

ARTICLE VII.

WHICHCOTE'S APHORISMS.

(Continued from p. 393.)

The Chief End of Man.

19. That which is not original to itself cannot be final to itself. But to whom it belongs to be the first cause, to the same it belongs to be the last end: so God should be to us by our own act. He that is original to us by himself should be final to us by our choice. 848. It is certain that God intended himself to be the peculiar object of mind and understanding in man, because mind and understanding in man are beyond the satisfaction that is to be had in anything, but God himself: it is too big for the world, and too good for it. 762. Worship God in spirit, i.e. in the motion of the mind and understanding—in the free, full, noble, ingenuous use of a man's highest powers and faculties. To serve God with the determination of the understanding and the freeness of choice, first to judge, and then to choose; this is the immutable religion of God's creation, the service of angels and men, self-established, not depending upon institution, indispensable; the religion of the state of innocency, and there is nothing beyond this in the state of glory, but as perfected there.

The Moral and the Positive in Religion.

586. There are but two things in religion: morals and institutions. Morals may be known by the reason of the thing. Morals are owned as soon as spoken, and they are nineteen parts in twenty of all religion. Institutions depend upon scripture; and no one institution depends upon one text of scripture only; that institution which has but one text for it has never a one. 1084. The moral part of religion consists of things good in themselves, necessary and indispensable; the instituted part of religion consists of things made necessary only by the determinations of the divine will. He that denies the former is atheistical; he that denies the latter is infidel. 222. Institutes were never intended to be in compensation for failure in morals; but are all for the better security of morals, and give place to them, and are in subservience to them. 362. Ignorance of mere institutes may be invincible, because institutes must be declared by some instrument of God (by revelation); whereof the party may have no notice; but in morals we are made to know and judge and determine, and the light of God's creation is sufficient thereto; so that here there is no invincible, and consequently inculpable ignorance.

The Bible.

921. The sense of the church is not a rule, but a thing ruled. The church is bound unto reason and scripture, and governed by them, as much as any particular person. 1168. It is neither necessary, nor indeed possible, to understand any matter of faith farther than it is revealed; that is not revealed which is not made intelligible; that which can be put into words may be taken into a man's understanding. Mystery is not what is unintelligible, and cannot be understood now it is revealed, but that which is specific and critical in the profession, which they only understand who are *μεμνήμενοι*, initiated. 1034. It is usual in scripture to sum up all religion, sometimes in a single phrase, otherwhile in one word. The reason may perhaps be, because never any of these is alone. 1008. Several forms of words in scripture express the same state, and so vary only the notion — differ not materially, but in substance are the same. To stand upon nice and accurate distinctions of them is needless, useless, since scripture uses them indifferently (regeneration, etc.). This is fit to be known, to avoid troublesome multiplicity in religion, and the possessing the minds of men with thoughts that religion is more intricate and voluminous than indeed it is; whereas truth lies in a little compass and narrow room. Vitals in religion are few. 1048. Scripture mentions several particulars often (as Eph. iv. 31, 32); not so much for the sake of making the distinction accurate, as the exclusion universal. 993. We may observe scripture, in matters of disputation, — not to speak curiously, but rather loosely, — with indistinction, and sometimes to appear to favor both parts. 578. In doctrines of supernatural revelation we shall do well to direct our apprehensions, and to regulate our expressions, by words of scripture. 505. Curious determinations beyond scripture are thought to be the improvement of faith, and inconsiderate dulness to be the denial of our reason; fierceness in a sect to be zeal for religion, and speaking without sense to be the simplicity of the spirit. 981. Determinations beyond scripture have indeed enlarged faith, but lessened charity, and multiplied divisions. 1182. Enthusiastic doctrines — good things strained out of their wits. Among Christians those that pretend to be inspired seem to be mad; among the Turks those that are mad are thought to be inspired. 796. Morality is acknowledged and owned, is farther settled and established, by the gospel — is settled, as much as possible, viz. by the creation of man, by the grace of the gospel. 878. They are, therefore, greatly mistaken who in religion oppose points of reason and matters of faith, as if nature went one way, and the Author of nature went another. *Non aliud natura, aliud sapientia suadet.* 1188. Where the doctrine is necessary and important, the scripture is clear and full; but where the scripture is not clear and full, the doctrine is not necessary or important. 869. There is nothing in religion necessary which is uncertain.

