

## ARTICLE VIII.

## THE INCARNATION AS A PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE KENOSIS.

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THE Incarnation as the all-important point for the earthly career of the Christ is also the all-important point for the doctrine of the Kenosis. If we are to build up a historical doctrine of the Christ upon the basis of the New Testament, our starting-point must be the Incarnation, as the first historically attested fact of his life on earth. The view we take of this important event will, to a great extent, determine our entire Christology. To give any historical sketch of the various views held with regard to this event, or even to enter fully into its Christological significance, would lie far outside the scope of my present purpose, which is merely to define the Incarnation from the standpoint of the Kenosis.

The New Testament accounts of the Incarnation may be arranged under five heads: 1. The miraculous Birth from the Virgin (Matthew and Luke); 2. The *πέμψις*, or Mission from the Father (Jesus, John, and Paul); 3. The *παρουσία*, or Coming, out of a preëxistent state of Glory, into the world (Jesus and John); 4. The Assumption of the Flesh, or the Incarnation proper (John and Paul); and 5. The Kenosis or self-emptying of the Logos in becoming Incarnate (Paul). Yet, while making this distinction, I am well aware that these classes of statement overlap; but I think that this arrangement has the recommendation, at least, of clearness and convenience.

I. The first class of passages records the Annunciation, the miraculous Conception, and the Birth (Matt. i. 18-24; Luke i. 26-38, the annunciation, and Luke ii. 1-10, the birth). There is really little, if anything, to add to the Bible narratives, which are straightforward accounts of a historical event. A great deal has been written on the manner both of the conception and the birth,—but to very little purpose. The Roman Catholic dogmata of auricular conception and of a birth *clauso utero* are sufficiently familiar to all to require more than a passing notice. Just how this conception and Virgin birth were possible, is beyond the scope of our knowledge. All we can say is that conception and birth are both alike miraculous. Nor can a purely human analogy help us much, though we shall have to return to this point later on. The analogy fails us just at the vital point, when we ask, How is any conception possible? So far as I have been able to ascertain, conception is the ultimate fact of human biology, which is unexplained and, probably, unexplainable. And, if we thus come—even in a matter of every-day occurrence, and of such apparent simplicity—to the limit of human knowledge, how can we explain the mysteries of a purely spiritual conception, brought about through revelation? When we examine the accounts of Matthew and Luke, we find very little upon which we could base a physiological inquiry. Matthew simply records (i. 18): “His mother, Mary, who was betrothed to Joseph, before they had any connection, was found to be pregnant of the Holy Spirit.” Here is a simple statement of the historical fact that the apparently premature pregnancy of Mary, the betrothed wife of Joseph, was due to the instrumentality of the Holy Spirit, a statement that gives us no basis for physiological reasonings from human analogies. Turning to the Annunciation, recorded in the Gospel according to Luke, we seem to find help in verse 35 of chapter i., “Behold, thou

shalt conceive, and bear a son." And when Mary, in great perplexity, asks how this can come to pass, seeing that she had "known no man," the angel answers (i. 35): "The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee." It is very plain that a pneumatophany is here implied. While under the influence of this pneumatophany, which represents the power of the Most High, the Virgin shall conceive. There seems to be, thus, a way out of our difficulty. But, unfortunately for our attempts at explanation, the pneumatophany is itself a miracle; and to attempt to explain one miracle by another would be like trying to solve an equation in algebra in which two unknown quantities and no known quantities are given. When, then, we turn to Luke's account of the birth (ii. 7), we find, simply, "And she bore her first-born son," which is a simple, straightforward statement of the historical fact, that gives absolutely no foundation for any physiological speculations. All we learn from these accounts of the Gospels is the fact, stated in words of simple beauty in the Apostles' Creed, that he was "conceived of the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary." What is important for us, from the standpoint of our doctrine, is the fact that he whom these two Gospels most evidently regard as the Son of the living God, was born of a woman.

