

ARTICLE V.

THE ECONOMY OF PAIN.

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PROOF OF THE CORRUPTION OF MANKIND.

From crowded cities.—As some distinguished modern authorities, to say nothing of earlier ones, impugn the belief in human corruption which enters so deeply into my present subject, it may be worth while to spend a few words upon it. I would, however, refer to the Duke of Argyll's "Unity of Nature" (chap. ix., "On the Moral Character of Man"), for some most valuable remarks on the subject.¹ It is, further, worth while noticing the fact that the ethical influence which human beings exert upon one another is

¹Some such remarks are as follows: "That which is really exceptional, and indeed absolutely singular in man [as compared with lower orders of creation] is the persistent tendency of his development to take a wrong direction. . . . Man has been, and still is, a constant prey to appetites which are morbid—to opinions which are irrational—to imaginations which are horrible—to practices which are destructive. . . . An element of confusion amidst universal order. Powers exceptionally high spending themselves in activities exceptionally base, the desire and the faculty of acquiring knowledge coupled with the desire and the faculty of turning it to the worst account; instincts immeasurably superior to those of other creatures, alongside of conduct and of habits very much below the level of the beast. . . . The general fact is this—first, that man is prone to set up and to invent standards of obligation which are low, false, mischievous, and even ruinous; and secondly, that when he has become possessed of standards of obligation which are high, and true, and beneficent, he is prone, first, to fall short in the observance of them, and next, to suffer them, through various processes of decay, to be obscured and lost" (pp. 365, 367, 371, 372, 373, ed. 1884).

multiplied through the closeness of their contact in all the relations of life. They come into the closest contact in great cities. Further, where that ethical influence is greatest, the ethical *tendency* must be most pronounced for good or for evil; just as the denser your galaxy of stars, the more brilliant, the denser your cloud of smoke, the more opaque. Now which of these two best typifies the densely massed population of a great city? Take any thousand from a spot where the density is at a maximum, and, if good predominated in human nature, they must needs be more virtuous than an equal number where they are spread out over, say, ten square miles. But every test which human experience can apply shows the directly opposite result.² Population at a maxi-

²It seems to me that this might be most clearly exhibited by a simple arithmetical formula. Let the good and evil tendencies in the average individual be supposed so nearly balanced as to be represented by two consecutive numbers in the scale, say by 10 and 9, and the question to be, Is the good to the evil as 10:9, or *vice versa*? Place two such, A and B, in such close proximity that the influence of each on the other, for good and evil, is at its maximum. This should, I think, be represented by all the units of good in A being multiplied by all those in B, and so also the units of evil. This would give $10 \times 10:9 \times 9$, or $100:81$, *i. e.*, the disproportion (on which ever side it may rest) is now nearly 10:8 which before was 10:9. Instead of two, take six persons, and, performing the same process, we arrive at $10 \times 10 \times 10 \times 10 \times 10 \times 10:9 \times 9 \times 9 \times 9 \times 9 \times 9$, *i. e.*, 1,000,000:531,441, which is little short of 2:1; and of course the more factors we introduce, the greater will be the disparity. But since experience clearly shows that humanity closely massed becomes more vicious, it must be the evil, not the good, which is in this ratio of 2:1, and therefore in the detached average specimen, which formed our initial assumption, it must be the evil, not the good, which preponderates. Some high authorities, I believe, demur to representing good and evil as arithmetical units. But as they exist in human beings, good and evil mean here the moral forces which determine conduct, and I cannot see why we may not measure them in units as we do mechanical forces or degrees of heat and cold. It may be that some more complicated function than a simple product of units would more fitly express the complete influence of character upon character. But assuming moral forces expressed in units, there must be a proportion capable of being stated between whatever functions we prefer to represent them by: and those functions, however combined, must, in order to express the increase of moral force by closer contact, be so combined as to *accumulate disparity*, and this must still show, under whatever complications, an original disparity on the same side.

imum of density shows vice at a maximum of intensity. There may be here and there a virtue which closeness of proximity tends to nurture and stimulate; but taking human nature all round, it is the germs of vice in the humanity thus inspissated, which seem to find genial surroundings and for ever to flourish and abound. Crowded cities,³ in short, exhibit human nature in its concentrated essence. Varying in their degree of depravity known and recorded, which is probably only a fraction of that existing as a whole, they universally confirm one another in the verdict, that condensation of humanity means concentration of vice, alike in quantity and in quality. But extreme cases only exhibit more clearly tendencies which are universal. All human beings are constructed ultimately of the same primary moral elements variously mixed. Therefore the tendency which