The Punishment of Sinners.

1003. There are sufferings which are no punishments; as, 1. The effects of God's absolute sovereignty (Jacob and Esau); 2. Those which come for probation and trial (Job); 3. Which come for exercise and increase of virtue; 4. Which we are involved in through the neighborhood of sinners (Josiah overborne by Manasses' sin). 5. Which prevent sin and misery (as, knowing the power of infection, taking the righteous away by death from the evil to come). Those sufferings in this world only are punishments where sin is the natural or moral cause of suffering. 810. It is blasphemy to say, 1. That God is a true cause of the creature's sin; or, 2. The only cause of the sinner's misery, so that, if it were not for God's power, a sinner, as such, might be safe, and, saving the prohibition, good and evil are both alike. 1002. God abates of his own right, that the condition of man might not be forlorn. Wherever there is a right, there is a power to moderate and abate of that right; yea, to part with it, if we please. Any man may take less than his right—may pardon upon any satisfaction, upon no satisfaction. We all say we have this right; and will we deny it to God? 809. Future misery is not a foreign imposition by power, but an acquired constitution of mind; it is guilt of conscience and malignity of spirit. 918. The evil of sin depends not only on the will of God forbidding it; there is an intrinsic malignity in it, and it is destructive of the subject. 811. Punishment is not an arbitrary act according to will, but a reasonable act, directed by wisdom and limited by goodness. 819. The judge is nothing but the law speaking. 309. The end of punishment, with respect to God, is the vindication of his uprightness and righteousness; with respect to the sinner, it is the reformation and amendment of his life; with respect to the innocent, it is warning to fear and do no such sin. 310. Even the worst of God, his punishments, will recommend God to us. 30. Nothing is more credible than that men's states shall differ as much as their spirits and tempers do differ. 518. The same goodness which pardons the penitent, who forsakes sin, punishes the impenitent, who are obstinate in sin. 165. As sin is the worst evil that is done, so it is meet it should fare the worst. 760. Had God borne with the iniquity of his creatures, he had condemned his own law. The import of punishment is, that the law is right, and that God will maintain it; that sin is wrong, and that men must forbear it. 268. Punishment has in it the notion of a remedy, and has the place of a mean, not of an end. Now, as no more of a mean is to be designed than what is necessary to the end, and a mean is considerable only as it has a relation to the end, therefore if the sinner repents there can be no necessity of punishment; for the end is obtained without it, and there is nothing in punishment, save as a mean, in which goodness can take content. 269. The execution of punishment is for the defence of righteousness. 701. If God punish sin

committed, it is no more than just. Justice in God doth not require that sin repented of be punished. Goodness doth require that contumacy in sin (impenitency) be controlled. Sin committed may be punished; sin repented of may be pardoned, may be not-punished, without injustice. It cannot be found anywhere in scripture that there is any such attribute in God as necessitates him to punish sin repented of and forsaken, in respect of any perfection inherent in him. 840. An impenitent sinner during his impenitency, cannot be pardoned, because God cannot contradict himself. The rule of righteousness is the law of his action and the law of his nature. 525. The ground of man's misery is not the first fall, but the second fault—a lapse upon a lapse; for a second sin is not only another of the same kind, but a consummation of the first.

Principles involved in the Atonement of Christ.

635. An ingenuous mind and a true penitent doth with more difficulty forgive himself than God doth forgive him. 398. It is a more difficult work to reconcile men to God than to reconcile God to men. 536. God is the creditor of that punishment which is due upon sin, and he has the right of abating, as well as the right of exacting. 490. There is a just which of right may be done, and there is a just which of right must be done. The rule or law of righteousness or justice requires that to be done which justly ought to be done; but it doth not require everything to be done which justly may be done. In the former sense, it is just to punish sin committed (Neh. ix. 33); in the latter sense, God is not obliged in justice to punish sin repented of. 580. It is not necessary to the satisfaction of him who is offended that a perfect recompense should be made by the offender; but the offended is master of his own right, and may accept of ingenuous acknowledgment only from the offender as satisfaction, if he pleases, and expiation is then made when that which is displeasing is taken away by something which is pleasing. 465. God might have pardoned sin by his own right; but he did not think that the best way, and what God does not think best we are not to think of at all. 466. If God had pardoned sin without any amends [satisfaction], God would have been thought to countenance sin, and man would have thought sin no great matter. 82. He that threatens may be better than his word, and very well save his word; for no man is worse than his word because he is better than his word. 1022. In the gospel we are taught the expiation and the extirpation of sin. Satisfaction was necessary to make expiation, that the law might not be counted void, that sin might not be counted slight, that repentance might not be counted sufficient (and what hope is left to the incorrigible of impunity, which is not even allowed the penitent without satisfaction?), that punishment might not be counted arbitrary, that pardon might not be counted indifferent (but a thing meet, fit, and necessary for discountenancing sin), that grace might not be counted

