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A table of contents for *Bibliotheca Sacra* can be found here:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_bib-sacra_01.php

an evil heart of unbelief in departing from the living God." If the religion is true, we cannot understand our scriptures without a spirit which is in harmony with them. In the neglect of true Christian culture, in the disuse of spiritual communion and a loving, obedient endeavor, the mind will grow dark. It is an appalling retribution, that they who exclude the light gradually lose the power to see. As fishes in dark caves have rudimentary eyes, but no vision, so, if the real truth is disliked, or regarded with prejudice, the mind will be darkened to its perception. We meet a blind man, with downcast face and hesitating step, groping his way along the street, and are sad for our blind brother. But how much more an object of compassion is he of the sightless soul.

ARTICLE V.

DEMOSTHENES AND THE RHETORICAL PRINCIPLES
ESTABLISHED BY HIS EXAMPLE.

BY THE LATE GEORGE SHEPARD, D.D., PROFESSOR IN BANGOR THEOLOGICAL
SEMINARY.

It is a remarkable fact that eloquence is to be found in its highest and best state at so early a period of its history. It is another remarkable fact, that there has been an almost universal concurrence in the sentiment that places Demosthenes at the head of all the eloquent. Men have differed in most other matters. But all eyes, from all countries and all ages, have agreed to look upon Demosthenes as the prince of orators. The verdict of all time being as it is, and being right, probably, I have selected him as being thus the highest authority in all matters of eloquence, and, for the purpose I have in view, shall first give a mere outline of his training — a summary of the qualities of his manner and style — and then proceed to derive from him certain oratorical lessons; using him as a teacher and corrector, and

bringing to this acknowledged standard some of the doctrines and practices of these later times.

The Grecian orator was born about 385 B.C. His father, who was respectable and affluent, died when he was seven years of age. This event placed him under the care of guardians, who plundered his property, while they neglected his education. As to native endowments, it is said, there was no early evidence of anything very remarkable. As to physical constitution, we are told, he was of a slender, sickly habit. But while his body was originally weak, his passions were strong — that for distinction showing itself decisively. The vindictive passions, also, were very prominent and active.

The fire of eloquence was early enkindled within him. Hearing Callistratus deliver an oration, Demosthenes felt the charm of his oratory, beheld the distinction it conferred, and then and there resolved to become an orator of the very first order. He resorted for instruction to Isaeus, on account of the nerve of his style, rather than to Isocrates, who was the more celebrated rhetorician. Cicero intimates that he had help from Plato. But Demosthenes, to a great extent, brought himself on by self-culture, severe personal drill. In this part of his course there was the utmost diligence and decision. However, previous to this protracted and rigid self-discipline, he made some public attempts. The first was a prosecution of his guardians, who had defrauded him of his patrimony. Here he succeeded so well that he adventured further. He stepped on a higher arena, and failed. He was laughed down and hissed away. But he carried with him an indomitable spirit, that said, in the depths of his disgrace: I will return, and stand in this same place, the first orator of Athens. He went out of sight. He went underground. His failure was prominently in the matter of delivery. He entered his subterranean abode, chiefly to practice and perfect himself in this. There he studied and practised, sallying forth into the light only to get the material used in his solitude — having shaved one half of his head,

that there might be no possibility of another premature attempt.

Of the fitness and efficacy of some of his resorts it is now difficult to judge favorably. How speaking when out of breath should strengthen the lungs, or how articulating with pebbles in the mouth should cure stammering, we can hardly understand. They are certainly remedies which are not resorted to now. But his attention during his withdrawal from the world was not wholly given to the proprieties and graces of action. He tasked most severely his powers of thought, and composed many of those passages, and even orations, which have since been the admiration of the world.

It was eight years before Demosthenes appeared again before a popular assembly ; and soon after the field opened admirably for his nervous and heated eloquence. Philip, by craft and bravery, was fast striding to the sovereignty of all Greece, as he went on trampling state after state into subjection. The Athenians, who alone could have brought him to a stand, or turned him back, looked on with indifference. On these two points—the arrogant, deceiving, all-grasping Philip, and the uncaring, supine Athenians—did the mind of the orator fasten and glow and blaze. He was favored with an audience that could feel all that was forcible in the sentiment and spirit, and appreciate all that was melodious and fine turned in the style of his eloquence. The common people were masters of the language ; critics, often, in its scholarly niceties ; practiced judges upon every species of oratory. It became a speaker to be careful how he came before such auditors. And Demosthenes was careful. He appeared willingly only when he had prepared himself thoroughly. The preparation extended, not merely to the gathering of material, the framing of the argument, the arranging of the thoughts and illustrations, but to the nice choice and position of the words ; occasionally to the musical balance of the sentences ; in short, to the utmost closeness, richness, strength of the language. This did Demosthenes and Pericles, and the greatest orators of that age.

Demosthenes was remarkable for growth in the line of effectiveness, up to the last effort he made. His last effort, the oration *Περὶ Στεφάνου*, was his greatest; this being made at the age of fifty-five, in the year 330 B.C., eight years before his death. What I have to say in this connection will have exclusive reference to this, which is called his masterpiece.

