

ARTICLE VII.

DALE ON THE ATONEMENT.¹

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THE Congregational Union of England and Wales has established, or as we may say, re-established, an annual lecture, or course of lectures, with a view to the promotion of biblical science and theological and ecclesiastical literature. Of these courses of lectures four have now been published: the one whose title is given above is the third. Most readers of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* will be already acquainted with Mr. Dale's name.

Like most that Mr. Dale has written, these lectures are very readable. A proof of this is that a fourth and cheap edition has just been published. The style is masculine, and ample use is made of good illustrations. We are inclined, however, to think that readableness has been secured at the expense of some scientific thoroughness, and especially of scientific completeness; and, after all, what we first look for in a scientific treatise is science. If Mr. Dale had held the reins of his rhetorical impulses tighter he would have left himself more space for the discussion of some branches of the subject which are but inadequately treated. Still the very defect to which we have referred will probably fit the book for awakening a wider interest in the subject, though it may prevent it from being of as much service to the theological student.

There are ten lectures and an appendix of notes. The lectures are headed as follows: Introductory; The History of our Lord Jesus Christ in relation to the Fact of the Atonement; the Fact of the Atonement — the Testimony of our Lord; the Testimony of St. Peter; the Testimony of St. John and St. James; the Testimony of St. Paul; General Considerations confirmatory of the preceding Argument; the Remission of Sins; the Theory of the Atonement illustrated by the Relation of our Lord Jesus Christ to the Eternal Law of Righteousness; the Theory of the Atonement illustrated by the Relation of the Lord Jesus Christ to the Human Race.

The introductory lecture is mainly devoted to a consideration of the necessity under which the Christian mind is laid of endeavoring to construct a theory or doctrine of the atonement. "It is very possible for our theory of the atonement to be crude and incoherent; but it is hardly

¹ The Atonement. The Congregational Lecture for 1875. By R. W. Dale, M.A., Birmingham. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

possible to have no theory at all. Some conception, however vague, of the relations between human sin and the death of Christ, and between the death of Christ and the divine forgiveness, will take form and substance in the mind of every man who believes that the teachings of Christ and his apostles reveal the thought of God. To speculate is perilous; not to speculate may be more perilous still." It may seem strange that it should be necessary at this day to defend the effort to form an approximately adequate rationale of the fact of the death of Christ and its relation to sin and punishment; but it is due to the religious obscurantism which is being fostered by the Plymouth Brethren, and others of like mind, who literally know not what they are doing; who dream not that they are preparing the way for a new kind of papacy.

Lectures II. to VI. are occupied with ascertaining the teachings of the New Testament as regards the *fact*, in distinction from a doctrine or theory, of the atonement; or, perhaps, rather with showing that the atonement is taught as a matter of fact. In effecting his purpose Mr. Dale appeals rather to the indirect than to the direct evidence. As he observes, the passages directly bearing on the subject have been collected and classified with great completeness, especially by Dr. Crawford in his work on the Doctrine of Holy Scripture respecting the Atonement; he therefore adopts a different method, and, as we think, very wisely. We agree perfectly with the remark that "a mere scattered catalogue of texts in which any great truth is definitely taught can never give a just impression of the place which that truth held in the thought and faith of the apostles. It might even be contended with considerable plausibility that the importance of a doctrine is likely to be in the inverse ratio of the number of passages in which it is directly taught; seeing that the Epistles were occasional writings, suggested by accidental circumstances, and that the central and most characteristic truths of the Christian faith are precisely those which the churches were least likely to abandon. From the very nature of the apostolic writings those truths which belong to the essence of the Christian creed are for the most part implied rather than taught." In fact we do not sufficiently remember that the method of Christ, at all events his primary method, was to evangelize by means of living men; not by books or letters. The latter were designed solely to confirm, encourage, correct, direct, and instruct those who already believed.

