

they have been disingenuously dealt with. Would not a more frank course be far better? When dogmatic definitions become obsolete, were it not wise to disuse them, and gradually to put in their stead the views that have actually taken their stead?

It is in this conviction that I have placed these views before the church. Cold as they may seem to some, they yet come out of a very warm heart, and are the sentiments of one who yields to none in childlike reverence for the Bible, and who finds in it a sanctuary in regard to which he joyfully exclaims, with the patriarch: "Surely the Lord is in this place; this is no other than the house of God, and here is the gate of heaven."

ARTICLE II.

ARISTOTLE.

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NO. III.—HIS ETHICS.

IN spite of man's vain-glory, he is yet ever haunted by a secret feeling of the shortness of his destiny. There is something in mere permanence that carries with it a dignity that man enviously confesses himself—as phenomenon—to lack. Even wholly insignificant men can so little content themselves with the oblivion that necessarily awaits them, that they seek out the hardest granite, compelling it to preserve the remembrance of the names and deeds that they dare not entrust to their fellow-creatures. When temporal aids fail, it is to the "eternal hills" that we lift our eyes for help. The Colosseum of Rome was at its building no more imposing than that of Boston, except from the lasting nature of the material. It is only because the Roman amphitheatre has so long endured that it oppresses the mind with its greatness; while the ephemeral creation of modern times

bore so plainly the marks of immediate decay that, for all its size, it was never truly sublime.

Endurance, then, although not itself greatness, is yet the best proof of the greatness of a human work. It makes plain those elements that appeal to the universal and essential principles of our nature, it shows that the popularity of a work that lasts is not due to any local or temporary causes, and it is, in short, the most obvious guide in a critical estimate of human possessions. Time has little to do with truth. What is only relatively true can never have any wide-spread influence; but when one comes upon a great truth, in an old book, the mind leaps with a certain delight over whatever insignificant centuries may have intervened since the author walked and talked, and rejoices as in new found kin. This feeling, which is, to a certain extent, a peculiarity of commentators, is in the case of Aristotle shared by many of those who have won distinction in any of the numerous lines of thought which bear the impress of that great genius.

Apart from his physical investigations, which in spite of modern advances could still call forth the enthusiastic utterance of Cuvier; and apart from his treatises on metaphysics and logic, which can never be wholly superseded, he was the author of four anthropological works which no modern philosopher can afford to neglect, and any one of which would, if it were now first to appear, make the reputation of its author. Concerning the "Rhetoric" Mr. Grote several times in his history expresses himself with great emphasis: "a treatise," he incidentally observes, "which has rarely been surpassed in power of philosophic analysis." Again, quite incidentally he remarks that if there were no other work of Aristotle's remaining, we should from this treatise alone decide that the author was a great man. The treatise on poetry still remains, it is probable, the most scientific, if not the only systematic work upon that subject. Dr. Arnold, who was so familiar with our author that he used to speak of him as "dear old Tottle," actually decided in favor of Oxford rather than Cambridge as his son's university, because, as he

said. "I would not consent to send my son to a university where he would lose the study of him." He looked upon the "Politics" as not only of great assistance in the study of early Roman history, but in the midst of the agitation of the questions of church authority and church government, in which he was so much interested, he asserted: "The Politics of Aristotle are to me of a very great and direct use every day of my life."

The Ethics of Aristotle have long occupied a prominent position at Oxford, and many editions have issued thence; but elsewhere, and especially since the time of Kant, this treatise has received less attention than it deserves. There are parts of it that would fasten the attention of even the most cursory reader, but in general the expression, which in enigmatic terseness rivals that of Tacitus, is little calculated to interest. We should constantly bear in mind the probability that we are dealing not with a finished composition of Aristotle's, but with the analysis or notes which either he or one of his hearers has preserved; a probability increased in the case of the Ethics by the existence of remarks addressed directly to "hearers." We know from Diogenes Laertius the names of twenty-seven dialogues, now lost, and from Cicero that Aristotle had a style distinguished by "*copia et suavitas*"; from which it is easy to infer that the published works were those of which Cicero is speaking, and which we know only by title through Diogenes. Indeed it would not be inappropriate to translate the title "akroamatic," which is applied to the extant writings, by "notes," or "lectures." The Ethics would not occupy a hundred of the pages of this magazine; but the quantity of thought that it contains could never have been imparted successfully in this condensed form. If Aristotle could secure so competent an interpreter as Plato has in Professor Jowett, one who would not hesitate to increase the bulk of this treatise even four-fold, it is not at all unlikely that such expansion would render inviting to a large circle of readers what is the laborious task of a few. It is not, perhaps, too rash an

opinion for a teacher to advance, that if this work were translated in such a manner, and furnished with a commentary by a scholar in ethics, not philology, it would be the most satisfactory text-book in this much-abused science that could be adopted in our colleges.

There are several reasons for maintaining this opinion. In the first place, the tone of Aristotle's writings is thoroughly scientific, that is, judicial. Many of our modern ethical treatises are written in a vein of maudlin sentimentality that inevitably excites the contempt of an intelligent youth. A text-book it seems to be forgotten is to be in great part committed to memory and recited. Now, any one would shrink from repeating a passage charged with really fine sentiment, unless to a sympathetic audience, after due preparation, and with consciousness of fitness for the task. — What becomes of the most touching speech in Shakespeare in the mouth of a dunce of a school-boy on a public stage! But when the sentiment is of the dishwater kind, although it may be tolerated in rapid reading, if the attempt is made to commit it to memory and recite it, there can only result disgust to the learner and derision from his fellows. No sturdy young man can preserve his self-respect while repeating the turgid eloquence and highly-wrought bathos of our modern moralists. "Beauty unadorned is adorned the most," and the severe beauty of righteousness presents an especially sorry figure in the tawdry and meretricious garments of an artificial rhetoric. Facts and principles are what is wanted in a text-book, if there is to be any "gush," that can be furnished cheaply by the teacher in quantities to suit the occasion. The fiery outbursts of a generous heart aroused by the stimulus of a glimpse of truth or report of wrong are to be welcomed and honored; but separated from the excitement of the occasion and the person they are no more the same than the tufa is the same as the volcanic eruption. The best sermons make the worst text-books.

Now in the case of Aristotle's Ethics, facts and principles, with reasons, are all that he offers us. There is not an

indication of personal feeling, nor an appeal to prejudice, or anything but reason, throughout the whole book. The most fastidious reader could find nothing pedantic, redundant, or superfluous. There is not a remark that any one need fear ridicule for making to-day. The book is full of shrewd sayings that strike the attention like proverbs. It is so *sensible*, so wise, and yet so free from all affectation, that a certain kindly and trustful feeling is produced in the mind of the reader. He feels as he is led along that he is not having opinions forced upon him, but that he is on a voyage of discovery with an intelligent and companionable guide, who has no personal glory at stake, and cares only to give the traveller the best possible knowledge of the country he is traversing.

A second merit possessed by this work is, that it is not devoted to the establishment of any metaphysical doctrine, but is, what ethics itself eminently is, thoroughly practical. Instead of interminable arguments on the freedom of the will, — a subject concerning which no one, however clear and positive his own convictions, can be so infatuated as to expect mankind will ever agree, — Aristotle simply points out the important fact that practically the question can be ignored without damage to morals. As men of equal virtue have always been found on opposite sides of this question, and have vigorously maintained that their opponent's views were subversive of all morality, we cannot but regard the position of Aristotle as decidedly the most judicious for a teacher of morals; although we should be glad to have had somewhere else a fuller presentation of his own views. As the opinion is sometimes maintained that this question was unknown to the Greeks, the remarks of Aristotle are worth quoting.