This is implied, also, in Paul's statement (Gal. iv. 4): "When the fullness of time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman (*γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικός*)," etc. The earthly, human birth of the Son of God is the first and, in some respects, the most important moment of his humiliation. That the Son of God, in becoming Son of man, in assuming human flesh, in entering upon a human mode of existence, should submit himself to the regular human method of coming into the world, rather than come in the burst of ineffable glory in which the Messianic hopes of his Jewish contemporaries pictured his coming, is one of

the most sublime proofs of his loving condescension to us, his brothers. By thus entering into a human family, and that one of the poorest in the land, he came into close, sympathetic touch with the flesh and blood of the race. Flesh of our flesh, and blood of our blood, we can claim him the Son of man, our Brother. Yet, one thing we must not forget, that this family, into which he was born, was, on both sides, of royal stock, both Joseph and Mary being descendants of King David. This was, so to say, a soteriological necessity, for the Messiah of prophecy was the descendant of David, born in the royal city of Bethlehem. The attendant circumstances of deep poverty serve but to emphasize the humiliation of our Saviour. Surely he who was rich, for our sakes became poor, for our sakes was born in the manger of that stable in Bethlehem, for our sakes descended to the deepest human poverty, short of actual beggary!

2. The second class of passages refers to the *πέμψις*, the Mission of the Son from and by the Father. Christ here represents his coming, not as an independent act, as we shall see him represent it presently, but as an act dependent upon the will of the "Father who sent him." Of course there is here no real contradiction. The *πέμψις* and the *παρουσία* are but different aspects of one and the same act of the eternal triune Godhead: the Father sends, the Son comes. And herein is expressed, at the same time, the temporal, economic submission of the Son to the will of the Father which is part and parcel of the humiliation of Jesus, the Christ. He himself viewed his coming into the world in this light, as is attested by numerous passages in the Gospel according to John (e.g., John iv. 34; v. 23; vi. 39, *et al.*). John iii. 16 presents this same aspect of his coming. The apostle Paul tells us (Gal. iv. 4) that, when the fullness of time was come, God sent forth his Son.

3. The third class of passages is that large one in which

Jesus refers to his "Coming." The *παρουσία* is a coming from heaven, from the Father, out of a preëxistent state of glory. The most important passages are, of course, those that report his own words. Among the most striking ones are: John v. 43: "I am come in the name of my Father"; vi. 33: "For the bread of God is he that cometh down from heaven"; viii. 42: "For I am come forth from God"; and especially xvii. 5: "And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was." In the prologue of his Gospel (i. 1-18), in verse 1, John distinctly affirms both the preëxistence and the divinity of the Logos: "In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was divine." This Divine Logos, who was with God, "became flesh, and dwelt among us." Leaving aside, for the nonce, the assumption of the flesh, which is really another aspect of the question, we are concerned more especially with the second clause of verse 14, "and dwelt among us." What is here distinctly stated is that the Divine Logos, who was in a preëxistent state with God, a state which, as we learned from John xvii. 5, was a state of glory, when he had assumed flesh, became as one of us, making this world his temporary abiding-place. Though the method of transition from the preëxistent state of glory into the state of dwelling among us is not directly stated, being involved in the *σὰρξ ἐγένετο*, yet this text teaches, as does also John xvii. 5, a coming out of this preëxistent state of glory, into the earthly life, with all that implies.

4. The fourth class of passages upon which we want to touch in this exegetical study of the incarnation, comprises those that refer to the Assumption of the Flesh. The most important of these is John i. 14: "The Logos became (was made) flesh." This text is nothing more or less than a theological statement of the fact of the human birth of Jesus, the Christ. While Matthew and Luke recorded

merely the historical fact of the birth, John, in his prologue, goes into the theology of that birth, and represents it as the incarnation of the preëxistent Logos. What in the accounts of Matthew and Luke appears as a simple, historical fact, is by John explained as a process within the eternal life of the Divine Logos. *How* the Logos became or was made flesh, we learn just as little as we learned from Matthew and Luke *how* the child Jesus was conceived and born. The two accounts give us the same account, only from different points of view. The two Synoptists view the event from the purely human standpoint, as a birth; John views it from the divine standpoint, as an incarnation, as an assumption of flesh on the part of divinity, as a becoming flesh of the Logos, the second Person of the Trinity. What is further involved in this statement we shall see as we proceed. We want now to add to this Johannine statement some statements of the apostle Paul which may serve to explain and to amplify it. Foremost among these is the celebrated passage Phil. ii. 5-8. This text teaches that Christ is both divine and human, is possessed both of the divine and the human essence; that, existing from all eternity in the essence of God, he took to himself, in addition, the essence of man. Thus we preclude, by comparison with this text, and with the texts in which Christ claims oneness with the Father (e.g., John x. 30), any explanation that might possibly posit an essential change in the eternal life of the Divine Logos. Paul teaches, moreover, that this flesh which the Logos assumed, was *σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας*, "sinful flesh," i.e., flesh which, like our flesh, is subject to the rule of sin. In 1 Tim. iii. 16, Paul quotes an old Christian hymn which speaks of Christ as manifested in the flesh (*Ὅς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σάρκι*).