The occasion of it was as follows: Soon after the defeat at Cheronea, which determined the subjugation of Greece and the complete ascendancy of Philip, Demosthenes, who had prepared for, and even advised to, this battle, was assailed by the voice of faction, because his measures had been unsuccessful. At this juncture, Ctesiphon, on the part of the friends of Demosthenes, that the clamor of unreasonable men might be silenced, moved a decree in the senate, to be ratified in the popular assembly, that Demosthenes be crowned with a golden crown, in consideration of the liberality of his private expenditure upon a public work with which he was intrusted. The senate agreed to the measure. But ere the question came before the popular assembly, Aeschines, the rival and enemy of Demosthenes, commenced a prosecution against Ctesiphon as the mover of a decree which was contrary to law: First, Demosthenes, being a public accountant, had not passed his accounts and had them approved; and the law was, that no such person should receive a crown till his accounts had been examined and approved. Secondly, the crowning was proclaimed in the theatre, which was contrary to law. Thirdly, the motion was full of falsehoods, stating that the conduct of Demosthenes had been honorable and highly serviceable to the country, when the fact was far otherwise. It was eight years before this memorable contest between these two greatest orators of the age came on.

At length the tribunal, composed of five hundred of the wisest and best citizens of Athens, was seated, and around them crowded myriads of eager auditors, curious to hear the advocacy of a cause which would range over a space of

twenty years, and bring in for argument and illustration all the great national affairs and events for that long and pregnant period. Aeschines opened with great ability, and in his speech expressed the wish that Demosthenes might be compelled to use the same method of arrangement in his defense, which he himself had used in the accusation. But no such power was exercised against Demosthenes. He was allowed his own order, which was far better for him than the one Aeschines prescribed. What Aeschines would have him put first, and make the chief point, Demosthenes reduced down to the smallest possible size, and laid away very quietly in the middle of his speech.

Our orator begins by conciliating his audience; meeting at the threshold the obnoxious attribute of egotism, which would be forced into his speech by the nature of the argument,—it being very prominently a defence of his own course and the measures of his administration. He cast the blame of this feature upon his adversary, who had instituted an impeachment of such a nature. He implores a kind and candid hearing, on the ground that everything was at stake with him. He affects not to come at once to the main question, because his adversary had not kept to it. He had brought in matters foreign, false, and injurious to himself, which he must meet and correct at the outset, or the judges would not be in a state to view his case impartially. He goes on, then, to raise a sentiment in his own favor, even to excite a spirit of admiration toward himself. To this end, he passes over, in a rapid and suggestive sketch, past events in which he and Aeschines had been prominent—brings to view the craft and hostility of Philip, his fearful encroachments, his own inflexible opposition to all his schemes, and the favor and service Aeschines had done Philip to the detriment of Athens. He avails himself here of the strong national sentiments and feelings of his countrymen, touching upon topics which feed that feeling, that he might be carried on its tide toward his great object. Having thus prepared the way, the orator ventures upon the ground of the laws

respecting the crown, which was his adversary's strong and main point, and his weak one. He affects to meet it fully and fairly; he makes it all so clear and obvious, by a few strokes, that he all but apologizes for turning aside from his main drift to notice it at all. He then turns back again most willingly to the topics he was on before; gives them more expansion; shows that the failure of his measures was to be attributed to fortune. The measures he advised to were the only likely and practicable ones. No one *did*, no one *could*, show any better. He defies his antagonist, even now, if he can, to point out any better; and, in an unparalleled strain, ascribes to the actors in those adverse events the high glory of following in the footsteps of their ancestors. He compares his own resources in the conflict with those of Philip; shows that he had been embarrassed and defeated in his patriotic designs by the influence of Aeschines and his party, who all along played into the hands of Philip. He comes, next, to more private matters — to the personal character and conduct of Aeschines and himself; and here are epithets of reproach, and passages of scorching obloquy, which cannot well be matched. He then draws a picture of a good citizen, to show, by the contrast, the vileness of his adversary; and concludes with the sentiment, which, indeed, runs through the speech, that Aeschines was with Philip, and against the country; Demosthenes, the opposite.

Wherein, now, lies the power of this speech of Demosthenes, or of the speeches of Demosthenes generally? We may answer this negatively, and say: It is not in a few detached and remarkable passages, which you can take out, and they shall seem as admirable and forcible as they are in the piece. There are not in this speech the unevennesses and the contrasts which sometimes appear in our eloquent men. It is earnestness, passion, progress throughout. Again, it is not the power of pregnant, condensed thought and sentiment. It is a rare thing, comparatively, to find in Demosthenes a great and independent sentiment or maxim, such as Burke, for example, abounds in. We read on a

long way in the great speech before we find a substantial one like the following: "It becomes individuals in their private concerns, and the state in public affairs, to shape their subsequent conduct in consistency with the brightest passages of their former lives." Admirable this; but few in our orator like it.

Nor was his power at all in pathetic appeal, nor in the kindred attribute of humor; for in both these he was almost wholly wanting. If he possessed, he did not use, either power. His eloquence was of the bare, unrelieved, severe sort. He had, in more senses than one, great severity. Singularly severe in the bad, the abusive sense, he had in an almost frightful degree the power of withering sarcasm and cumulative reproach. He calls his adversary "a reviler," "a wretch," "a miscreant." "Why, then, wretch, do you bring your false accusations? Why do you fabricate your lying words? Why do you not purge out your filth with hellebore?" He calls him "a pompous declaimer," "a slanderer," "a sneer-monger," "an unhallowed villain," "the offscouring, the hack of the courts," "word-spawner," "execrable pedagogue," "a most abandoned citizen, the common pest of all that have perished—men, districts, cities." Though Demosthenes had the eloquence of Paul, he had nothing of his spirit. His was the spirit of utter selfishness, of intense, unappeasable revenge.