exorbitant, that prerogative might not be counted dishonorable. By this satisfaction God provided for the discountenancing of sin, on the one hand, and for the saving of the sinner, on the other. 1104. The great excellence of Christ's sacrifice did consist in the moral considerations belonging to it. 1150. In the death of Christ there are, (1) many excellences, worthinesses, as resignation to God, compassion to man; (2) singular virtues exercised, as faith in God, patience, meekness, and gentleness; (3) due acknowledgements made, as man's debt of obedience, God's demand of right, the law's authority, the sinner's cause not defensible, creature's insolency corrected, eminent instance of impartiality; (4) fitting submissions to God, to raze out the memory of man's misbehavior by affectation, usurpation, insolence, bold practice, to restore a creature state; (5) singular intimations of the causelessness, filthiness, and demerit of sin; 6. necessary ends served, impediment to divine goodness removed, man put in a new way of life. 435. In case of offence, the just man overlooks what is involuntary without taking notice of it, and forgets what is voluntary, upon the satisfaction of repentance. 1055. Expiation of sin is made when, upon something done or suffered (either or both), according to God's pleasure, appointment, and acceptance, God is pacified, the fault is pardoned, the guilt extinguished, the punishment prevented, and the sinner released (*Ἀπολύτρωσις*, Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14; Heb. ix. 12. *Καθαρισμός*, Titus ii. 14; Heb. i. 3; 1 John i. 7. *Ἁγιασμός*, Heb. ix. 13. *Ἀθέτησις ἁμαρτίας*, Heb. ix. 26. *Ἰλαστήριον*, Rom. iii. 25. *Ἰλασμός*, 1 John iv. 10. *Καταλλαγή*, Rom. v. 10, 11). 1198. The law supposes that the judge is an advocate for the prisoner, and will suggest such defences as are lawful. 1199. In the reconciliation by Christ, the rights of God and the necessities of men are equally considered. 1119. Jewish sacrifice was *Ἀνάμνησις ἁμαρτιῶν*, Heb. x. 3. Christ's sacrifice was *Ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν*, Matt. xxvi. 28. 1069. The Jewish church was not so under the law as not to be under grace, and the Christian church is not so under grace as not to be under the law. 742. We partake of the death of Christ by passing into the spirit of Christ. The great work of Christ in us lies in implanting his own life (lively nature) in the lapsed, degenerate souls of men. Christ is not to be as in notion or history, but as a principle, a vital influence. 1063. It pleased God to provide such a justification of righteousness that it should be practised by Christ in the human nature of sinners, and such a condemnation of sin that the human nature of sinners, in which Christ practised righteousness, should notwithstanding die.

Pardon of Sin.

364. Our own righteousness is obedience; the righteousness of faith is pardon. 209. The sense of repentance is better assurance of pardon than the testimony of an angel. 1108. All acts of vindicative justice and merciful forgiveness are subject to wisdom. Actual punishment is not

necessary to the upholding of government, but only the power of punishing or pardoning, as seems good to wisdom. 768. When the sinner hath used his liberty to repent, and God hath used his prerogative to pardon, then sin, which hath been, is as if it had not been. 270. It is altogether as worthy of God, and as much becoming him, to pardon and show mercy in case of repentance and submission and reformation, as to punish in case of impenitency and obstinacy. 1156. (1) Sin is pardonable; (2) God hath a right to pardon; (3) It is very credible God will pardon those who repent; (4) It is not at all credible God will pardon obstinate and contumacious sinners; (5) In what way, in use of what means, upon what terms, God will pardon sin, lies in God wholly to resolve, determine, and declare; (6) It is declared in scripture that God doth pardon in and through Christ.