“ Since the end is what is willed, but the means what is deliberated about and preferred, the acts relating to these should be according to choice and voluntary; such are the active displays of the virtues. Now virtue depends upon ourselves, and so vice; for whenever doing is in our power so also is not doing, and *vice versa*. So that if it is in our power to do a thing which is honorable, it is also in our power not to do it, which is base; and if to leave undone is honorable and in our power, to do,

which is base, is also in our power. But if doing and leaving undone what is honorable and what is base are in our power, — which is being good or bad — then being good or bad is in our power.

But as to the saying, 'No one is willingly wicked nor unwillingly blessed,' this is in one sense true, in another false. No one is unwillingly blessed, but vice is voluntary; or else we must contradict what we have just said, and deny that man is a principle, or originator of his acts, as of children. But if this be so, and we cannot refer to other principles except those in ourselves, then the things of which the principles are in our power are themselves in our power and voluntary. This is borne witness to both by individuals and lawgivers, for they chastise and punish evil-doers who are not such from compulsion, or ignorance of which they are not the cause. And they honor the doers of good so as to foster the latter and repress the former. And yet no one encourages us to things not in our power nor voluntary, not thinking it worth while to persuade us not to be hot or cold or hungry or any such thing, for we shall suffer them none the less. For people are punished for ignorance itself if they seem to be the cause of their ignorance; as punishment is double for drunken people, for the principle (of action) is in themselves, since they were able not to get drunk, and this is the cause of their ignorance. And those who are ignorant of anything in the laws, which they ought to know, and is not hard, are punished; and so in the case of others who are ignorant from negligence, their ignorance being owing to themselves, since they were able to pay attention. But (it may be replied), such a man cannot give his attention. Still he is the cause of this inability, because he has lived intemperately; and men are themselves the causes of their being unjust and intemperate by doing unjust and intemperate acts; for practices of any kind make characters of that kind. This is clear from those who are given to any exercise of conduct, for they are continually practising. Now it is certainly stupid not to know that from continual activity in special directions habits are produced. Furthermore it is unreasonable that he who practises injustice should not wish to be unjust; or that he who acts intemperately should not wish to be intemperate. Now if any one not being ignorant does those things from which he will be unjust, he would be voluntarily unjust; nevertheless, he will not be able whenever he wishes to leave off being unjust and be just: for the sick man cannot be well, even if it so happen that he is voluntarily sick from living recklessly and disobeying his physicians. At one time it was in his power not to be sick; but by yielding and not controlling himself he has lost the power; just as it is no longer in the power of one who has thrown a stone to recall it, while yet throwing and hurling was in his own power, for the principle (of action) was in his power. Thus in the first place it was in the power of the unjust and the intemperate not to become so, and therefore they are so voluntarily, although when they have become so it is no longer in their power not to be so.

Not only the vices of the soul are voluntary, but, in some cases, those of the body are so, and these we blame. For no one blames those who are ugly by nature, but those who are so from lack of exercise or negligence. In like manner, also, concerning weakness and deformity and mutilation; for no one would revile a man blind by nature or disease or a blow, but rather pity him; but every one would blame him who becomes blind from drunkenness or other intemperance. Now of the faults of the body, those which are in our power are blamed; those which are not in our power are not blamed. And if this is so also in other things, the faults that are blamed would be those in our own power.

Now if any one should say that all men aim at what they imagine to be good, but are not masters of their imagination, that but the end appears to every one according to what his character is, ; if every one is, in a certain sense, the cause to himself of his own character, he will also be, in a certain sense, the cause of his own imagination. But if no one is the cause to himself of his own bad acts, but does them through ignorance of the end, thinking that through them the best results will follow, and that the aiming at the end, by which he judges well and will choose what is truly good, is not a matter of his own choice, but is a natural endowment, like the possession of sight, and that he is naturally favored who is born with this faculty (for he will have the greatest and most honorable thing, and one which he cannot get or learn from any other man, but will have it just as it was given him by nature — and to be well and honorably endowed with this by nature constitutes the perfect and true natural goodness), — if this be true, how will virtue be more voluntary than vice? for to both alike, the good as well as the bad, the end is apparent and laid down by nature, or in some such way, and referring everything else to this, they act accordingly. Whether then the end, of whatever sort it is, appears to every one, not by nature, but is something *his*, or whether the end is fixed by nature, but the good man performs the remaining things voluntarily, virtue is voluntary and vice is no less so; for there is just as much spontaneity (*τὸ δὲ αἰτιόν*) in the acts of a bad man, even if not in the end. If then, as has been said, the virtues are voluntary, for we are ourselves in some way joint causes of our habits, and from our being of a certain character we propose to ourselves a corresponding end, the vices would also be voluntary, for the case is the same."¹

This is certainly an admirable treatment of a most difficult subject. No determinist can object to the statement that if vice is involuntary so also is virtue; and no advocate of freedom can deny that habits escape the control of the will. Both can unite on the ground, which is entirely sufficient

for all practical purposes, that, apart from all hereditary or natural tendencies (as Aristotle calls them), a man is to be adjudged virtuous or vicious by his deliberate acts. Greater fulness may be desired on such a subject, but not greater fairness.

Still, it is doubtful whether it is not better that the discussion of this question should be carried on in treatises professedly devoted to metaphysics or theology. Ever since the time of Augustine and Pelagius,—that is, ever since the church has patronized philosophy, or philosophy has served as a handmaid to the church,—this great controversy has tended to overshadow the path of ethics. We should now feel that an ethical treatise where the will was not the most prominent feature in the discussion was like the play of Hamlet with the part of Hamlet omitted. The doctrine of sin, depending practically on the question of responsibility, has inevitably led to the most prolonged and embittered struggle that the schools have ever experienced; and, in spite of all arguments and discussions, bulls and catechisms, assemblies and councils,—in spite, even, of wars and persecutions,—philosophers are still as far as ever from agreement. The question has thus become so entangled with its real or supposed corollaries that the very mention of the words “necessity” and “freedom” is enough to arouse the passions of strife and becloud the reason. Let a philosopher once be called a necessarian, and his influence with many is immediately gone, no matter what the value of his other teachings; and with the believers in determinism the hearing accorded to a teacher of the freedom of the will would not perhaps be more attentive. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that ethics as a science may and should exist apart from theology. The relation of man to his own development, and his relations to the corresponding development of his fellows, is an entirely legitimate subject of scientific investigation, apart from the relation of man to his Creator. The righteousness of man may be as filthy rags, compared with the righteousness of God; and yet it has a real and very im-

portant existence in all the relations of human life, and therefore has a claim to scientific treatment in an even greater degree than most other phenomena of society. Such a science, as we shall see, may be related to that higher science which connects man with God, and here the question of the freedom of the will cannot be evaded; but, however necessary the connection may be in fact, both sciences may be elaborated separately.

No philosopher has done anything to vindicate the freedom of the will in comparison with Kant; not that by his own individual labors he accomplished so much, but that he originated a movement which has had a prodigious influence upon the present century. In great part through Coleridge, who seems to have freely used the treasures that he discovered in Germany, an entirely new element was introduced into English thought. The doctrine of Adam's sin, as expounded by Dr. N. W. Taylor, of New Haven, seems to require as its ultimate basis the ground of Kant, that the soul is a thing-in-itself. The great work of Müller on the Christian Doctrine of Sin is Kantian, and in its logical conclusion, the pre-existence of the soul, is but carrying out the principles of Kant. Kant saw, as well as Hume, that we perceive only phenomena, and never causal connection; but the irresistible tendency to discern more than what the senses give us demanded his explanation. He observed that in internal phenomena, or consciousness, we follow the method of science when we discern motives. They are causes in the phenomenal sense of telling *when* certain results will follow; but they never tell *why* they will follow. This question can never be answered in the case of external objects — why they cause certain results; but in Kant's view the *ego* is a thing-in-itself, of which we are immediately conscious; in fact, the only one. Hence we know what causal energy is in our own selves. The motive is the *when*; the will is the *why*.