Let us turn, now, to the rhetorical severity. "In nothing," says Lord Brougham, "is the vast superiority of the chaste, vigorous style of the Greek orators and writers more conspicuous than in the abstinent use of their prodigious faculties of expression. A single phrase, sometimes a word, and the work is done,—the desired impression made, as it were, with one stroke; there being nothing superfluous interposed to weaken the blow or break its fall." This rigid abstinence extends to matters of figure and ornament. The extended, gorgeous, high-wrought figure is not found in our orator. Often is it the extreme of the brief and the simple,—as in that celebrated one, the *ὄσπερ νέφος*. The heavens had

become black with overhanging perils, when, with one magic touch, the orator causes them all to pass away before the potency of his decree, *ὡσπερ νέφος*, "as a cloud."

Before proceeding further in giving specimens of our orator's figures, we remark that there is really a dearth of figures, that is, such figures as one can take out, and hold up as specimens, with good effect. Still, though this characteristic has led some critics to deny the fact, we are compelled to admit, as we read Demosthenes, that he has a highly figurative style. The figures are closely inwrought into the whole texture of discourse—into the words, facts, arguments. The facts and arguments are figures; the figures are all arguments.

We will begin our illustrations with *metaphor*. The great oration is full of this figure; but it lies very much in the words, and therefore is not separable for purposes of illustration. The following is of this kind: "In the Greek state there shot up a crop (*φορά*) of traitors, mercenary and abandoned, such as no one remembered at any former period." Here is an instance of very pregnant metaphor, where the words are so full of a figurative sense that critics and commentators have been greatly plagued to get out into English the whole strong, picturesque meaning. He says: "Aeschines has disgorged upon me the foul contents of his own villainy and injustice." The original word places before us this picture, viz. of one dashing into the face of another the remains, results—spewings, if you please—of a previous night's debauch. Our orator's terms of reproach, often so cleaving, and so ludicrously, terribly picturesque, are metaphorical; and their singular force results from this fact. In this way he gets a great deal of hot, heavy obloquy into a word, and then drives it into his adversary without any flinching. Thus, at the close of a passage where he succeeds in winding up Aeschines, he breaks out upon him: *ἐμβρόντητε*. If we say "thunderstruck," we get out but a portion of the meaning; for Demosthenes intends to insinuate that Aeschines was turned into a fool, as by a

clap of thunder. Again, in the phrase "Raising his voice, and exulting and vociferating," the last word is so chosen as to present a ludicrous image of the fellow straining and cracking his wind-pipe. A term which our orator repeatedly applies to his antagonist, and which we can only render, "despicable wretch," carries the scorned idea of spit upon — *κατάπτυστον*, "this spit-upon." This must suffice in illustration of the character and power of the metaphors of Demosthenes, in his way of employing which he gained to his orations great condensation and liveliness.

Antithesis is another figure of which our orator seems to have been very fond. And this figure he loved, doubtless, as affording condensation; especially, as so combining closeness with clearness as to produce vivacity. The single instance which we will adduce is a fine one, for the quick turn of the parts and the rapidity of the movement: "Draw the parallel between your life and mine, Aeschines, and demand of this audience which of the two each of them had rather be for his past. You were an usher, I was a scholar; you were an initiator, I was initiated; you danced at the games, I presided over them; you were clerk of the assembly, I, a member; you, a third-rate actor; I, a spectator; you were constantly breaking down, I always hissing you; your measures were always in the enemy's favor; mine, ever in the country's." We cannot stop to quote antitheses from Demosthenes. Almost everything is by contrast. The whole oration on the Crown is one great antithesis — the patriotic and incorruptible Demosthenes set off against the traitorous and corrupt Aeschines.

The *dilemma*, related not distantly to antithesis, we find in our orator, well executed, though not always perfect. But then a complete dilemma — that is, one that admits of no retort — we are told, by one of the greatest of living debaters, is an exceedingly rare occurrence in oratory. "And here I should like to ask Aeschines a question. When all this was going on, and the city was filled with enthusiasm and gratitude and eulogy, did he join in the gratulation, or

remain at home, sorrowful, and bemoaning and begrudging the public prosperity? For, if indeed he made his appearance and took part with the rest, is not his conduct dreadful, — nay, rather, is it not impious, in now calling you to condemn those proceedings as evil which he called the gods to witness were good? But if he did *not* appear, does he not deserve a thousand deaths for groaning over a spectacle that filled all others with joy?” In the following we have two terrible horns: “And now, one of two things follows [from the silence of Aeschines], — either, that, finding nothing to blame in my measures, he had no others to propose; or, that, seeking to *benefit the enemy*, he did not propound measures better than mine. But said he nothing, propounded he nothing, when there was room for working you some mischief? Why, then there was no chance for anybody else to be heard.”