³As regards the moral statistics of great cities see an article, in the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, Jan. 1885, founded on the researches of Von Oettingen, a German statistician, from which I extract the following: "As a rule, the married of both sexes are less criminal than the unmarried. . . . In Berlin crime among the married rose from 47.3 in 1873 to 49.1 in 1878" for men, and "from 42.9 to 52.9" for women (p. 56). Again, "the [same] city has grown very rapidly in the past thirty years, but prostitution has grown twice as fast as the population. As marriages decrease, harlots increase, and run a deadly parallel with increasing suicide. In 1845 there were 600 lewd women under police oversight; in 1875 there were 2,241; in 1879, 2,767; in 1880, 3,033. . . . Of the 15,000 servant girls who come annually to Berlin, 4,000, we are told, fall a prey to the destroyer. . . . Of 1000 such women in Berlin 192 live in their father's house, 137 of them are under 20, and 22 under 15 years of age (1874). . . . These women, especially in Berlin, have also particular male followers, the so-called Louis, who keep them at their vile trade, live off their earnings, and in conflict with law or police defend them. There are supposed to be 4,000 such in the city of Berlin" (pp. 64, 65). Similar statistical facts are given for London and Paris; but "compared with Berlin the prostitution of Paris and London is stationary" (p. 64); and "Hamburg is, if possible, even worse than Berlin." Still, in London "there is one harlot for every seven women" (p. 64), and "about 27,000 unknown children are sent annually—nearly half the birth-rate of the city—from Paris to 18,000 nurses in the suburbs" (p. 62). Von Oettingen's *Moralstatistik* reached its third edition in 1882, I believe, without its estimates being seriously impugned then or since.

comes out so strongly in every mass must pre-exist in every unit, and this is what is meant by the moral corruption of man's nature.

From the contact of civilized with savage man.—Again, take another extreme case as illustrative of tendency, in the outer zone where now for three centuries civilized and savage man have met. The passing of the electric spark of civilization to the latter seems inevitably to shatter and destroy him. The powers which dominate at the point of contact are vicious, on the whole, and therefore destructive of the weaker. Civilization, defective in the moral element as Mr. Buckle proclaims it to be, means power, and power undirected by virtuous principle proportionately strong, seems inevitably to tend to vice. This tendency is obscured in a mixed mass where all share the same power. The specialty which brings it clearly out is the absolute helplessness of the uncivilized in the presence of the "strong man armed" with all the resources of civilization. He fires the mind of the savage with more ardent passions, inoculates his body with strange diseases, finds the most acceptable objects to him are strong drink and fire-arms, alike weapons of precision and of destruction, and supplies him freely with these means of suicide and internecine strife. Thus it has come about that the greater part of the aborigines who filled, though sparsely, mountain and forest two centuries ago have withered and died before our contact, as completely as if stamped out by massacre; whilst the remnants which remain require all the vigilance of authority and all the fostering influence of the most humanizing of religions to keep them from extermination. Their incapacity for human vice is the sole but sufficient protection to our domesticated animals. But for this, they likewise would wither away at our touch, and we should be forced continually to recruit flock and herd from the wild creatures of the prairie and the steppe. Man, in short, carries his innate corruption with him. When wielding power which relatively to a weaker race is absolute, the stronger race is set free from the re-

straints imposed by that law which is strong in proportion to the race itself,—its native tendencies start forth unchecked. And as the stronger race is impressive of them, so the weaker is receptive of the same, because the same moral elements variously mixed are present in both. But being weaker the savage has no moral stamina to resist their potency. In him those tendencies are realized at once or speedily; and their true nature, checked and tempered in a thousand ways in a stronger average individual and a thoroughly organized society, is at once revealed as by a crucial experiment. The result is the destruction of the savage, and except those tendencies were more powerful for evil than for good, that result could not be; and this dominance of evil tendencies is what is meant by the corruption of man's nature. This sufficiently shows the fallacy of Mr. Buckle's reasoning, that "mankind at large has far more virtue than vice," and that, "if this were otherwise, the preponderance of evil would long since have destroyed the human race." It does always *tend* to destroy, and where it works without restraint, it *actually* destroys.

PAIN CLAIMS A FUNCTION MORALLY, AS WELL AS PHYSICALLY
AND MENTALLY.

To claim for an imperfect being perfect surroundings, and for a corrupt being completely wholesome surroundings, is probably to claim that which in nature is impossible and in reason is absurd. Given a morally corrupt humanity, an unblemished *physique* for the same seems to contradict all that we know of the ubiquitous interaction of moral and physical laws, and of the interdependence of the moral and physical elements of our nature, upon each other. As we might suppose these in their perfect state to harmonize, so we may expect that in their defects and drawbacks they correspond. For such creatures a discipline is plainly needed; and that any discipline without pain as a factor would be able to stem the tide of depravity, and to arrest the lapse of perpetual degeneracy, is more than we can venture to affirm. Thus we

need not be surprised that pain possible and actual has so wide a range as we find it to have.