It is difficult to convey, in short space, the meaning of Kant; but the following passage will serve to show how inevitably Müller was driven to the conclusion that he has been so derided for adopting.

“When it is admitted that the intelligible person may, in regard of any given act, be free, even while as a person belonging in part to the world of sense he is mechanically conditioned, it still seems as if we must admit that the actions of mankind have their determining ground in somewhat entirely beyond their power; so soon as we admit that God, as the Author of all things, is the cause of the existence of substance (a position which cannot be deserted without abandoning theology). Here it would seem that all man's actions have their last ground in the causality of a Supreme Being, different from himself; and, in truth, if the actions of man which belong to his modifications in time be not mere determinations of him as phenomenon, but of him as a thing-in-itself, then freedom would irrecoverably be lost—man would be an automaton, wound up and set agoing by some supreme artist. His self-consciousness would no doubt make him a thinking automaton, where, however, the consciousness of his spontaneity, if deemed freedom, were illusory, as it could only be called so comparatively speaking; since the next determinators of his movements and their series up to their last cause would, it is true, be internal, but the last and highest would be met with in a different hand. . . . The solution of the said difficulty can be effected shortly and clearly, as follows: If existence-in-time is a mere sensitive kind of representing appertaining to the thinking subjects in the world, and so quite unrelated to things-in-themselves, then the creating of these latter beings is a creating of things-in-themselves, because the notion of creation has nowhat to do with the sensitive representing of an entity, but refers to noumena. When, then, I say of beings in the sensible world, ‘*They are created,*’ so far I regard them as noumena. And as it would import a contradiction to affirm that God is the originator of the phenomena, so it is likewise a contradiction to affirm that he is as Creator cause of the actions which as phenomena are exhibited in the sensible world, although he is cause of the existence of the agent as a noumenon. And if, now, it is possible to assert freedom without prejudice to the mechanism of the system of actions as phenomena, then it cannot make the least difference that the agent is regarded as created; since creation refers to intelligible, not to sensible, existence, and so cannot be figured as a ground of the determination of phenomena; which result, however, would fall out the other way if the finite beings existed in time as things-in-themselves, since then the Creator of the substance would be the Author of all the machinery attaching to the substance. Of so vast importance is the separation of time from the existence of real entities effected in the *Critique*.”¹

To a mind uncommitted to any dogmatic system, and only anxious to learn the truth, it might appear that freedom cannot exist if time is an objective reality, that is, the view

¹ *Metaphysic of Ethics* (Temple's translation), pp. 135-137.

of Kant is correct; but the solution must ever be to ordinary comprehension more difficult than the original difficulty. A method which requires us to think away time in order to establish freedom would go far to prepare the mind to think away freedom in order to re-establish time. Such an inquiry as that of Kant is entirely legitimate as a metaphysical speculation; but, although the results may be used in ethics, — that is, we may maintain that the will is, so far as ethics are concerned, free, — the treatment of Aristotle is much better adapted for the common understanding, and, although not so profound as that of Kant, it is, so far as it goes, equally scientific in spirit. Kant's efforts did, indeed, result in the discovery of a semblance of a door, after showing that all other conceivable paths were vain; but they put it so far off that we can never know whether it is more than a semblance; and should we, gifted like him with superhuman powers, reach this door and find it real, we should still discover that it was locked upon the other side — reason never being able to free herself from the categories. Yet even this semblance is enough to frighten off absolute scepticism. In spite of the lapse of centuries, the framework of ethics, both practical and theological, has remained nearly as Aristotle first constructed it. The doctrine of ends or final causes elaborated by him has established itself as firmly and as necessarily as his logic. It is (so far as I know) not probable that President Edwards had ever read the Ethics of Aristotle; nevertheless, the beginning of his treatise "Concerning the End for which God created the World" bears a striking resemblance to Aristotle's opening of his subject; while the dissertation on the "Nature of True Virtue" is, apart from its specific assumptions, fundamentally Aristotelian. In the first-mentioned treatise Edwards begins by distinguishing ends, chief and inferior, ultimate and subordinate, which is just what Aristotle does in his first chapter. After this, in both treatises, follows the question, What is the greatest good? where the formal conclusions are the same, although the theological subject of Edwards causes his

material results to be different. In the view of Aristotle the highest of sciences was that which he called political — not in the restricted sense of governmental in which we now use the term, but in that larger sense which it is fashionable to express by that deplorable word “sociology.” “The end of this science will be *the good* of man. To discover the good of an individual is well; but it is noble and divine to discover that of a state.” It is, of course, not necessary to state, in these pages, that Edwards’s definition of the chief good is something quite different from this. In fact, it may be feared that Aristotle and all his followers, so far as they were not duly attentive to the glory of God, have woven for themselves a web of their final causes that draws them so close to an evil end that only their ignorance can save them. But as it is quite certain that Aristotle, if he had admitted the postulates of Edwards, would have coincided with him in his conclusions, we may be permitted to hope that these great spirits are not now separated in their contemplations.

The style of Edwards is unfortunately too diffuse to admit of his being here quoted; but a few words from Aristotle will at once be recognized as furnishing the key to the Edwardean system:

“The best end is something perfect; so that if there is some one end which is alone perfect that would be what we are in search of — if more, the most perfect. The object pursued for its own sake is more perfect than that pursued for the sake of something else; and that which is never chosen on account of anything else is more perfect than those chosen both on their own account and on account of that other. In a word that is simply perfect which is always chosen on its own account and never on account of anything else.”¹

At this point, however, we meet with what appears to be a startling divergence of views. Aristotle immediately adds that this perfect end is happiness; while according to Edwards it is the glory of God. If we were to stop here we should certainly be obliged to admit the common depreciation of Aristotle to be correct. That it is not correct we may show more clearly hereafter. For the present, we must

¹ Eth. Nik., 1, 7.

observe that the word inadequately translated happiness is *εὐδαιμονία*, which is really not very different from the election of God. If we were to say that the perfect end of human action is to be elected of God, the modern theologian might well hesitate before denying this proposition. He might reply that such was the perfect end in the sense of being the perfect result so far as man is concerned, although not the perfect end in the sense of aim or purpose. This distinction, as we shall see, is of great importance; but, after all, Aristotle does not use the word in its etymological sense. Happiness is, in the first place, something "self-sufficient" — something which apart from everything else makes life eligible and in no respect lacking. It is, again, the activity of the soul according to reason, and not any passive state; which is, again, called the activity of the soul according to virtue, or to the best and most perfect virtue, and this too in a perfect life; "for one swallow does not make spring, nor does one day make a man happy." Here, now, the Edwardean philosophy must again pause before denying that the perfect end of human action is the activity of the soul according to virtue.

