

ARTICLE IV.

THE DATA OF ETHICS.

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THOSE who have followed the course of Mr. Spencer's work may have ventured, from time to time, to wonder at the vast labor expended upon merely subsidiary matters. They may even have dreaded, at moments when their faith was weak, the possible danger of a portico too magnificent for the building. The great number of Mr. Spencer's works, and the long trains of elaborate argument that they contain, have aroused expectations in regard to the final outcome that it can be no easy task to satisfy. Some may have even apprehended that the fate, not unknown among German philosophers, of being overwhelmed with the mass of materials collected, might befall Mr. Spencer, and that, instead of the completed work of the master, the world would receive but the jarring opinions of his disciples.

If any such apprehension has been felt, the appearance of the *Data of Ethics* must have caused its immediate relief. "The vision of the world and all the wonder that would be" unfolded in this work is so imposing in scale that it would justify an even more labored preparation than it has received. The promise of the eventual existence of a world — not only the possible, but the probable existence — "where every citizen finds a place for all his energies and aptitudes, while he obtains the means of satisfying all his desires," is a more alluring vision than ever Mohammed offered his followers, and may well require all the volumes that Mr. Spencer has written, in order to be announced to the human race with appropriate ceremony. Nor is this millennium to be a matter of mere faith. "The type of nature to which the highest social life affords a sphere such that every faculty has

its due amount, and no more than the due amount, of function and accompanying gratification, is the type of nature toward which progress *cannot* cease till it is reached." Nor is a warning spared to those that stiffen their necks and harden their hearts: "Not he who believes that adaptation will increase is absurd; but he who doubts that it will increase is absurd. Lack of faith in such further evolution of humanity as shall harmonize its nature with its conditions adds but another to the countless illustrations of inadequate consciousness of causation."

Nowadays, perhaps, to be posted as a living illustration of inadequate consciousness of causation in punishment for lack of faith, has more terrors than the ban of the church. But unequal as the contest may be between one that has an adequate consciousness of causation and one whose consciousness is inadequate, it cannot therefore be declined. Great principles may prevail over criticism and opposition; but opposition and criticism are not to be on that account abandoned. Where theories so radical as Mr. Spencer's are in question, it certainly seems too much to ask, that doubters shall be silent because Mr. Spencer has announced his contempt for all doubt. Even *The Methods of Ethics*, a work whose sustained dignity and sweetness of style has not been equalled since the time of Aristotle, did not escape without vigorous attacks; and certainly Mr. Spencer's style is not calculated to disarm hostility. In the interests of the science of ethics such passages as these must be deprecated:

"If, as the sequence of a malady contracted in pursuit of illegitimate gratification, an attack of iritis injures vision, the mischief is to be counted among those entailed by immoral conduct; but if, regardless of protesting sensations, the eyes are used in study too soon after ophthalmia, and there follows blindness for years or for life, entailing not only personal unhappiness, but a burden on others, moralists are silent."¹

¹ *Data of Ethics* (Am. ed.), p. 93.

Even Job's comforters had the grace to be silent for a period! But the implied assertion that moralists have no judgment to pass upon such cases seems extraordinary. Are we to understand that a person who has through ignorance brought blindness upon himself and distress upon his family is to be pursued by moralists with a hue and cry? If we accept the doctrine of evolution, must we abandon the merciful view that blindness may be supposed to be a sufficient penalty to warn the unhappy sufferer that he has erred?

"Another [student] who, thinking exclusively of claims on him, reads night after night with hot or aching head, and, breaking down, cannot take his degree, but returns home shattered in health and unable to support himself, is named with pity only, as not subject to any moral judgment; or, rather, the moral judgment passed is wholly favorable."¹

It is not easy to comprehend the spirit in which this is written. We must suppose that Mr. Spencer's labors "among the Bodo and Dhimals" have been so absorbing that he has actually been unable to inform himself of the nature of the moral judgments of his fellow-citizens. If Mr. Spencer sincerely believes that other moralists besides those of his school are in the habit of passing favorable judgment upon such cases as he supposes, it is easy to understand his passionate invectives; but even if we begin our reckoning with Socrates, he is certainly wrong in his idea of what is generally taught by moralists. A person incapacitated by overwork is generally sympathized with, especially if his motive for exertion was the happiness of his fellows. He is not reproved, if it is thought that his sufferings will have taught him wisdom; but if it is feared that he is unconscious of his error, he is warned that he has acted foolishly, and that no sympathy will be extended to him if he repeats his folly. To maintain that moralists as a rule do not regard self-injury as wrong is as unjustifiable as it is to quote as a "recent" expression of a theory the treatise of a writer who died in

¹ *Ibid.*

1828. Since Mr. Spencer, at a much more recent period, has referred with respect to divine laws as regulating the universe, it seems hardly becoming to heap ridicule upon those that regard the divine will as regulating conduct.

I. In a critical consideration of the Data of Ethics, the question that is of interest to students is simply this: Has Mr. Spencer brought forward a new method? To answer this question, however, is by no means a simple matter. A careful comparison of the passages wherein Mr. Spencer controverts other moralists with those in which he expresses his own views results in great uncertainty as to his meaning, if we suppose him to mean anything new, and great perplexity as to his tone, if we suppose him to be really in agreement with those whom he criticises. To throw light upon this subject, it will be necessary to bring together from all parts of the book expressions that bear upon particular points. We shall then be better able to judge whether existing methods of ethics are likely to be superseded, or whether any suggestion has been made toward their improvement.

One very important point may be easily settled. "The ultimate moral aim is a desirable state of feeling, whatever it be called — gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is as much a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a necessary form of intellectual intuition."¹ In some sense, then, we should conclude, Mr. Spencer recognizes the greatest happiness as the end of action; and we might hastily set him down as a utilitarian. This decision, however, he would resent, and we therefore have to inquire into his objections to utilitarianism.