The second lecture deals with the evidence from what Christ himself was and did. The difference between him and prophets, apostles, nay all others, is thus described by Mr. Dale: "They were taught of God and they tell us what they have learnt. But the revelation is over when they cease to speak. Their personal character and history; their relations to their friends and to their enemies; their occupations, their sorrows and their joys — all these have only a secondary and human interest. It is not so with our Lord Jesus Christ. Far more of God was revealed in

what he was, in what he did, and in what he suffered, than in what he taught." Replying to a remark of the late Frederick Robertson, to the effect that if the atonement is so essential a part of the gospel, it seems very startling to say that in the most elaborate of all his discourses Christ should omit to mention it, and that it is "absolutely revolting to suppose that the letters of those who spoke of Christ should contain a more perfectly developed Christianity than is to be found in his own words." Mr. Dale well says: "The real truth is, that Christ's chief object in coming was that there might be a gospel to preach." Underlying, perhaps, most attacks on the Bible is the false or, at all events, twisted notion that its chief significance is due to the truths it reveals from God; whereas its chief significance is due to its recording what God has done in, for, and through men for the world's redemption. Primarily it is an historical, not a didactic, book. Mr. Dale brings this out well in relation to the one fact of the atoning death of Christ. To our mind this second lecture is the finest of the whole; concentrated, vigorous, and deeply impressive.

Many readers will be surprised, in reading the third lecture on our Lord's own teachings relatively to his death, to find how much there is in the Gospels bearing on the subject. The manner in which Mr. Dale gathers it up is as appropriate as it is effective. Two points alone can we touch upon. Referring to the notion that his death contributed to our redemption only by producing in us those dispositions which render it right and possible for God to forgive us, he well replies that, if this were so, his death would be no more intimately related to the remission of sins than every part of his public ministry. But how then did it happen that he never even incidentally, not even by implication, affirms that he wrought miracles or revealed truths for the remission of sins; whereas he does affirm that he died for that purpose? "He must have believed that the relation between his death and the remission of sins is different in kind from that which exists between his teaching or his example and the remission of sins." Again, how is the silence of our Lord in relation to such testimony as that of John the Baptist, "the Lamb of God taking away the sin of the world," in view of the idea of the sin-offering which possessed the mind of the Jewish nation, to be explained, if he had not come to obtain by his death the remission of sin?

We must pass over the lectures on the teachings of Peter, John, James, and Paul, though we had noted many points deserving of attention, and, after touching briefly on that headed "General confirmatory Considerations," go on to deal with Mr. Dale's theory. "There are very many persons," says he, "who believe that the idea of an objective atonement was invented in order to satisfy the exigencies of rigid theories concerning the divine justice. . . . This is precisely the reverse of the truth. Theologians did not invent the idea of an objective atonement in order to complete the symmetry of their theological theories. They have invented

theory after theory in order to find a place for the idea. That the death of Christ is the ground on which sin is remitted has been one of their chief difficulties." By way of illustrating this position a few of the chief theories of the atonement, including those of Gregory Nazianzen, Anselm, Luther, Calvin, Grotius, and minor names, are passed in review. Notwithstanding the statement that "it is no part of my intention to sketch, even in outline, the wayward and perplexed movements of speculative thought which [began with Irenaeus and] at the end of sixteen hundred years have not yet arrived at any satisfactory conclusion," we should have been glad if Mr. Dale had spared space elsewhere for this purpose. The course of thought on this subject, especially in Germany since the Reformation, has been deeply interesting; and a review of the chief explanations adopted would have materially aided in the formation of a deeper and truer view of the atonement.

But now to the theoretical portion of the treatise; and let us begin with the lecture on the Remission of Sins. It is mainly devoted to a refutation of the theory of Dr. Young, laid down in his "The Life and Light of Men," which Mr. Dale thinks renders forgiveness impossible; and of that of Dr. Bushnell in his "The Vicarious Sacrifice," which he thinks makes forgiveness unimportant. It seems to us a defect of form that the subject of the forgiveness of sins should be dealt with polemically. Mr. Dale says, indeed, "To attempt a philosophical demonstration of the possibility of the remission of sins is not my purpose. But I propose to examine a theory which, if it were true, would require us to believe that, in the nature of things, sin can never be remitted." Still it seems to us that the efficient refutation of one theory is scarcely possible, save on the basis of another theory; and the lecture would certainly have gained very essentially had the constructive method been pursued.

