

## ARTICLE II.

DR. COCHRAN AND OTHER RECENT WRITERS  
ON THE ATONEMENT.

[Continued from Vol. XLVI. p. 498.]

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IN the July number of this Review for 1889, one of the ablest of recent treatises on the atonement was examined as to its theories and logic, leaving the "Scriptural Relations of Christ and His Atonement to Mankind" for later consideration. To this we now proceed, along with an examination of other volumes—now multiplying, it is hopeful to see—on the same subject. Dr. Cochran's is, for American students and masters of theology, the most important, from its American origin and its strength of thought; and though such works are not easy to read, it is not the most difficult among them.

The first to claim attention, on the score of the earlier date of its production, is Dr. Lewis Edwards's "*The Doctrine of the Atonement*," first issued in Welsh in 1860, translated into English by Rev. David Charles Edwards, Bala, 1886.<sup>1</sup> The translator is of Balliol College, Oxford University, England; the author was president of the Welsh Presbyterian College at Bala. The recent appearance of the book in English is owing to the high regard in which it is held in Wales. It was written a quarter of a century ago from a conviction also independently expressed in his own way by Dr. Cochran. "Both sides" in the controversy on atonement, says Dr. Lewis Edwards,—

<sup>1</sup> London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1886. pp. 246.

"failed to touch the soul of the question, and even forgot that it had a soul, which is, whether the *justice of God's nature* demands an atonement in order to pardon sin. Instead of keeping to this point, where their real strength lay, the defenders of the old doctrine set up a sort of commercial atonement, and, by so doing, simply overthrew their own system. Their opponents contended for the theory of a governmental atonement—an atonement rendered merely to the divine government. But this did not touch the point at issue. . . . Andrew Fuller and Dr. Williams were good Calvinists; . . . but they erred by separating the justice of God's government from the justice of His nature. If they, however, regarded God too exclusively as governor, without reference to His justice,<sup>1</sup> the tendency of our days is to think of God as Father only. *Both errors spring from disregard of justice as an attribute in the Godhead.*"<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Edwards adopts the literary form of dialogue—between teacher and disciple—and manages it with naturalness and flexibility. But he has an order of topics of conversation, which is this: The Atonement in Relation to God (chaps. ii., iii., iv.); In Relation to Christ (v., vi.); In Relation to Man (vii., viii.); In Relation to Church History (ix.). As would be inevitable in dialogue, the theory, argument, and Scripture proof are blended. The first contact with the subject (p. 40) raises the question of a divine system for man, and whether power ever acts without rule or order.

"The power manifested in man's salvation is love; this power acts in accordance with the order of divine justice," "the principles of moral law," "inasmuch as the Lawgiver was made [?] under the same law as His creature." "The love of God acts within certain limits," "the limits of justice and law" (p. 42). "There is no tenable position midway between the doctrine, that God's justice rendered the atonement necessary, and the Socinian view, that Christ died only as a martyr." "His death for us was the purpose of His incarnation." "The essence of the atonement is merit."

This view does not admit repentance as part of the merit, and differs as much from the commercial theory as gain-

is to him who pays it for another; it does not consist in a definite sum of sufferings; so we are still liable to punishment till we repent. And if Christ was the Son of God, He must have died as a Surety and Substitute for lost men." "If we had a true insight into the depth of evil there is in sin, perhaps we should then believe that it was no light and easy thing for the Son of God to merit forgiveness for sinners." "If you observe how He carried Himself in Gethsemane and on the cross, you must feel that there were certain sufferings in His cup beyond the power of men or devils to inflict, and beyond their power to understand." "Two things are necessary to constitute greatness of moral merit, viz. the greatness of the person and the greatness of the act." "He could not in all the greatness of His Person be an atonement without giving Himself for us in an act of infinite worth. . . . It is equally true that no act would have been an atonement apart from the Person" (pp. 201, 203). "If the act was an atonement apart from the Person, then righteousness would have no more to say to the person of the transgressor, after receiving satisfaction for the sinful act; moreover, the atonement would of necessity have been finite, since an act of the Son of God Himself would not have been infinite unless His Person had been in the act." "Man had fallen into such an attitude of unbelief in relation to God, that no act was great enough to produce faith in his mind, but the act of dying for him" (pp. 128, 135).

This catena of quotations exhibits the pith of the Welsh theologian's views. Language in which the more commonly affirmed aspects of the subject are recognized, hardly need be quoted. Nor the use made of Scripture to support the citations above. Nor the distinction made between atonement and justification in Dr. Edwards's views. What the latter is actually in salvation, the former is meritoriously. Both are indispensable to remove condemnation. Our views of the two must correspond. There is sufficient characterization, by summary, of erroneous representations. Augustine's taking justification as the rendering a man "righteous in principle" is noted. Atonement "in its true meaning and essential character, is altogether lost." So in some American and English books of our time.

"It is difficult to preserve the spirit of the Bible when the letter is lost. The old terms, inspiration, atonement, etc., are used, but are emptied of all real meaning. By contempt of the letter, these writers have turned the spirit into mere letter. It is not merely in her dress, but in her voice and countenance, that Duessa is able to imitate Una."

The moral influence of the atonement is as heartily recognized here as in Dr. Cochran's work, while it is not reduced to a moral influence.

"We must believe that God could not forgive without the death of Christ, or else the fact that Christ's death can have no impression upon us. The inward truth influencing our minds must rest upon some corresponding truths in the nature of God." "More than a moral impression is necessary to effect a change in the heart of man. We ought to be careful not to exclude the work of the Third Person in the Trinity.<sup>1</sup> The Spirit must have some truths to reveal. The work of the Spirit in us is founded upon the work of the Son for us."

The Spirit works also in Christ. "Every system that does not acknowledge a relation between the atonement and justice tends to destroy the nature of forgiveness, and, in the same degree, sacrifices every incentive to holiness."

The "*Atonement and Law*"<sup>2</sup> of the Rev. John M. Armour, an American writer, was written in 1885, and issued in 1886. It is fashioned as a formal treatise in two parts: I. Law, Moral and Natural; II. Atonement. The title is not only thus reversed in the order of topics; but under the first topic, the order is reversed again, Natural Law coming before Moral. This discloses the starting-point, which is neither the moral system, nor justice or love, or any other attribute of divine character, but the law of God. One chapter (twenty pages) is given to

<sup>1</sup>This exclusion, however, occurs on pp. 211, 212. In our judgment, there is now no more serious error, not only in popular religious language, but in professed theological writing, than the confounding of the work of the Son and that of the Spirit, which occurs every day. It works an utter prevention as to distinguishing reconciliation and the new birth from each other in Christian knowledge and in Christian experience. Cardinal Newman said, in his "Lectures on Justification" (1838), that up to the Resurrection "God the Son and God the Holy Ghost so acted together in their separate Persons, as to make it difficult for us creatures to discriminate what belongs to each respectively." Difficult, but not impossible, in the light of Scripture distinctions between them, and for less so, since the work

showing that everything called law comes from the will of the Lawgiver—even self-evident axioms. "Space and duration are what they are because God is what He is." "Suppose space to be, as Clarke calls it, an attribute of God, its necessary existence by no means implies its independent existence." "The Nature of Things" is "the Latest Idol." The nature of God is recognized as the first source of being, fact, and truth; but "there is nothing determined by the nature of God which is not determined by the will of God." Two plus two equal to four is in no sense independent of his will. Natural and moral law rest upon it alike.