It is plain that everything depends on the question, What is virtue. Aristotle soon decides that virtue is not found in the irrational soul, but in the reason, on the one hand, and in the control of the reason, on the other — the will, it should be remembered, is included by him under the reason — and thus a twofold virtue appears — intellectual, and what may be called moral, where the appetites obey reason. Wisdom and prudence are of the first class of virtues, liberality and temperance of the second. Virtue, it further appears, is a habit, accompanied with deliberate choice, exercised in a mean state, so far as we are concerned, controlled by reason, and especially the reason of a discreet man." The "mean" is the right course between the too much and the too little, both of which are wrong. But with reference to the standard of goodness, virtue is an extreme. Deliberate preference has nothing to do with desires and passions, to which

it is often opposed. And, finally, the conclusion is reached that we wish or will ends, the virtuous wishing the real good, the vicious, that which appears to each one good; the good man seeing the truth in every case, while most men are deceived by pleasure. Deliberation is solely concerning means, and deliberate choice is also of means—for we cannot be said to *choose* immortality, but to *wish for* it; nor do we choose happiness, but the means of being happy; and in general we choose only what is in our power.

It thus appears that what the virtuous man desires or wishes is the most perfect activity of his soul, and that he chooses the means of attaining this activity. This use of language is quite different from that of Edwards, who would say that we *choose ends*; but the ordinary usage is certainly that of Aristotle. We desire a remote result, as health, and we choose the best of the means offered for attaining health. We can, in short, choose to *do*, to *act*; we cannot choose to *be*, or that others should *be* or *do*, however much we may wish it. We may loosely say that a man prefers health to sickness, meaning that he likes health and dislikes sickness; or we may say that he chooses to be well rather than to be sick, with the same meaning; but in strictness the proper expression would be that a man wishes to be well, and chooses to do what is necessary for health, and it is by metonymy that he is said to choose health. No one prefers sickness to health or pain to pleasure; but many prefer acts that result in sickness and pain.

This difference, however, is not material, since Aristotle holds that he who chooses to act unjustly virtually chooses to be unjust. We have, therefore, to compare the proposition—virtue consists in benevolence to being in general, with the definition of Aristotle. The first inquiry that suggests itself is, whether benevolence or love to being is a habit. Now in spite of his own words it is generally admitted that Edwards did not mean the mere sentiment of love, but the exercise of this sentiment in appropriate acts, and not the occasional, but the constant, exercise. It might well,

therefore, be called a habitual exercise, and Edwards would be the last to deny that it was in consequence of deliberate choice, and controlled by reason, which, with Aristotle, includes the conscience. So far the two systems are at one; and we have now to consider in what sense virtue is a mean state and connected with prudence. Aristotle repeatedly uses proportions to illustrate his doctrine, and the idea of a judicious steering between the extremes of conduct is fundamental with him; "as it is possible to be wrong in many ways, but right in one alone."

On the other hand Edwards observes: "After benevolence to being in general exists, the *proportion* which is observed in objects may be the cause of the *proportion* of benevolence to those objects; but no *proportion* is the cause or ground of the existence of such a thing as benevolence to being. The tendency of objects to excite that degree of benevolence which is proportionable to the degree of being, etc., is the consequence of the existence of benevolence, and not the ground of it."¹ If this be taken to represent Edwards's view, then love to being in general is one thing and love to being in proportion to its worth is another; or else if a man have love to being in general he will love it in proportion to its worth; and, conversely, he who has not love to being in proportion to its worth has not love to being in general. The latter is of course the view of Edwards, as appears in the position that he who has not love to being in general has no virtue. So that in spite of the above quotation, it is not the love to being that in itself constitutes virtue, but to being *in general*, or in proportion to its worth. It is therefore the *proportionality* of the love, and not its mere existence, that constitutes virtue. One man may have a much greater degree of love than another, but as he applies it to a limited circle of being, he will be vicious; while the latter, by loving being in general, will be virtuous. There thus appears to be no virtuous quality in love to being apart from the due distribution of that love, from which it follows that virtue

¹ Works, iii. p. 116. New York, 1829.

coincides with justice, as Aristotle also says, and is simply equity, or giving every one his due. This can be established beyond all question by the following passage: "When I say true virtue consists in *love to being in general*, I shall not be likely to be understood that no one act of the mind or exercise of love is of the nature of true virtue but what has being in general, or the great system of universal existence, for its *direct* and *immediate* object; so that no exercise of love or kind affection to any one particular being, that is, but a small part of the whole, has anything of the nature of true virtue. But my meaning is, that no affections towards particular persons or beings are of the nature of true virtue but such as arise from a generally benevolent temper, or from that habit or frame of mind wherein consists a disposition to love being in general."¹

As, according to Edwards, the wicked may clearly see and understand that they are loving private being rather than universal, and yet persist in so doing, he does not make vice to consist in any weakness of the understanding, any ignorance of the consequences of sin, but in an abominable and native perversity of the will, which, in spite of all light and all good influences, will, except for the grace of God, always choose wrong. The doctrine of total depravity is thus logically unassailable if this assumption be granted. Most of the assaults against it are utterly futile, involving an *ignoratio elenchi*, and it is worthy of remark that probably the most able and successful attack upon this doctrine that has ever been made was made before the doctrine was ever dogmatically in existence — in the teaching of Socrates that virtue was knowledge. So far as Aristotle and Kant are concerned, their systems furnish the most solid support to this much-berated dogma. They would, equally with Edwards, say that the man who wished his own good, and not the greatest good, was a bad man; although Kant and Edwards would say that his will was bad, Aristotle that his reason was defective.

Yet when the problem is reduced to this form it may be

¹ Works, iii. p. 95. New York, 1829.

questioned whether the reason be not a better term than the will. Sin has become a mere question of mathematics; the sinner deliberately chooses one instead of ten; the righteous loves ten better than one. Quality is expressly excluded by Edwards and impliedly by Aristotle, and the whole question being made purely quantitative, becomes pre-eminently a matter of reason. To the question, why is it wrong to choose to take one and not ten (*ceteris paribus*), no answer can be given, except that it is irrational. No answer, that is, that will not eventually lead around in a circle to the same question. The fundamental basis of all morality, then, which underlies the system of Aristotle and Edwards, and, as will appear, of Kant also, is *the subjective appearance of that principle which, under the name of the sufficient reason of Archimedes and Leibnitz, is objectively the basis of all dynamical explanation of natural phenomena.*

Nothing happens without a reason why it should be so rather than otherwise. If there be a pair of scales in every respect exactly alike on each side, and with no weights, or equal weights in each scale, it must remain motionless, because there is no reason why one side should go down rather than the other. No mechanical science is possible without the assumption that if a body is acted upon by two perfectly equal forces it will move equally between them; and the only justification that can be offered this assumption (apart from the purely empirical one that it has always been so), is that no reason can be given why it should move more to one side than to another. Any violation of this law we should call a violation of reason itself; a balance that refused to weigh evenly we should call a bad balance; and in the same way we call a will that prefers the less to the greater good a bad will. It is bad because it is irrational; because no sufficient reason can be assigned why it should take the less good.

This principle is required to harmonize all the varying theories of morality. All other explanations will be found themselves to require explanation; and this can only be offered in the above formula. Sin consists in a violation of

the law; but why is it sinful to violate the law? Because we ought to keep the law. But why ought we to keep the law? Because it is right to keep it, and wrong to break it. But why is it right to keep the law? To this the usual reply is a meaningless iteration: What is right is right, and must be done rather than what is expedient; which is mere dogmatism. But the only proper explanation is, that no reason can be given why if a man admits the law at all—which he must if he is a moral being—he should make any exception to it in his own case. By the very fact that he made exception he would establish another law, viz. that any one could make exceptions to the law when he greatly desired it; and this he would at once see would do away with all law.