Again, the *climax* is a figure admirably managed and sustained in our orator. The interest rises and swells, as he proceeds; and, even though he brings forward the same facts again and again, they are so connected and invested that they have augmented force on every repetition. We bring forward a particular instance of the *climax*, which has been much admired. “Having said thus much, I sat down; no one uttering a word to the contrary. Not only did I offer this speech, but I made a motion; not only did I make a motion, I went ambassador; not only did I go as ambassador, but I persuaded the Thebans; and, throughout the whole transaction, I persevered, and gave myself up, without any reserve, to confront the perils which surrounded the country.” There is a remarkable climacteric passage, which ends with the famous oath, and has been pronounced “one of the greatest pieces of declamation on record in any tongue”; but it is too long for citation. It rises and pours along in augmenting majesty and vehemence, till he comes to the extreme elevation: “But it is not true, men of Athens, that you have done wrong in fighting the battle of all Greece, for her freedom and salvation. No! By your

forefathers, who for that cause rushed upon destruction at Marathon; and by those who stood in battle array at Plataea; and by those who fought on the sea at Salamis; and by the warriors of Artemisium; and by all the others, who now repose in the sepulchres of the nation—gallant men, to all of whom the state decreed a public funeral, deeming that they, too, had earned such honors, not merely those who had combatted fortunately, and had come off victorious,—and justly; for the duty of the brave has been done by all.” The saddest, most untoward event in all the administration of Demosthenes was the utter defeat at Chaeronea; and when he comes to this dark spot, he wakes up all his powers, and strives to hide, if not illumine it, by a sudden, overpowering blaze of rhetoric. We have here argument, precedent, apostrophe, the most spirit-stirring recollections. The effect upon the Athenians must have been prodigious, giving to defeat all the prestige of victory.

In coming to the reasoning of the Grecian orator it is very obvious to say, what every one sees on reading a few passages of him, that he is not a reasoner, in the formal, technical sense. There are no propositions laid down, and then proved by close, rigid processes of argumentation. In his orations we do not find one portion set apart for proof, another for narration, another for appeal. And while it is true that there are no portions rigidly given to the set forms of reasoning, there is diffused all through that kind of reasoning most effective for the occasion and purpose. It is rapid, linked with fact, made lucid by figure, impregnated with passion. There is argument in his comparisons and metaphors, in his antitheses and dilemmas, in his climaxes, his interrogations, and apostrophes. These are put into such a shape, brought into such connections, and so charged with fact and sentiment as often to do very quickly and powerfully the whole work of argument. Demosthenes takes an early opportunity to change the argument from the ground of law to that of facts, and so secure to himself the high advantage of fighting from his own ground, and making the course and

policy of his own administration a shield of defence. Demosthenes's arguments, then, are Demosthenes's facts; and those topics and facts that are especially to his purpose he makes the most of. He brings them up again and again, in new connections and with fresh illustrations. In this we have a distinguishing feature of the great master's reasoning. He seizes upon the strong points and facts, and makes these do about the whole work of conviction. The hand of the master is seen in investing the old topic with a new interest and power, every time it is fetched in. There is one point, or fact, which, as we have already seen, our orator makes great use of, and which he employs with astonishing effect. The point is simply this: Why did not Aeschines bring his *accusations* at the time of the events? Why did he not propose his *measures*, if he had better, at the proper time, and not now croak about mine? These points, topics, Demosthenes swings around, like a great sledge-hammer, upon the head of his antagonist, and, though the first blow from it smites him to the earth, he swings it and swings it, till by it he grinds him to powder. "But if he saw me acting injuriously toward the state, especially if I were doing the things he has been ranting about, it was his duty to enforce the penal laws against me while the facts were recent." Again: "But you — by what name shall I describe you aright? — when did you ever come forward at the moment to testify your indignation at seeing me, before your eyes, wrest from the country so grand an opportunity for an alliance as that you are now tragically declaiming about? When did you ever stand forth to denounce or to scrutinize all that you are impeaching me for?" Once more: "Then, when by law you could have brought me to justice for the public good, had I offended, you never proceeded against me on any head of charge whatever. But, when I stand clear on all hands, — by the laws, by lapse of time, by prescription, by judgements repeatedly pronounced, by my never having been convicted before the people of any offence, — and when much glory has been gained to the country by my public conduct, then it is you take your stand."

We pass now to his other oft-repeated topic. He says: "Here is what I did. You know it all; you know the circumstances. Now, what ought I to have done? What better could I have done?" "The statesman," he says, "gives his counsels before the event, and makes himself responsible. The partizan, holding his peace when he ought to speak out, finds fault, for the first time, the instant anything goes wrong." Observe, now, the skilful use, the climacteric arrangement of this topic. He says, in the next recurrence of it: "I will go to such a pitch of candor as at once to confess I was in the wrong, if, even now, any person will point out a better course, or show that any other could then have been taken than the one I did take." A page further on it comes around again. Addressing his adversary: "If you spoke not then, speak out now. Say, what plan ought I to have fallen upon? What alliance, what measure, was there that I ought to have preferred, and pressed upon the people?" A little further on, he asks again: "If I did not adopt all possible expedients, according to all human calculation; if I did not strenuously persevere in them, and with exertions above my strength; or, if I did not insist upon those measures which were glorious for the country, and worthy of her renown, and necessary for her safety, show me that, and impeach me when you please." Further on, again: "But, since he dwells so much on the actual events, I will hazard a somewhat bold assertion: If the events of futurity had been manifest to all, and you, Aeschines, had foretold them, and had bellowed out your protestations ever so vociferously, instead of never uttering a word,—not even then ought the country to have acted otherwise than she did, if she had any regard for her glory, or her ancestry, or her posterity." Further on it comes up once more, and he finishes off the topic with a little spice of drollery: "For why will you now be insisting on what ought then to be done, when you never brought forward any such proposition *at the time*, though you were in the city, and were present at the debates? What does your eloquence profit

the country, while you now descant upon what is past and gone? As if a physician, when called to patients in a sinking state, should give no advice, nor prescribe any course by which the disease might be cured, but, after one of them had died, and the funeral rites were performing, should follow him to the grave, and expound how the poor man would never have died had such and such things only been done? Moon-stricken! is it now, at length, that you too speak out?"