It is therefore the peculiarity of this book, that it denies the atonement to be in any way exceptional. It "conforms to, obeys, and satisfies law." "Its origin is of the mere sovereignty of God. Sovereignty characterizes all beginnings." Treating plan and law as identical, the writer maintains that "the work of redemption, as well as the course of nature, proceeds in accordance with a pre-determined plan, *and* under absolute and invariable law, law quite as exact as that which governs the material universe." "Turretin's idea of relaxation of the law," Symington's of "dispensing in some respect with the law," and even Dr. Hodge's of "substituting person for person" are negatived. Absolute satisfaction of law by the blood of Christ is asserted, and the longest, freshest, and most peculiar chapter (seventy-six pages) is entitled "Substitution Normal in Law." Two positions logically precede and prepare for this, viz. "No salvation without atonement," "No atonement by the violation of law." Non-execution of the penalty would not protect the sinner from fearful natural consequences of sin. But he can have no assurance under law of its non-execution. "Law which may be relaxed could not have been holy, just, and good." "The authority of the Lawgiver is in every precept." The offender meets him face to face in the simplest. In his own person he can never expiate any offence

or thereafter render any acceptable obedience. Obligation is continuous, and requires the utmost. Involuntary sufferings cannot atone; this were absurd.

But "law in its own nature provides for, and is fully satisfied with, an adequate (voluntary) substitute." The central chapter in which this is maintained is divided into six sections, and is followed by chapters arguing that substitution is "obedience to law," and intervention is itself a law of God's realm. But this not of obligation.<sup>1</sup>

"No doctrine of redemption that in any way casts the slightest shadow over the high mountain of divine sovereignty can be tolerated for a moment. All theologies that in any manner touch or imply that there was any obligation upon God to do this or that for fallen, rebellious subjects of law, are unscriptural, unreasonable, if not blasphemous" (p. 26). "That the saved deserved nothing, that they had no claim upon God, that there was no *obligation* upon God from without, must never be forgotten; but to hold that the will of God acted for our salvation when His nature did not require it, is to glorify the will of God at the expense of a supposed nature of God."

Human law provides for its own satisfaction by substitution: (1) Work for the public benefit may be done by a substitute, willing, able, and free from like obligations; (2) So may military service; (3) Debt may be paid by a surety who releases the debtor and satisfies law; (4) So may penalty for crime be suffered by a substitute. "But with great difficulty, and never without heavenly illumination, can men be brought to see clearly that Christ quite as fully satisfies all we owe unto the law of God as a surety satisfies a given obligation, bond, or note." It follows that—

§ 1. Obligation always rests upon the person. Even in debt lifted by another's paying the required sum, the payer, the endorser is a personal substitute. Debt and sin here come under like normal provisions. No substitution in either by mere prerogative or relaxation of law.

§ 2. Legal obligation is in both imputed to the substitute

but under grace, entirely reinstated as owing naught. So Christ perfectly reinstates the sinner, by perfect satisfaction of moral law. Hence "a general or indefinite" atonement ("provisional?") is held untenable. It is for individual sinners, and removes liability. § 3. Law, then, is entirely satisfied. This is the "strategic position." The crucial question is as to dispensing with law, or relaxing it at all. The resources of law provide for salvation without either of these. "Whatsoever God does, whether in nature or in grace, He does with infinite exactness." § 4. Equivalent penalty or suffering is recognized in civil affairs, if (1) it is by one offering, (2) is not ruinous, (3) the vicarious sufferer is in the long run rewarded. It is even required. § 5. No conflict between God's law and His executive will. No dispensing power is needed. § 6. The qualifications of sureties are (1) they must be of the same nature with those for whom they intervene, (2) not under like obligations, (3) free in assuming those of others, (4) must come under law in doing so, (5) make covenant engagement to this effect, (6) be competent and eventually unharmed, (7) secure reinstatement from justice, (8) place the beneficiary under grace and obligations of grace, (9) confirm all this completely and forever. Objections can lie only *vs.* an inadequate substitute; not at all *vs.* Christ as a perfect one for sinners.

It would be impossible to make so exhaustive a digest as the above of the protracted and ponderous dialogue in which Dr. George Jamieson, of "Old Machar," Scotland, tries to overthrow the traditional faith of the church of which he is a minister.<sup>1</sup> It is very doubtful if one at all satisfactory or useful can be made. The volume is called "*Discussions*," the disputants being Mr. Staywell and Mr. Freshfield. Mr. Freshfield, and the author also in his Preface, starts at the opposite pole from Mr. Armour, Dr. Edwards, and Dr. Cochran, and renounces and denounces

<sup>1</sup> *Discussions on the Atonement*. Is it vicarious? Edinburgh and London: Mr. Blackwood & Son. 1887. pp. 526.

substitution in every form and degree. To this view much the largest space is given with an air of wonderfully superior wisdom and learning. Interpretations of Scripture and meanings of Greek words always accepted by scholars are superciliously looked down upon. That our Lord suffered aught *in our stead*, he would drive out of Christianity root and branch. And Mr. Freshfield *naïvely* grows impatient and fretful when Mr. Staywell's briefer replies to his long logomachies seem to show that it cannot be driven out. On his fourth page the author pronounces "the preaching of substitution a burlesque of Christianity." He stigmatizes it as "the dogma of substitution."

Fifty-four pages of this large book are filled with metaphysical matter which is foreign, not to say exceptionally unclear and profitless. It seems to be drawn from a still larger volume on "Profound Problems in Philosophy and Theology." Over a hundred and seventy pages more are occupied with combatting orthodox writers. It is in the first half that Dr. Jamieson's own views are affirmatively advanced, not without controversy at every step. Scripture criticism is scattered through both parts of the work. And there is incessant repetition that "to atone" and "to justify" mean simply to convert to holiness. *Ex uno omnes.*

"If sin be the offence, expiation is *the removal of sin*, and therefore the extinction of guilt; and it is this removal of the offence, and this extinction of the very grounds of the offence, that gives satisfaction, that brings about reconciliation, that makes God and man friends, in contrast to the enmity, which, under the sinfulness of man, must needs subsist between them. In short, when you say that atonement is the expiation of sin, I understand you to intimate that it is *the taking away of sin from the sinner*, and that his sin is no longer imputed or reckoned to him; and that God is accordingly satisfied with him who was the offender, but is now no longer the offender. and that this satisfaction is called reconciliation with God."

In such a form of Scotch "moral influence theory" (shall we call it?) of course the propitiation of God's moral nature by the death of Christ is utterly displaced and

removed away.<sup>1</sup> Propitiation by sinning no more is thrust in in lieu of it. To be sure, Christ does somewhat to bring about the cessation of sinning on the part of the offender. Else "atonement of Christ" means nothing. But what is he credited with doing towards the taking away of sin from the sinner? He conquered sin completely in his own person, and this is, *ipso facto*, the death of sin for the race. All that is needed is the application of this personal moral victory of Jesus to individuals. In this strange sense he uses such language as Dr. Cochran's: "He made a *provisional* atonement—that is, a real atonement, having *in view its application* to those, and those only, who should receive the same by faith." But this in contradistinction still to a substitutionary one. He denies that suffering is any ingredient of propitiation; it is to be held as a mere "inseparable accompaniment," "the accident that is inseparable," as our Lord's death has been held to be by others. Sin is the "very essence of our carnal nature;" the flesh is the very source and spring of sin (was it in the angels that fell?); in taking this upon himself Christ took all the burden of our sin, and being so "made sin," by his painful victory over it, put it, or entirely removed it, away. He can now impart to men his life-blood, viz. "the blood of a renovated humanity." His blood shed is "spiritual economy," "spiritual blood." the law of the spirit of life;<sup>2</sup> the application of the cross,

<sup>1</sup> For dissent from Bushnell on "sacrifice by cost," etc., see pp. 420-429. Bushnell does not go far enough. Nor do Young, Robertson, Maurice, McLeod, Campbell, and many others, in that they do not show the origin and nature of sin—"the key of scientific theology"—as inherent in the body! But Stier, in his Words of the Lord Jesus, Vol. vi. p. 74, is praised as recognizing it.