Again, if it be said that sin is selfishness, it may be asked, why is selfishness sinful? It is not enough to say, Because it is. Nor is it of any avail to say that selfishness is contrary to the greatest good of the greatest number, for instantly the question reverts to its quantitative form, why is it wrong to choose ten rather than one? To which the only answer is, that no reason can be assigned why one should be chosen rather than ten. So also if it be said with the Utilitarians, that the greatest good of others is the greatest good of the individual, and that he that is selfish neglects his own greatest good, we arrive at the same question, Why should he not neglect his own good? and at the same answer, Because there is no reason why ten should be taken rather than one. This is a purely rational principle, and at the same time, implies the only dynamical principle of the reason, containing the two moments: I choose to act, which is the same as, rational existence in general, and explains why some choice must be made, either of ten or of one; and, secondly, this action must be in accordance with reason, that is, quantitative, showing why ten is taken rather than one. All reasoning consists in the knowledge of the equality or identity of objects or relations, taken first in pairs and then compounded into more complex units; and the judgment that a right act must be performed is as purely a rational judgment as that

of equality. As it would be called irrational to maintain that two does not equal two, so it is irrational to desire ten rather than one, to choose the less good before the greater. Bad reasoning, then, as well as bad action, is bad because it is inequitable. Love to a small portion of being is wrong, because it is disproportionate or inequitable, and the virtuous man occupies a mean, because that is equitable. So the principle of Kant — act as if the maxim of thy will were to become, by thy adopting it, a universal law of nature — may be reduced to the same basis, since if the individual make an exception in his own case, when the same could not be made into a universal law, he is violating reason by making one equal to ten. And the principle of Bentham — every one to count for one, and no one for more than one — falls also under this law; for after the assumption that every one's interest is the same in amount, so far as moral questions are concerned, that is, that the worth of every soul is the same as that of every other, no reason can be given why one should be taken before another. So far as doing right in the abstract is concerned, the particular person is not important, — we cannot say to another, it is better that thou do wrong than I, — and therefore all must be treated equally by the law.

In Aristotle's discussion of justice, which he finds to coincide with virtue, except that justice is relative and virtue is absolute, he expresses himself as follows :

“ Since the unjust man is unequal, and what is unjust is unequal, it is plain that there is some mean of the unequal, and this is the equal; for in whatever action there is the more and the less there is also the equal. If then the unjust is unequal, the just is equal; which is without argument admitted by all; and since the equal is a mean the just would also be a mean. The equal is in at the least two things, hence the just being a mean as well as equal must relate to some things and some persons. So far as it is a mean it is of things, that is, the more and the less; and as equal it is in relation to two; and as just, to certain persons. Hence justice implies four forms at least; for there must be two persons to whom it relates, and two elements in the things to which it relates. And there will be the same equality between the persons and between the things, for as the things are to each other so are the persons; if the persons are

unequal they will not have equal things. Fights and quarrels arise whenever either equal persons do not have equal things, or unequal persons have or get equal things. This is evident from the regard according to worth; for all confess that in distributions what is just must be according to some standard of worth, although they do not all make the standard the same. . . . Justice, therefore, is something proportionate, for proportion is not peculiar to arithmetic, but of everything quantitative (*ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ*), for proportion is an equality of relation (reason or ratio, *λόγου*), and in the case of at least four terms. . . . And justice is in at least four terms, and the relation is the same; for they are similarly divided, both the things and the persons receiving them. $A : B :: C : D$ or $A : C :: B : D$ or $A + C : A :: B + D : B$, which is the formula for just distribution. . . . Injustice is disproportion, either in excess or deficiency. And this is the case in acts, for he who acts unjustly has too much, and the one that suffers injustice too little good. The opposite is the case in regard to evil; for the less evil stands in the relation of good compared with the greater; for the less evil is rather to be chosen than the greater, and what is deserving of choice is good, and what is more deserving is greater good.”¹

This implies, beyond mistake, the Edwardean principle of love to being according to its worth or quantity. In fact, although Edwards maintains that “agreement and consent of different things” is only a secondary kind of beauty, and not that of true virtue, he so involves the idea of proportion, which is fundamental to his whole argument, that he cannot escape the conclusion of Aristotle. The substance of what he says is expressed in the following passage, which should be compared with a previous extract:

“Indeed, most of the duties incumbent on us, if well considered, will be found to partake of the nature of *justice*. There is some natural agreement of one thing to another, some adaptedness of the agent to the object; some answerableness of the act to the occasion; some equality and proportion in things of a similar nature, and of a direct relation one to another. So it is in relative duties; duties of children to parents and of parents to children; duties of husbands and wives; duties of rulers and subjects; duties of friendship and good neighborhood; and all duties that we owe to God, our Creator, Preserver, and Benefactor; and all duties

¹ Eth. Nik., v. 3.

whatsoever considered as required by God, and as what are to be performed with a regard to Christ. But there is another and higher beauty in true virtue, and in all truly virtuous dispositions and exercises, than what consists in any uniformity or similarity of various things; viz. the *union of heart to being in general*, or to God, the Being of beings, which appears in those virtues; and of which those virtues, when true, are the various expressions or effects.”¹

What is here meant by “union of heart to being in general” is of course deplorably uncertain, so far as the language casts any light upon the question. Edwards, of course, does not hold that virtue resides in the natural affections. As we have before observed, he does not regard the mere *feeling* or *sentiment* of love to being as having anything to do either as cause or as effect with virtue. (“Natural affection does not arise from a *principle* of virtue, and has no tendency to produce it.”²) It is the correct and proportionate distribution of this feeling that introduces virtue as it introduces the choice. We must therefore suppose that the meaning of the above passage is, that virtue does not consist in the *proportion itself*, but in *acting, willing, or choosing* according to this fitness or natural agreement. And this is precisely the view of Aristotle. The position of Edwards, therefore, contains nothing new compared with that of Aristotle, except the introduction of the concept of God as equivalent to being in general. This, however important theologically, does not in the least affect the reasoning of ethics. Aristotle, as much as Edwards, could maintain that virtue consisted in love to being according to its worth, although his view was more restricted in estimating the quantity of being. The foundation that he laid, although verbally different and more complex in conception, is really that upon which Edwards built; and no incongruity would result if a theological superstructure were put upon Aristotle’s ethics. The following passage shows where such an addition might naturally be made:

¹ Works, iii., p. 115.

² Ibid., p. 137.

“That the perfect happiness is a kind of contemplative or speculative (*θεωρητικῆς*) activity might appear from the fact that we regard the gods as especially blessed and happy. But what actions can be attributed to them? It would be ridiculous to regard them as just in bargaining, repaying deposits, and such things. Or are they brave, encountering terrible things and exposing themselves to danger because it is honorable? Or are they liberal? But to whom will they give? And it is absurd to suppose they have money or anything of the kind. Or can they be temperate? Such praise would be inept, because they have no bad desires. And if we went through the whole list, all moral acts would seem trifling and unworthy of gods. But yet all suppose that they live and are active; for they do not sleep like Endymion. But if life is without ordinary transactions and productions, what is left except the use of the reason [*θεωρίας*]? So that the activity of God as it excels in blessedness would be speculative [cf. Plato, *God geometrizes*]. Hence that human activity which is most akin to this would be the happiest. He who is active intellectually, and guards his mind, and keeps it in the best state, is likely to be the most beloved of the gods; for if they have any regard for human affairs, as is probable, it is reasonable that they should rejoice in what is best and most akin to themselves; but this is the mind. And they would benefit those who especially loved and honored this, as those paying attention to their friends and acting rightly and honorably. Now, that all these qualities belong especially to the wise man is not doubtful; he is therefore most dear to the gods, and in this sense he is the happiest man.”¹

In technical language the definition of virtue given by Aristotle is *formal*; by Edwards it is *material*. From a scientific point of view, therefore, the Aristotelean definition is much superior, as any moral action may at once be tested, and it involves no reference to any particular religious belief or even metaphysical doctrine. It is as general in its application as the laws of number or of the reason itself. It does not specify the worth of any object, but simply points out that decision must be made in accordance with worth. So long as virtue is made a matter of reason, so long as the natural affections are denied all moral quality, this position cannot be overthrown. On this foundation, although perhaps in ignorance of its existence, Edwards built his system. It consists of an axiom and a postulate. The axiom is that of Aristotle—Action must be in proportion to end, or love to being must be distributed according to its worth.