"There continues to be entire satisfaction with that form of utilitarianism in which the causal relations between acts and their results are practically ignored."² Those who have read Mr. Spencer's works will not lay too much stress upon the statement that utilitarians are entirely satisfied with

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

² *Ibid.*, p. 58.

such a form of ethics. It would not, perhaps, be possible to name a writer of that school who would maintain that "there is no possibility of knowing, from fundamental principles, what conduct must be detrimental, and what conduct must be beneficial."¹ But, not to cavil over peculiarities of style, it is plain that Mr. Spencer considers that utilitarians make no use of deduction in their method. They imply "that we are to ascertain by induction that such and such mischiefs or benefits do go along with such and such acts; and are then to infer that the like relations will hold in future."² Morality, in Mr. Spencer's view, implies that we are to ascertain by deduction from the laws of life and the conditions of existence that such and such mischiefs and benefits must necessarily go along with such and such acts, and to infer that the like relations must hold in future. But certainly utilitarians are not precluded by their system from making use of the deductive method. On this point no one could be clearer than Mill, in his book on the Logic of the Moral Sciences. Speaking of the formation of character, he says: "The empirical law derives whatever truth it has from the causal laws of which it is a consequence. . . . Mankind have not one universal character; but there exist universal laws of the formation of character. . . . It is evident that both the character of any human being and the aggregate of the circumstances by which that character has been formed are facts of a high order of complexity. Now to such cases we have seen that the deductive method, setting out from general laws, and verifying their consequences by specific experience, is alone applicable. . . . I believe most competent judges will agree that the general laws of the different constituent elements of human nature are even now sufficiently understood to render it possible for a competent thinker to deduce from those laws, with a considerable approach to certainty, the particular type of character which would be formed in mankind generally by any assumed set of circumstances." These remarks are upon the science of in-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

² *Ibid.*, p. 17.

dividual man, and are repeated in a stronger form in speaking of man in society. The very illustration used by Mr. Spencer in regard to "the course of one who studies pathology without previous study of physiology," as resembling the usual course of moralists, is one used by Mill for precisely the same purpose. "Students in politics thus attempted to study the pathology and therapeutics of the social body before they had laid the necessary foundation in its physiology."¹ In fact, Mr. Spencer's volume is very curious reading, taken in connection with the sixth book of the *Logic*. The complaint of Mr. Spencer, therefore, seems to be not of utilitarianism, but of utilitarians; not of the method, but of the practice. As this is a purely personal affair, we may dismiss it as not germane to a discussion of principles.

If we do not take this view of Mr. Spencer's meaning, we must inquire whether he uses the terms "must" and "necessarily" in an absolute sense. He remarks that the deductions of modern astronomy are deductions from the law of gravitation, showing why the celestial bodies necessarily occupy certain places at certain times. Now it is clear that Mr. Spencer, who adopts the nebular hypothesis, cannot mean, in this case, an absolute necessity. He must mean a hypothetical necessity; if the law of gravitation be admitted, then the places of the planets are necessarily determined. Hence in morals we may infer his meaning to be that if we know the laws of life and the conditions of existence, and if we identify or combine pleasure with vitality, then we can tell what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness. To say that utilitarians deny this proposition would certainly be inadmissible. The question whether we do know the laws of life and the conditions of existence in the future seems to have no more intimate relation to utilitarianism than the question whether the law of gravitation is to be the law through all eternity has to astronomy. Some forms of matter may be excepted from gravity, as is already implied in current doctrines respecting the ether; and some

¹ *Logic*, Lib. vi. cap. vi. § 1.

new laws of life and conditions of existence, it will be thought by many, may be revealed in the future; but in neither case is the present astronomy or the present ethics affected. Both are conditioned on the permanence of existing laws.

We may throw still further light on Mr. Spencer's relation to utilitarianism by examining some statements made in other connections. Considering what Mr. Sidgwick calls the fundamental assumption of hedonism,—that all feelings considered merely as feelings can be arranged in a certain scale of desirability,—Mr. Spencer remarks that the hedonist is not committed to this assumption. He gives two reasons for this: first, although “indefinite things do not admit of definite measurements, yet approximately true estimates of their relative values may be made when they differ considerably.”¹ Yet elsewhere we find the statement: “The philosophical moralist is obliged wholly to ignore any deviation from strict rectitude. It cannot be admitted into his premises without vitiating all his conclusions. A problem in which a crooked man forms one of the elements is insoluble by him.”² One would think that the philosophical moralist, as well as the hedonist, might be permitted to use approximate measurements, and probably such measurements would satisfy Mr. Sidgwick's requirements. At least, it may be concluded that some kind of estimate is possible and necessary, if happiness be the end of action, even if not, in the strictest sense, a definite estimate. The second argument is as follows: “Even if the relative values of things are not determinable, it remains true that the most valuable should be chosen. . . . Because I believe that of many dangerous courses I ought to take the least dangerous, do I make the ‘fundamental assumption’ that courses can be arranged according to a scale of dangerousness?”³ The question in dispute is a practical one. It cannot well be denied that courses either can be arranged according to a scale of dangerousness, or they cannot be. If they cannot be so

¹ *Data of Ethics* (Am. ed.), p. 152.

² *Ibid.*, p. 272.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

arranged, of what conceivable value is the maxim, "Take the least dangerous course"? Unless it were possible to discriminate between courses, no such maxim would ever have been formulated. If it be replied that it may be possible in most cases to arrange courses according to their dangerousness, but not in all, we must say, as before, no utilitarian claims perfection for his method, and none claims absolutely definite results. Furthermore, unless it is possible to estimate the pleasure-giving effects of different acts, the system of Mr. Spencer seems as defective as that of his adversaries. Without this fundamental assumption, it is not easy to understand how the principles necessary to Mr. Spencer's deductions can be obtained. Unless they are purely *a priori*, they must be furnished by induction, and this inductive process would require a constant use of the fundamental assumption. How is the relation between pleasure and vital acts discovered, unless certain feelings can be weighed against others? If a pleasurable act and a chosen act are identified, it may be possible to deduce conclusions without the aid of this premise. Whether this identification is made, or not, we will not here consider. In any case, so long as human action is concerned with the future, it must have some means of guidance, and if its end is pleasure, it must have some estimate of pleasures.

Mr. Spencer's assault upon this position is explained by his supposition that in the common view happiness is the immediate aim of action. It is somewhat perplexing to find him presently quoting, again from Mr. Sidgwick, "the fundamental paradox of hedonism, that the impulse towards pleasure, if too predominant, defeats its own aim. . . . It may certainly be said that we cannot attain them [our active enjoyments], at least in their best form, so long as we concentrate our aim on them." Mr. Spencer maintains that this is no paradox, because it is a general law "that the pleasure attendant on the use of means to achieve an end, itself becomes an end." No one, perhaps, ever disputed this; but it does not seem to have any bearing on the

paradox, which is equally true of pleasures connected with the use of means and of other pleasures. "The good cannon which a billiard-player makes yields no pleasure. . . . The pleasure arises from the fresh proof of capability, and from the imagined admiration of witnesses." But if these pleasures are made the conscious aim, the highest zest and flavor are gone from the pursuit. Probably no failures to attain pleasure are more signal than those of persons who aim deliberately at the imagined admiration of witnesses. Mr. Spencer, therefore, does not explain why happiness cannot be reached by making it the immediate aim. He does not seem to be successful in overthrowing either the fundamental assumption or the fundamental paradox. We cannot judge of pleasures at all without comparing them, and we cannot get them to the fullest extent if we consciously aim at them. Mr. Spencer himself seems paradoxical when he says that the pleasure of using means itself becomes an end,¹ and at the same time maintains that happiness cannot be reached by making it the immediate aim. Plainly something must be taken as the immediate aim; if it is not pleasure of some kind, it cannot be the pleasure attendant on the use of means to achieve an end.