Two points in Dr. Young's position are assailed, namely: first, that the amount of penalty, visible and invisible, to the veriest jot and tittle, which the violation of law deserves is inflicted; secondly, that spiritual laws, as truly, or even more truly, than natural, being self-acting, these penalties inflict themselves. Against the first point Mr. Dale adduces the apparent inequalities in human experience of the penalties of sin, and apparent escapes from penalty altogether; illustrating his point by reference to cases of intemperance, profligacy, and fraud. Whether Dr. Young would allow these apparent escapes and inequalities to be really such, we know not. He *might* retort by asking: Do the sins you describe, in all cases bear the same proportion to the powers and opportunities of the sinner? If not, the penalty in each case may be exact, and yet not equal or alike. And to urge, as you do, that there is "a confederacy of powers to rescue the guilty from the evils with which these laws menace them" in favor of the possibility of "forgiveness," is to place yourself in another form on my side; for as this confederacy checks some of the penalties by checking some of

the *evil*, so God stops *all* the penalties by rooting out *all* the evil. Besides, even if the inequalities in question be allowed, it depends on the definition of forgiveness whether the fact is relevant or not. We have not been able to make out clearly which of the, at least five or six, different views of the forgiveness of sins Mr. Dale takes. In one place he says (p. 336 f.): "that the *remission of sins, if it stood alone*, would leave us *unsaved*, is one of the common-places of Christian theology; but it does not follow that the remission of sins includes the blessings which are necessary to complete our salvation, or is to be confounded with them. So long as the human heart is conscious of a two-fold misery — the misery of being under the divine condemnation, and the misery of being under the tyranny of evil habits which it cannot throw off, and of evil passions which it cannot subdue — it will passionately cry for a two-fold deliverance. *It is one thing to receive the divine pardon, it is another to recover the divine image.*" Here pardon seems to refer to the divine condemnation alone, and not to include escape from penalty, so far as "the misery of being under the tyranny of evil habits" is a penalty, as which it seems to be regarded by Mr. Dale. But elsewhere (p. 820) we read: "I do not regard the remission of sins as being absolutely identical with escape from the penalties of sin. Sin is sometimes forgiven, although some of the penalties of sin are not recalled. But the remission of sins must be understood to *include the cancelling of at least the severest penalties with which unforgiven sin is justly visited.*" If we take the view expressed in the second quotation, the fact above spoken of is relevant; if the first view, scarcely.

In reference to the second point Mr. Dale says: "Dr. Young's theory ignores the difference between the laws which ought to guide, but which often fail to guide, the conduct of persons and the laws which determine the sequence of phenomena; between ethical laws and those laws which in every sphere of man's individual and social life, from the lowest to the highest, are the same in kind as the laws of the physical universe." We scarcely think Dr. Young would object to this just distinction; but, to our mind, the question depends mainly on whether, as he assumes, there be an eternal law of righteousness, independent of God, to which God and all other beings are alike subject. If there be no such law — as we for our part believe, and if all law, whether natural or ethical, have its seat and root in God, then it is merely a question of terms whether we describe spiritual laws as self-acting, so far as the penalties of their violation are concerned, or as wielded by their author.

In point of fact, the question of penalties arises only in connection with ethical laws; for, as Mr. Dale has vigorously illustrated, natural laws cannot be disobeyed; or, to put the matter in a, to us, preferable form, the only forces that have the option of disobeying their laws are the ethical forces; consequently they are the only ones that can incur penalties. If this be true, Mr. Dale's distinction will only help him, if he can show that

Dr. Young's view of the relation between law and God is false. Judging from the extract from Dr. Young laid before his readers, Mr. Dale seems also to have pressed the word "immediate" rather unfairly; for, as we read him, all he means is that the spiritual laws *begin* to act at once, and go on acting "*as long as the evil remains.*" These last very important words of Dr. Young's have not been allowed their due weight. There is no denying, however, be it said, that Dr. Young has laid himself open to critical attacks, by the exaggerations which mark his style of discussion.

