of freedom is first caricatured. Consideration is restricted to the will, and the contention that the will is free is represented as if the will were a balance possessed of the absurd characteristic of ignoring the weight put into its scales and

of moving by accident and sheer arbitrariness. Freedom of the will, being thus interpreted as a faculty of wholly arbitrary action, in indifference alike to motive and character, can easily be proved both absurd and immoral. Do we not, we are asked, approve or disapprove of an action for the one sole reason that it is the outcome of the character? When we consider a person responsible for a bad action, what do we blame him for, except for being a bad character?

If, however, we thought action upon character a fixed, direct, invariable result of force in that mechanical way, we should neither approve nor disapprove of it, nor ascribe to the doer of it any responsibility. We disapprove and ascribe responsibility because we believe that the doer of a wrong action has a character to which the will has not been loyal, a character which disapproves of what it is made responsible for, or, if not, he has lost it by previous disloyalties. Not in indifference to impulse and motive are we free, but in the power of being loyal to our moral selves. That we have, or ought to have, such a power our experience testifies, nor can any morality be a real force of which that is not a postulate. The mere fact that a man may abandon his moral sovereignty and surrender himself to the anarchy of impulse, ending sometimes in the madness which turns him from being a person into a thing, a feather wafted on every air, shows that the will seated on her throne is at least not the mere creature of any form of determination known to us.

An independence of the will to which it is not a mockery to say, You can do right because you ought, is essential to the very idea of morality. Personal independence is thus as vital to morality as personal dependence to religion. The two requirements cannot be compounded in any mere amalgam of both without depriving us of moral independence and of religious dependence alike. It is no solution to say that our moral independence is qualified by our religious

dependence and that here as elsewhere the world is governed by compromise, and that the way of wisdom is in the just mean.

Where religious dependence modifies moral independence, the result is not wisdom but a corrupt morality. It is not an accident, but in the nature of the case, that piety, used as a substitute for moral independence, produces a dubious morality. It has that result because it is cherished as a substitute for the clear moral issue that a man ought to obey his conscience and he can. Consciously pious people are often not moral for the simple reason that the natural man can use considerations of piety, like any other considerations that may be at hand, to confuse straight moral issues. Nor is it necessary to go the length of bribing conscience by the promise that occasional times of dubious but pleasant and profitable action God will wink at. To put conscience on one side and God's mind on the other, and our will on one side and God's succour apart from it, is a frame of mind full of moral pitfalls. Nay, if we only put our own approval of conscience on one side, and doing good to win God's favour on the other, our feet are on a slippery path. The only safe moral attitude is to believe a thing is right because we see it to be so, and to do right solely from reverence for right itself. In consequence the history of modern ethics tells mainly of attempts to free morals from religious authority and religious motives and to display it as itself the sanction and reward of its own laws.

Religion does not thereby suffer loss. It does not prosper by sapping the independence of the moral personality. By putting in place of goodness existing in its own right God's arbitrary will, it loses every standard by which it could judge a doctrine of God. Then it is led to make merit a condition of grace, and grace a sort of plaster for patching up the flaws of merit. Salvation becomes an external pos-

session to be half won and half given, a mixture depending upon God's arbitrary will, and not what it really is, our true, natural and obviously right relation to God and man. Religion in consequence is made to appear indifferent to conscience of right, for which it seems to substitute a way of going to heaven according to God's arbitrary demands and our own foresight towards our selfish well-being. Even at that cost, religion does not succeed in safeguarding the interest of religion itself, because religion ought to be not a partial but an absolute dependence upon God.

If no more can be said, religion and morality must at best ignore each other. At worst they will be direct antagonists. The religious and the moral type will be indifferent to each other, and it will not be strange if at times they are suspicious and hostile. On the one hand, we shall have a man like Augustine, apt to regard whatsoever savours of moral independence as savouring also of ungodliness, apt to regard the appeal to moral sincerity not as an excuse but as an additional offence in any one who on personal judgment differs from what appears to be God's battalions. On the other hand, we shall have to accept a man like Kant to whom every kind of dependence even upon God was only moral flaccidity, so that, in the stress of moral conflict, to betake oneself even to prayer was to endanger our moral integrity.

But if morals and religion are genuine human interests, they cannot be thus kept apart. We know how much a conscious piety, heedless of morals, is worth. We know how it becomes a mere device of the natural man to shield him from the claims of his own conscience. Wherefore, as has been said, it is not an accident, but an obvious resort of the natural man that makes so many consciously pious people not ethical. And it is just as little an accident that makes so many consciously moral people not religious. It

is the unwillingness of the natural man to follow his moral independence to the point where it becomes dependence upon a moral reality greater than ourselves, where it casts down all the rigid ethical boundaries he has set up for himself and brings him face to face with those infinite claims which destroy all idea of merit, and leave him, after he has done his utmost, an unprofitable servant.

As a practical concern, the issue is not doubtful when we divorce morality and religion. Morality has no more a wide heaven to breathe in, or religion a solid earth to walk on. Yet, if morals requires absolute independence and religion absolute dependence, how can they ever be agreed?

JOHN OMAN.

EPHESIANS IV. 21: "*AS THE TRUTH IS IN JESUS.*"

Καθὼς ἐστιν ἀλήθεια ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ. None of the many renderings of this phrase seems to be satisfactory. For the popular form of the quotation—"the truth as it is in Jesus"—there is, of course, no authority; it would be interesting to know the origin of this all too common transposition of the words of the Authorised Version, "as the truth is in Jesus." The Revised Version giving the rendering "even as truth is in Jesus" corrects the A.V. in its insertion of the article before *ἀλήθεια*, but raises a new question as to the true significance of the phrase, which presented little difficulty to the reader of the old Version. Dr. Abbott rightly rejects the interpretation given by Jerome and others which expands the meaning into "as truth is in Jesus, so shall it be in you," on one ground that it requires a forced meaning for *ἀλήθεια* = holiness, and on a second, to which we should demur, that *ὑμᾶς* is not emphatic. He makes the following sentence the subject of the clause, and translates, "as is right teaching in Jesus: that ye put