Mr. Spencer makes another rather remarkable attack upon Bentham. In reply to Bentham's statement, "What happiness is every man knows, because what pleasure is every man knows, and what pain is every man knows," Mr. Spencer intimates that what pleasure is, is an extremely uncertain question. But, as Mr. Spencer's whole theory is based upon the principle that pleasure is the test of welfare, it seems to follow that if men do not know what pleasure is they cannot know what welfare is. Unless welfare consists in something other than happiness, which Mr. Spencer argues at length it does not, it cannot possibly be shown how welfare can be obtained, if we do not know what happiness is. The "principles which, in the nature of things, causally determine welfare" have been themselves ascertained either

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

intuitively or by experience of pleasurable and painful action. Mr. Spencer would hardly admit the first source, and he seems, in this criticism, to exclude the second.

The criticism on this sentence from Bentham, — “What justice is — this is what on every occasion is the subject-matter of dispute. . . . What regard is it entitled to other-wise than as a means of happiness?” — is still more perplexing. Mr. Spencer understands this to mean that on every human occasion a dispute about justice arises; but it is clear that Bentham means that when disputes do arise they are concerning justice. Further, Mr. Spencer contends, “there is no dispute about ‘what justice is,’ for it is admitted to be equalness, but what under particular circumstances constitutes equalness.” This criticism hardly seems to help the matter; for if in every case we could determine equalness there would probably be no trouble with regard to justice. The mere substitution of one word for another does not take the place of a definition. A certain kind of definition is given by Mr. Spencer in the statement that justice “is concerned exclusively with *quantity* under *stated conditions*; whereas happiness is concerned with both *quantity* and *quality* under *conditions not stated*.” But this seems to make the sphere of justice too limited; for we certainly speak of what is just in regard to quality, as when we receive one person with cordiality and another with contempt. If the measurements of pleasures are indefinite, so are the measures of the “relative amounts of actions or products or benefits, the natures of which are recognized only so far as is needful for saying whether as much has been given or done or allowed, by each concerned, as was implied by tacit or overt understanding to be an equivalent.” To determine that one act, or one part of a course of action, is equivalent to another, is not, in numerous cases, an easy matter. If I stipulate to pay a certain number of stamped coins on a certain day, there is little doubt possible as to what is just, the expectations of the party of the second part being precise. But if I engage to deliver merchandise, the quality of the goods may not

satisfy the expectations of the other party, and yet the goods may be the very articles that I considered from the beginning an equivalent for his services. That is to say, it is impossible in most cases to specify all the circumstances relating to future acts. It is impossible that the understanding of all persons should be the same in regard to any future act. Mr. Spencer's definition of justice reduces it to a mere fulfilment of expectations. But the cases where expectations are to be disappointed are the only occasions where the question of justice is of importance. In such cases the consideration of the different qualities of pleasures is almost always conspicuous. If a contract relates to material commodities, concerns only two persons, and is expressed in unmistakable terms, it is probably, as a rule, just to fulfil it; but there are very few contracts of this kind. In all other cases it is generally necessary to consider the conflict of expectations or claims; and here we seem compelled to resort to an estimate of the pleasures resulting from different courses.

It may be remarked by the way that, if a comparison of pleasures is impossible, justice is impossible. If we cannot estimate pleasures, we cannot say that one pleasure is equivalent to another, or one sacrifice to another, or one action or product or benefit to another. To say that the fact that agreements are made wherein one party contracts to make a sacrifice on condition of receiving a gratification shows that this party regards his sacrifice as repaid by an equivalent pleasure is a misleading statement. This party, perhaps, feels that his reward is very far from an equivalent for his labor. It is all that he can get, and he therefore takes it; but the mere fact of contract does not affect the question of equalness. Probably most laborers regard their wages as unjustly small. On the other hand, to say that the fulfilment of all contracts is justice is to assume that the state of society under which the contracts are made is a perfect one. But it can hardly be contended that any state of society is perfect where any members regard their sacrifices as greater than their returns; and a state of society where men do

regard their sacrifices and returns as equivalent must be thought to imply a power of estimating pleasures. We seem to be compelled to resort to the short and easy method of natural selection, and to claim that, discontent being unfavorable to survival, only those that consider their sacrifices as adequately rewarded will ultimately occupy the earth. Then, when all men have acquired the judgment necessary to frame such contracts that a physical equivalent of pleasure shall be given for all labor, implying the ability to foresee all changes that may take place between the time of making and fulfilling the contract, it will be no longer necessary to estimate pleasure in determining action.

After all, it is by no means clear why Mr. Spencer attacks Bentham's position. In the very passage which he selects for criticism, Bentham implies that justice is a means to happiness. Mr. Spencer maintains the same doctrine, but asserts that then, like every other means, it must take precedence of its end. This word "precedence" seems to be ambiguous. If Mr. Spencer means a temporal precedence, it is not probable that Bentham would controvert him. If it means a higher importance, then there seems to be danger of the objection that the means is no longer subordinate to the end. But it is, perhaps, unnecessary to examine farther this criticism; for there seems little doubt that Bentham meant to oppose setting up justice as the ultimate aim, while Mr. Spencer opposes setting up the greatest happiness as the immediate aim. There seems to be no necessary inconsistency between the views.

Concerning what Mr. Spencer calls absolute ethics, we are again involved in considerable perplexity. In various places he insists upon the existence of such a code, and criticises the view of Mr. Sidgwick, who had instanced geometry as dealing with irregular lines. Mr. Spencer, if we understand him, denies point blank that geometry can deal with irregular lines. But certainly all the lines that we perceive through our senses are irregular. We may call them perfect; but it is only by a figure of speech. It follows, therefore, that geom-

etry has no practical applications — a conclusion so repugnant to common sense that it can hardly be received. All that Mr. Sidgwick seems to contend for is, the possibility of applying the principles of ethics to the actual world in which we live, just as geometry is applied to the lines and figures that our senses furnish us. Mr. Spencer himself, in concluding the discussion, makes statements that seem to admit all that Mr. Sidgwick would probably contend for. This “system of ideal conduct,” he states, “is to serve as a standard for our guidance in solving, as well as we can, the problems of real conduct.”¹ It “enables us to form approximately true conclusions respecting the natures of the abnormalities and the courses which tend most in the direction of the normal.”²

But in regard to absolute ethics Mr. Spencer seems hardly clear. We are told that “the moral law is the law of the perfect man, the formula of ideal conduct, the statement in all cases of that which should be, and cannot recognize in its propositions any elements implying existence of that which should not be. No conclusions can lay claim to absolute truth but such as depend upon truths that are themselves absolute. The philosophical moralist treats solely of the *straight* man. Any deviation from strict rectitude he is obliged wholly to ignore. It cannot be admitted into his premises without vitiating all his conclusions. A problem in which a crooked man forms one of the elements is insoluble by him.”³ If we contrast with these requirements the statements with which Mr. Spencer closes his treatise, we shall find serious discrepancies. “A code of perfect personal conduct can never be made definite. No specific statement of the activities universally required for personal well-being is possible. Certain general requirements, however, have to be fulfilled by the individuals of all societies; but that it is possible to reduce even this restricted part to scientific definiteness can scarcely be said. In solving problems concerning negative beneficence, the only help absolute

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

² *Ibid.*, p. 277.