The second part of the volume containing Dr. Whichcote's Aphorisms (see pp. 384, 385 *supra*) is devoted to "Eight Letters of Dr. Antony Tuckney and Dr. Benjamin Whichcote, concerning the Use of Reason in Religion, the Differences of Opinion among Christians, the Reconciliation of Sinners unto God, the Studies and Learning of a Minister of the Gospel: written in September and October, 1651. 1758."

From the Preface to this second part of the volume, and from Dr. Dillingham's "Praefatio" to Tuckney's "Praelectiones Theologicae," we compile the following account of Dr. Tuckney. He was born in the latter part of 1599, "at Kirton, near Boston, in Lincolnshire, where his father was minister." At fourteen years of age he entered Emanuel College, Cambridge; took his first degree before he was seventeen years old; was chosen fellow of the college three years afterward. Having resided some time at the college, "where he "soon became an eminent tutor," he "went to Boston, as an assistant to the famous vicar of that town, Mr. John Cotton." When Mr. Cotton left the Boston of Old England for the Boston of New England, young Tuckney took Mr. Cotton's place in the famous church of old Boston, and was held in high estimation there as a preacher. He was one of the two men sent for the county of Lincoln to the Assembly of Divines at Westminster. "He is said to have been much considered in the Assembly, and obtained, as all the favorites did, a parish in London." "He is affirmed to have had a great hand himself in framing the Confession and Catechisms, and particularly to have drawn the exposition of the Commandments in the Larger Catechism." In 1645 Tuckney was made Master, and in 1648 Vice-Chancellor of Emanuel College, Cambridge. In 1653 he was chosen Master of St. John's College, and in 1655 Regius Professor of Divinity in Trinity College. From both these preferments "he was civilly turned out" at the Restoration. He then repaired to London, "was nominated a commissioner, on the Non-conformist side, at the Savoy Conference, but never attended," being

shrewdly suspected to have the ἀπὸρρύαγγη. His library was consumed in the great fire of London. He died at that city, in February, 1669, aged sixty-eight years, and was buried in the noted church of St. Andrew Undershaft.

"Dr. Tuckney printed some sermons in his lifetime; and seven years after his death, Mr. Jonathan Tuckney, his son, published in a quarto volume forty of his father's sermons; which he followed, in 1679, by a collection of all his Latin pieces, consisting of Sermons *ad clerum*, Positions, Determinations in the chair and for his own degree, Lectures," etc. He was a man of vast learning, "a ready and elegant Latinist," frank, faithful, earnest, conscientious. He was "no enemy to the royal or episcopal power, but above measure zealous for church power and ecclesiastical discipline." His friend, Dr. William Dillingham, describes him as a man, "indole alacri et amaena, ac ubi res postulabat, satis vehementi;" "Virtutis verae custos, rigidusque satelles." In one of his Determinations on the subject of divorce, he speaks of John Milton as "*infamis et non uno laqueo dignus*." On page xii. of Dr. Salter's Preface, Tuckney is described as "narrow, stiff, and dogmatical"; but on p. xv. we read that in Tuckney's "elections at St. John's, when the President, according to the cant of the times, would call upon him to have regard to the *godly*, the Master [Tuckney] answered: No one should have a greater regard to the truly godly than himself; but he was determined to choose none but *scholars*; adding, very wisely: "They may deceive me in their godliness; they cannot in their scholarship." Such incidents induce even Dr. Salter to say of Tuckney: "He was worthy to have lived in better times and a less prejudiced or bigoted age."

Being a high Calvinist, it is easy to see that Tuckney must have been annoyed by the opinions, perhaps yet more by the phraseology, of his pupil and colleague, Dr. Whichcote. The correspondence contained in this volume betrays an occasional irritability in both these divines. They had been uncommonly attached to each other. Their theological differences caused an evident, perhaps a permanent, alienation. One prominent question on which they dispute is this:

Do all good men agree in doctrine substantially?