<sup>2</sup> "The blood of the sin-offering, under the law, underwent a very mysterious and remarkable change after sacrifice. Whereas, before sacrifice, it was the blood of sin, and therefore the life of sin, and therefore had to be poured out, that the life of sin might be destroyed: it became thereafter 'sacred,' and, the emblem of another and an opposite life." But we are not told how Jesus put away "the sameness of sinful flesh" which he is asserted to have been born into. Augustine's theory is that of miracle before

or of the blood, therefore, is, repentance that prepares the way for faith,"—the "very beginning of atonement" in us; the shedding of the life-blood of Christ for the believer is "the pouring out of the things of Christ into his bosom," the "entire death of the flesh, as the body and ground of sin" is, in him, his redeeming qualification for and in us; the infusion of his righteousness in us is our partaking of his body and blood, and the ground of our justification. The divine nature in him is necessary to the possibility of all this, dwelling in him along with the evil germ in the flesh of the Son of Mary—"made sin"—yet not defiled by it, for he successfully resisted it.

In "*Atonement, Soteriology*,"<sup>1</sup> by Rev. S. G. Burney, D.D., LL.D., professor of theology in Cumberland University, 1888, the sacrificial theory is maintained against all others. This is to be understood as meaning, however, principally against the Old School Presbyterian scheme of Dr. Charles Hodge. Beginning with the "Apostolic Fathers" and at once denying categorically that *any* being can be a substitute for sinners, he follows the Anselmic ideas and dissenting ones down to our day, and assumes the impossibility of substitution all the way through (and he has none in mind but substitution of penalty). For Christ's imagined suffering of this, he revives the obsolete word "penalty." Of course all his arguments fall powerless with those who deny that our Lord suffered the literal penalty of sin. The distinction between penalty and natural consequence is denied. Of the different uses of the word "law" in physical science and

Of course with such a writer salvation is merely the cessation of sin and of its natural consequences (miscalled penalty) along with it.

“The restoration of the rebel to obedience is by necessary consequence the removal of penalty, just as the cure of disease is the removal of its painfulness. Hence the grand object of the atonement is not to satisfy abstract [!] justice by substitutionary penalties and legal fictions, transferred guilt, etc., but to satisfy concrete justice in the sinful soul [!], to purge the conscience, and enable the sinner to love God and his neighbor as himself.”

The half-truth that men's hearts need moral change is put for a whole truth throughout the book. Justice is concrete only in men; in God “abstract.” Propitiation loses color and reality, save as between man and man. None of the Old Testament atonements are regarded as removing aught but present uncleanness, never liability to future punishment of any kind. The assertion is, therefore: “No atonement made by Moses, or Aaron, or any other human priest, ever saved a soul from the natural consequences of sin [miscalled penal] or rendered such salvation possible.”

Our Lord saves not by his death, “but by priestly power, through prayers, supplications, and self-sacrificing love to God and man,” as a mere benefactor. His mental woes were “identical in kind” with those of his followers. Priests were benefactors; so was Christ. Obedience—and his was perfect—is the only “sweet-smelling savor” to God. We do not know why, or why in consequence of it, Christ's righteousness is imparted (never imputed) to saints, save that it involves spiritual contact with him. He himself saves, not any work he has done.

“*The Redemption of Man*,” 1889,<sup>1</sup> by Dr. D. W. Simon of the Congregational Theological Hall, Edinburgh, is “simply a collection of studies,” but they are clear, well wrought, and of considerable merit as scientific contributions, which they do not claim to be. The order of topics will show the lines of approach to the gist of the sub-

<sup>1</sup> Discussions bearing on the Atonement. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. pp. 430. (“Redemption in its wide sense is here meant.”)

ject: (1) Atonement and Kingdom of God; (2) Constitution of Humanity; (3) Relations of Man to God; (4) Hebrew Sin Offerings, with Ethnic Parallels; (5) The Anger of God; (6) Forgiveness of Sin; (7) Passio Christi; (8) The Passion of Christ the Passion of Man; (9) Atonement and Prayer; (10) Historical Influence of Christ's Death. Several of these topics can be detached from the rest; but it is more and more the theological habit to draw important and vital matters surrounding the atonement into its circle. Chapters ii. and iii., for example, prepare the way for the representative theory of atonement, laying a basis for it in the constitution of humanity as a corporate or organic whole, and its relations as such to God. This basis runs under the succeeding chapters on Sin Offerings, Anger of God, Forgiveness, Passio Christi, and the Passion of Christ the Passion of Man (especially). For example, as to sin offerings, it is said:—

"1. They were rooted in the *consciousness of disordered relations* between either the individual Israelite or the congregation, i. e., the nation as a whole and the divine ruler."

"2. The design of the sacrifices was to atone. . . . 'To cover' (*Kippër*) refers to an effect on God himself. . . . 'Make atonement for them before the Lord.' [Hide it.]

"[3]. In what sense atone? . . . Our modern distinctions between ceremonial, political, moral, and religious offences had no existence for them. . . . Sin, ingratitude, rebellion against God on the part of an Israelite, were something widely different in intensity and significance from the same things in us. It may also be true that atonement could be accomplished in the case of Israelites by means which, when Christ came, had become utterly inadequate." (p. 208 et seq.)

That is, subjects of the kingdom were "restored to peace" in the mixed relations named above; and one would almost expect the Federal Headship to appear in this connection. More than a hundred pages later, after much interesting discussion of other themes, we have Christ brought forward as "generally the mediator of the divine immanence in man," "in immediate, generative, creative, sustentative, i.e. immanent control with" men; so that "what He did, suffered, and is, we do, suffer, and are."

Setting aside that lower and common meaning of vicarious, to which some would reduce the Messiah's saving passion, on the ground that mere human suffering for us is not identified with us as his was, Dr. Simon says:—

"Men have always had a dim idea of a representative such as Christ is. They have felt that he who was to act for them in such a way that his acts should be theirs, must in some sense *express* them; that they must put themselves, as it were, into him; that the whole must be present in him. Some men fulfil this condition more nearly than others; still none can do it completely. All are outside the rest, merely co-ordinated to or with them. . . . And at the best there is not the identity which is the condition of truly vicarious action; . . . identity with the whole, yet distinction from the whole,—two conditions which no individual can possibly fulfil. The Lord Jesus Christ does. He is, as the Logos, the man in men, the humanity in mankind. . . . Every individual is rooted in Him" (pp. 337-338).

"God regards us. . . as an organization of organisms. . . The Logos, who, as I said, is the whole—the human in man—stands for man—really and not assumedly or forensically or by any fictitious, arbitrary process whatever, as the whole; and what He therefore does or suffers for the whole is, and is regarded as, the doing or suffering of the whole" (pp. 338, 339).