Mr. Dale's treatment of Dr. Bushnell's so-called "moral theory" of the atonement is just; and he deserves the thanks of all who are interested in biblical Christianity for his vigorous reassertion of such "austere" truths as the wrath of God.

As the remaining lectures contain the essential part of Mr. Dale's theory, we must give a somewhat full outline of their argument, and shall reserve our criticisms till the close. After a brief reference to the various New Testament representations of the death of Christ, and to the relation between Christ and the penalties of sin set forth in the words of scripture, we are introduced to the problem in these words: "In these lectures it is assumed that Christ was the eternal Word, who 'was in the beginning with God,' and that 'all things were made by him, and without him nothing was made that was made.' The question we have to determine is, the *relation between God himself and the eternal law of righteousness.*"

Is the will of God the ultimate ground of moral obligation — of the antithesis between right and wrong? No; for then we could not account for the recognition of moral obligation where the existence of God is denied or doubted; for if we impeach the absolute and eternal authority of our moral intuitions, we cannot trust any of our faculties; moreover, no mere command can create a duty unless there is an antecedent obligation to obey the authority from which the command proceeds. "Duty," in a word, "is inconceivable if moral obligation does not exist antecedently to the divine commands."

Nor can the origin of moral distinctions be found in the nature of God. "Conscience does not rest the moral obligation of justice on the fact that God is just, but affirms that justice is of universal and necessary obligation. We reverence God himself because he is righteous; not righteousness merely because by righteousness men become like God."

What, then, is the relation between the two? God's "relation to the law is not a relation of subjection, but of identity. Hence 'he cannot be tempted of evil.' In God the law is alive; it reigns on his throne, sways his sceptre, is crowned with his glory." "God, as a living person, must have the same authority over my will that conscience acknowledges in the eternal law of righteousness, if I am to worship and obey him; in other words, if he is to be my God."

As a part of this general question, the *relation between God and the*

penalties of sin is next investigated. Various views of punishment — the reformatory, the rectoral, the personal — are first examined, and the just conclusion arrived at, that the “only conception which satisfies our strongest and most definite moral convictions, and which corresponds to the place it occupies in the organization of society and in the moral order of the universe, is that which represents it as *pain and loss inflicted for the violation of a law.*”

“Is it necessary that this principle should be asserted, and asserted by God himself?” It is; “or else,” we are told, “the divine will cannot be perfectly identified with the eternal law of righteousness. God would cease to be God if his will were not a complete expression of all the contents of the eternal law of righteousness.”

“It is, then, inevitable that God should inflict the penalties which sin has deserved? Is the moral government of the universe a vast and awful mechanism, dispensing rewards and punishments from eternity to eternity in exact proportion to righteousness and sin?” This is not so; for “whatever moral significance might attach to the punishment of sin if punishment were inflicted by “self-acting” spiritual laws, its moral significance is immeasurably heightened if in every case it is the immediate or remote effect of a divine volition.” “The sufferings which punish sin in this world, and the sufferings which will punish it in the next, are the expression of the irreconcilable antagonism of God to sin and to those who persist in sinning. *It is this which gives them their transcendent significance.*”

But if these things be so, “it would appear that, if in any case the penalties of sin are remitted, some other divine act of at least equal intensity, and in which the ill-desert of sin is expressed with at least equal energy, must take its place. If God does not assert the principle that sin deserves punishment by punishing it, he must assert that principle in some other way.”

“The Christian atonement is the fulfilment of that necessity.” The principle in question would have been “adequately asserted had God inflicted on man the penalties of transgression.” It is asserted in a still grander form in that he to whom it belonged to assert by his own act that suffering is the just result of sin, endured the suffering himself, instead of inflicting it on the sinner.