³ *Ibid.*, 271.

ethics gives is by enforcing the consideration that inflicting more pain than is necessitated by proper self-regard, or by desire for another's benefit, or by the maintenance of a general principle, is unwarranted. Of positive beneficence, under its absolute form, nothing more specific can be said than that it must become co-extensive with whatever sphere remains for it. Under its relative form positive beneficence presents numerous problems, alike important and difficult, admitting only of empirical solutions. How far is self-sacrifice for another's benefit to be carried in each case? etc. Evidently to these and many kindred questions approximately true answers only can be given."

If a code of perfect personal conduct can never be made definite, it can hardly be called an absolute code. And if personal conduct cannot be made definite, it hardly seems possible to maintain that race conduct or national conduct can be made definite. For there is no conduct of races or nations except what is made up of the conduct of persons. Rules for the conduct of masses of men must be more general, and therefore less definite, than rules for the conduct of the individual. If, then, there can never be an absolute system, but only an approximation to one, we fail to secure any advantage from Mr. Spencer's claims. The standard itself being uncertain, the measurements must all be uncertain. We are left at the end very much where we are left by existing systems of morality. We are given a few vague and unquestioned aphorisms, as that we must be governed by a proper self-regard, or must maintain general principles, or must estimate probabilities, and consider the character of others, their needs, and the various claims of self and belongings. Obviously, unless we have an absolute code in the strict sense of the term, we are no better off than we are now with a vague calculus of pleasures. If there can be no definite code of perfect personal conduct, the philosophical moralist, who is forbidden to consider any other conduct, will be deprived of employment. The least objectionable compromises of the claims of an indefinite

absolute ethics with a defective and empirical relative ethics, with no standard of objectionableness to appeal to, is all that we have to guide us in weighing the claims of present self against the claims of future self, and our own interests against those of others. It will hardly be thought that this outcome is an improvement upon the ordinary conclusions of moralists.

We have to notice a further uncertainty in which Mr. Spencer seems to involve his readers. In criticising the expression, "every one to count for one," etc., Mr. Spencer inquires: "Does this mean that in respect of whatever is portioned out each is to have the same share, whatever his character, whatever his conduct? If the distribution is to be made without reference to the natures and deeds of the recipients, then it must be shown that a system which equalizes, as far as it can, the treatment of good and bad, will be beneficial. If the distribution is not to be indiscriminate, then the formula disappears. The something distributed must be apportioned otherwise than by equal division. Shall the interpretation be that the concrete means to happiness are to be equally divided? But, it turns out on examination, that greatest happiness could not even proximately be so secured. Differences of age, of growth, of constitutional need, differences of activity and consequent expenditure, differences of desires and tastes, would entail the inevitable result that the material aids to happiness which each received would be more or less unadapted to his requirements. Even if purchasing power were equally divided, the greatest happiness would not be achieved, the means which would approximately suffice to satisfy the wants of one would be extremely insufficient to satisfy the wants of another, and so the greatest total of happiness would not be obtained. Means might be unequally apportioned in a way that would produce a greater total."¹

We are here again perplexed by the fact that this comment occurs directly after a quotation from Mill, to the effect that

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

“the greatest-happiness principle is a mere form of words without rational signification, unless one person’s happiness, supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted for exactly as much as another’s.” Mr. Mill’s words certainly seem to imply a “reference to the natures and deeds of the recipients,” and do not justify the inference that he insists on a system that equalizes the treatment of good and bad. All differences of age, etc., are provided for under an estimate of the kind and degree of the happiness of an individual. Whether we regard this as practicable, or not, is another question, which we shall presently answer in the words of Mr. Spencer; but the theory requires an equalization of all differences.

Mr. Spencer’s solution of these difficulties must be noted. “There seems to be but a single possibility. There remain to be equally distributed nothing but the conditions under which each may pursue happiness. The limitations to action — the degrees of freedom and restraint — shall be alike for all. Each shall have as much liberty to pursue his ends as consists with maintaining like liberties to pursue their ends by others; and one as much as another shall have the enjoyment of that which his efforts, carried on within these limits, obtain.” Mr. Spencer has just decided that “the necessaries of life, the appliances to comfort, the facilities for amusement” would give neither ultimately nor proximately the greatest happiness, if equally distributed. But certainly these are conditions under which each may pursue happiness, and conditions *sine quibus non*. What are the most common limitations to action but absence of the necessaries of life, the appliances to comfort, the facilities for amusement? If Mr. Spencer were an ultra-spiritualistic philosopher, we could explain his contempt for all concrete means of happiness; but as it is, we are at a loss to know what mode of measurement is to be employed in estimating the conditions under which happiness is to be pursued, if we are to abandon all material conditions. Mr. Spencer ridicules the idea that “happiness can be cut up into parts and

handed round," so that we cannot suppose him to entertain a similar idea in regard to liberty. If we attempt to define the conception that "each shall have as much liberty to pursue his ends as consists with maintaining like liberties to pursue their ends by others," excluding all material conditions, we find that our endeavors are fruitless. We are still face to face with differences of age, of growth, etc., and we are totally unable to answer the question: How is this liberty to be measured? The liberty of A is measured by the liberty of B, C, D, etc., the liberty of B by that of A, C, etc., and no common measure is to be used. Each shall have the enjoyment of that which his efforts obtain. But enjoyment cannot be measured, and that which his efforts obtain, if material, is no standard. And since in society no efforts are without the co-operation, direct or indirect, of others, how is the proportion of the state, the family, the friend, the benefactor, the teacher, the physician, the soldier, the lawyer, etc., in the result of our efforts to be ascertained? Mr. Spencer's principle seems to be purely formal, and without the material guidance that Mill can avail himself of.