5. The last class of statements noted comprises those passages of the Epistles of Paul in which the apostle expounds his conception of Christ's humiliation (Rom. viii. 3; 2 Cor.

v. 21; Gal. iii. 13, iv. 4, 5; 2 Cor. viii. 9; 2 Cor. xiii. 4; Rom. viii. 32; and Phil. ii. 5-8). The general teaching of Paul is that Christ, who knew not sin, was made sin for our sakes; that he was sent in the likeness of sinful flesh; that he redeemed us from the curse, by becoming a curse for our sakes, in our stead; that he was sent in the fullness of time of the Father, being made of a woman; that, though he was rich, yet for our sakes he became poor; that he was crucified through weakness, but liveth by the power of God; that God spared not his own Son; and that, though he existed from all eternity in the essence of God, yet considered it not a thing to be eagerly grasped, to be equal with God, but emptied himself of this, being equal with God, assuming the essence of a slave, and being made in the likeness of men. Thus we find that Paul conceives of the incarnation as implying both a self-emptying of equality with God, i.e., of the exercise of divine functions and prerogatives, and the assumption of the human nature.

We have, then, under these five heads, the New Testament doctrine of the incarnation. The Son of God, sent of the Father, came upon the earth and was born of a woman, in the regular course of nature (yet she was a virgin, and the conception was brought about by the instrumentality of the Holy Spirit); or, in theological language, the eternally preëxistent Divine Logos became flesh, i.e., assumed the human flesh, with all of its liability to sin, having first emptied himself of his equality with God;—and all this, without loss of divine essence. The resultant product of this process is Jesus Christ, the God-man, Son of God, and Son of man.

Thus far we have closely followed the guidance of Holy Scripture; but a number of speculative questions has arisen out of the fact of the incarnation, which have been discussed by theologians with a great deal of warmth. Just how far such questions are legitimate, it is not always pos-

sible to say. Some of them are certainly of great importance, and must be met by every one who enters upon a discussion of the incarnation. In discussing these questions I shall strive to use the utmost candor and shall, so far as at all possible, be guided by just and logical deductions from Holy Scripture.

Of course, the leading question, from our point of view, is, What is the import of the incarnation for the earthly life of Jesus, the Christ? The answer is simple: It is the initial act of the Kenosis, or self-emptying, by which the Son of God becomes Son of man. Certain it is that the real beginning of the earthly life, the real incarnation, lay back of the birth, in the conception. The moment of the conception is the moment of contact between the divine and the human life processes; and, from this moment on, proceeds the clothing of the Logos with flesh. Here, in the conception, we have the moment of the self-emptying of the Logos, the moment of his resignation of the exercise of divine functions and prerogatives.

The great question of the Kenosis is as to how far this self-emptying of the Logos is carried. Koenig taught that the Logos emptied himself of omniscience and omnipotence in assuming the human nature in its integrity, and so became a theanthropic personality. Thomasius conceives the Logos as emptying himself of the divine mode of existence, in order to the assumption of the human form of existence, which necessarily implies a surrender of the divine glory that he had from the beginning, with the Father. The incarnation is to Thomasius, as it is to me, the unity of the two moments of assumption (of human flesh) and self-limitation (surrender of divine mode of existence). Liebner regards the incarnation from a peculiar standpoint. Holding to an eternal kenosis, and an eternal submission of the Son to the Father, he finds that in "the actual incarnation" this eternal kenosis and subor-

dination of the Son have become temporal. Gess teaches a complete loss of divine consciousness and of independent life on the part of the Son in becoming man. The self-emptied Logos, reduced to mere potentiality, is transformed into a human soul. Ebrard teaches an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the eternal form of existence; but he teaches, also, that the Logos did not lay aside his omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence, but retained them in an applied form. Martensen teaches, like Gess, a renunciation of divine self-consciousness on the part of the Logos. He bases this teaching on the words of the angel to Mary (Luke i. 35): "The holy thing which is born of thee [reading ἐκ σοῦ] shall be called the Son of God." But the proper translation, omitting ἐκ σοῦ, is: "That which shall be born shall be called Holy, Son of God." Martensen here lays undue stress, to my mind, upon the neuter τὸ γεννώμενον, as bearing out his view. He holds a peculiar theory of a double life of the God-man.