Thus it seems antecedently on moral grounds inevitable that pain should find a place in our economy. Its physically defensive and intellectually stimulant uses have been noticed already; and thus, if it is operative in those two great spheres of our being with wholesome results, there arises some further presumption that in the third, the moral, it is not inert for good.

HOW PARTICULAR PAINS ACT ON THE MORAL SENSE.

To all who admit a moral sense as furnishing a standard of conduct to man's governing faculty, whether that sense be innate, implanted, or acquired, the following remarks will have their force. Others will explain away into necessary functions of the organism the phenomena with which they deal. Pain, while active, may be so acute as to disable reflection; but when past, it promotes it, and specially prompts the question, What is there which my will can alter which might relieve me of this affliction or prevent its recurrence? One's own consciousness, or the authority of others competent to advise, tells him, let us suppose, that the cause is his own over-indulgence. Reflection suggests that indulgence to excess is vicious, contrary to some law of his nature, and to whatever higher law he may acknowledge. Of the reality and binding force of those laws he was imperfectly, for practical purposes, conscious before. Pain by its own intense reality in the physical sphere brings home to him the cogency of those laws in the moral, and suggests that relief is possible only by fulfilling them. And here conscience, which is the moral sense reacting self-judicially, to whatever extent it is developed within him, intervenes to remind him that that moral sense has been outraged, and his conduct has been the folly of one who knows the rule of right and does it not. If by the pain, while it lasted, his will has been beaten down and his resolutions frustrated, reflection points out that his will, yielding to some appetite through depraved choice, was

the primary cause of this folly, and that this prostration of the will is a retribution in kind for not duly exerting it when he might. Further, his own partial experience, reinforced by the example of others, warns him that the prostrating pains thus caused by excess are a foretaste of the total ruin which excess is apt to bring.

WHY THIS MORAL INFLUENCE OF PAIN IS OF UNCERTAIN EFFICACY.

No doubt in many cases the moral sense and the conscience, its judicial exponent, are too feebly developed for the stimulus thus given to their action to expel the *vis inertiae* of indulgence in which the will stagnates. But this only confirms further what was said above (page 4) of the demoralizing influence of pleasure. The disciplinal efficacy of pain may indeed be wholly baffled by that demoralizing power. Further, the executive efficacy of conscience depends on loyal obedience promptly rendered to its dictates. That efficacy, through facile disobedience stimulated by the hope of pleasure, is rapidly weakened; like a pendulum which, yielding to friction, swings through an arc smaller and smaller, and at last stands still. When this is so, the corruption of nature reinforced by habit has done its full work. But as these facts where they occur are no disproof of the proper authority of the moral sense, so they are no disproof of the disciplinal influence of pain.

ANALOGY OF PAIN, AS ACTING IN THE PHYSICAL SPHERE AND IN THE MORAL.

For indeed pain so acting in the moral sphere is precisely analogous to the way in which it guides man with reference to his physical surroundings. Suppose some poisonous herb or berry swallowed, on which internal pains give a warning of danger. The sufferer, if he survives, learns what to avoid; only the moral sense is not called into action in the process, and there is no seducing influence of pleasure concerned, to mislead his will through appetite. His sense of self-preservation is all that needs rousing; and is most likely

effectually roused, because the corruption of nature has left that in untouched power. In the other case, the balance against that seduction of pleasure requires to be restored, and the authority of the moral sense enforced; but that is precisely what the corruption of nature has weakened. Therefore the disciplinal efficacy of pain is precarious and uncertain. But as pleasure and its seductive influence are moral realities, so are pain and its disciplinal influence.

TO UNDERSTAND PAIN AND ITS ATTENDANT PHENOMENA WE MUST
STUDY MAN AS A WHOLE.

It seems then proved that pain is capable of such disciplinal influence and is designed to exert it. And if this is true of the particular pains which follow excess, and where we can plainly trace this influence; so it is presumably true of pain generically, even in cases where its disciplinal office is obscure. This being so, it seems idle to study the problem of pain in the physical sphere only; and a presumption is raised, that any surplus, if such there be, of pain above referred to, is concerned with that disciplinal office. In short, if we seek to know why pain has so wide a range in human experience we must study man as a whole; for as a whole he suffers, even to the prostration of the will and the incapacity to give effect to resolutions, although the primary incidence of pain may be in his physical economy. And the same presumption extends to the phenomena which attend on pain, such as its unequal distribution, and its not following any recognizable law of moral desert. These last phenomena which seem to a superficial observer to set pain against the moral law, and to load it with an insuperable objection, may, I think, be shown to be, on the contrary, the only conditions under which it could conduce to moral ends.

OBJECTIONS FORMULATED, AND SHOWN TO LIE, AS REGARDS UN-
EQUAL DISTRIBUTION, AGAINST THE NATURE OF MAN.