Our orator affords some fine specimens of the clinching force in the argument from the less to the greater: "But mark this. If such was our fate when we fought with the Thebans *on our side*, what had we not to expect if, instead of having them for allies, they had joined Philip, which Aeschines spent all his voice to make them do? And if, when the battle was fought three days' march from Attica, so great peril and such alarm beset the city, what would have been our prospects if the disaster had happened close upon our territory?"

We have alluded to interrogation as aiding in the reasoning of Demosthenes. The peculiar argumentative power of the orator's questions lies in this — that they admit of but one answer. If answered at all, they must be answered in the orator's favor. They also help in the speed and sprightliness of the movement. We have a quick succession of short, pithy questions, with a few rapid strokes following them, and "in the quick process he contrives," in the phrase of another, "to forge the whole massive chain of his argument." The following is an example: "What should you, at that crisis, call upon the Greek states to do? To attain peace? They had that already. To make war? But you yourselves were deliberating about peace."

Having now shown, by references and citations, what the practice of Demosthenes was, we pass on to state some rhetorical principles and lessons, established, we think, by the authority of the great performer before us.

1. The first is, That the true style for effect in one age,

or upon one class of minds, will be effective in every age, and upon every class of minds. In other words, there is a universal style, always powerful, always pleasing. Demosthenes has it perfectly, and it is the secret of the fact that he has kept the crown of eloquence so long and so indisputably. Whereas, if he had had an artificial style, of a kind that abounds in our day, he would have passed into oblivion ages ago. It is owing to this attribute of his style that the remark which Hume makes of it is perfectly just—that, “could it be copied, its success would be infallible over a modern assembly.”

This universal style, of which Demosthenes is both a master and a model, is characterized, at bottom, by great simplicity. The words chosen are the familiar and the known. The Grecian orator understood that the words which are oftenest in the people's mouths go the quickest and deepest into the people's ears. There is also great precision in the choice of the words; so that a great weight of meaning is conveyed on the wing of very little language. Yet there is also a very considerable range to the style. While the general feature is close, condensed simplicity, occasionally there is a roundness and fulness to the sentences; in one place, great delicacy and an artistic finish; in another, lying almost in juxtaposition, a vulgar and startling coarseness. Thus, he says to his adversary, in close connection with a grand and impassioned movement: “You cannot deny it, though you lie till you split open.” The great orator's style inclines more to the side of the palpable and strong than to that of the refined and the beautiful. Still, there is a touching on both sides. This appears in our ample citations. But, what is better, go to the book for yourselves, and see what it is. It would be well to read this, or some kindred style, till we learn to love it, and shall try to do like it; read it till it shall harmonize in our ears, and fully satisfy them. It seems to me that a person has made a very encouraging advance, when he can relish and be satisfied with the Demosthenic style. Cicero informs us

that he was not satisfied with it. He gives Demosthenes all praise; then says: "Nevertheless, he does not fill *my* ears; they are so greedy and capacious, always desiring something immense and infinite." We plainly see in this fact that, if we would utter simple and pungent things, we must come to relish them. If we would pour from our mouth the Demosthenic eloquence, we must get our ears down to the Demosthenic dimensions. Most certainly, if we keep the great ears of Cicero, we shall have with them his *ore rotundo*, his swelling mouth.

The man we now have before us, let us say, is precisely the man we want for the correction of many faults found among us in the use of language and figure. We refer to the strong tendency there is to excess in these respects—the running into the extra-fine, the lofty, and the grandiloquent. There is a great deal brought in for mere show, as a flourishing appendage; reminding one, as Moore says, in his life of Sheridan, of a peacock's tail. This is a mistake, no matter what the subject or the object. If there is any design of eloquence, it is a great mistake. For the mind in a truly earnest or eloquent frame never goes after embellishment. It will pick it up, if in its way, but never step aside for it. The orator uses his imagination, it has been well said by some one, as the ostrich uses his wings, not to fly with, but to aid him in running—to give him an onward, rushing vehemence. In oratory we want what has force, and we find not this quality in the merely beautiful. It lies rather in the opposite. There was not a little meaning in Mirabeau's declaration, as he shook his seamed and shaggy head: "You do not understand all the power of my ugliness." There is certainly a power in plainness, sometimes in a homeliness and coarseness, far more than in the opposite. We say, *let there be good taste*; let there be also a pervading simplicity, verging, if you please, toward the Grecian severity and rigor. It will not hurt us to be studying and striving in that direction; and the old master will help us amazingly, if we will only listen, and let him teach us.