The next question is: “*On what grounds could the moral Ruler of mankind so identify himself with our race as to assume our nature and endure suffering instead of inflicting it on us?*” Mr. Dale here goes back to the original relation of Christ; first to the universe generally, and secondly to mankind in particular. The former he finds set forth in Col. i. 15-17: “For in him were all things created that are in heaven and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones or dominions or principalities or powers; all things were created by [or through] him, and for [or unto]

him. And he is before all things, and by him all things consist." The latter is "illustrated in the simplest and most perfect manner by our Lord himself in the words, 'Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself except it abide in the vine, no more can ye except ye abide in me. I am the vine, ye are the branches: he that abideth in me and I in him the same bringeth forth much fruit; for apart from me ye can do nothing.' We truly live only as we live in Christ. Our highest life is life derived from him. . . . In a true and deep sense Christ is the 'Firstborn of all creation'; all ranks and orders of created beings, and even the material works of the divine power — through whatever is fair and noble in them — have a relationship to Christ more or less intimate or remote. Between man and Christ, according to God's thought, the relationship was meant to be near and vital." In other words, all creation, humanity especially, has its root, ground, subsistence, in Christ, and is through and unto him what it is.

Such being our relation to Christ, "there is nothing technical, formal, or artificial, in the prerogative of divine sonship which is conferred on all that are in Christ. Our own relation to the Father is determined by the relation of Christ to the Father." Hence "the real and frank consent to the justice of the penalties" of sin, without which there can be no redemption, and which Christ gave for us, becomes really, and not merely technically, ours; and when he submitted on the cross to be forsaken of the Father and die, he endured the "*actual penalty of sin*. . . . He made *our real relation to God his own*"; so that from thenceforth "his relation to the Father is no longer of a kind to render it untrue to our relation to God."

Further, not only do we originally live in Christ, but, as Paul seems to teach, "we died in his death"; "in his death our sin dies, and in his life the very life of God is made our own." This, too, was necessary; for "no assertion on God's part of the ill-desert of sin, no submission on our part to the justice of the penalties of sin, could have made it morally possible for the penalties of sin to be remitted in the absence of a complete security for the disappearance of sin. This moral security has been created by the sufferings of Christ on the cross. The death of Christ is the death of sin."

Mr. Dale's own summary of his theory is as follows:

1. "The death of Christ is the objective ground on which the sins of men are remitted, because it was an act of submission to the righteous authority of the law by which the human race was condemned — a submission by one from whom, on various grounds, the act of submission derived transcendent moral significance, and because in consequence of the relation between him and us, his life being our own, his submission is the expression of ours, and carries ours with it. In a real, and not merely in a technical, sense the act is ours."

2. "The death of Christ is the objective ground on which the sins of

men are remitted, because it rendered possible the retention or the recovery of our original and ideal relation to God through Christ, which sin had dissolved, and the loss of which was the supreme penalty of transgression."

3. "The death of Christ is the objective ground on which the sins of men are remitted, because it involved the actual destruction of sin in all those who through faith recover their union with him."

4. "The death of Christ is the objective ground on which the sins of men are remitted, because in his submission to the awful penalty of sin, in order to preserve or restore our relations to the Father through him, there was a revelation of the righteousness of God which must otherwise have been revealed in the infliction of the penalties of sin on the human race."