For indeed the string of indignant and impatient queries urged above (page 19) really imply no more than two or

at most three objections: (1) The distribution of pain is unequal; (2) It does not follow moral desert; (3) It does not follow any recognizable law. These facts are alleged as offending our moral sense. Here, in the first place, I think, the objector is bound to show that a different distribution would better serve the end in view, supposed disciplinal, *i. e.*, moral. I believe it not only impossible to show this, but that all the tendencies point the other way. But here, firstly, notice that, if (1) is a legitimate objection, (2) ceases to be so, and *vice versa*. For if the distribution of pain ought to be (whether on grounds of justice or any other) equal, it could not follow moral deserts, which are manifestly unequal; and if bound to follow moral deserts, it could not possibly be equal. But, further, when we talk of equalizing pain, the question arises, Is men's capacity for pain uniform? It seems to be established, even as regards physical pain, that it is not, and this inequality seems to extend, as before mentioned, to entire races. And when we pass to the moral sphere of emotional pain the disparity of their capacities becomes enormous. I will not further dwell on this latter fact at present. But, taken as facts, these inequalities imply a presumption arising from our nature itself against an equal distribution of pain in fact. They show that there is, pre-established in ourselves and fundamental, something which prepares for inequality of distribution and forbids equality; although it is no part of my argument that the disproportion in actual pain is analogous, even approximately, to that of capacity for it. Some will perhaps go on to object to that inequality of capacity. They might as well contend at once that all men should be equally long-lived, should be each six feet high, and have skins of the same color.

UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION AGREEABLE TO UNIVERSAL ANALOGY;
EQUAL DISTRIBUTION WOULD BE PARADOXICAL.

For indeed, if we look round nature, human and other, we shall see everywhere a total absence of equality, uniformity, and, in this sense, of regularity. Intellectually, human vari-

ations range from the zero of idiotcy to the colossal dimensions of Plato or St. Augustine or Isaac Newton, and morally those variations, although more difficult to measure, are probably greater still. But I will take one only of man's more ordinary faculties, and the one which in its results is most measurable and most marketable, the faculty of acquiring material wealth. Men sort themselves under inequalities in this respect, at least as enormous as those of the pains which they endure; and physical suffering is only like material wealth, if it has a tendency to run into lumps wholly irrespective of moral desert. If that suffering were equally apportioned, it would be the one exception of equality in an universe of inequalities. It is not inequality, but its opposite, which would constitute a paradox. But in order to meet the objection more fully, let us suppose equality to prevail, and note the morally certain consequences.

A LOW AND EQUABLE PAIN-TAX AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

If then each human being were to receive from the total *quantum* of pain among mankind an equal dividend regularly distributed (for if irregularly, some of the results of inequality would be retained), that dividend would be very small, while the regularity of the incidence would enable men to discount it beforehand. Such a low rate of pain-tax levied equally and regularly upon all would be closely analogous to a restraint upon certain activities for some hours, or perhaps minutes, only of each week. We should know it to be inevitable, accept it as a law of nature, turn it to the utmost possible account as an excuse for duties undone, grumble at it while it lasted as at a November fog or a sirocco wind, and altogether escape from any disciplinal effects of it. Being normal and fixed, it would be taken into account in all the arrangements of life, but its disciplinal effect would be as utterly *nil* as if the average temperature of the earth were a degree higher or lower.

And further, the preservative and didactic uses of pain would be greatly jeopardized. For the system we are

supposing seems to postulate a practical limiting of human capacity for pain. For, if no one were ever to suffer more than a small limited amount, however in theory we suppose that capacity maintained, it is clear that in practice, on which human life and progress chiefly depend, the result would be as if that capacity were absolutely limited. We have seen how at present a minimum of pain for these uses suffices, because of our capacity for a maximum. I fail to see how that wise and tender economy could be retained in man and nature; how human progress, with its stimulus thus blunted from the very beginning, would be more than infinitesimal; or even in numberless supposable cases human life preserved. We can escape from this deadlock of the wheel only by assuming deeper and indeed fundamental changes in the relations of nature and man, and probably in man himself.

A HIGH AND EQUABLE PAIN-TAX AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

If this disciplinal inefficiency were sought to be remedied by doubling or trebling the amount to each, there would be two or three times as much pain in the world as there is, but still I do not believe any disciplinal effect would be gained. It would rather resemble the tax of a tyrant who grinds all alike and squanders the proceeds in thriftless waste. Further, the heavier pain-tax would seriously disable men from their needful business, and increase the difficulty of living, at every turn. Indeed, if the suffering were simultaneous to all, it may be doubted if the needful business of life could go on. Let us suppose, however, that it came at different times to different men, thus enabling them to tend one another. This would be done merely as commercial exchange is effected now, leaving no sense of obligation and no gratitude behind. Disinterested benevolence in the relief of such suffering would be nearly impossible. At any rate there would be a declaration in the system of nature against it, and the tendency of this *quid pro quo* system would be to extinguish, not to promote it, and, thus outweighed in the scale, it must in the

course of ages die out of human nature. All men would be fellow-sufferers everywhere without sympathy anywhere. Selfishness and impatience combined could be the moral result of such equal distribution, while the preservative and didactic uses of pain would still be jeopardized as before.