Whichcote contends that they do; that "for one *real* difference in matters of consequence, between persons considerable, there are twenty mistakes of meanings." Controversialists "too often study to represent each other in the worst sense. I perceive it in men alive, therefore suspect it of the dead" (p. 52). Tuckney treats Whichcote's word "*substantially*" as modern controversialists treat the phrase, "*for substance of doctrine*." That word, he says, "is a good salvo." How can we determine *who* are good men? The most "pestilent heretics" have not been "*sine larva pietatis*"; they "have been in outward demeanor, at least for a time, sober and some severe, but *sobrii ad evertendam rempublicam*; enough to

justify what I said, that we are rather to look at their doctrines than their persons" (p. 78).

As Whichcote contends that good men, "agreeing in scripture forms of words should rather think they do agree than not" (see above, p. 393), the question arises:

Shall theologians, in their teachings, confine themselves to biblical phraseology?

Tuckney says: "The child, it may be, will better understand the mother's lisp than when she speaks more plainly. All children's catechisms are not made up of the express words of scripture. Other words, expressing the true sense of them, may more distinctly and particularly discover any corruption; which was the occasion of orthodox divines in all ages framing of new words and expressions, more punctually to hold out old truths against heretics' innovations, that, as *they* in their own words give a false sense of scripture, so *we* in ours may give a true" (pp. 25, 26). In the course of the correspondence, the tables appear to be turned; and Dr. Tuckney, who condemns his colleague for exaggerating the importance of biblical phrases, condemns him also for departing in his style from the biblical standard. He advises him thus: "Affect not to speak in school-language, nor to run out in school-notions; it is far different from the scripture, both style and matter," etc. (pp. 37, 60). Of an expression used by Whichcote, Tuckney says: "It is "a stranger to scripture manner of speaking, which, as *all* should much heed, so I expect that *you* will, especially, who before, in contradistinction of the fallible expressions and forms of words of man's making, judged, and that truly, scripture expressions to be aptest to convey all saving truths to our understandings" (p. 35).

Dr. Tuckney often counsels his former pupil to read Plato and other heathen philosophers less, and the Christian divines more, and condemns him for devoting too much attention to the scholastic and the Arminian writers. Hence comes the question:

Was Dr. Whichcote misled by the schoolmen and the Arminians?

"I said," writes Tuckney, "I was sorry to see you tread, in these proposals, in somebody's footsteps. . . . Sir, those whose footsteps I observed were the *Socinians* and *Arminians*; the latter whereof I conceive you have been everywhere reading in their works, and most largely in their *Apologie*" (p. 27). "Some are ready to think that your great authors, you steer your course by, are Dr. Field, Dr. Jackson, Dr. Hammond — all three very learned men, the middle sufficiently obscure, and both he and the last, I must needs think, too *corrupt*" (p. 38). Whichcote's reply to these charges is somewhat conclusive: "And truly, sir, you are wholly mistaken in the whole course of my studies. You say you find me largely in their *Apologia*. To my knowledge I never saw or heard of the book before, much less have I read a tittle of it. I should lay open my weakness, if I should tell you how little I have read of the books and authors

you mention; of ten years past, nothing at all: I know not who should be your informer; but truly, in a thousand guesses, you could not have been farther off from the truth of the thing. And for schoolmen, I do not think I have spent four and twenty hours in them *divisim* these fourteen years. Dr. Field, on the church, I read, over eighteen years ago, but have not looked into him, I believe, these ten years; Jackson and Hammond I have a little looked into, here and there, a good while since, but have not read the hundredth part of either of them. Truly, I shame myself to tell you how little I have been acquainted with books, but for your satisfaction I do. While fellow of Emanuel College employment with pupils took my time from me. I have not read many books, but I have studied a few. Meditation and invention hath been rather my life, than reading; and truly, I have more read Calvin and Perkins and Beza than all the books, authors, or names you mention" (pp. 53, 54). "*Bene novi quam sibi mihi curta supellex*" (p. 55).

A plausible charge made by Tuckney against his colleague regards not so much any single item as the *general proportion* of Whichcote's teaching. The power of the assailant is seen in his method of marshalling his forces for an assault along the whole line. The question is suggested:

Did Dr. Whichcote say too much of man's noble qualities, and too little of the sovereign grace of God as manifested in the gospel?