In later pages the author declares that what Christ suffered "really was a propitiation." Citing various Scriptures, he says that at the bottom of them lies the idea that Christ "took our place and bore what it was just and right that we should bear," what would have been deemed penalty of the positive sort if we had borne it. Holding the reality of God's anger with man for sin, in an appendix he commends Dr. Shedd's vigorous language touching the effect of Christ's death on the divine nature,<sup>2</sup> though he denies that a forensic process could effect an "essential *personal* ethical end."<sup>3</sup> A substitutionist would read with pleasure the following:—

<sup>1</sup> Following Gess, Dale, and Dorner, Dr. Simon recognizes the lower meaning of this in work which benefits us, and in suffering that relieves our pain. "But Christ's work touches deeper depths" (p. 332).

<sup>2</sup> See his *Dogmatic Theology*.

<sup>3</sup> The way was prepared for this by the exposition of God's anger as personal in distinction from rectoral, the recoil of personal holiness and self-consistency rather than that which is judicial or governmental *vs.* sin,—a divine "psychical indignation." While this is clearly separated from the objectionable passion of man, Dr. Simon does not shrink from anthropopathi-

“ His humiliation, sufferings, and bitter death were endured for our sake, *in our stead*—not merely to show us His own feelings, or the mind of God, or the nature of sin, or all of these, though this was part of His design; but because unless He had endured them, corruption, misery, and eternal death must have been our portion. In a word, He was our own substitute.”

But a sharp-sighted substitutionist sees, as Dr. Simon sees, that such words are “ a good deal used by a certain school that arrogates to itself the title of ‘ Broad,’ ‘ Liberal,’ ‘ Advanced,’ and so forth, either consciously or unconsciously in a very ambiguous way.” He will, therefore, turn back to the author’s chapter “ *Passio Christi*,” to see what his words mean. He summarizes “ the specific sufferings of the Logos as incarnate ”—not of the mere man—as follows: 1. From the limitations involved in taking flesh; 2. Inconveniences and difficulties of incarnation; 3. Positive physical pain from his relations to human beings; 4. Sympathy with their sufferings; 5. The evil of sin, in all its greatness, brought home to him; 6. Organic race influences; 7. Assaults of the powers of darkness; 8. Subconscious relations with men from his divine immanency; 9. The divine grief over sin.

The form of these headings confines the points and particulars of description to the God-man. A mere man could have no such experiences; and therefore he could not be the representative of man that Dr. Simon sets forth our Lord as being.

In his closing chapter on the influence of Christ’s death in history, he shows that this influence was impossible, if his disciples, Paul, converts, and preachers since, through whom it has spread in the earth, understood him to have died as a sacrifice for us, “ in essentially the same sense in which *all* sufferers for the truth, for right, and for love, are cal description with qualifications. “ The inward reason of recoil, resistance, pain, resentment, all up through the hierarchy of the organic sphere, and which I have ascribed to God, is but another mode of . . . the divine holiness.” It is this which is propitiated rather than any unresolved remainder of derived sentiments such as Dr. Bushnell fell back upon when he found his first bald moral influence theory inadequate and repugnant to common evangelical convictions.

sacrifices both for men and for sin." This point is made *vs.* the moral influence theory with fatal clearness. But if the world "needed a propitiation," and "the death of Jesus really was the propitiation for the sins of the world," all is simple, natural, rational.

We resume here our examination of Dr. S. D. Cochran's "*Moral System.*" The most vital part of such a writer's scheme of doctrine is its adjustment to Scripture. Its great alternative, *punishment or atonement*, is therein to be vindicated. In the remaining two hundred pages of Dr. Cochran's work (Part IV. chapters xvi.-xxiv.) he sets forth the biblical instructions as to Adam's sin and its effects, the Levitical law and atonement, the priesthood of Christ, the Messiah in Isaiah's prophecy, *ἀντί* and *ὑπέρ*, the Bible testimony to atonement of Christ, the governmental theory, forgiveness and justification, and the so-called "moral view." Points of comparison with the exegesis of other authors will suggest themselves.

It may promote clearness if we consider—out of its place above—how far Dr. Cochran agrees and disagrees with the governmental theory. This and his exegesis may mutually color each other. It is an old and well-known charge against our Congregational theologians, that they give moral law and moral government an unsuitable place in theology.

And this is the very objection Dr. Cochran has to their theory from his own standpoint. It is, that both punishment and atonement in its place are just made expressions of God's official will as a ruler, rather than as a person with personal rights and "dues from and claims upon his rational creatures." Justice is thus not directly connected with his moral nature, but with a "devised government," to defend and carry on which it is necessary. The divine polity overshadows everything else divine. The moral nature and claims of other social-moral beings which call for punishment or reparation are ignored. Public, retributive justice seems to be considered

as distinct from ethical in the nature of all, as it is not. What it inflicts is really "not a mere act of rectoral policy for *impression* on the loyal, not an expression of anything, but a real exaction from the sinner of what God absolutely owes to Himself and to each and all others," and what the sinner owes. This, he says, is the true theory.

"God is not only the universal Ruler, but a moral Being, a Person, having all the rights, claims, and susceptibilities of one. . . . He is Creator, Preserver, and Benefactor. . . . No mere governmental theory at all meets the case. . . . Sin in the Scriptures is always against God, and not merely against His law, government, or subjects. . . . Justice respects Him immeasurably more than it does all creatures. . . . and all relations to them."

Here Dr. Cochran and Dr. Simon are nearer each other than any two of our authors. They might agree to set forth Christ as the substitute in *the moral system at large* for sinners, and his atoning death as the equivalent in such a system for the penalty of sin in moral government under moral law. This should be borne in mind whenever Dr. Cochran interprets atonement as a "full equivalent" for what sinners deserve. A (provisional) equivalent *for* penalty and a penalty equivalent are two very different things. Moral law and moral government are but portions, not the whole, of God's moral system at large. What is satisfactory in the latter ought to satisfy the former.

That forgiveness, pardon, or remission is not merely personal, but the act of God as a ruler as well, Dr. Cochran proceeds to show. Some phrases imply that it is official or governmental. It is no "strictly personal settlement" with the individual sinner. So the verbs ἀφίημι and δικαιώω show.

"Any forgiveness inconsistent with the justice of the law, both ethical and retributive [justice], is of necessity *immoral*; and any notion of it which makes it a mere non-rectoral, personal act of God toward the repentant sinner, regardless of justice, is [a notion] of Him as committing universal injustice and outrage."

consequences, nor effect personal renewal to obedience and righteousness; but it fully exempts him from the penalty or positive punishment his sins deserve, and from nothing else." "It is an act of the forgiver, done in himself in favor of the forgiven, not in the forgiven at all."

The "righteousness of God" (Rom. i. 17) is God's righteous act of justification, a judicial act set forth as restoring men provisionally to right relations, is one of ethical justice, Christ having met with ethical justice the claims of moral love. In this sense righteousness is imputed to penitent believers; they are endowed with it-forensically; as by the work of the Spirit they are actually made righteous in heart.

Substitution is found as formative principle in the Levitical sacrifices and in those that preceded them. The idea of substitute for guilty men appears in the priesthood, prefiguring Christ. From Eden times the hope of propitiation came down. Abel's acceptable sacrifice of living victims was the type of all. The place Adam held towards legal probation, the second Adam holds towards a gracious one. Rom. v. 12-19 explains the one redemptive plan. Radically, expiatory sacrifice, symbolic and symbolized, runs clear through. Even the peace-offerings refer to sin and atonement. Temporal retributions of theocratic (national) law represented eternal ones, and could not include them. Analysis and exposition here of Isaiah's Messianic passages and of the Epistle to the Hebrews,—coinciding mostly with Magee,—are solid and strong, and all the Old Testament and New Testament passages bearing upon the fact and the necessity of substitution are copiously collected—even to much repetition—and exhaustively considered. So are the interpretations of old and new commentators canvassed, and their reasons weighed. And the conclusion is very firmly and consistently drawn, that atonement must have been made to God as indispensable: could not in itself affect men, and could but be universal. The topic is admirably handled.