PAIN DISTRIBUTED ACCORDING TO MORAL DESERT (STRICTLY TAKEN) AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

We next proceed to consider the consequences of distribution of pain according to moral desert. But let us first try to understand what this means. It may mean and, strictly taken, ought to mean, that a perfect standard of morals is to be applied to men by a perfect insight into their characters, and pain then distributed according to desert so adjudged; varying not only as between man and man, but in each individual man as his deserts might vary. It is plain that such moral spoon-feeding must revolutionize the world. But before attempting to trace its consequences, we may observe that to give this effect we must either call in the preternatural, or we must alter human nature. For if the proportion between suffering undergone and moral desert were not perceived by the sufferer and by human society, how could the alleged offence to the moral sense be removed? And how is it other than impossible for that proportion, depending on a perfect standard applied by perfect insight, to be perceived by our corrupt instincts and our superficial faculties? A distinct revelation in each individual case would on this basis be required to give the scheme effect. Or else man must be supposed equipped with a perfect moral sense and a perfect insight. The moral revolution thus caused would be total; and short of this revolution the scheme could not take effect. But, although it cannot be justly required to argue out such extravagant conditions, one may add that it is not easy to see how vice could prevail in such a society at all. And with vice would disappear virtue, as we now understand it. This, however, I pass by for the present, to remark that, with the disappearance of vice, pain, which

follows moral desert, would by hypothesis disappear also. So that we arrive at this result, either a resort must be had to preternatural intervention, or the distribution of pain according to moral desert thus understood is only suited to a society in which there is no pain to distribute.

OR ACCORDING TO A MORE POPULAR STANDARD, AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES.

But to give the objection every possible advantage, let us mend our assumption, and suppose the moral standard, not as perfect, but so far as each man recognized it, to furnish his standard of desert for violating it, and his moral insight merely such as to make perceptible to him the proportion between pain and moral desert at that standard. This last is indeed an undue assumption, clogged with difficulties, and involving an altered basis of human nature. But I waive this for the present and make the objector a present of the assumption. Firstly, it seems certain that the current *quantum* of pain in humanity must be largely increased in order to yield an appreciable dividend *pro rata* even at this defective standard. For man being corrupt, and, whatever moral standard he owns, prone to fall dismally below it, pain, which now in large and fixed amounts is rare and exceptional, must become frequent to be *pro rata* appreciable. Thus human suffering would be greatly increased. But would proportionate disciplinal effects follow? I think that, on the contrary, thus too, they would be greatly jeopardized, in short, that virtue would vanish from mankind.

THE PROBABLE RESULT, PHARISAISM AND PUBLICANISM.

We are here supposing a very complex system at work, and must speak with due circumspection and reserve in pronouncing on its probable results. But taking mankind to be still in other respects as we know them, this new economy would tend, as the actual one does, to different results in different men—in some to the indulging of their propensities at the certain expense of their skins, in others to refraining

under salutary terror. For the former it would *prima facie* convert the world into a purgatory. Schopenhauer's description of it as "a penal settlement" would for them be literally true. In the latter it would tend to substitute the dread of consequences for every higher motive. We cannot, of course, exclude that dread from any ethical system; but such an extension of it would plainly violate all the proportions of our ethical structure. Further, as the fact of suffering would be proof patent of moral delinquency; mankind would tend to divide into two hostile camps, the one ostracizing the other as social lepers. The two all-absorbing types of distinction would correspond roughly with those of the Pharisee and Publican, but with a fixed and widened gulf between them. In short, "God, I thank thee that I am not as [those] other men are," would be the only form of religion, if any, which could survive. The whole area of compassionate feeling for suffering of pain would be burnt up in an arid desert of censoriousness, while that of active beneficence would be enormously narrowed; for who would presume to relieve the victim of righteous retribution recognized as such? The office of Good Samaritan, unless as between these social lepers themselves, would be extinct, and that universal bond of sympathy in which uncertain suffering unites us at present would be cancelled. A set of self-righteous men with no pains to relieve, would surely be the ossification of all virtue.

HUMAN CORRECTIVE JUSTICE WOULD BE SUPERSEDED, TO THE
DETRIMENT OF MANKIND.