The aphorisms in the present Article, and in the Article on pp. 384-393, suggest the plausibility of this charge. With compressed force, Dr. Tuckney sums up his accusations thus: "The power of nature in morals too much advanced; reason hath too much given to it in the mysteries of faith—a *recta ratio* much talked of, which I cannot tell where to find, Mind and understanding is all; heart and will little spoken of. The decrees of God questioned and quarrelled, because, according to our reason, we cannot comprehend how they may stand with his goodness, which, according to your phrase, he is *under the power of*. Those, our philosophers, and other heathens, made fairer candidates for heaven than the Scriptures seem to allow of; and they in their virtues preferred before Christians overtaken with weaknesses. A kind of a moral divinity minted, only, with a little tincture of Christ added; nay, a Platonic faith unites to God. Inherent righteousness so preached as if not with the prejudices of imputed righteousness, which hath sometimes very unseemly language given it, yet much said of the one, and very little or nothing of the other" (pp. 38, 39).

Some of the most eloquent passages of Dr. Whichcote contain his attempt to show that he exalted human reason in order to magnify the grace of God. "I endeavored," he says, "to make it appear that the truth declared by God concerning our relief by Christ was amiable, grateful, acceptable to mind and understanding, and such as spake itself from God, as our Saviour spake himself to be Christ to the inward sense

of the Samaritans. And to this purpose reason was made use of as a receiver, as a discerner, as a principle to be instructed and taught, not as an author or inventor or controller of what God speaks; divine truth always carrying its own light and evidence, so as that the mind receiving it is illuminated, edified, satisfied. *Sacra scriptura est divinitus est deo digna, est fide digna*; it speaks for itself; it recommends itself to its subject; it satisfies the reason of the mind, procures its own entertainment by its own excellency. I add, also, that the persuasion of the Holy Spirit contributes to the mind's assurance and satisfaction. I receive the truth of Christian religion in a way of illumination, affection, and choice. I myself am taken with it, as understanding and knowing it; I retain it as a welcome guest. It is not forced into me; but I let it in, yet so as taught of God, and I see cause for my continuance to embrace it. Do I dishonor my faith, or do any wrong to it, to tell the world that my mind and understanding are satisfied in it? I have no reason against it; yea, the highest and purest reason is for it. [What doth God speak to, but my reason? and should not that which is spoken to hear? Should it not judge, discern, conceive what is God's meaning?] (pp. 47, 48).

"That precept of wisdom, 'Acknowledge him in all thy ways,' I am sure, overrules me; head, heart, hand; it is the inward sense of my soul, digested into a temper, complexion, constitution. I never leave God out; I ever give him the principal place; *omnia a Deo, omnia sub Deo, omnia cum bono Deo*. In the sense of my mind, I was very far from taking from God to give to myself. God is really all in all to me; I hold of him, derive from him, live by him, enjoy myself under him, hope in him, expect from him. There is nothing more written in my heart than the sense of my dependency upon him; there is nothing that I am more free to acknowledge than his influence, operation, and presence. So far was it from me to understand what you fetch out of the words, that nothing seems to me more horrid, monstrous, violent, contra-natural. My heart riseth with indignation against such a thing; I have a perfect antipathy in my soul against it; I should sin against all the experience I have of God in my life, if I should say or think such a thing" (p. 58).

"With all my heart and soul I acknowledge and assert (and wholly depend thereon) the Holy Spirit's superintendency, conduct, presence, influence, guidance, government of man's mind in the discerning of the things of God. There is nothing that I have more insisted upon, and more carefully endeavored to demonstrate, *de industria*, upon texts purposely chosen; occasionally still interposing clauses to this purpose. Yea, it had a large place in my speech, at which, you say, so much offence was taken. I am not clearer, fuller in any point; I experimentally know it, I thank God, to be true; I have witness of it within me; it is my sufficiency; it is my strength; it is my security; God with me is all in all. God forgive them the palpable breach of the ninth commandment who have

defamed me in this kind. Nothing is less true of me; I might rather have been accused of any evil in the world" (99, 100).

"I count it true sacrilege to take from God to give to the creature; yet I look at it as a dishonoring God to nullify and make base his works, and to think he made a sorry, worthless piece, fit for no use, when he made man. I cannot but think of a noble, able creature, when I read, *ad imaginem et in similitudinem Dei*; or if, *in statu lapso*, it be as nothing, then you vilify the restitution by Christ" (pp. 112, 113).

Did Whichcote believe in the vicarious atonement?