Mr. Spencer elsewhere seems to make, in his own case, some relaxation of the requirements that he exacts so severely from others. He remarks: "That principle of equivalence which meets us when we seek its roots in the laws of individual life involves the idea of *measure*; and on passing to social life the same principle introduces us to the conception of equity or *equality* in the relations of citizens to one another; the elements of the questions arising are quantitative; and hence the solutions assume a more scientific form. Though having to recognize differences among individuals due to age, sex, or other cause, we cannot regard the members of a society as absolutely equal, and therefore cannot deal with problems growing out of their relations with that precision which absolute equality might make possible; yet, considering them as approximately equal in virtue of their common human nature, and dealing with questions of equity

on this supposition, we may reach conclusions of a sufficiently definite kind."¹

If Mr. Spencer allows himself to consider the members of a society as "approximately equal in virtue of their common human nature," it seems hardly fair that he should denounce others for equalizing the treatment of good and bad, as in the passage quoted above. If "differences due to age, sex, or other cause" may be overlooked when he is making a system, why are "differences of age, of growth," etc., held up as bringing to nought the speculations of others? Mr. Spencer has almost the air of laying heavy burdens and grievous to be borne upon the shoulders of other moralists, and declining himself to lift a finger toward their support. The "idea of *measure*" seems to be nothing but the "fundamental assumption" elsewhere exploded by Mr. Spencer; the conception of *equalness* is apparently but another statement of Mill's doctrine, "every one to count for one," etc. If there is to be equalness in the relations between citizens, how can this be discovered if the citizens themselves are extremely unequal? And if Mr. Spencer may assume them to be equal, why may not his adversaries do the same? If Mr. Spencer's conclusions seem sufficiently definite to him, why may not utilitarians consider their conclusions as of a sufficiently definite kind?

II. The examination of Mr. Spencer's criticism of other systems, conducted by reference to passages in his work, does not seem to justify us in admitting that he has developed a new method of ethics. That examination, however, may be thought too purely negative in character to be entirely satisfactory; and we therefore proceed to consider his views, and the assumptions and conclusions to which he is logically committed, without special reference to their relations to the views of others.

As has already appeared, Mr. Spencer holds that our knowledge is now so far advanced that in morals the deductive method is to be employed. The immediate object of pursuit

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 285.

should now be conformity to certain principles which, in the nature of things, causally determine welfare. It is plain, therefore, that we must inquire what welfare is, and what are the principles that determine it.

Conduct is good or bad, according as its aggregate results are pleasurable or painful; and good conduct is highly evolved conduct. Conduct is most highly evolved, and therefore best, when the making of all adjustments of acts to ends subserving complete individual life, together with all those subserving maintenance of offspring and preparation of them for maturity, not only consists with the making of like adjustments by others, but furthers it. The complete life is the life that is the greatest possible, both in length and breadth. Length of life, perhaps, requires no definition. Breadth of life varies as the sum of vital activities, or with the number and variety of adjustments of acts to ends. Hence we may suppose that life to be the broadest wherein the number of adjustments, allowing for variety, is the greatest possible.

There seem to be several "fundamental assumptions" here. The first that we will consider is this: *The proportion which variety, in the adjustment of acts to ends, bears to number, is a knowable proportion.* Unless we can say whether one life, containing a greater number but a less variety of adjustments, is more or less broad than another, we cannot tell what breadth of life is. And if we cannot tell what breadth of life is, we cannot tell what complete life is; for life is estimated by multiplying its length into its breadth. If we cannot tell what complete life is, we cannot tell what conduct is most highly evolved or best. But this proportion is nowhere stated by Mr. Spencer, so far as we can discover; and yet a knowledge of it is fundamental to his system. When it becomes necessary, at the close of his work, to make rather more definite statements than usual, he remarks that, in virtue of their common human nature, we may consider the members of a society as approximately equal. But if we do so, we must consider the breadth of their lives as

equal; and the whole scheme is thus brought to nothing. A like assumption is made in regard to the knowableness of length of life, and a like criticism may be made upon it.

A second assumption is still less warranted than the first. Supposing that, in accordance with the first assumption, we can reduce quality of adjustment to number, it is necessary then to assume that *the greatest possible number of adjustments is a knowable quantity*. We must know what the final number of possible complete lives upon the earth is, in order to regulate our acts so as to produce and maintain this number. Any miscalculation will result in a diminution of possible happiness or an increase of positive misery. Absolute ethics cannot admit guess-work or approximate estimates with regard to this matter. Every citizen must find a place for all his energies and aptitudes, while he obtains the means of satisfying all his desires. Until this number is known we cannot be certain that any of our acts are right, and, of course, what conduct is best must be completely uncertain.

A third assumption seems equally vital and equally unwarranted. *The proportion between acts that subserve complete individual life, and those that subserve maintenance of offspring, is a knowable proportion, as well as the relation of this proportion to all similar proportions*. Most men are concerned with the solution of problems concerning these relations, and solve them by the rule of thumb. But absolute ethics cannot be satisfied with any such unscientific procedure. If these proportions are to furnish an absolute standard, they must be capable of definite numerical statement. Without this it would be totally impossible to declare that any conduct was the best. Any uncertainty in regard to a single proportion would render uncertain its relations to all other proportions, and make the whole system imperfect. Furthermore, the degree of imperfection would be necessarily unknown, for if it were known, the error would be known, and, therefore, it could never be asserted that the system even approximated to perfection.

Until these assumptions are established as truths, absolute

welfare cannot be known. If it were known, it would be found to be, according to the definitions given above, a state wherein the adjustment of acts to ends results in the adjustment of acts to ends; for the adjustment of acts to ends is a condition of complete life, and complete life is the greatest possible sum of adjustments.

With this definition of welfare we see that happiness has no apparent connection. This connection is supplied by Hobbes's doctrine in regard to the relation between pleasure and vitality. The greatest amount of adjustment, or complete life, will be attended by the greatest amount of happiness. Mr. Spencer defines pleasure as a feeling which we seek to bring into consciousness and retain there. He then reasons that if we desired what was injurious we should presently be extinguished, and, therefore, we must, as a condition of existence, seek pleasure. If the terms are equivalent we may say, then, that every feeling that we seek to bring into consciousness and retain there, is pleasant. But, as Mr. Sidgwick remarks, "if by pleasant we mean that which influences choice, exercises a certain attractive force on the will, it is not a psychological truth, but a tautological assertion, to say that we desire what is pleasant, or even that we desire a thing in proportion as it appears pleasant. But if we take "pleasure" to mean "agreeable sensation," it then becomes a really debatable question whether our active impulses are always consciously directed towards the attainment of agreeable, or the avoidance of disagreeable, sensations as their end. . . . But, as a matter of fact, it seems to me that throughout the whole scale of our impulses, sensual, emotional, and intellectual alike, we can distinguish desires of which the object, what we are consciously moved to realize, is something other than our own pleasure."