Further, moral delinquency being thus far self-detective, the form in which hypocrisy would determine would be for men to attempt to conceal not their vices but their pains. Then, if any large number succeeded by self-discipline in doing so until these became intolerable, it seems certain that to make the system efficient a largely increased *quantum* of pain would be called for. And I suppose it must further follow that no scope would be left for human corrective

justice, or only the function of assessing further pains, in case those of natural consequence were deemed insufficient to deter. This would strike a grievous, perhaps fatal, blow at the self-discipline of society, with results probably detrimental to individual morality. For society would become in this respect a self-executing machine, with a great deal done for us which we now have to do for ourselves by painful effort with wholesome results. But, indeed, probably a more summary and radical process would efface the conditions which make these remarks applicable.

NEXT, THE PHARISEES WOULD ATTEMPT TO STAMP OUT THE
PUBLICANS.

It was assumed that under this economy of retribution men's own moral standard was to be their guide. We have seen that there would be no inducements to cultivate mercy, for nature would have declared against it. This being so, the average moral standard among our Pharisees, as I have called them, would, I think, be found compatible with the actual extermination of our Publicans. Being blots on the social system, as well as incumbrances on its resources, being stamped by their penal state as reprobates, and disabled by pain for self-defence, they would, whatever their numbers, be easy victims. If we can conceive of any social system holding together under such an economy, is it not morally certain that vice being always, or nearly always, betrayed by pain, society would attempt to stamp out vice and pain together? If so, is it not plain that all such penal sufferers would be killed off by righteous indignation and selfishness reinforcing one another? A scheme of enormous severity leading up to human interference yet more severe would be the net result. Nature must become, in reference to man, a system of *peine forte et dure*, or Draco would become the only legislator of humanity, or these results would be in various degrees mingled. Would morals benefit on the whole? And again, I ask, What would have meanwhile become of pain as a life-preserver and as a teacher?

AND HUMAN VIRTUE WOULD BE AS "SALT" THAT "HAS LOST ITS SAVOR."

But further, in proportion as this scheme of sanguinary penalties took effect, it would tend to subvert the entire ethical system of humanity. For checked at every step by a jerk at the string of penalty, no moral course could ever be freely described, no career be left for spontaneous development of character. We should all in moral faculty be children, but children born and bred under a dismal heredity—a reign of terror—with all, or nearly all, the gentler virtues starved out of our nature. Nor only so, for justice would be done for us, just as mercy would be out of the question and humility an unmeaning name. "To do justice, to love mercy, to walk humbly," would thus dwindle to a barren or rather an impossible formula. Indeed all our virtues could at best only exist as indolent sentiments, lingering blindly in us, like germs whose development had been arrested. The moral sense itself must shrink and be attenuated for lack of use, its function being superseded everywhere by the imminence of summary retribution. Pride would be everywhere the natural attitude of those who held fast their negative and emasculated integrity. "The salt which has lost its savor" would represent the entire breadth of our moral being. Hypocrisy, being "the homage which vice pays to virtue," would be extirpated, or its object so changed that it would change its nature; but the resulting moral condition would be one which even a hypocrite would despise.

THUS A FATAL BREACH WOULD BE MADE IN THE MORAL ORDER OF NATURE.

It may be remembered that in the physico-sensuous sphere we saw reasons for thinking that nature aimed at quantity rather than quality. In the moral sphere her aim seems to be quality rather than quantity, *i. e.*, to ensure conditions which shall test on the whole the genuineness of virtue, rather than ensure a wide-spread average of doubtful value. Thus her system is favorable to a few eminent

examples of an exalted character, leaving the inferior types to make the best struggle they can with their doubtful surroundings. And here, for those who will receive it, the supernatural aid of Divine Grace finds its fitting sphere of operation, which in my present argument requires a passing notice only, as adapted to the natural order. But the outcome of the system we are supposing would be to make in this natural order a fatal breach. The quantity of the nominally virtuous, let us suppose for argument's sake, would be increased; but the quality would be fatally tainted, and thus while imaginarily improving the conditions of life all should have destroyed the chief motives for living. Vice would be killed off by penal consequences, and virtue tied to its carcass to share its corruption.

AND MAN'S PROBATION WOULD BE UNDERMINED.

Indeed, all the schemes which we have been considering undermine that probation which seems to be part of the purpose of our present existence. The arrangements which regulate pain may be in great part inscrutable to us, but under them pain fits into that probation and forms a leading element of it. Accordingly to alter those arrangements would dislocate the whole. And this seems to me a conclusive general answer to such objections as I have been discussing, whatever may be thought of the particular answers which I have given to each. As we experience moral facts, virtue and vice, like all opposites, help to define one another in idea, while in practice and under the conditions of probation vice is necessary to virtue. For probation is little else than human beings acting on one other through their various degrees of opposite moral qualities, and "virtue is militant here." Under a scheme of summary retribution first one would perish and then the other. The results of probation would be anticipated, but the process, in which lies the whole present value, would be destroyed.