With all this discussion, there seems to be little clearness as to what it was that the Logos relinquished in the kenosis, at the moment of incarnation. While the older writers are agreed in making the Son of God empty himself of the μορφή Θεοῦ, yet when we come to inquire what they understand by this exegesis, we find them greatly at variance. While Thomasius prudently uses the most general terms, Gess and Martensen go so far as to deny to the self-emptied Logos a consciousness of his divinity and ascribe to it mere potentiality, Gaupp finds in it a subordinationary view of the Trinity, Liebner removes both kenosis and subordination into the eternal Trinitarian life-process, and Ebrard denies any real kenosis of divine attributes, so-called. I have already touched upon what I consider the true significance of the passage Phil. ii. 7, which has given rise to this entire discussion. It is important here to say that I do not believe that in this passage the apostle de-

sired to convey the impression that the Son of God emptied himself of the *μορφή Θεοῦ*, which signified to him "the essence of God." What he did empty himself of was *τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ*, referring to the exercise of divine functions and prerogatives, of Omniscience, Omnipresence, Omnipotence, etc., which are generally called "attributes of God," a term that might, in my humble judgment, be with great propriety replaced by the expression "modes of divine existence." I would be understood, then, to say that in becoming man, the Son of God laid aside these Modes of Divine existence in order to conform himself to the modes of human existence. To illustrate, the *Λόγος ἄσαρκος*, the pre-incarnate Son of God, was omnipresent, and infinite, in every place at one and the same time, and unlimited by any boundaries of space;—the *Λόγος ἔνσαρκος*, the historical Jesus Christ, could be only in one place at any given time, and was limited by well-defined spacial boundaries. The pre-incarnate Logos was all-wise: the historical Jesus Christ knew not the day or the hour of his second Coming (Matt. xxiv. 36). In these instances we find that the Incarnate One has given up some former divine privilege, in order to become like his brethren in all things. What the New Testament presents to us is not the picture of a monster in human form, reaching out to divine powers, not an unheard-of monstrosity, with his feet on the earth, and his head in heaven, but the picture of a man of flesh and blood, like ourselves, though, owing to his divine origin, more highly endowed and absolutely free from sin.

The most difficult question, the one in which we must cut loose most completely, from all Scripture guidance, is, in how far the kenosis has affected the divine self-consciousness of the Logos. The easiest way is, of course, to cut the Gordian knot, and to declare that this divine self-consciousness is lost in the incarnation, and reappears, after a time, as the human self-consciousness; or to assume

a separate development of a divine and of a human consciousness, in the child Jesus ; or, again, to assume a theanthropic development of the self-consciousness as well as of the life of Jesus Christ. All of these methods have been followed by theologians. The first of these views is that of Gess, the second is that of Martensen, and the third that of Thomasius and Liebner.

One thing that all writers who assume a renunciation of self-consciousness on the part of the Logos forget, is, that self-consciousness is an inseparable adjunct of personality. Psychologically, we cannot conceive of personality apart from self-consciousness. If, then, the Logos did divest himself of self-consciousness at the incarnation, he also divested himself of personality ;—becoming unconscious, he became also, by necessary implication, unpersonal. Such a consideration would lead, logically, to the position taken by Gess, which seems altogether unwarranted on scriptural grounds. There is no definite statement in Holy Scripture by which such theories could be tested. But, perhaps, the analogy of the growth of human self-consciousness can help us a little here. There is a very definite point at which a human self-consciousness germ, if such an expression be permissible, is given in the foetus. The moment of conception, which consists in the union of the male and female life principles in the ovary, imparts to the embryo organism certain qualities, both essential and accidental, which belong to both parents. In the growth of the newly conceived organism these qualities are gradually developed. This is what is known as "heredity." One of these germinal possessions is self-consciousness, which is developed gradually as the infant grows. Fully developed self-consciousness is not reached, ordinarily, before the third or fourth year of life ; but it is an essential inherent fact of personality. From this human analogy we might conclude that, in the ovary of the Virgin, there was im-