¹ *Eth. Nik.*, x. 8.

The postulate is in this application perhaps peculiar to Edwards — God is the greatest quantity of being. This postulate is a necessity for his system as a system of theology, and its assumption transforms the science of ethics into theology.

We may here notice a reproach often made against Edwards, but which, if it applies to him, applies equally to Aristotle. According to Edwards, it is said, God is the most consummately selfish being in the universe. The position of Edwards is logically evident enough. If virtue consists in love to being in general, God as the greatest quantity must love himself the most. If any one wishes to avoid the conclusion, he must deny the condition. The explanation of the term "love" given by Edwards is perfectly satisfactory; but it cannot be denied that it is his own fault that he has been misunderstood. The word "love" always has been, and always will be, in common parlance, a word signifying an emotion or feeling or affection. Now, to maintain that virtue has nothing to do with the natural affections, and then to select a word to define virtue that could not fail to suggest these affections, was to invite misunderstanding. Hence the bitter feeling so often excited by this system of theology. Men knew that love could not at the same time be virtuous and evil, and yet this unanswerable logician showed that it must be so. Assent could not be refused, nor consent granted. Edwards therefore deserved his ill success; the men he convinced were convinced against their will, with the usual consequence. And so this great man, — a mind which in the power of sustained deductive reasoning may be ranked with that of Newton, — from his neglect to frame his leading positions in clear and unambiguous language, will be forever misunderstood. Posterity can cling to but a few of any man's utterances; and where the very catch-words of a system are uncertain, the whole must pay the penalty.

We find, however, an explanation of the term "self-love" that is clear enough for any purpose:

"Self-love, I think, is generally defined, 'a man's love of

his own happiness'; which is short, and may be thought very plain. A man's *own happiness* may either be taken universally, for all the happiness or pleasure of which the mind is in any regard the subject, or whatever is grateful and pleasing to men; or it may be taken for the pleasure a man takes in his own proper, private, and separate good. And so self-love may be taken in two ways: 1. It may be taken for the same as his loving whatsoever is pleasing to him, or loving what he loves. This is only a general capacity of loving or hating, or a capacity of being either pleased or displeased, which is the same thing as a man's having a faculty of will. For if nothing could be either pleasing or displeasing, agreeable or disagreeable, to a man, then he could incline to nothing, and will nothing. But if he is capable of having inclination, will, and choice, then what he inclines to and chooses is grateful to him, whatever that be — whether it be his own private good, the good of his neighbors, or the glory of God. And so far as it is grateful or pleasing to him, so far it is a part of his pleasure, good, or happiness. This may be a general reason why men love or hate anything at all, and therein differ from stones and trees, which love nothing and hate nothing. Self-love, as the phrase is used in common speech, most commonly signifies a man's regard to his confined *private self*, or love to himself with respect to his *private interest*. By *private interest* I mean that which most immediately consists in those pleasures or pains that are personal. For there is a comfort and a grief that some have in other's pleasures or pains, which are in *others* originally, but are derived to them, or in some measure become theirs, by virtue of a benevolent union of heart with others. And there are other pleasures and pains that are originally our *own*, and not what we have by such a participation with others; which consist in perceptions agreeable or contrary to certain personal inclinations implanted in our nature, such as the sensitive appetites and aversions, etc.¹ And

¹ Works, iii., pp. 118, 119.

though self-love is far from being useless in the world, — yea, it is exceedingly necessary to society, — yet everybody sees that if it be not *subordinate* to and regulated by another more extensive principle, it may make a man a common *enemy* to the general system.”¹

The refutation of the charge that he makes God a selfish being follows a somewhat similar line of reasoning, but is too much expanded to be here presented. It is found in the treatise on God’s chief end in creation. What we wish to call attention to is the similarity of the above-quoted explanation to that given by Aristotle. The question comes up in his celebrated discussion of friendship, when he remarks :

“It is a question whether a man ought to love himself or some other best; for we may blame those that have an especial affection for themselves, and, as if it were disgraceful, call them self-lovers. The bad man seems to do everything for his own sake, and all the more the more wicked he is. They censure him, therefore, because he does nothing without reference to himself. But the good man acts from honor, and the more excellent he is the more he is governed by honor and by regard for his friend; but he disregards his own personal convenience. But facts are not in accord with these words, and not unreasonably so. For they say that one should love best the one who is most of a friend. Now he is most friendly who wishes good to another on his own account, even if no one should know it. Now this, as well as all the other things that make up the definition of a friend, is especially true in the relation of a man to himself, for it has been stated that from himself proceed all friendly feelings even towards others. And all the proverbs agree in this, as “one soul,” and “everything in common among friends,” and “friendship is equality,” and “the knee is nearer than the ankle”; for all these things exist especially in regard to oneself; for every one is a friend to himself, and therefore ought to love himself most.

“It is therefore a reasonable question, which of these views we are to follow, since both seem credible. Perhaps, then, it is necessary to analyze such arguments, and define how far and in what sense they are true. If then we were to take the word “self-lover” and see how each uses it, we should be likely to get at the truth. Those, then, who apply it as a reproach call those self-lovers who take to themselves the greater share of money or honors or bodily pleasures, for most men are striving after these, and are most desperately in earnest about them, as if they were the best things; whence also they are very much fought about. Now those

¹ Works, iii., p. 143

who are eager for such things gratify their desires and, in general, their passions and the irrational part of the soul. But most men are of this kind; hence also the appellation has arisen from the fact that the generality of men are bad. Accordingly it is just that self-lovers in this sense should be reproached. And it is clear that the many do call those self-lovers that so discriminate in their own favor. For if any one is always eager that he himself especially of all should do what is just or temperate or anything virtuous, and in general wishes always to win honor for himself, no one would call such a man a self-lover, nor blame him.

“And yet such a one would seem to be all the more a self-lover; for he assigns to himself what is most honorable and especially good, and gratifies the most superior part of himself and obeys this in every respect. And as the supreme part especially seems to be the state and every other system, so it constitutes the man; and therefore he that is devoted to this part, and gratifies it, is especially a self-lover. And so a man is called continent or incontinent according as the mind rules or not, as if this were the individual. And men think that what they do with reason they themselves especially do, and do voluntarily. Hence it is plain that this especially constitutes the individual, and that the good man is especially devoted to this. Hence he would be especially a self-lover, in a different sense from the reproachful one; differing as much as living according to reason differs from being governed by passion, or as desiring what is honorable differs from desiring what seems profitable.