2. My second remark is, that condensation, as an element of power, comes to us as another lesson from the model before us. We here learn that a great effect may be produced in a reasonably short time. Demosthenes generally produced his prodigious results in a brief space. There is but a single oration — that on the Crown — which is of any considerable length. This is a choice sentiment, or fact, worthy to be laid up by the speaker in a place where it will always be at hand and ready for use. Not a few of our speakers seem to have got possession of the notion (or the notion of them) that a great effort must be a long effort. And the effort and the man who made it appear to be reckoned great in proportion to the huge holding on. A monstrous perversion this of every common-sense principle. The truth is, this exhausting system, this wearying diffusion, this desperate unwillingness to let go of a thought when once we get hold; this beating and spreading out, this embarrassing and burying up with piles of wordy paragraphs the simple point that needs to be seen or felt, is utterly at war with all the precedents and precepts, and utterly preventive of all the great results of eloquence. Fluency is a good thing; but sometimes it is a nuisance. It is flow, flow, flow: never at a loss for something to say; never having anything worth saying: never in want of a word; never seizing one of any significance and power. Eloquence comes not out from such places. Eloquence has ever put forth its greatest things closely, rapidly. All the memorably great effects of the great orators of the past have been the results of masterly strokes, intensely conceived and quickly delivered. “Sudden bursts,” to present an admirable description of two of the most effective speakers that have appeared — “sudden bursts, which seemed the effect of inspiration; short sentences, which came like lightning, dazzling, burning, striking down everything before them; sentences which, spoken at critical periods, decided the fate of great questions; sentences which everybody still knows by heart — in these, chiefly, lay the power of these extraor-

dinary men." Whoever he may be, or wherever, that finds himself called to the vocation of speaking, let him learn to gather all the force and all the fire of his thoughts, as the diffused fluid is gathered on the electric wheel, and he will be pretty likely to produce an effect. He will have a power at his disposal, and the people will know when it touches them.

3. In the next place, we remark that we may learn something from the great Grecian master upon the mode of effecting this desirable reduction and condensation of discourse. The substance of the rule is found in the brief and blunt advice given by Dr. Witherspoon to his students: "When you have anything to say, say it; and stop when you get through." Demosthenes manifestly effected the reduction and condensation for which he was so remarkable by observing these two things: First, immediately coming to the point; secondly, inflexibly adhering to it. This is the grand beauty of his exordiums, a grand felicity in his eloquence. While the exordium was very much elaborated, it was perfectly simple—every word in it had to do with the subject in hand. How infinitely preferable to those heavy, vague introductions we are sometimes doomed to sit and hear! The speaker commences far off in the distance, with some frigid generalities; then edges up, and carefully approximates; and ventures a little nearer, and then a little nearer, to the subject of discourse, till, at length, he is seen to strike upon it. And no mortal can tell why he did not start at the point which he has thus reached, after twenty-five minutes' wearisome travel.

Not only from the exordium of our orator, but from the body of the piece, all extraneous matter was expelled, pushed aside, pushed out. The splendid coruscation off from the straight line of remark was never seen in the great Grecian model, and never should be in any speaker. Episodes in oratory, however fine, commonly do more hurt than good. They distract the hearer's mind, decoy attention from the main point and business in hand, and help to make out,

often, an insufferable length of discourse. They denote the speaker's mind at play; while the straightforward style, which takes in only what is to the purpose, denotes a mind full, and at the same time significant and earnest in the discharge of its contents. The figures and metaphors of the former have been well likened to fire-works shown up for display; and those of the latter to sparks emitted from a working-engine.

4. The next oratorical doctrine, or maxim, which we derive from the great model of ages is, that the most effective eloquence is not, as a thing of course, nor commonly, the address which is the most replete and weighty with thought, argument, matter. In other words, the orator is not to strike for a learned discourse — a discourse abounding in original views and profound researches and novel theories — a discourse heavy and crowded with recondite material. He has to do rather with the common things, the common sentiments, the common minds and hearts of the world. He feels strongly, as he should feel, on the great, the obvious, the generally admitted facts and truths. His chief object is to transfer, and his work is done when he has transferred, his own glowing sentiments to the breasts of others. So far from laboring to put a crowd of foreign thoughts within those who attend upon him, he touches, wakes up, gives life and productiveness to what were there before. Demosthenes, we know, did produce the greatest effects by his efforts. In this none have ever surpassed him. Yet he is never close, concatenated in his argument; or rich, profound, or philosophical in his matter. What is true of this orator is true of the whole kind. We do not undertake to say that the utmost solidity and depth of thought and sentiment may in no case go with the utmost oratorical force and effectiveness. We only state the fact, as it has notoriously occurred. All along down from the Grecian master, we find that the most effective orations have not been those most replete with profound thought and severe argument, but the reverse. For example, few forensic arguments in modern times have