planted in the new forming organism, the germ of self-consciousness. Just as, in the purely human conception, the germs are not from one parent or the other, but result from a coöperation of the male and the female life principles, so we may suppose that, in the process of germ formation in the ovary of the Virgin, there was an analogous coöperation between the divine and the human life forces. Thus the product came to partake both of the divine and human natures, i.e., from the very beginning, from the very moment of conception, the development was theanthropic. Furthermore the product of this coöperation between the divine and the human life forces was to be a personality. We may reasonably assume that, in the regular manner, there was implanted in this theanthropic embryo the germ of self-consciousness; and, as the personality was to be theanthropic, the self-consciousness, from the earliest germinal beginnings on, was theanthropic. Following the human analogy, then, I would assume a germinal union of the divine with the human nature at the conception, and that the embryo which resulted from this conception possessed the germs of the entire future development. To apply this still more fully to the incarnation, I would explain that act as the entrance of *Λόγος ἄσραψτος*, self-emptied of the divine modes of existence, but not of the divine essence, which includes the divine self-consciousness, as the divine life germ, into intimate union with the human life germ, taken from the Virgin Mary, so that the resultant product was the God-man; the human ovum is fructified, in this case, by the Logos coming into contact with it. Thus may we represent to ourselves the Logos becoming flesh.

Now this embryo, thus formed, gradually developed in the womb of the Virgin, through all the stages of foetal growth; and, when the period of foetal development was completed, the child Jesus was born. A careful study of

the development of the child, so far as it is possible, fails to show the least trace of a duality of consciousness. The boy of twelve in the Temple is just awakening to a great fact of his life; but there is no trace that he is conscious of another *ego* within himself: "I must be about *my* Father's business" (Luke ii. 49). The man Jesus Christ, also, is ever conscious of both his divinity and his humanity, in one and the same act. Thus he says: "I am the living bread that came down from Heaven" (John vi. 51); "Before Abraham was, I am" (John viii. 58); and, to give but one other passage: "Glorify me with the glory which I had with thee, before the world was" (John xvii. 5). In these and many similar passages, Jesus Christ distinctly indicates the unity of his theanthropic consciousness and the continuity of his theanthropic personality, upon which the former depends. He does not seem to feel separately conscious of his divinity and of his humanity, nor does his claim of preëxistence before Abraham, and even before the world was, appear at all strained; but his consciousness of that preëxistence, and of the continuity of his identity and of his personality since before the foundation of the world, is perfectly natural to him. Jesus Christ knows himself, throughout his entire earthly career, from the time he could think for himself and claimed God for his Father to the end of that career, as one with the Father ("I and the Father are one," *ὁὐ ἑσμεν*, John x. 30). And yet, on the other hand, He always claims equality with men, calling himself "the Son of man." Yet there is never any duality of consciousness. It is the *man* Jesus Christ who is one with the Father, who expects to receive again the glory which he had with the Father, before the world was. Herein is given the fact of his theanthropic personality and consciousness. Both natures, intimately united, yet without intermixture of confusion, bound together in a single theanthropic personality, with a single theanthropic self-

consciousness, make up the historic Jesus Christ of the New Testament records.

Another speculative question that has been raised in connection with the incarnation concerns the integrity of the humanity of Jesus Christ. This is the oldest of these speculative questions, dating from the times of Bishop Apollinaris of Laodicea (latter half of the fourth century), who, in attempting to secure an organic union between the man Jesus and the Logos, denied that Jesus possessed a true human spirit, its place being supplied by the Logos. Thus while according to the anthropology of his time, man was made up of body, soul, and spirit, the man Jesus was made up of body, animal soul, and Logos. The orthodox church failed to follow the bishop of Laodicea in his views, but modern scholars hold views that infringe just as much upon the integrity of the humanity of Jesus Christ. Thus Gess, as we have seen, makes the Logos take the place of the human soul, in order to secure continuity of consciousness. The question is not without its deep interest for the Christologist, though it has little bearing on our doctrine. I want just to correct a common misapprehension that seems to run through most of our systems of theology. Modern anthropology, based upon the Greek and the New Testament anthropology, has generally adopted the trichotomy of *σῶμα*, *ψύχη*, and *πνεῦμα*. This trichotomy is based upon a misinterpretation and misconception of Paul's anthropology. From Rom. viii. and Gal. v. 16 ff., we learn what Paul means when he uses the terms *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* in the strict sense. Though there is, it is true, more or less laxity in the use of these terms in the New Testament, yet it is very obvious that both refer, here, to ruling principles of life. A sharp distinction is made between them, in these two passages; sin is referred to the *σάρξ*, and righteousness to the *πνεῦμα*. Only those are righteous who walk *μη κατὰ σάρκα ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα*, and Rom. viii. 6, we read: "For the mind of the flesh is death, but the mind of the spirit is life and peace." Again (verse 7), we read that the *σάρξ* is hostile to God, and (verse 8) that those who walk *ἐν σάρκι* cannot please God. While it is very evident that an essential distinction is here made between *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα*, it is equally evident that *σάρξ*, used in this sense, is identified with *σῶμα* as little as *πνεῦμα*, used in this special sense, is identified with *ψύχη*. When we refer to Gal. v. 19, 20, and read the list of the *ἔργα τῆς σαρκός*, we find that, in such connections, *σάρξ* is anything but material, and anything but identical with *σῶμα*. Fornication and uncleanness may be more or less material conceptions; but certainly idolatry, sorcery, enmity, strife, zeal, wrath, jealousy, and envy are not at all material. As used in the passages under discussion, these terms are used of the opposite life principles that overrule the entire human life, both body and soul. The *πνεῦμα* is the principle of life, the ambassador of God, in our being; and the *σάρξ* is the principle of death, the ambassador of Satan, in our being. Either principle may,