Now, although Mr. Spencer frequently reasons, especially when considering lower forms of life, as if he understood the doctrine as a "tautological assertion;" yet he elsewhere seems to give it the other meaning described by Mr. Sidgwick. It seems unlikely that men at large would side here with Mr. Spencer against Mr. Sidgwick, if we judge from the

distinctions they are constantly making between pleasure and duty, although they are constantly misled by the ambiguity of "pleasure." But allowing Mr. Spencer his use of the term, we find that it is of service to him only with the aid of several inadmissible assumptions.

It is undeniable that the choice of a present pleasure instead of a present pain often results in death or a diminution of life. This proves that pleasure in itself is not a satisfactory criterion. But, Mr. Spencer replies, "this merely shows that special and proximate pleasures and pains must be disregarded out of consideration for remote and diffused pleasures and pains." Mr. Spencer's position seems a curious blending of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, and the Socratic view that virtue is knowledge. It certainly seems necessary, if we are to consider remote pleasures, that we should be able to estimate them. But Mr. Spencer has elsewhere committed himself against the fundamental assumption that pleasures are measurable. Passing over this consideration, however, we may take up a further statement, designed to explain why proximate pleasures and pains fail to guide us correctly.

"Since the conditions of existence have been occasionally changing there have been occasionally arising partial misadjustments of the feelings to the requirements. . . . Hence result such failures of guidance by pleasures and pains as is daily exhibited. . . . But lack of faith in such further evolution of humanity as shall harmonize its nature with its conditions, adds but another to the countless illustrations of inadequate consciousness of causation. . . . Progress cannot cease till complete adaptation is reached." Hence the guidance of pleasure will sometime be trustworthy. Egoistic hedonism, we may suppose, would then be the proper ethical method.

The resemblance between this speculation and those of some Christian theologians is too striking to be overlooked. As they contemplate a millennium, wherein peace and goodwill shall reign, and sin, disease, and death shall disappear, and as they describe the moral nature of man as now debased

or undeveloped, but as containing in itself the germ of perfection, so Mr. Spencer, with even higher faith, insists that the existence of such a world, "with every longing satisfied and full fruition blest," is not only possible, but certain. It does not appear that even death is a necessary phenomenon in the world as it will be in the last stages of evolution. Unless we regard the vitality of man as limited by some fixed law, unmentioned in the doctrine of evolution, there seems nothing to prevent the adaption of man to his conditions becoming so complete that vital processes may indefinitely continue. Indeed we are not sure that an adequate consciousness of causation would be satisfied with anything less than this. Only the vicious metaphysical assumption of a vital force of fixed amount that is gradually wasted seems to interfere with this conclusion.

It is important, however, to point out the assumptions that must be admitted before this future can be regarded as definitely secured to the human race. It must first be granted that *happiness has gradually increased*. The increasing school of pessimists would not admit this. They would maintain that the greater length and breadth of life in some modern communities results in an increase of susceptibility to pain and disease, at least of the more subtle kind. So far from increase of consciousness being an increase of happiness, the philosophy of the unconscious requires the opposite conclusion. Even those that hesitate to adopt so gloomy a creed find themselves often in doubt whether their existence has been or is so desirable that they would have decreed it, had it been left to them to decide. The discovery that the population of China was less by a hundred millions than was previously supposed, would probably cause not a pang of grief to the mass of mankind. Indeed, the "last stages of evolution" seem to be exposed to the same, perhaps rather captious, objection that has been suggested in regard to some descriptions of the Christian's heaven — a possibility of tediousness. The contemplation of an existence where the satisfaction of all desires is insured, where self-sacrifice is no longer possible,

where there is no uncertainty as to the outcome of any action, is extremely repugnant to minds of a particular cast. Lessing's apothegm on the search for truth is here in point. But all pessimism will doubtless have been extinguished by natural selection, long before evolution shall have reached its completion.

A second assumption is,— *The conditions of existence, which have hitherto been occasionally changing, will become fixed.* Obviously, if the conditions of existence are to keep on changing, misadjustments must keep on arising, and failure of guidance by pleasures and pains must be still daily exhibited. But this assumption does not seem to be required by an adequate consciousness of causation. When Mr. Spencer, in his *First Principles*, has to meet the question as to the continuance of the integration of matter and dissipation of motion, he gives no clear answer. Whether the solar system gets back from space the heat that is radiated through space, involves the answer to the question whether the universe is infinite or not. Mr. Spencer, so far as we have observed, nowhere asserts that adequate consciousness of causation requires a particular answer to this question. Here Mr. Spencer has difficulty in fencing off the unknowable.

Granting this assumption, a third is necessary: *What the ultimate conditions of existence will be, and when they will be established, is knowable.* If we do not know what the ultimate conditions will be, we cannot correct misadjustments. We should be as likely to go wrong as right in any attempt at progress. We should have no means of distinguishing the pleasures that were truly beneficial, from those that were injurious. Even if we knew what the ultimate conditions would be, we could make little use of this knowledge unless we knew when they would be established. A course of action that would be right if these conditions were to be reached in a million years would be wholly mistaken if two million years must first elapse. We see that errors on this point have led many persons, actuated by laudable motives, to prescribe conditions in their charitable foundations that later

generations have found pernicious. Indeed, we find a fourth assumption inevitable, viz :

The conditions of existence that will intervene between the present and the ultimate conditions, are knowable. Unless these are known it will be impossible to adjust conduct with reference to the ultimate conditions. If the system of competition and contract is to be permanent, one course of action will be relatively right. If a period of warfare is to intervene, such conduct may be wrong. If socialism is to do away with competition, which, we may remark by the way, what Mr. Spencer calls justice, 'considering members of a society as approximately equal in virtue of their common human nature,' would seem to require, then the nature adapted to one system would beget natures unadapted to the other. Should the great basis of existing civilization, coal, fail at some future time, it is undeniable that a change in the conditions of existence would occur, and unless this change can be foreseen, there is great danger that population will find that it has outgrown the means of subsistence. Great geological or climatic changes may take place, unless the last stages of evolution are to arrive sooner than is popularly supposed; and the adaption of man's nature to an irregular succession of earthquakes must necessarily require unusual prescience. In short, it is very difficult to anticipate the possible future readjustments of vital forces to their conditions, because it is not easy to foretell these conditions with the necessary definiteness.