The first point to which we wish to direct critical attention is the notion of "the eternal law of righteousness" with which Mr. Dale operates. Our knowledge of this eternal law of righteousness is put on the same footing as our knowledge of the truths of pure mathematics; and we are told "we can trust none of our faculties unless we can trust those by which we apprehend the *universal* and *necessary* obligation of justice and truth, and which affirm the eternal distinction between good and evil." In short, our perception of right and wrong is our perception of "the eternal law of righteousness." But is this so? Right and wrong are surely qualities of relations between actually existent beings; and the relations between beings are surely determined by their nature. If this be the case, right and wrong, as far as men are concerned, can have had no existence till men were created; and right and wrong in the human sense can have no existence even now for beings whose nature is not identical with ours. What we perceive, is the rightness or wrongness of a possible or actual relation between ourselves and other beings; and assuming that wherever the same kinds of beings are similarly related the same things will be right and wrong, we attribute to our notion of right and wrong a sort of universality—a universality, however, which does not apply to beings not possessing our nature. But this is not identical with the perception of an *eternal* law of righteousness. Right and wrong were created for us when we were created what we are. This is evident from the simple fact that what is right and wrong for us is not right and wrong for one of the lower animals. An *eternal* law of *righteousness* can have no existence save in or for an eternal being; and, so far as we can see, even such a being can know nothing of such an eternal law, unless it be in relation; for both the idea of righteousness and the idea of law are unthinkable without relationship. The only senses, so far as we can see, in which our perception of right and wrong can be at all fairly described as the perception of "the eternal law of righteousness"—neither of which is indicated by Mr. Dale—are the following: When God thought in eternity the beings which he created in time, he thought, also, their relations, and thought those relations, of course, as right or wrong. When we

think right and wrong relations, it is because we perceive the divine thought; our perception is not merely a perception of the relations themselves as right or wrong, but of the divine thought of the relations. Hence the eternal and necessary element supposed to be in it. Or eternity is predicated of the quality of righteousness in this connection, because the one factor of the relation, God, is eternal. Whether either of these thoughts lies back of Mr. Dale's position, we know not. For our own part, we see nothing in our notion of right or wrong requiring us to give such an account of its rise.

We next come to Mr. Dale's treatment of the relation between God and "the eternal law of righteousness." When combating the idea that the antithesis between right and wrong originates in the will of God, he says that such a notion renders it difficult to account for an atheist's "recognition of moral obligation." We believe it to be impossible to give a scientific or philosophical account of the consciousness of moral obligation apart from the recognition of the existence of God; but we see no more reason why the denial of God should interfere with a man's sense of right and wrong, than with his idea of agreement or disagreement between an intellectual representation and a sensuous impression. God has created us both for the one and the other, and no denial of things outside of us will get rid of things that pertain to our very constitution. We may be unable to explain the origin of the distinction save by referring it to the will of God; but that does not affect the reality to us of the distinction itself. This by the way, for we cannot here enter further into the question of the reason of the so-called universal validity of mathematical and moral truths.

As was mentioned previously, Mr. Dale refuses to find the origin of the antitheses between right and wrong, or of the eternal law of righteousness, either in the will or nature of God, and says that this law is "alive in God," or is "identical with God." We confess that we do not quite understand the difference between his position and one of those which he repudiates. Suppose the eternal law to be alive in God, — either the two were primarily distinct and subsequently blended into unity, which cannot be Mr. Dale's notion, or the two were originally identical. In the latter case the question recurs: What then is the seat of this law in God? Is it his nature, or is it his will? Mr. Dale's mode of speech logically implies the former; for surely *life, identity, being*, are expressions relating to the nature and its modes of subsistence. Such objections as "we reverence God himself because he is righteous; not righteousness because by righteousness men become like God," are not met by the identification of the law and God; for one might reply, "in order to know that God is identical with the eternal law of righteousness I must have an independent knowledge both of the law and of God"; indeed, they rather suggest the independence of the law, as maintained by Dr. Young, which we reject as earnestly as Mr. Dale can do.

But, passing by minor points open to criticism, we must now go on to examine the final outcome of Mr. Dale's reasonings, his own rationale or theory of the atonement.