Philosophically it is apparent that Dr. Cochran's view of the whole subject, being more analytical than others, is

broader and deeper. Moral nature and moral reason lie beneath and behind God's moral law, moral government, moral system<sup>1</sup> and society, and his moral administration. When we ponder expiation in such a system, it is really expiation to God's moral nature and the law contained in it requiring him to govern of which we are thinking. And the justice, love, or holiness whose spirit requires, devises, and is propitiated by it (as he is infinite in everything), must be also infinite as both personal and moral. To keep this steadily in view is necessary beyond the understanding of a meritorious author,—it is needful in order to avoid errors busily taught, and to gain and keep strong and helpful conceptions of truth.

It is seldom that so much clear doctrinal truth has been packed into fifty or sixty pages as in "*Some Thoughts on the Atonement*" by the Rev. Daniel R. Goodwin, D. D., LL.D., professor in the Episcopal Divinity School, Philadelphia.<sup>2</sup> It is recent, but no published date shows how recent. To readers of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, *Biblical Repository*, and other Reviews, Dr. Goodwin has long been known as one of our most cogent and skilful writers on themes requiring deep and lucid thought. Keen and

<sup>1</sup> Some prefer to regard moral law as presupposing a system of moral beings, logically—not chronologically—for, as is said *ante* (*Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. xlvi. pp. 477, 480, 476 footnote), such a system requires such a law, as such a law implies such a system. "No universal moral system could exist without such a law." It is "necessarily founded in moral natures,"—the eternal moral nature of God being chief,—and may be said to be coeval not only with the moral nature of creatures older than man, but with His. Nor is this a point of mere theoretical logic, reaching back beyond His moral creation, when He was simply a law unto Himself alone (in our conceptions); for, without this potential antiquity of moral law, "eternal atonement" would be a myth, and such scriptural language would be without meaning as Rev. xiii. 8, "the Lamb that hath been slain from the foundation of the world," and 1 Peter i. 19, 20, "precious blood as of a lamb . . . even the blood of Christ; who was foreknown indeed before the foundation of the world." And along with these would go the clear significance of Eph. i. 4, "even as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world." (Cf. Rev. xvii. 8.)

<sup>2</sup> Philadelphia: Evangelical Education Society. pp. 59.

searching as are the writer's philosophical powers, he treats the doctrine purely and exclusively as revealed. "A new Christian theology," he says,—

"is a monstrosity. It is the novelty that is to be suspected, not the antiquity; the 'fresh thought,' not the 'tradition' thought, may be too fresh. Protestantism has always protested against the new,—against novelties, whether of papal invention or of private speculation. Its office has been to build up, not to pull down, but to build on the solid foundation of God's word, and not on the sand drifts piled up by the doctrinal gales and fresh gusts of to-day."

The objective character of our Lord's propitiation is here set forth in a very terse and solid way. First, as a reconciliation of the Father to men.

"To be reconciled to another, or to reconcile one's self to another, often means directly and properly to propitiate *his* anger or ill-will, to secure and recover his favor and be restored to *his* friendship. According to the ordinary use of the English language, as well as of the Latin and the Greek and probably of all languages, this *may* be the meaning of the phrase in any case; and it *must* be the meaning whenever the reconciliation spoken of is that of a party offending to a party *offended*."

A very apt and pithy application is made of this to the case of a brother's being offended (Matt. v. 23-26), and being reconciled to him—i. e. by securing his forgiveness before offering a gift at God's altar. So in 1 Sam. xxix. 2-4, the lords of the Philistines thought David would betray them in order to "reconcile himself to his master," i. e. reconcile Saul to him, or propitiate the king's anger.

"Nor is it merely a vulgar or merely Scripture use. The Greek authors often speak of offering prayers and sacrifices to Jupiter or to the gods in order to be reconciled to them, i. e., in order to expiate offences, to propitiate *their* wrath, and be restored to *their* favor. I believe they never speak in such cases of reconciling the gods to themselves, although that would express exactly what they meant by being reconciled to the gods. In the "Ajax" of Sophocles, e. g. (744) Ajax is represented as meditating how he might be reconciled (*καταλλαγῆναι*) to the gods; i. e. might appease *their* wrath and conciliate *their* favor. Compare also Thucyd. viii. 70 (*διαλλαγῆναι*) and 90 (*συναλλαγῆναι*); in both which cases, the Athenians reconcile themselves, or seek to reconcile themselves, or to be reconciled to the Lacedæmonians by deprecating *their* displeasure and conciliating *their* good will. . . . The Scriptures, in speaking of our being reconciled to God, always recognize us as offenders against God, who have all the fault on our side. . . .

Reconciling us to God, in Scripture phrase, implies that God is propitiated, not we. . . . If the death of Christ were designed simply and directly to produce a moral effect upon us, removing our enmity, and so reconciling us in our hearts to Him, then the sacrifice for our sins was offered to us and not to God, then the ransom was paid to ourselves. But the Apostle declares that "Christ loved us and gave Himself an offering and a sacrifice to God for an odor of a sweet smell." . . . "God is in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself"—how? Is it said, 'by removing the enmity from their hearts?' No; but—"not imputing to them their trespasses." In Christ, God is reconciled to us, ready freely to forgive our sins for His Name's sake; and He graciously invites us to be reconciled to Him. . . . Some would teach us that God could require no propitiation, and that to suppose that He needed to be propitiated is an insult to His loving Fatherhood. Not so the apostle John: 'Herein is love; not that we loved God, but that He loved us, and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins'—here is the highest manifestation of the fatherly love, that He Himself provided the propitiation."

Equally instructive is Dr. Goodwin's handling of the word "atonement," of the subjective effect of Christ's death, the theory or *rationale* of it, Paul's teaching as to the term "justify," etc., substitution in the sacrifices, the question of penalty on the cross, the wrath of God, the Greek terms *ὑπέβ, ἀντί,* and *περί*. The point is very strongly made that Christ is always represented in Scripture as having died, shed his blood, or been crucified, for our sins; never to have come down from heaven, to have been born, or become incarnate for this. "We are justified by His blood, not by His incarnation." The summary of what the atonement is in Scripture, given by Professor Goodwin in lieu of any theory, is admirable. The last two points are these: "(9) Its practical and complete effect *objectively* is secured by Christ's intercession for us (Rom. v. 10; Heb. vii. 25). (10) Its effect *subjectively*, in each human soul, is secured and carried out by the work of the Spirit (Gal. iv. 6; v. 16-20; Rom. viii. 14)." We are disastrously prone to confound the work of the two persons in the Godhead. We need to remember that *God is reconciled to us solely by the work of the Son. We are reconciled to him by the work of the Spirit.* It would save confusion of speech and of thought to do this.

Dr. Goodwin has acute and searching criticisms in small compass, of various theories which we have no room now to notice. The "confession of humanity" theory and the incarnation theory are particularly well exploded. "The *process* of propitiation, precisely *how* it is *objectively* effectual, in short, the *modus operandi* in or upon the divine mind, we may not presume to scan or set forth."