A more concise statement of these assumptions would be as follows: *We know the conditions of existence past, present, and future, the time during which they will be changing, the time when they will cease to change, and we know that when that time has been reached, man's nature will become harmonized with the conditions.* The conception seems to be like that of the relation between the asymptote and the hyperbolic curve. The conditions of existence are fixed like the straight line, and man's nature approximates to them more and more, to infinity, like the hyperbola. But when we consider the vagueness of the terms, conditions of existence,

we cannot help regarding this analogy as misleading. All previous changes condition present existence, and all future changes will affect future existence. The number and variety of these changes is so inconceivably great that we can reach certainty concerning them only by hypothesis, and the nature of humanity is such a comprehensive conception, involving the estimate of all the different emotions, thoughts, and feelings that every variety of man has had or may have, that our conclusions can be hardly more definite; while the relation between these two vast and varying complexities would be infinitely more difficult to grasp than either. Whenever we encounter a case where this relation requires statement, we see that Mr. Spencer only succeeds in simplifying the problem by leaving out the difficulties. Thus, "within each society the associated persons are of the same type, needing for the fulfillment of their several lives kindred activities," etc., is an assumption that must be made before the principle that "the mutual limitations of their activities must be everywhere alike in order to maintain equilibrium, social or molecular." Such reasoning is only cogent if we admit an analogy between men and molecules. Ethics differs from physics because this analogy does not hold. Physics is a science because it assumes the essential similarity of molecules. To assume the similarity or equality of men reduces ethics to so simple a form as to be practically useless. The moral perplexities of men arise mainly because all men are not equal, and a system based on the assumption of their equality could relieve no such perplexities. Mr. Spencer's criticism of the doctrine that "every one is to count for one," etc., returns constantly upon himself, as we have elsewhere pointed out, with destructive force.

At the outset Mr. Spencer states the difficulties of the case very fairly. No part of conduct, he declares, can be understood, unless we understand not only the whole of human conduct, but that of all living creatures; and not only their present conduct, but all previous conduct, and we may add, all future conduct, in order to complete the whole. Mr.

Spencer considers himself to have this understanding, but common sense shrinks from such an assumption. The human mind could understand such a whole only in the sense of framing a few principles of the highest degree of generality, that could be maintained only on the supposition that the unknowable has no influence upon the knowable, and, if maintained, could be of only the slightest practical importance. As Mr. Spencer remarks in criticising universalistic hedonism, "The few factors in this immense aggregate of appliances and processes which are known, are very imperfectly known; and the great mass of them are unknown." And again, "Throughout a considerable part of conduct no guiding principle, no method of estimation, enables us to say whether a proposed course is even relatively right."

Such being the conception of welfare, and its implied assumptions, it remains to consider the principles that causally determine welfare. We do not find these principles very clearly brought out, except perhaps in the case of justice. We have a fundamental requirement that the life-sustaining actions of each shall severally bring him the amounts and kinds of advantage naturally achieved by them; but what are the natural achievements of a member of society, owing to the complicated interactions of other members, is really the question at the root of ethics. Besides fulfilment of contracts, services beyond agreement are to be exchanged; but to what extent we are not told, unless in terms that bring us around in a circle to the idea of equivalence. "There must be a relation between the expenditure of bodily substance in vital activities, and the taking in of materials from which this substance may be renewed. There must be a relation between the wasting of tissue by effort and the need for cessations of effort, during which repair may overtake waste, and similarly between the rate of mortality and the rate of multiplication in any society. Pursuits of other leading ends are determined by natural necessities, and from these derive their ethical sanctions. That it will ever be practicable to lay down precise rules for private conduct, in

conformity with such requirements, may be doubted." Such principles as these, we are told, being given by absolute ethics, we must consider whether our "conduct fulfils them as well as may be." But here we seem to be set adrift; for we need a standard for measurement of the "as well as may be"; and unless some fixed rule can be laid down, we really get nothing more than the morality of common sense. Professor Bain thinks that Mr. Spencer's great advantage consists in the constant reference to the physical side of our being. Whether the position of a medical adviser, thus assigned him, would be regarded by Mr. Spencer as a recompense for all the labor involved in the preparation of his many volumes, we very much doubt; at least he seems to make claims to do more than point out improved methods of diet and exercise. But unless he can make his principles of welfare more definite, we can hardly help agreeing with Professor Bain as to the limits of the service that he has rendered to ethics.

There is one principle, however, that of justice, concerning which Mr. Spencer is less vague. This is the condition of social life in an industrial community. We can only say on this point, what we have already implied, that a measurement of pleasures is absolutely indispensable to the attainment of justice, and the possibility of this measurement is rejected by Mr. Spencer. Justice, therefore, is only possible on the assumption of the approximate equality of members of a society, an assumption that he condemns when made by others, and which, if admitted, would render ethics a very simple matter, by leaving out of view all that makes it complicated. The essence of Mr. Spencer's system may be expressed in a very few words. Life is an efflux and influx of force. The greater the amount of this process, the better the life. Rightness, relatively, exists when the efflux and influx are equal; absolutely, when they are equal and as great as possible. Pleasure varies with rightness. These are the definitions; to make a working system, the assumptions given above must be added. The remainder of the

work consists of illustrations, explanations, and criticisms. There is much to say upon the criticism of altruism, but it is not necessary for our present purpose to say it. Some observations of a general character may, however, now be made.

The system of evolution has the strength and the weakness of other systems that involve final causes. Grant that a system can prophesy the state of the world when its present phase of storm and strife is ended, when existence is maintained under unchanging conditions, and the bewildering flux of phenomena gives place to an orderly succession, and it is not very difficult to overcome the remaining difficulties. The Christian and Mohammedan systems have a popular advantage in the promise of happiness to the believer after death, since, for the present, at least, discontent with their lot is likely to exist among the poorer classes of society. The system of evolution may, perhaps, serve the needs of those that have no faith in a future life, by exciting enthusiasm for the future of humanity. It is, therefore, an elevating system, by virtue of its altruism. But it is hard to see whence its disciples will come. It can hardly appeal to the ignorant, and the intelligent will hesitate over the assumptions that it makes necessary. The expression, "the last stages of evolution," is too indefinite to suggest to a scientific mind an ideal goal for humanity. It implies that evolution is approaching its end; but until the end is reached and adjustments are perfected, absolute ethics would not become practical; and unless we are assured that humanity is to exist in equilibrium with its conditions for some time after the "last stages" have been completed, the adjustment of practical ethics to absolute ethics lacks a motive. If the race is to be extinguished when it has reached its last stages of development, the final cause of its existence seems to be rather the combat than the victory, which is certainly not in accordance with hedonism.

If we ask what are the sanctions of this system, we are immediately struck by the fact that they are the same as

those of stoicism. Hence we declare it to be elevating in tone. So long as evolution is incomplete it may be possible to obtain greater pleasure by acts that tend to delay the ideal state than by acts that promote it. The evolutionist, like the stoic, can only say to the sinner, you are not in harmony with nature. In a perfect state there will be no vicious pleasures, and your indulgence in such pleasures delays the perfect state. Obviously there is here an opportunity for religious faith to entwine itself about the idea of a beneficent fate or force, whose outcome is happiness for mankind.