In the letters of Dr. Tuckney there are intimations that his colleague regarded the death of Christ as operating not on God, but only on men; the ground of God's reconciliation being something in us, and not being his own free grace (p. 4). Whichcote replies: "Christ doth not save us by only doing for us, *without* us; yea, we come at that which Christ hath done for us with God by what he doth for us *within* us. . . . Christ is to be acknowledged as a principle of grace in us, as well as an Advocate for us. For the scripture holds forth Christ to us under a double notion: (1) to be felt in us, as the new man," etc.; "(2) to be believed on by us as a sacrifice for the expiation and atonement of sin," etc. "They therefore deceive and flatter themselves extremely who think of reconciliation with God by means of a Saviour acting upon God in their behalf, and not also working in or upon them to make them godlike" (pp. 13-15).

"I am very free to acknowledge Christ the only foundation since the apostasy and sin of man. He alone gave the stop to God's just displeasure; his interposing prevailed with God not to take the forfeiture; or, if taken, he procured the restoration and recovery" (p. 126). "You have no cause to suspect me for scant and narrow apprehensions of free grace, Christ's merits, and divine goodness. Yet I confess my shallowness; but that is my grievance and burthen, and I would have my apprehensions raised and my thoughts of the gospel enlarged. I attribute to the creature, upon its own account, nothing but unworthiness, inability, and insufficiency, and look at Christ as the only ground of acceptance, and his Spirit as the only principle of enablement, power, and sufficiency (p. 127. See also pp. 123, 124).

The suspicion that Whichcote was inclined to Socinianism he regards as a result of his reliance on argument and reason; but he says that, for employing rational proof against the opposers of orthodoxy, "I deserve as little to be called a Socinian as David for extorting Goliath's sword out of his hand and cutting his master's head off with it did deserve to be esteemed a Philistine" (p. 62).

The Westminster Assembly's Catechism.

It is evident that while Dr. Tuckney regarded his pupil as too liberal in his tendencies, Whichcote regarded Tuckney as exorbitant and domineering. In his Second Letter he makes the following significant allusion:

“For my own part, I plead not for liberty of proposing, though I would be very glad not to be imposed upon; for I understand our Saviour, ‘Cast not your pearls [before swine] lest they [turn again and] rend you,’ as granting a dispensation for reservation and secrecy in case persons will be mischievous” (p. 53). In Dr. Tuckney’s Third Letter, he replies to this insinuation in a manner which will surprise those who know his interest in the Westminster Assembly (see p. 769 above): “For matter of imposing upon, I am not guilty. In the Assembly I gave my vote with others that the Confession of Faith, put out by authority, should not be required to be either sworn or subscribed to (we having been burned in the hand in that kind before), but so as not to be publicly preached or written against; which, indeed, is contrary to that ‘liberty of prophesying’ which some so call for, but you say you plead not for; though your second advice in your sermon seemed in mine and other men’s eyes to look fully that way. But I believe what you now write, and only add that, as you plead not for that liberty, so what hath been said by others hath not been to impose on you, but only as freely to assert what they think is truth, as what you did assert was so in your judgment, and therefore were not culpable of maintaining, *rixas et lites*, as hath been charged. Though I heartily and humbly desire of God that we may either so inwardly agree, or outwardly not express disagreement, that we may not give occasion of advantage to more sorts of men than one that watch for our halting” (pp. 76, 77).

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTES ON EGYPTOLOGY.

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THE science of Egyptology has sustained a severe loss in the death of M. le Vicomte Emmanuel de Rougé, Member of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles-Lettres, Curator of the Egyptian Museum in the Louvre, Professor of Archaeology in the College of France, and a principal editor of the *Revue Archéologique*. For a quarter of a century M. de Rougé had stood at the head of French Egyptologists, and he had contributed as much as any scholar of his time to the elucidation of Egyptian antiquities. The following list of his principal publications will witness to the activity of his mind, and the fertility of his pen; many other essays are scattered through Reviews, and the Journals of Scientific Academies and Societies.

1846: L'examen de l'ouvrage de M. Bunsen. 1848; Sur les éléments de l'écriture démotique des Egyptiens; published in the form of a letter to M. de Saulcy. 1849: Mémoire sur l'inscription du tombeau d'Ahmes.