Since the above was written, the last of translations of three treatises of Professor P. P. Waldenstroem, Ph. D., D. D., have been published in this country, viz. "*The Blood of Jesus*," "*The Reconciliation*," "*The Lord is Right*."<sup>1</sup> This writer's prominence in the Swedish "Free Mission" movement, and his influence, in this country as well as at home,<sup>2</sup> as professor of theology and of biblical Hebrew and Greek in the College of Gelfe, Sweden, give interest to these treatises. His views are like some already noticed. Under the question, What is the significance of the blood of Jesus? he answers, Nothing as to expiation or any vicarious virtue. He denies that a single word in the Old Testament or New Testament conveys these ideas or that of substitution. Christ in no sense whatever takes our place. The blood of the cross, he incessantly repeats, brings peace by being applied directly to the soul—whatever this may mean—and producing a moral change from sin to righteousness. There is no other atonement. The spiritual life of Christ passes through the blood somehow

<sup>1</sup> Chicago: John Martensen. 1888 and 1889. pp. 42, 118, and 303.

<sup>2</sup> His publisher asserts that his "new views"—in denial of the vicarious sacrifice, have been "accepted by the great majority of believers among Swedes in the old country, and in this, also by many among Norwegians and Danes." They were adopted by him in 1872, he was "admitted into the higher orders of the clergy," 1873, appointed professor in a State College, 1874. Any one whom Rev. M. W. Montgomery's deeply interesting pamphlet, "A Wind from the Holy Spirit," etc., left in the dark at all as to Dr. Waldenstroem's views, will get them thoroughly cleared up by reading "The Reconciliation." Yet consult the pamphlet, pp. 24, 40, 46, 60, 77, 78, 97, 99, 100-103. It is denied that his views prevail in Sweden.

into the spirit of man. This is the meaning, symbolically taught, of Lev. xvii. 11. The blood has no value as an offering in the accepted sense; no faith in its value in this sense avails the sinner a whit; "the blood itself cleanseth" from heart sin. Christ's death, as Son of God and Son of man, is nothing; this mystic transfusion of his very blood into men is all. "It is a grievous error to teach aught beside," under the figures of the New Testament or in any other way. "The sinner is made a partaker of the sacrificed life of Jesus," "given in death to him." Redemption is simply moral change, conversion. This is the effect of "a personal relation to Jesus"—comparable, some will think, to that of one person to another from whose veins blood has been transfused into his own. We are simply to confess sin and believe in him. It is a perversion of 1 John i. 7 to understand that the sacrifice on Calvary in any way or sense leads God to forgive. It just leads us to be righteous. "Washed," or "purchased," in his blood means this alone. Redemption is all within man's breast.

Under the question, Was God or man reconciled in the atonement? or God and man? he answers, Man alone, God not at all, and in no sense whatever. Salvation consists in man's change of character and relations toward God, simply and only.<sup>1</sup> Any imagined reconciliation of God to man is a heathen idea.

"There is not to be found a single passage in the Bible setting forth the atonement as having its cause in this, that the justice of God needed satisfaction." "The love which was in God showed itself to be righteous or holy just in this, that He did *not* seek satisfaction for Himself, but salvation

<sup>1</sup> Relation in his writings has a mere subjective meaning, and it is only a synonym for internal character. If he says: "To bring one into a right and good relation to God, just in this consists the essence of recon-

for us ; yea, He sacrificed all—even His only begotten Son—for our salvation." "The word of God nowhere teaches that God was to be reconciled through Christ, and we ought not to speak of these things otherwise than the word of God speaks of them."

It is denied that God's wrath for sin rests on the being who sins. For him God has nothing but love, though Scripture says he "is angry with the wicked every day." He leaves God neither reconciled nor unreconciled to man ; the reconciliation is wrought by God through the cross, but is all in man, as, being simply conversion, it must be.

Our notice of these writers would not be "critical" at all if we found no fault with them ! Some of Dr. Edwards's distinctions it will be difficult for many readers to seize ; that, for instance, as to the person of Christ being or not being *in* the act of self-sacrifice. How the law regards the believer "a perfectly righteous person, through the (infinite) merits of Christ," while yet this merit "abides in His person," it will be hard for some to see. Dr. Edwards takes refuge here, with De Wette, in imputation. The distinction attempted between the Spirit's working *on* the mind in conviction and *in* the mind in faith will interest certain minds. So will the assertion that belief in Christ on conviction (in place of repentance), and union with Christ, on the basis of his vicarious work, must precede regenerate living. New School theologians, we suspect, will hardly accept the following :—

"The first thing man has to do is to believe ; and if he argues that he has not the ability to believe, it may be answered that ability is not necessary [in order] to believe. This is the only act that does not need some ability to perform it, and this may be one reason why salvation is connected with believing. If all men were brought to accept this truth, they would feel that the responsibility of their salvation rests with themselves [!], that they have something to do, and do without delay, which needs no ability to do it."

The author betrays a fear that if a sinner feels he has ability, (and *therefore* responsibility "commensurate,") and so exercises it, he will imagine—or, perhaps will if he

repents of sin first—that he has found a “fitness” to believe in himself! He even says: “We may make bold to invite every man, as a lost sinner, to come to Christ without any evidence of his conversion,” that is, without conversion? This would seem to be the meaning, for he repeats that the atonement only and directly works conversion, quoting 1 John i. 7, on the atoning sufficiency of Christ’s blood, as if this were, *per se*, the Spirit’s influence. If this is not letting in at the window the moral influence theory turned out at the door, what is it?

Two extended discussions in Mr. Armour’s volume are quite superfluous,—those on the Will and on Motion, Force, and Life. What is true as to either topic is true whether there has been an atonement for sin or not. Indeed, the whole consideration of natural law is aside from the subject. Precepts as to right and wrong, addressed to spirit, and material phenomena are wide apart in fact. “Natural law” is used in one of the three senses given to it by physicists—all of them diverse from the meaning of law in religion, morals, or political institutions. And the leading physical meaning—uniformity of physical phenomena, is not the one taken—but that of force, though the two are blended and confused together a little. While in formal definition it is said, “Natural law is but the observed uniform *method* of the acting of the Supreme Power,” it is added in the next sentence, “We can mean nothing else than the acting” (p. 34). Later it is said: “Law *as force* and law *as commandment*, these are the two forms of law known to us” (p. 68). In order to make out

phenomena and commandment were one,—and of treating violation of law in the two different meanings of the word “law” as one and the same thing, is obvious enough. *Commands* exact on the one side and actual *phenomena* alike on the other are not identical. Yet it is asserted that “natural and moral law are not separable; they do not merely co-operate, nor is it the whole truth to say that they *become* one—they *are* one.” Dr. Mark Hopkins, in his “Evidences of Christianity,” argues an analogy between them, because not a particle of matter escapes from physical uniformity of fact, while no idle word, nor the thoughts and intents of the heart, are neglected by the moral law of God. Who does not see that the analogous, here, are not identically one and the same? If they were, analogy would be impossible. Dr. Hopkins argues “the same absolute perfection of government” in the two realms; which could only be if the realms are two, not one. “Law that governs angels” may be in its commands “quite as exact as that which governs atoms,” i. e. as the actual phenomena in atoms; but the Ten Commandments and the *rationale* of gravitation are not therefore one. That they are “both directly from the will of God,” or that “infinite power sustains” both, can by no means prove identity, only analogy at most. A writer who maintains that redemption is “*analogous* to the paying of a debt” (p. 158), yet is not a commercial payment, “so much for so much” (or the suffering of a full legal penalty), ought not to have fallen headlong into this fallacy. He demonstrates that it was not necessary.