TO ARGUE FROM THE LAW BEING UNRECOGNIZABLE IS TO ARGUE FROM OUR IGNORANCE.

There remains the third allegation (page 473) that the distribution of pain does not follow any recognizable law. This objection is really one against the limitation imposed on human faculties, and means that we ought to have a larger insight than we have into the working of the whole moral scheme of which we are part. And, if it be intended to argue, as I suppose it must be, that the distribution of pain is therefore vicious, this is making our ignorance a ground for impugning those very arrangements to which that ignorance applies. It is just as if a man with no ear for music were to find fault with the sounds proceeding from an orchestra, because they "did not follow any recognizable law." Than which it is not easy to state a greater absurdity. But beyond even this it is quite supposable that our ignorance may be even a necessary condition of the working of the law, *i. e.*, that its results, being moral, may so depend upon our ignorance, that, if we knew more, we should make use of that knowledge to frustrate those results. And this becomes not only supposable but probable when we consider what follows.

AND THIS IGNORANCE MAY PROBABLY BE A NECESSARY CONDITION OF THE DISCIPLINAL RESULT.

There is certainly no presumption derivable from experience against this life being a probation with a view to a future one, *i. e.*, a process which both tests and trains our character for that future one. We find that future events even in this life are hidden from our ken. And this seems, with a view to our conduct and therefore to our probation, highly expedient and perhaps necessary. For how, if we knew the future of this life, could we avoid shaping our conduct according to that knowledge, which might make the living for temporal ends and objects a law of our life, and give mere expediency an undue ascendancy over other motives? And wherever a future issue of present conduct

is concerned, a similar restriction on knowledge is presumably necessary. Indeed, it seems likely that a knowledge of the law of the distribution of pain would in some way involve a knowledge of the future. If, therefore, the disciplinary result of pain is in any sense to be carried over into a future state, our ignorance of the law under which that disciplinary result is wrought, *i. e.*, of the law which regulates the present distribution of pain, may be probably a necessary condition of that result. Further, if man be, with all his corruptions and defects, the noblest creature within our experience, it must be because there is in store for him in the future something which is not self-evident in the present. And if the distribution of pain in this life be a moral paradox, owing to its being neither guided by moral desert, nor satisfied by any other compensating advantage, that paradox is of itself a presumption, strong in whatever proportion it assails our sense of moral fitness, that this life is not our whole area of being.

Prudens futuri temporis exitum
Caliginosa nocte premit Deus,
Ridetque si mortalis ultra
Fas trepidat,

is probably true of the conditions by which the future is wrought out of the present. A mystery may be part of an economy which we are engaged in working out for our own benefit.

IMPATIENCE IN ACCEPTING AN ALTERNATIVE DOUBTFUL
THROUGH OUR IGNORANCE.

It is precisely in the moral sphere that our corruption chiefly disables us, and by clouding the medium in which the intellect works, imposes on the latter its own disability. If ever we reach a stage of being in which that corruption ceases to obscure our view, the mystery of pain may probably be penetrable. But, setting corruption aside, a large moral scheme, of which we are a part and see only a part, probably cannot appear to us perfect. Still, the imperfection may be

subjective, not objective. Therefore, if the alternative lies between a supposed blemish in the moral scheme, and a supposed future state of being in which its perfection may be fully vindicated, the consciousness at once of our limited faculty and of our inbred corruption should lead us to accept the latter as more probable. And this is true, even if we have no faith in the moral character of the universe, *i. e.*, no disposition to trust it further than we can verify it. But on those who have faith in that character these presumptions will have the effect of assurance. But even with no more than these presumptions to guide us, and leaving faith out of the question, to accept the former alternative would seem a wanton pitch of impatience. It is really saying in the tone of peevish childhood, "I don't choose to wait till I am older: I insist on being fully satisfied now."

THE BURDEN OF PROOF LIES REALLY ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE.

The disciplinal tendency which we saw to be true of some pain is probably true of all. This is no more than saying that pain, wherever we find it in the scheme of nature, is probably adapted to the same end or ends. Nor can the fact that the law of its distribution is inscrutable to us affect its tendency to procure those ends. But on those who object to its existing distribution as a fact opposed to moral sense, the burden of proof really lies, *i. e.*, of proving that, if it were otherwise distributed, better moral results on the whole would probably follow. This is indeed claiming for the moral scheme established in nature and man no more than is commonly claimed for the legal and constitutional systems which man sets up. They hold their ground until it can be shown that better results may be obtained by changing them. If, indeed, this can be shown, the objection of offence to our moral sense will be worth discussing; but until it is shown, it is sufficient to reply that our ignorance and our inbred corruption together deprive the verdict of moral sense of any weight which on such a question it could carry. It was not, therefore, incumbent on me to prove that the rival proposals

as regards distribution were impracticable or subversive of a disciplinal end. This I claim to have done, but it has been done *ex abundanti*. The burden of proof lay on the opposite side. And whatever reason there is for thinking that we do not see the whole of the moral scheme, is a reason for thinking that this burden of proof can never be duly discharged.