The problem is stated by him as follows: "If God does not assert the principle that sin deserves punishment by punishing it, he must assert it in some other way. Some divine act is required which shall have all the moral worth and significance of the act by which the penalties of sin would have been inflicted on the sinner; the Christian atonement is the fulfilment of that necessity." The alternative divine act thus required was accomplished when Christ submitted to "the awful experience which forced from him the cry 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' and to the death which followed." The question which then arises is, what constituted these sufferings of Christ a sufficient alternative for the infliction of the penalty of sin on the sinner? Mr. Dale's language seems to us at this point to lack its usual clearness and precision. After repeatedly and carefully examining his statements, we have been unable to avoid the impression — though we may be mistaken — that they contain irreconcilable elements. But we will give the reasons of our impression. So far as we can discover, the following are the grounds assigned for the sufficiency of what Christ suffered on the cross:

(a) *Endurance of the actual penalty of sin.* "On the cross he submitted to the actual penalty of sin." "He did not merely confess our sin; he did not merely acknowledge that we deserved to suffer. He endured the penalties of sin." By the awful experience he endured and his death "he made our real relation to God his own, while retaining — and, in the very act of submitting to the penalty of sin, revealing in the highest form — the absolute perfection of his moral life."

(b) "The death of Christ was a propitiation for the sins of men because it was a revelation of the righteousness of God, on the ground of which he can remit the penalties of sin; because it was an act of submission to the justice of those penalties on behalf of mankind, an act in which our own submission was really and vitally included; and because it secured the destruction of sin in all who, through faith, are restored to union with Christ." This statement seems to Mr. Dale "the complete truth." The same ideas are elsewhere expressed: "Act of submission to the righteous authority of the law by which the human race is condemned"; "Surrendered to desertion and to death that the justice of the penalties might be affirmed before the penalties were remitted"; "No assertion on God's part of the ill-desert of sin, no submission on our part to the justice of the penalties of sin, could have made it morally possible for the penalties of sin to be remitted in the absence of a complete security for the disappearance of sin."

(c) "The whole law — the authority of its precepts, the justice of its penalties — must be asserted in the divine acts." It was asserted in that Christ endured suffering himself, instead of inflicting it on the sinner.

He endured "penal suffering" in order that "the penalties of sin" might be remitted.

In these three sets of extracts there seem to us to be traces of the three following views of Christ's death: The *first* set would most naturally suit the doctrine that "what Christ paid when he became obedient unto death was exactly what sinners owed, or neither more nor less than an equivalent for it." The *second* seems to have more affinity, partly with the position of Dr. McLeod Campbell and Mr. Maurice, partly with a declarative, or perhaps a governmental or rectoral, doctrine like that of Dr. Wardlaw and many New England divines. The *third* set, again, reminds us of what Dr. Crawford calls the catholic view, which is, "that God has been pleased to appoint and to accept of the sufferings of Christ as a propitiation for the sins of all who trust in him; or that he has deemed these sufferings a sufficient ground for exempting all such from the penalties they have justly incurred"; in other words, the "Satisfaction view."

Our own explanation of these inconsistencies is this: that whilst Mr. Dale's philosophical premises led naturally to the "Satisfaction view," repelled by the coldness and unreality commonly characteristic of it, he has endeavored, on the basis of the idea of the vital headship of Christ, to deal with the death of Christ as "really, and not merely technically, ours." Hence the use of the strong terms about "penalty." But sensible of the impossibility of such an endurance of "the actual penalty of sin," he turned off towards the idea of submission to "justice," to "authority of law," to "righteousness" — between which and Campbell's "confession of sin" and the "repentance for sin" advocated by others, there seems to us an essential affinity. We think he would have found a solution of the problem more in harmony with his own instincts, equally, or indeed more, philosophical, far more exactly scriptural, and quite as just to all that is essential in the past thought of the church, in the *direction* indicated by Professor Dr. Schöberlein in a small, little known, but very suggestive, work, entitled, *Die Grundlehren des Heils entwickelt aus dem Principe der Liebe*.

Whilst we have freely hinted at some, and criticised other, defects of Mr. Dale's work, we cannot part from it without expressing our conviction of its value. Taken as a whole it is pre-eminently fitted to be useful. The inductive portion which deals with the scriptural evidence of the fact is admirably done — as fresh as it is thorough; and the theoretical part, though theoretically unsatisfactory, contains so much of important truth, forcibly, eloquently, warmly put, that it will be sure to arrest attention to its grand theme, and suggest to other minds new lines of investigation.