and does, use all the powers, both of body and of soul, for its purposes. The domination of one or the other principle in the life of a man determines his standing with regard to God and with regard to Satan. The man in whose being the *πνεῦμα* dominates is well pleasing to God; the man in whose being the *σάρξ* dominates is at enmity with God. Between these two principles there is constant warfare (Gal. v. 17), each striving ever to gain and to retain the mastery. The victory of the *πνεῦμα* means regeneration. In other words the distinction between *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* is a distinction made in the sphere of religious experience, while that between *σῶμα* and *ψύχη* is a purely psychological distinction. Instead of a trichotomy, *σῶμα, ψύχη, πνεῦμα*, we have, then, a double dichotomy: one psychological (*σῶμα, ψύχη*); and the other religious (*σάρξ, πνεῦμα*). In other words, man is composed, as to his nature, of *σῶμα* and *ψύχη*; and, as to his life principle, he may be ruled, either by the *σάρξ*, being in the unregenerate state, and doing the works of the *σάρξ* (Rom. vii. 8; Gal. v. 19, 20), or he may be ruled by the *πνεῦμα*, being in the regenerate state, and bringing forth the fruits of the *πνεῦμα* (Rom. viii. 4; Gal. v. 22, 23). I forbear entering further upon this fascinating theme, having touched upon the main points.

Now, Jesus Christ, the God-man, on assuming human flesh, took to himself a true human body and a true human soul. As regards his possession of one or the other of these life principles, the *σάρξ* in the sense of "principle of sin and death" can certainly not be ascribed to him. The only one of these two principles that can be brought into any connection with the sinless One is the *πνεῦμα*. But what use had he, who had within him the life of the Father, of this human life principle? The good, life, was his eternal choice; and, in his life, the eternal God-life, abiding in him, which he came to manifest, took the place of this human life principle. The integrity of Jesus Christ's humanity, according to my view, consists, then, in this: In the incarnation he took upon himself a human body and a human soul, while, as far as his religious experience is concerned, that was dominated by the fact of his sinlessness and the other fact of his oneness of essence with the Father, which placed him outside of the ordinary sphere of human religious experience. But we cannot, of course, enter into the innermost religious experience of the Son of God, and say just how the human and divine natures are combined in him, or what relations they bear, the one to the other. We can only accept the fact that he is the God-man, that he is both human and divine, and leave one side all speculations and all attempts to understand a mystery that is far beyond our ken.

Let me digress for a moment or so, and consider very briefly some passages in which the *σάρξ* and the *πνεῦμα* are attributed to Jesus Christ. The word *σάρξ* is used by Paul in four special senses, besides the religious significance which we have vindicated for it in our discussion: 1. The literal "flesh," as when Paul speaks of "flesh and blood" (*σάρξ καὶ αἷμα*), re-