OF PAIN IN THE PHYSICAL SPHERE CONNECTED WITH
CORRUPTION IN THE MORAL.

There is grave reason for thinking that as a considerable class of pains are directly connected with the individual sufferer through his own delinquency, so the whole class of pains known to man may be similarly connected with the human race at large through its moral corruption. Nor need the pains most obviously preservative and didactic be excluded from this connection. For we see that many of these have a moral bearing besides the physical and mental ends which they serve; and conversely many pains which arise through moral delinquency have a preservative and didactic power. The tendency of vicious excesses of which the body furnishes the direct organs is to strike home in form of bodily pain on the organism. But they may further leave inherited defects or morbid tendencies which descend far down in a family. Besides, there are other moral offences which at once distribute their evil effects abroad amongst a number of relatively unoffending victims. Thus we have (1) A class of pains which are naturally retributive on the offender himself; and (2) Another clearly produced by delinquency other than that of the sufferers, or including theirs with that of others; and there remains (3) A class of pains which cannot be referred to either class. We can see that at once, both in (1) and (2) an obvious disciplinal end is served; for (1) gives each a strong direct interest in his own conduct, and (2) gives human society a like interest in the conduct of all its members; prompting alike in (1) and (2) the prevention of the consequents of pain by avoiding the antecedents of misconduct. But we may further notice that where those conse-

quents of pain are concentrated in one or in a few, these antecedents of misconduct may be distributable among a vast number, in degrees too variable for us to apportion responsibility. Or again, the problem may be yet more complicated, where antecedents no less wide and disproportioned in their distribution may be followed by no less widely diffused and disproportioned consequents. And this brings us to conceive that possibly some such antecedents may be distributed as widely as the human race itself, and be followed by consequents no less widely diffused, but existing in every degree of disproportionate distribution. Now this would be, in fact, indistinguishable from the case supposed above, viz., of pains as a whole connected with the human race at large through its moral corruption. And this makes it probable the class (3) of pains mentioned above may be, if we had faculties to trace out such a complicated problem, such as would be referred ultimately either to (1) diffused by heredity or other circuitous medium, or else to (2).

PAIN IN GENERAL A STIMULUS TO THE MORAL SENSE IN
MANKIND.

But wholly apart from particular origin of pains in specific offences, or their particular incidence on individual offenders or non-offenders, there may be as real a connection between pain as a fact in human nature and moral corruption as another fact, as there is between the clouds and rain-fall on the one hand and the water-surfaces of this our earth on the other. We know that that general connection is real, although we cannot point out the portion of water-surface which gives origin to each volume of cloud or shower of rain. And although we know something of the physical machinery which connects them in this case, yet the connection subsisted for ages before evaporation was thought of. Nor is the fact that the consequent is physical and the antecedent, in this case, moral, a refutation of the analogy; since we know in fact of a considerable class of pains which have their root in depraved habits, in short that the moral and

physical spheres cannot be precisely separated, but interact as shown above. And as we cannot fix limits to this interaction, so it may be at once subtle, complicated, and extensive, beyond the power of our faculties to trace; since it is precisely in the moral sphere, as shown above, that our faculties are most likely to fail us. And as it has been seen that particular pains stimulate the moral sense of the individual (page 470) and since without such stimulus moral sense would be much feebler than it is; so on the larger scale the race of man stands in need of the perpetual witness of pain as a whole, stimulating by its presence the moral sense of humanity, and attesting higher aims of being than mere sensuous enjoyment. Our disposition to realize these, defective as it is, would be certainly far less, were it not for that witness never far removed from us.

ARTICLE VI.

THE DIVINE IMMANENCY.

BY THE REV. JAMES DOUGLAS, D. D., PULASKI, N. Y.

[Continued from Vol. xlv. p. 355.]

THE DIVINE IMMANENCY IN RELATION TO MATERIALISM.

BEFORE entering directly upon the subject of the relation of the doctrine of the divine immanency to materialism, I propose to answer the question, How does the doctrine of immanency as here propounded differ from that of Spinoza? Spinoza traces phenomena to substance, and affirms that substance, as the ground of phenomena, is all there really is of the universe; that this substance has two fundamental qualities, thought and extension, cognizable to us; that there is only one substance, and that is God. God is the immanent cause, but a cause not passing out of itself.¹

¹Bowen's History of Modern Philosophy.