The danger attending this mode of ethical reasoning is inseparable from any system that assumes a knowledge of final causes, but in this case the dogmatic spirit begotten by the assumption of superior knowledge, seems to be in peculiar danger of degenerating into persecution, because the appeal is professedly to reason rather than authority. In one view, the true advance in civilization consists in the increased freedom of the individual, due to an increased skepticism concerning the validity of our knowledge of final causes as governing the affairs of this life. Freedom cannot be defended upon any other ground. Provided we are convinced that happiness is the end, and that we know how it is to be obtained, we have the motive for a despotic exercise of whatever power we may be able to wield. To those that oppose our interference with their liberty it is a sufficient reply that we shall secure their happiness better than they can themselves. Freedom is only defensible upon the ground that the greatest happiness is thereby produced. Now the evolutionist claims to know what is for the benefit of his fellows better than they themselves do or can know: for he can forecast the future by the aid of his theory, while they must remain in ignorance. He is not only at liberty, but also logically required, to compel the wayfarers to come in. The process of compulsion will cause some unhappiness, but the proper conditions of sound living must eventually have their natural effect in increased happiness, and those that at first were rebellious will soon become contented with

their lot ; “ the remoulding of human nature into fitness for the requirements of social life, must eventually make all needful activities pleasurable, while it makes displeasurable all activities at variance with these requirements.” The school of evolutionists and the Romish church occupy the same position ; each claims to foreknow the future ; and, if the claim be admitted, each is justified in the extermination of heretics. The evolutionist can only parry these objections by professing ignorance of the particular conditions that affect individuals, and urging the importance of liberty so far as these conditions are concerned ; but the general conditions of existence he knows by his own claim, and is bound to bring them to pass by the most effective means in his power. This system, therefore, may be expected to come into favor with autocrats, and governments in general will probably be willing to adopt it in justification of arbitrary proceedings. It is only too easy to preach, in the fashion of the last century, contentment to the lower orders, to give them assurances that their lot is provided for them by evolution, and that their happiness will be secured by limiting their desires to those gratifications that are suitable to their station in life. Evolution can hardly profess to remove inequality in the deserts of men ; it must, therefore, in some way suppress the feelings of jealousy and envy that are now so strongly felt by the inferior classes of society. This it can do by satisfying those that are willing to be satisfied with what it pronounces to be the appropriate gratifications, but those that are still dissatisfied must be themselves suppressed.

A still deeper objection to the theory of morals propounded by Mr. Spencer, may be drawn from his virtual adoption of the Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge. Rightness consists in adaptation, which results in pleasure, and pleasure is what we choose ; according to our knowledge of the conditions of life, therefore, will be our virtue. But the strength and the weakness of this doctrine have been so often exposed that it is, perhaps, not desirable to enlarge upon it at this time.

An objection less easily formulated, is expressed by "Theophrastus Such," in the remarks upon the "shadows of the coming race." Should a knowledge of all the conditions of existence be once obtained, and all human action adapted to these unchanging limits, "the futile cargo of a consciousness screeching irrelevantly," need no longer be carried. "Thus the feebler race, whose corporeal adjustments happened to be accompanied with a maniacal consciousness which imagined itself moving its mover, will have vanished, as all less adapted existences do before the fittest, i.e. the existence composed of the most persistent groups of movements and the most capable of incorporating new groups in harmonious relation."

Concerning Mr. Spencer's anticipations in regard to the reception that his views will receive, we have only to remark that he does not seem to exemplify, in an attractive degree, that "justice" upon which he lays so much stress. The following extract is from his concluding pages: "That these conclusions will meet with any considerable acceptance, is improbable. . . . From the ten thousand priests of the religion of love, who are silent when the nation is moved by the religion of hate, will come no sign of assent; nor from their bishops, who, far from urging the extreme precept of the master they pretend to follow, to turn the other cheek when one is smitten, vote for acting on the principle, strike lest ye be struck. Nor will any approval be felt by legislators who, after praying to be forgiven their trespasses as they forgive the trespasses of others, forthwith decide to attack those who have not trespassed against them; and who, after a Queen's speech has invoked "the blessing of Almighty God" on their councils, immediately provide means for committing political burglary."¹

This passage is from a chapter entitled "Conciliation"! Perhaps another quotation from Theophrastus Such will be the most suitable criticism as well as conclusion: "In transactions between fellow men, it is well to consider a little, in the first place, what is fair and kind toward the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

person immediately concerned, before we spit and roast him on behalf of the next century but one. I cannot feel sure how my voting will affect the condition of Central Asia in coming ages, but I have good reason to believe that the future population there will be none the worse off because I abstain from conjectural vilification of my opponents during the present parliamentary session, and I am very sure that I shall be less injurious to my contemporaries. On the whole, and in the vast majority of instances, the action by which we can do the best for future ages is of a sort which has a certain beneficence and grace for contemporaries."

ARTICLE V.

THE NEW TESTAMENT VOCABULARY.

BY PROF. LEMUEL S. POTWIN, WESTERN RESERVE COLLEGE, HUDSON, OHIO.

III.—NATIVE WORDS NOT FOUND IN CLASSICAL AUTHORS.¹

EVERY large telescope has its "finder," — a spy-glass attached to the great cylinder, by which the observer can easily discover the object upon which he would turn the full power of the larger instrument. The aim of this series of Articles is to be a "finder" for the larger instrument, the

¹ I. Words in New Testament Greek borrowed from the Latin. — Bib. Sac., October, 1875. II. Words in New Testament Greek borrowed from the Hebrew and Aramaean. — Bib. Sac., January, 1876. The former Article seems to require the following changes. 1. *ἀσάριον*, instead of being a Greek diminutive from the Latin *as*, is probably the neuter form of *asarius*, as *δηράριον* is of *denarius*. 2. The following should be added: (a) *λίτρα*, "pound" (John xii. 5; xix. 39), from *libra*. Compare the formative endings *-τρον*, *-τρον*, *-τρον*, *-τρα*. (b) *ξέστης*, "pot" (Mark vii. 4), probably from *sextarius*. Compare *ξύν* and *σύν*. Here an interchange. Perhaps, also, *μόδιος* should not have been given without some explanation or defence, as the Lexicons under this word refer to Dinarchus (95), who was born B.C. 361. It will be found, however, that the text of the Teubner edition (ed. Blass) does not contain the word, but *μόδιμοι* instead. It would seem that nothing but idolatry of manuscripts could have retained *μόδιοι* so long; for it is certainly a Latin derivative from *modus*; and how could the word possibly be in use at Athens at that early period?