ferring to the material portion of our being, which shall not inherit the kingdom of God (1 Cor. xv. 50). 2. The totality of attributes that make up our true humanity. Thus Christ is spoken of as "manifested in the flesh," *ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί* (1 Tim. iii. 16), signifying that he was manifested as a complete man. When Christ is spoken of as come of the seed of David, "according to the flesh," *κατὰ σάρκα* (Rom. i. 3), this same thing is implied. 3. It is also used as a synonym of *σῶμα*, by synecdoche,—using the part for the whole. In 2 Cor. iv. 11, Paul speaks of our "mortal flesh," *ἡ θνητὴ σὰρξ*, where it is evidently synonymous with *σῶμα*; and 2 Cor. vii. 5, "Our flesh (*ἡ σὰρξ ἡμῶν*) had no rest," where the identity of *σὰρξ* with *σῶμα* is quite evident. 4. It is used finally, in the sense of all material, physical being, both animal and human, generally in quotations from the LXX., as *πάσα σὰρξ*—Hebrew כָּל בָּשָׂר, in Rom. iii. 20; Gal. ii. 16, etc.

It is in the second of these senses, employed by Paul, that the term *σὰρξ* is used in John i. 15: "The Logos became flesh," i. e., became man, in all the totality of human attributes, to which statement the quotation from the old hymn (1 Tim. iii. 16), "Ὁς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, is parallel. Whenever, then, the expression *σὰρξ* is applied to Jesus Christ, even in so strong a passage as Rom. viii. 3, in which it is said that "he came in the likeness of sinful flesh," *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*, it always refers to the integrity of his human nature, and has no reference to the usage of *σὰρξ* as the principle of sin and death. In the same manner we must interpret the word *σὰρξ* in passages like Heb. v. 17, "in the days of his flesh"; 1 Peter iv. 1, "Jesus Christ having suffered in the flesh" (cf. 1 Peter iii. 18); and "Jesus Christ come in the flesh" (1 John iv. 2; 2 John vii. 1).<sup>1</sup>

The term *πνεῦμα*, also, is used more or less laxly and is often confounded with the term *ψύχη*, the soul, or immaterial part of our being. Whenever the *πνεῦμα* of Jesus is spoken of, it seems to have this significance. Thus Mark ii. 8: "Jesus perceiving in his spirit: *ἐπιγινώσκει ὁ Ἰησοῦς τῷ πνεύματι αὐτοῦ*," where *πνεῦμα* is used of the noetic function of the soul, and is synonymous with *νοῦς*, which might stand in its place without changing the sense in the least. Matt. viii. 12: "sighing deeply in his spirit"; John xi. 33: "He groaned in the spirit"; and John xiii. 21: "He was troubled in the spirit," all refer to the immaterial side of human nature, to the *ψύχη*, which word might here well be used in place of *πνεῦμα*. I have appended these few references to my discussion of the *σὰρξ* and the *πνεῦμα*, in order to avoid any possibility of misconception.

We have, then, as a result of these discussions, arrived at the conclusion that the man Jesus Christ shared with us, in the fullest manner, our human constitution, both in the

<sup>1</sup>I have to some extent, and with modifications, used the discussion of Vincent, W. S. iii. pp. 74-76, which is very good and clear.

physical and in the psychical life. The Gospels everywhere bear witness to his physical likeness to ourselves, and to the reality of his body, which was not exempt from the weaknesses of the flesh. He was subject to bodily weariness, and to thirst (John iv. 6, 7); he slept in the boat, in the midst of the storm, an indication of great weariness (Matt. viii. 24); he was hungry (Matt. iv. 2; xxi. 19). He was like us also in his soul life: he loved the young ruler who came to him to inquire the way of life (Luke x. 21); he is again and again represented as "sighing," "groaning," or "troubled" in the spirit (Mark viii. 12; John xi. 32; viii. 21); he has mercy on the crowds that throng him (Matt. xiv. 14); he weeps at the grave of Lazarus (John xi. 35); he fiercely denounces the Scribes and Pharisees (Matt. xxiii.). The outcome of the incarnation, then, is a Being who, while he is true God, is at the same time true man; and herein lies the great import of the incarnation for our doctrine. It is the great turning-point in his eternal life of love, the point at which the Son of God, casting aside his pristine glory, and taking unto himself our human nature with all its weaknesses, becomes Son of man, the point at which the *Λόγος ἄσαρκος* becomes *Λόγος ἔνσαρκος*, the point at which the eternally preëxistent Christ enters into the world history as the man Jesus Christ. And this incarnation is in order to the salvation of the world (John iii. 16, *et al.*). Herein lies the eternal significance of the incarnation, that makes it the central doctrine of the Christian faith, and the central point of the history of our race.