equalled in weight and wealth of sentiment and splendor of illustration the celebrated defence of Peltier by Sir James Mackintosh. Yet, for the purpose of shielding the poor Frenchman, it was good for nothing. Though read ever since with delight, it was at the time a splendid and miserable failure. The three most effective speakers that were ever in the British House of Commons were probably Lord Chatham, Charles James Fox, and Richard Brinsley Sheridan; and they, especially Chatham and Sheridan, never produced their effects by solidity and strength of matter. When Sheridan was asked how it was that he succeeded so well in the house, he replied, "that he had not been there very long before he found that three fourths of the members were fools; and he resolved, therefore, not to shock them by too much severity of argument." Nor did Chatham, in the character of him drawn by Grattan, "conduct the understanding through the painful subtilties of argumentation, but rather lightened upon his subject, and reached the point by the flashings of his mind, which, like those of his eye, were felt, but could not be followed." In precise accordance with the above was the advice given by that shrewd observer, Dr. Johnson, to Boswell, who had occasion to speak at the bar of the House of Commons: "You must not argue as if you were arguing in the schools. Close reasoning will not fix their attention." But it will be said, according to these authorities eloquence is mere declamation. And so it is, often. In its greatest passages, all along its course down, it has been declamation — solid, arguing, nervous declamation. The famous oath of Demosthenes (which has been quoted from his speech upon the Crown), deemed the greatest passage in all eloquence, is declamation. It is made of clear, plain, fresh things, vividly conceived and earnestly uttered — torrents of palpable truth, of inflamed common sense. But it will be asked, perhaps, if we mean to discourage the power of profound thought in the orator. By no means. Let him be a very master in this line. But what use the power to him, if it is not to be brought out in his appropriate

work, his professional structures? What the use of sense, and what use in laboring to acquire it, if it be true, after all, that the world suffer themselves to be swayed and ruled by nonsense? We confess that we have sometimes been completely staggered by this question, as it has been forced upon us, in witnessing frequent instances of the magic and triumph of nonsense. Yet we must believe, after all, that sense is a good thing, and that nothing but manliness and variety of thought will sustain the orator, and give him reputation and success, in the long run. The people will be satisfied, will think better of him, will more deeply feel him, when they know he has the power, even though he does not always use it. Let him not be too lavish of the mere product of the brain,—not aim to crowd the address as closely as possible with this material,—but have regard to some of the other things which we know to have made up the effectiveness of all the great eloquence of the world.

5. Kindred with the preceding remark is this — that practical power in oratory consists, often, very much in skilful repetition. This is another of the lessons we derive from the Grecian master. We have seen that Demosthenes brought up and presented the same things again and again. The same is true of Fox. And in his case this was not the result of accident; it was not because he had not enough else to say, but because he deemed this the way to carry his points, and imbed them in the minds of the people. If we aim at a crowded fulness of thought in a popular address,—make it an object to see what an amount and variety of matter we can press into it,—there cannot, of course, be these rhetorical repetitions; they are necessarily crowded out. So that we see how, in one respect, the utmost amount of thought in a popular appeal is not consistent with the highest oratorical effectiveness.

The position that the repeated bringing up, or the continued holding up, of the same point is indispensable in order that the thought or argument may do its full execution, we might sustain by authorities additional to that of De-

mosthenes. Said Dr. Johnson, in his instructions to Boswell, already quoted from: "You must say the same thing over and over again, in different words. If you say it but once, they miss it in a moment of inattention." An eminent advocate of this country remarked to a preacher, whose pulpit performances he criticised, as losing in effectiveness for the want of this species of repetition, that he found it necessary, in addressing a jury, to repeat what he wished to impress upon their minds, at least twice, and often three and four times, or even more; otherwise, he did not carry their minds along with him, and so failed in the end. We have the same doctrine, and rather a humorous instance of its success, in the excuse rendered by a distinguished English advocate for being rather prolix in a plea he had made. He acknowledged the fact, but said in justification: "Did you not observe the foreman—a heavy looking fellow in a yellow waistcoat? No more than one idea could ever stay in his thick head at a time; and I resolved that mine should be that one. So I hammered on, till I saw by his eyes that he had got it." It was the hammering on that got in the idea, and the getting in of this gained the case.

The secret of the efficacy of skilful repetition is: (1) That it insures attention to the important point; (2) A full understanding and apprehension of it; (3) It enhances the hearer's estimate of its importance; (4) It holds it before the mind, till its just importance and force are felt.

But, after all, we must be allowed to say that this repetition, the bringing up or presenting the same topics or points, is rather hazardous business. While it is deeply convictive and implanting, if well done, it is dull, burdensome, disgusting, if badly done. It is one of the difficulties in the way of reaching the highest style of popular eloquence. Repetition, with variety and an augmenting interest and power—this the difficulty. Demosthenes mastered it, and his name has become the synonym for cogent and successful appeal.

6. We get from the Grecian orator confirmation of the

doctrine that clearness of meaning is found in connection with the highest oratorical power, and is indispensable to it. Demosthenes, though often concise, was always clear, entirely so, to those he addressed. Not only the Grecian, but all eloquence, ever has had, and ever must have, this quality of lucidness. In order to an effect, the meaning must stand out; must be obtrusive, not to be searched for, not dug out of darkness, but flashing and forcing itself upon the people. "Nothing in nature," says Robert South, "can be imagined more absurd, irrational, and contrary to the very design and end of speaking than an obscure discourse." Yet this very consummate absurdity has really been embraced and practised by many as the true doctrine. According to the old-fashioned doctrine, a discourse to be impressive must be intelligible. According to the new-fangled doctrine, the way to be peculiarly searching is to be utterly unsearchable; the way to sink the truth deep into terrestrial breasts, is to aim the shaft at the zenith. And this will be pronounced very fine and very forcible, and will raise a very great admiration on the part of some in the community, who are always most rapturously taken with what they cannot comprehend. They behold a lofty figure and flourish before them—manifestly a great gathering and rolling up of the elements, and they are quite sure there is something remarkable going forth from the speaker; and, though they cannot see any meaning in particular, yet they have no doubt that there is a most magnificent meaning behind the cloud. All this may be very admirable; but that obtuse, probative class, who insist upon knowing what they admire, will not be very much carried away with it. They certainly will not feel the force of it as eloquence. For eloquence is not only a clear thing; it is a sublunary thing. The orator, in his telling strokes, like the lightning, strikes downward. Just so far as he mystifies and subtilizes his matter, he spoils it for oratorical effect. Man was not made to be moved by such means. Civilized or savage, there is nothing in his nature which responds to such exhibitions. If our eloquence is to be car-