Although he defends the commercial figures of speech in Scripture as literally exact, Mr. Armour here and there reduces the supreme work of Christ to the moral level of human sacrifices for others, as Bushnell did, while he does not make the latter redemptive, as Abbott does. “The vicarious element in the *commonest* acts of charity, as well as in the one of which all others are but the shadow,” is an expression which, by reducing both to one

scale of degrees, ignores the high, vital relation (an interior one) of atonement to the divine moral order. This also is indeed expressly asserted: "What Christ does for those whom He redeems and saves differs *not in its nature, but only in extent*, from that which is required of *all* in befriending and helping those who are in trouble and in need." And this seems to be logically required by the author's axioms, "substitution normal in law" and substitution "of universal obligation,"—a curious example of the meeting of extremes theological; for if what is "required of all" had sufficient extent it would redeem, and even Bushnell recoils from asserting that we "*share Christ's cross with him*," as perhaps some would not.

Dr. Jamieson's work seems to us not only radically untrue, but a somewhat violent and presumptuous attack on the truth.<sup>1</sup> The tone of it is dogmatic. It deals chiefly in assertion and point-blank denial, especially as to current evangelical interpretations of Scripture. But these faults are overshadowed by those conceptions of Christ's life and death on which he bases his transformation of atonement into conversion. This last we hardly know how to classify, whether as unscriptural or unintelligible. To exclude any form of substitution, he maintains that Christ's sufferings and death were merely his painful struggles to preserve sinlessness and his constant dying to sin. He is prodigally, not to say prodigiously, repetitious of this, as of vehement denials that the breaking of the body and shedding of the blood had anything to do with substitution for us, or substitution in any form anything to do with our salvation.<sup>2</sup> The "Sacrifice of Himself" was just his

<sup>1</sup> Presbyterianism in Scotland seems to have suffered more than Congregationalism, there or elsewhere, from the combined assault of a "higher criticism" and a lower theology. Our preachers of the New Departure variety do not set themselves *vs.* Scripture, in special texts and as to its integrity, as do those of the "Scotch Sermons" of 1880.

<sup>2</sup> One substitution he believes in, that of his philosophy or hypothesis of the Passion for the plain scriptural facts. This singular representative of recent Scotch Presbyterianism is "quite sure," as Britons say, that the

dying unto sin. All connection between his death on the cross and the removal of our guilt is denied. Ransom is moral antidote. So *ἀντίλυτρον* is emptied of all its meaning. Christ gave himself only as influence; redeems us from the curse of the law by bringing us hereafter to keep it; purchases us by converting us; all the debt the saints will have to the Lamb that was slain will be a debt for bearing an "inward cross" and for subjective persuasion to righteousness; he is our representative but not our substitute; there is no distinction between putting away sin and pardon of sin; Scripture always means deliverance from the power of sin when it seems to mean release from penalty.<sup>1</sup> The "very cause of action" *vs.* a sinner for his past sins is taken away when his present sinning ceases; justice requires that man should repent, and then that God should forgive; for past sin is annihilated with present sin in repentance. How utterly unlike the views of other writers here noticed and of evangelical Christendom these representations are, it is hardly necessary to say.

Dr. Burney's "Soteriology" is perhaps more controversial than any other work now under review.<sup>2</sup> Part III., churches of Christendom will never be at one on atonement till his hypothesis is universally accepted. Distant be the day! He seems incapable of conceiving a moral system like that set forth by Dr. Cochran, or any doctrine intermediate between the "penal" theory and his own. Dr. Campbell's representative repentance of the Saviour, he repels. As to Christ's peccability, he is akin to Edward Irving.

<sup>1</sup> Even *ἀφεσις* can only be made to mean forgiveness and pardon by "a sort of unconscious cozenage." Dr. Cochran protests against this transforming expiation into subjective renewal in this vigorous fashion (the italics are his): "*The truth is, that neither Christ himself, nor his whole manifestation of love, obedience, and atonement, ever regenerated a single sinner. This is done by the Holy Spirit only, with the truth as instrument. He is sent by the Father and the Son on the basis of the atonement of Christ to God for the sins of the world.*"

<sup>2</sup> One "general statement" may represent this writer's many controversial pages, *viz.* "All theories that make Christ a substitute for sinners, or his sufferings a substitute for the penalty due to sinners, involve by necessary consequence a double infliction of the penalty itself, or the infliction of the

Extent of Atonement, is least so, and is but twenty pages. Part I., Soteriological Theories (one hundred and thirty pages), is aimed against substitution, and Part II., Nature of Atonement (two hundred and forty-nine), against penal substitution. His own views are to be gathered rather from contentions than affirmations. How he fails to do justice to substitution as reconciling God's moral nature to the forgiving of sin is shown in his inference from it, that "if all men are not saved it is *only* because God has *not succeeded* in reconciling Himself to men." He knows no difference between human forgiveness of injuries and our Moral Governor's forgiveness of sin; for instance, the sin in injuries. Nothing in religion to him is vicarious. Sin and punishment begin and end together, as cause and effect. Justice never contemplates suffering, or evil, only good. Christ has no merit that is available for men. He does not and cannot bear our sin, or be a substitute for its liabilities, or repair any of its results, but simply takes it away and prevents them for the future. God is satisfied with repentance or obedience only.

Dr. Simon disarms all criticism naturally suggested, by styling his book "rough and sketchy," and adding that "various matters which ought to be included in a systematic treatment of the subject are left quite untouched." If he could have but told us how the well-depicted woes of our Lord took the place of those of sinners, and how they propitiated the moral nature of God, his "studies" would offer a pretty complete exposition of the great subject. Here his limitations are those of all other thinkers, —enhanced, we must think, by his restricted view of God's anger, consequently of forgiveness, as personal. Remission of penalty he seems to entirely exclude from forgiveness. We doubt if, in distinguishing them, the lat-

ter has been excluded by old writers or "explained away," so far as it is personal, but only as purely and merely so. If it has, Dr. Simon's view may prove a healthy counter-extreme. He notices "those references in the Bible to the work of Christ which, superficially regarded, point in the direction of legal, forensic, governmental relations between God and man" as "pressed and taken as the key to the *entire* divine method." We hardly know where this is done in American theology. And if there be such a thing as penalty for sin, rectoral forgiveness is not to be ignored. Unless all government has lapsed in grace, there must be a moral governor's acquiescence in the pardon of sinners, so far as government is concerned.

In making Christ's passion that of men, the latter are said to "subsist naturally in Him," as Scripture represents them to have their being in the Father. So to sin and reject Christ is represented as departing from some sort of previous oneness with him. We are not mystical enough to be able to adjust this to inspired accounts of sin.