“Accordingly all approve of and praise those who are chiefly concerned about honorable acts. If all contended for the honorable and strove to do the most honorable things, every one in general would have his due, and to every individual there would be the greatest of the goods, if virtue is what we say it is. So that it is necessary that the good man be a self-lover, for he himself will be delighted in doing what is honorable and will profit everybody else. But this is not necessary in the case of the wicked man; for he will injure both himself and his neighbors, following evil passions. To the wicked man, then, what he ought to do and what he does are at variance; but the good man does what he ought; for all mind chooses for itself what is best, and the good man obeys his mind. And it is true of the worthy man that he does many things on account of his friends and his fatherland, even if it becomes necessary to die. For he will cast aside money and honors, and, in short, all those goods that are objects of strife, gaining for himself honor. For he would prefer a great and short pleasure rather than a little and protracted one, and to live one year honorably rather than to live in the ordinary way for many years, and to do one great and honorable act rather than many little ones. This is what happens to those who die for their country. They choose great honor for themselves and would relinquish money that their friends might receive more of it; for the money goes to the friend, but

the honor to himself, so that he takes the greatest good to himself. And with respect to honors and great place it is the same; for he gives up all those to his friend, for this is honorable to himself and praiseworthy. Hence he is justly regarded as a good man, choosing honor before all things. It is even possible that he give up the performance of such acts to his friend, and that even more honorable than his own doing of a thing may be the causing a friend to do it. In all laudable things, therefore, the excellent man seems to assign himself the greater share of what is honorable. Thus, then, it is necessary to be a self-lover, as has been said; but in the way that the many are, it is not necessary."¹

In spite of all that has been written upon this question, nothing has been added to what Aristotle here gives us. Every source of misunderstanding is disposed of, with but a word in many cases, but a word that ends dispute. One touch is especially fine, where it is observed that a truly good man, whose sole end is upright conduct, will even stand aside to allow a friend to perform an honorable act, and thereby gain the greater honor. But the chief merit of this explanation is that it makes clear beyond all mistake that honorable conduct is in the nature of things a good in itself, and the highest good. Hence a man cannot be virtuous without securing to himself the greater good, aye, even aiming at it for himself. So that the altruist cannot escape aiming at his own greatest good, from the simple fact that self-abnegation may be the greatest good. For a man to disregard himself, in the sense of Aristotle that his reason or conscience is himself, is to be mad or wicked, and not noble. For a man to disregard his own desires and passions that he may obey his reason is not to disregard *himself*; unless his passions constitute himself, and not his reason. The whole question, therefore, depends upon the definition of self, and it would have saved uncountable disputes of those eager enthusiasts whose anxiety to repudiate selfishness is itself an illustration in its most annoying form of the feeling against which they contend, if these hasty correctors of mistakes that are really their own, but which they impute to others, would have strengthened their understandings

¹ Eth. Nik., ix. 8.

with a little study of the great moralists. Whatever definition be chosen there is no doubt that he is unjust (and therefore in the common sense selfish) who condemns others without a most thorough examination of their words; and it is never edifying—unless as a disgusting but wholesome medicament—to behold self-conceit striving to win popular applause by lauding unselfishness.

We cannot but regard the whole controversy between the opposing schools of moralists as depending upon a confusion between the final cause or end of actions and their result. It is quite possible—and we venture to say it is common—for two opposing authors to dispute *ad infinitum* simply because one uses the word “end” in the sense of purpose, while the other employs it in the sense of result. The difference inevitably leads to results as wide as the poles asunder. In one sense the end of virtuous action is itself—it is to act virtuously, to do what is right for no ulterior reason, but simply because it is right—because reason and conscience demand it, because it is complying with the law, because it is the greatest good, or whatever form of words be employed. But the end of virtuous action in the sense of the result, is happiness, and the greatest good to oneself. To confuse these two conceptions is to hopelessly involve the whole subject of morals; but this is what is too often done by the controversialists. The utilitarian really means that what is best for him is what will make him happiest, and he does not, as is too often absurdly supposed, maintain that the gratification of his senses will make him happiest, but the obedience to his reason; and this is precisely the virtue of the other school; so that if one says, I do this because it will make me happiest, and the other, I do this because it is right, their difference is only an accidental, and not an essential one; for, if they be pressed for further reasons, the one will reply, it will make me happiest because my reason will not allow me to act otherwise; and the other (if he can be persuaded to cease iterating, as Cicero does, from one end to the other of his treatises, without ever stum-

bling upon another idea — because it is right) must answer, it is right because reason requires it.

It is perfectly consistent with utilitarianism for a man to lay down his life for his friend or his country; and greater love hath no man than this. To insist that a man shall not think of the results to himself of his own acts is to insist that he shall not think of their results at all; to reduce virtue from a matter of reason to a matter of impulse. Now it is, perhaps, a sound view to regard virtue as not consisting in rational choice, but in good impulses; but if so, it should be properly explained before criticism of the existing theories which are certainly founded upon another basis. The proposition which harmonizes both schools is this: The virtuous man is he who so acts as to promote the highest good of all, by doing which he indeed insures to himself the highest good also; but what fills his mind in his deliberation and action is not himself — the thought that *he* is to be benefited, but the good results that are to follow. In other words, his view is purely objective, and the more it is subjective the less it is virtuous. Who does not recognize as those he *respects* most, those quiet men of clear and powerful reason who seem unconscious of their own existence in their devotion to the ends for which they labor; who sink altogether their own personality in their work, so that they are astounded when flatterers come to praise them; who dislike to be thanked or be reminded that they are admired, that being foreign to their purpose; men who do not wish to say, *I did it*; but *it is done*; perfect servants of God, who calmly fulfil their appointed round of duties, as the great earth quietly swings about the sun, not without internal commotions and struggles, as the earth has its tornadoes and volcanoes, but just as little affected by them, because of the immensely overmatching force of the divine controlling reason.

Before quitting this passage from Aristotle, it is important to notice the great principle implied in his remark that self-love in the bad sense means taking to one's self the greater share of money, honors, or sensual pleasures. It might be

asked why this should be so wrong, and yet it be so right to secure the highest degree of honor. One obvious distinction is that the former are means, while honor is an end-in-itself, or absolute good. This may have been the meaning of Aristotle; but there is a deeper truth in his remark. All such things as money, honors, and bodily pleasures are limited in quantity; while to honor itself no such relation can be applied. There are many human beings, and only a moderate amount of worldly goods. He, therefore, who seizes for himself a disproportionate share of the surface of the earth does unjustly; for he deprives another of what this other has an equal claim to, thereby sinning against his reason in making an exception to law in his own favor. So, as by a natural law the numbers of both sexes are made equal, he who does not content himself with one woman sins against justice. But with righteousness there is no limit, nor has any one yet found that for him there was no share of goodness. The fountain of virtue is not to be drained dry, though millions drink thereat; for it is inexhaustible as time, and like space it has no end. Here, then, the spirit of man finds its freedom; for there is nought to restrain, and no excess is possible. The appetites are not the man, as Aristotle says, but the mind; and to the free play of reason no opposition is found. What constitutes freedom is freedom from the control of the appetites, which are something foreign to the soul, and the most complete and hearty abandonment to one's own self, to the loftiest and widest flights that reason can attain.

It is not necessary, in these pages, to refer to the New Testament for passages to illustrate this great truth. For popular apprehension the language there used will not be superseded. But as a scientific basis for the possibility and reality of freedom, the absence of all quantitative determination of the will in its desire for truth and righteousness is as important as the presence of the same element in the decisions of justice. And here we may catch a glimpse, although an uncertain one, of the freedom proclaimed by

Kant. It would, however, lead us too far from our subject to follow further this discussion. We may content ourselves with simply recalling the profound remark of Aristotle, that virtue and justice are nearly the same, except that justice is relative, while virtue is absolute.