The criticism has been made on Dr. Cochran's book, that it does not review other authors on the same subject at large, or even those of a few years past. Professor Simon does the former in his ingenious Introduction, and to some extent the latter.<sup>1</sup> But every author cannot do

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 6-65. He makes an elaborate classification: I. Objective theories: (1) Crypto-Dualistic: "ransom to the devil," an eternal law, churchly or orthodox theory,—Crawford, the Hodges (C. and A. A.), Turretin; (2) Personal objective, or Godward,—Burge, Dale, Westcott, Dorner, Maurice, White. II. The so-called "moral" theories: (1) Strict ones,—Young, Wace, Barnes, Gilbert (the governmental view); (2) Organic or dynamic,—Anselm, Magee, Robertson, Schleiermacher, Hegelians. Principal Cave, "Scriptural Doctrine of Sacrifice," 1877. pp. 328-370, has another classification: (1) Those which but partially recognize what Christ was,—Gnostic, Unitarian; (2) Those which but partially appreciate his death,—Patristic, Arminian, Socinian, Anselm, Abelard, Duns Scotus; (3) Those which imperfectly represent his "deathlessness,"—Ebionite, Unitarian. An enlarged classification will be hereafter necessary in order to include all theories reviewed in this article. Dr. Simon suggests a new philosophical class of theories. "In the first subdivision may be placed Jacob Boehme and the mystics and theosophists generally; in the second, Schelling, Hegel, Daub, and others; in the third, Kant, some of his followers, and others akin to him."

this; it were not desirable; and Edwards, Armour, Jamieson, Burney, and Goodwin do not. Dr. Cochran said in his Preface, that his work is "not designed to be a history of the doctrine of the atonement," and that he has "quoted and referred to only a limited number of writers with whom" he is familiar and has consulted. The critic probably did not read this,—but the rule stands that an author is to be judged by his avowed object. Another criticism is better taken, viz. that Dr. Cochran's treatment and style are not after the pattern of our day, but of an older one. Mr. Spurgeon has ever been open to the same animadversion in his preaching, and without proof of his lack therefore of power or usefulness. "A presentation of the truth," even in archaic form and phrase, may prove the word of the Lord. Our own judgment is that two or three other points can be better made, viz. repetition of favorite views in numerous connections, accumulated qualifying phrases in long sentences, somewhat various indeed, giving them an involved character, and considerable preaching.<sup>1</sup> The other volumes before us bear no marks of ever having been preached, or—most of them—that they could have been. Dr. Cochran's bears many and strong marks of both. To the homiletic strength and fitness of much of its matter the present writer can personally testify.

Dr. Goodwin's pithy and unpretending pamphlet would be more fitted for general usefulness—such as its merits deserve—if it were not as obviously a defence of the teachings of the Episcopal Church as of Holy Writ. Not that the creeds of other communions are not so recognized that any instructed Christian will read his brief pages without perplexity and with profit. The claim that atonement is "taught in our liturgy, has been the re-

ceived doctrine of the Church," etc., is not offensively or exclusively made, nor the Thirty-nine Articles referred to oftener than good taste allows in such a pamphlet. It was written for Episcopalians. Any *authority* of the Articles is waived, indeed, though "Scripture is explained by the Articles." So wholesome and cogent a piece of criticism should belong to all the orthodox churches.

The theory of Dr. Waldenstroem, denying any efficacy toward God in the sacrifice of his Son, whether as to intent or as to result, falls under Dr. Goodwin's description, "the negative theory." It sweeps away at a stroke what has been considered one-half, on the divine side, of a two-fold salvation. It renders idle the inquiry of every soul convicted of sin, "How does God stand before me?" and bids it only ask—what indeed conviction answers—"How do I stand before God?" It forbids his looking to Christ's blood and cross with any view to pardon, but only with a view to subjective renewal, for which the evangelical doctrine bids him look to the Spirit. Indeed, it transfers the work of the Third Person in the Trinity to the Second. It sums up salvation in this: "Confess your sin and believe in Him; the blood of Jesus cleanses" (internally), "thus you will be saved." Salvation is taken out of the hands of God as the All-Holy Administrator of a moral system, and becomes wholly "a personal relation to Jesus." This relation is purely subjective; nothing objective occurs. Forgiveness follows faith, and depends directly not at all on Christ's death. A renovated life is not only made necessary to it as condition, as all have taught, but it is all; nothing else is needed. Christ's blood is merely an instrument to cause repentance; it is repentance that saves, or rather is all of salvation, this sometimes being confounded with faith, as it is too often by more accurate thinkers. God set forth Christ as a propitiation only in the sense of a throne of grace for sinners. (Cf. Dr. L. Abbott on Rom. iii.) Not even in the sense always recognized as figurative, does Christ pay any moral

debt<sup>1</sup> or ransom or redemption price for us. He simply pours his life from Calvary into our souls. The fact that the Swedish tongue has but one word for the three ideas atonement, propitiation, reconciliation, lends plausibility to his constant iteration of this. He treats the three ideas as identically one.<sup>2</sup> Any general or conditional atonement he rejects. Everything is an individual as well as a personal transaction (p. 106, footnote). God sacrifices *everything* for man. No great interests of a moral system are recognized—only those of sinful creatures. He even goes so far as to assert that Christ “propitiates sinners from their sins, that is, He propitiates sinners so that they get rid of their sins.” All satisfaction of God’s moral nature and moral polity is ruled out.<sup>3</sup> His comment on Lev. x. 17, “atonement for the sins of men before the Lord,” is, that this should mean “making satis-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dr. Cochran’s statement, *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. xlvi. p. 481, and Waldenstroem’s in “A Wind from the Holy Spirit,” p. 108. The latter’s terse objections: “A debt of money can be paid, but not a debt of sin; the debt of sin can be forgiven, but not paid,” hold only *vs.* those who regard Christ’s satisfaction as penal, and quantitatively equal to the eternal woes due to saved men. Cf. *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. xlvi. pp. 496, 497. It goes without saying, that nothing like what Dr. Waldenstroem controverts is held among us.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 5-8, 47-49, 74, notes by translator of “The Reconciliation.”

<sup>3</sup> With all the fine magnetism of the man and his grand work in Sweden in reforming the Lord’s Supper, we are compelled to think, as we read his writings, of serving “the creature more than the Creator” as something possible in doctrine as well as in practice. His antagonism to the faith of our churches here is lost sight of in his useful mission to “Independent Swedish” churches; should it be altogether? Much that is illogical in his teachings might be pointed out; e. g. he denies that punishment is anything but discipline by natural consequences “to produce repentance,” yet he proclaims God’s wrath to come upon those who persist in sin—to “produce repentance” in them, of course, whence follows restoration inevitably. The only escape is, that some “cannot be received to repentance.” God’s wrath is simple hatred of sin, with love unchanged to the person sinning, yet he seems both to affirm and deny that moral anger can or should rest on the sinner. His continually occurring subreptions in using atonement and propitiation to mean a subjective change of mind in sinners will strike the attention of all evangelical readers.

faction unto the Lord for the sins of men before the Lord," if evangelical teaching is correct,—in which neither the learning nor the wit is very evident. From God's own word in Ezek. xvi. 62, 63, "when I am pacified toward thee," he expels all moral appeasing, substituting forgiveness *minus* satisfaction, though he can recognize pacifying the wrath of a king, and appeasing Esau, as scriptural expressions. His editor pronounces his writings "non-controversial,"—"he combats no theories by name,—whether the moral, the vicarious, the governmental, or any other." Our readers can judge of this,—such contention as we have sampled, fills almost every page. And he makes no distinction between the penal substitution theory and any other in his attacks. The third of Dr. Waldenstroem's works above mentioned, "The Lord is Right," is based on the theology of the other two; yet being really devotional and only slightly controversial, adds nothing to our knowledge of the author's exceptional views of the subject upon which they all bear, and calls for no additional comment. The first, "The Blood," sent out in advance as a pamphlet to ministers of the Interior, caused a natural expectation that the others would teach "nothing but the blood of Jesus" for propitiation instead of the contrary, denying divine propitiation *in toto*. Taken together, his books displace both the office-work of the Spirit and that of the Son. We profoundly doubt whether any evangelical air there is about them will successfully mislead our churches, and induce them to vacate the Spirit's work in begetting righteousness and pass it over to the Son, vacating also the Son's vicarious work and denying altogether that Christ immediately and meritoriously saves us from wrath, the curse of the law, and the "everlasting punishment" of sinful "deeds done in the body." It would be anything but the breath of the Holy Ghost which should blow away from Christian experience and thought this vital and formative element of all that is evangelical.