It may be remarked, in reference to Kant, that he apparently does injustice to Aristotle (although he does not refer to him by name) in his sweeping condemnation of Eudemonism. He says that "the consciousness of agreeable sensations, regarded as uninterrupted through the whole course of life, constitutes happiness; and the ruling principle to make regard to one's own happiness the supreme and single determination to action is the principle which is justly called self-love. Consequently all material principles which put the determinator of choice in the pleasure or pain resulting from the existence of an object are to this extent all of the same kind—that they belong to a system of Eudemonism, and rest on one's own self-love."¹ Now, as we have seen, Aristotle does not at all make happiness to consist of the consciousness of agreeable sensations, but in a virtuous, rational activity; and, although Kant is correct if his definitions be accepted, yet these definitions by no means represent the view of Aristotle. Again, we have seen that the principle of Aristotle is no material principle, but as purely formal as that of Kant himself; indeed, that both principles are at bottom the same, and differ rather as different aspects of the same truth than as opposing theories.

How much Kant misrepresents the view at least of many self-called utilitarians may be seen by taking one of his illustrations: "A fourth, possessing wealth, observes others struggling with difficulties; and, though he might easily assist them, he says, What concern is it of mine? Let every one be as happy as he can. I neither hinder nor envy any one, nor can I take the trouble to exert myself to advance his welfare nor to redress his sorrows."² This is not virtue in the utilitarian sense, which is to gratify not simply the

¹ Met. of Ethics, p. 79.

² Ibid., p. 34.

desire of ease, but all our impulses, including that of justice, and all in due proportion. Again, Kant says: "If a person were to attempt to justify his having borne false witness by alleging to his friend the sacred obligation he lay under of consulting his own happiness, by enumerating the profits and advantages accruing from this falsehood, and if he were in, conclusion, to point out the extreme cunning he had employed in the whole matter to fortify himself against detection, and to add that, although he now intrusted to his friend this secret, yet he was ready to deny it stoutly at any future occasion, and that in all this he was discharging a humane and reasonable duty,—certainly his friend must either laugh him to scorn or turn from him with disgust; although, if maxims are to be constructed singly with respect to one's own advantage, nothing of moment can be urged against such a line of conduct."¹ Certainly his friend, if a utilitarian, would laugh him to scorn or turn from him with disgust, and would be but a poor teacher of his principle if he could urge nothing of moment against such conduct. No man could take pleasure in such gains, and no gains are advantageous in the utilitarian view unless they afford pleasure, and that not mere sensual pleasure, but that higher delight that comes from the exercise of the moral reason. So that it is only the most degraded kind of Hedonism that Kant is opposing — that which, as Aristotle says, makes the man to consist in his appetites, and not in his reason; while the modern school of utility entirely coincides with Kant in making the reason supreme. The difference arises from the fact that they speak of the *test* or *proof* of right as if it were the *end* or *purpose*. The two eventually coincide, but ought not to be confused. The fact that a right act results in my own greatest happiness is a most serviceable and practical test of rightness; but it does not follow that it is the end present to the mind in action. If this be maintained by utilitarians, or any other school, they lie open to the destructive criticism of Kant.

¹ Met. of Ethics, p. 95.

The whole discussion of the question of pleasure by Aristotle is so admirable that it is an injustice to quote any part of it. He disposes with masterly good sense of those who maintain that pleasure in itself is an evil — a doctrine, it is safe to say, that is only theoretically held, and never exemplified. Pleasure, it is clear, cannot be the chief good ; but that does not hinder us from regarding it as a good. It is, in Aristotle's language, the perfection of an energy. It is not itself an end, except in connection with a virtuous activity ; it is like the bloom of youth to those in their prime. So long as perception and thought are in all respects sound, there will be pleasure in their exertion. Pleasures are of as different kinds as the activities — some good and some bad. Pleasure is not thought or perception, although some foolishly suppose that because they cannot be separated they are the same. Pleasure, then, is an invariable attendant of the activity of the perfect man ; it is not an efficient cause of happiness, but a formal one. Against pleasure as thus explained no reproach can be brought. It is not made the final cause of action, and, with this restriction, is a blessing, and not a curse, the fair handmaid of virtue, the exquisite scent of a perfect flower, and not the temptress of Hercules.

It might seem from the speculative character of the themes on which we have been engaged that the treatise of Aristotle was of an abstract description. But in fact this great philosopher intermingles with his practical remarks sentences of such deep and far-reaching truth as, if expanded, would indeed alter the appearance of the work. The explication of these truths may not, perhaps, be uncalled for in the present backward state of ethics in this country ; and yet it is certainly desirable to recall attention to the admirable delineations of the particular virtues that make up the most fascinating part of the *Nikomachean Ethics*. Especially noteworthy in the discussion of such subjects is the delicate discrimination in the meaning of the different terms employed in ethics. No preparation would be of greater advantage to the student, for instance, of Theological ethics, as

enabling him to thread his way understandingly through the confused maze of casuistry and speak convincingly to men, than a careful examination of these celebrated portraitures. They are gems as perfect in their way as cameos. Nor should the distinction be neglected, although we cannot here dwell upon it, of the virtues into those that are purely rational, and those that arise from the control of reason over the appetites, or intellectual and moral virtues. It is a distinction verbally known, but perhaps not fully appreciated in all its bearings, and would reward the student for its investigation. The same quantitative determination that we have already alluded to will be found here to mark the moral virtues and not the virtues of the reason. Here we may discover again an adumbration of the doctrine of Kant, that the soul is a thing-in-itself, or noumenon, and its true activity is free from all bonds of space and time.

Sir Henry Maine remarks in his "Ancient Law" on the total change effected in the science of ethics by the system of Kant. How can this be true, it may be asked, if the great principles of Kant were proclaimed by Aristotle in the work that, until this century, dominated the science? In reply it may be observed that Aristotle only implies what Kant makes most prominent. The system of Aristotle may be harmonized with the principles of Kant, which shows that it is in reality based upon the same truth; but the aim of Aristotle was especially descriptive, while that of Kant was speculative. It is no reproach to Aristotle that he did not elaborate principles in his ethics that were elsewhere discussed by him, and were here foreign to his purpose; nor is it any disparagement to Kant to say that the great Stagirite had dimly felt what he clearly saw — he, that sublime genius whose lofty flights conducted him so far into the realm of pure being that his voice descends to us as a voice from out of the heavens. All truth has ever been within the reach of man — the ability to discern it, no matter when, is the test of genius. The keen eye of the artist that detects, in a work that all but him have slighted and despised, the in-

spired hand of a former master, implies in himself the possession of a like inspiration.

All truth is one; and the deeper the penetration of two great minds the nearer do they approach. The works of both Kant and Aristotle in ethics are needed, and, one might almost add, no others. One point especially in which Aristotle fails us and where Kant's glory shines brightest, is the presentation of the only feeling, or correlate to feeling, that his vigorous system admits — reverence for the law. This "spring" of action is enough; but as much as this is needed. This humbles the haughtiest, be he king or philosopher. Back of this no mortal can ever go. To him who would still ask, when morality has been shown to be ordained by reason, Why should reason be obeyed? no answer can be given but that contained in these great words: "How naked reason, independently of every other spring, can be itself active and spontaneous, i.e. how the mere principle of the validity of its maxims for universal laws, independently on every object man may be interested in, can be itself a spring to action, and beget an *interest* which is purely *ethical*; to explain this, I say, *how reason can be thus practical*, is quite beyond the reach and grasp of all human thought, and the labor and toil bestowed on any such inquiry is fruitless and thrown away. The idea of a pure cogitable world, as an aggregate of reasonable beings, to which we ourselves belong, although still parts in a physical system, is a most fertile and allowed idea for the behoof of a reasonable faith, all knowledge falling short on this side of it. Nor can the august ideal of a universal kingdom of ends in themselves fail to excite in man a lively interest in the moral law, since mankind can only then figure themselves its inhabitants, when they most industriously adhere to the imperatives of freedom, as if they were necessary laws of the physical system."

[To be continued.]