ried forward, or higher, in power, it must be kept from these morbidly refining and obscuring tendencies and influences.

7. The next oratorical doctrine or principle that we get confirmation of, is, that the style which has great power is often the result of great labor. Demosthenes certainly settled the point that utmost finish and utmost force of style are perfectly consistent, if not necessary, one to the other. Our orator, we have said, greatly elaborated his style. He not only labored to attain power in composition, he also expended a vast amount of strength and solicitude upon the several pieces he produced. He had his favorite passages, which he wrought to the very highest possible finish, and introduced into different orations. And it is curious to see the delicate changes which he introduced on the repetition of a favorite passage — how careful as to the collocation of a word, or the position of a particle; and yet these are the passages of the greatest effectiveness, those on which he particularly relied.

Not only Demosthenes, but all the best writers that have lived, and whose writings have lived, have been hard elaborators. The men who stir us by things put down a century ago, put down those things with a great deal of painstaking. We might show this, were there time, by individual allusions and proofs, and make it appear that every cogent quality of style may be gained by rightly working on it. A person may work his style into the utmost closeness and condensation, by habitually working out from it all the inept and useless words, and getting and keeping in only the precise and significant. He can work off roughnesses, when a smooth surface would be the most effective, and put on a polish that shall flash and attract. He can take the wind out of the too swollen and bombastic, and bring it down to a decent and comely simplicity. The rigid and hard-moving joints he can change to an easy and quick flexibility. His bluntest and squarest sentences he can forge to a point, if a point they should have, as infallibly as the blacksmith can hammer his iron to that form. And if more heat is wanted in the mass,

he can blow it in. Certainly, by working it over, he need not draw out what is already in, as many seem to suppose. Not only may the skilful elaborator gain all these and more good qualities in his productions; but, while he continues thus to elaborate, he will be advancing in the power to bring out every effective attribute of style. In order to this, he must know how to elaborate; must do it heartily, with resolute vigor, and with the eye upon the right things. Some of the most stirring paragraphs that ever went from human lips into the human ear and heart were written to the turning of every tittle. The doctrine we here find is that the foundation of power must be laid in the tasked and striving pen. So, we are told, Brougham did; so he taught. In his Inaugural Discourse he lays it down, as a rule admitting of no exception, that a man will speak well, in proportion as he has written much; and that, with equal talents, he will be the finest extemporaneous speaker, when no time for preparation is allowed, who has prepared himself most sedulously when he had an opportunity of delivering a premeditated speech. This may seem extravagant doctrine; but such actually is the mode in which no small part of the most effective eloquence of the world has been prepared for and produced. Great power in this line has been, for the most part, the result of the extremest labor and painstaking — not to make the discourse dense and deep with thought, but to crowd it full of that indefinable, but electric thing called eloquence. Such a course, where there is a strong and earnest soul, will help to the attainment of eloquence. But the rage and clamor for mere off-hand, and the consequent practice of opening the mouth and slovenly pouring forth whatever happens to be uppermost, tends to reduce our speech to a compound of utter feebleness and offensiveness.

8. Let me say, finally, when we have attained to good matter, it should be remembered that it will not do to trust in that alone. The Grecian master, in the first instance, made this mistake. He came forth with good matter, only, and the people would not hear it. They hissed him out of

sight. At length he came back, with the orator's other part — *the manner* — perfected, and he swayed and moulded the same mass at pleasure. There is a decided tendency in educated men, men who think richly and strongly, to disregard and despise manner. What they have to say is so important and so good, that it needs the commendation of no mere outside trickery. It is admitted that a few men have done wonders by the simple, unaided power of thought. But these men are the exceptions. It is not safe to undertake to be one of them. It will not do for the preacher at the present day to hold up his sermon in his hand, and read it off, without motion or emotion, because Jonathan Edwards did so with success. If he does, let him not be surprised should some empty-headed vociferator across the way empty his meeting-house for him.

There is one point, in this connection, deserving notice, namely, the attainableness of a good manner, in the face of serious defects. Demosthenes encountered such defects, and came off with triumphant success. He seems greatly to have increased the compass of his voice, to have made it flexible, and gained the mastery of it. Let any other man, who has marked faults of manner, meet them as the Grecian did, and, with a like indomitable purpose, decree their correction and the bringing in of the corresponding excellences, and he will, in a measure, succeed. Let him put his finger resolutely upon the specific defects, and say: "If my voice is harsh, I will try to make it smooth; if it is feeble, I will try to give it strength; if it is slender and squeaking, I will labor for volume and manliness; if the emission is mostly at the nose, I will practise till I can drive it out at the mouth, where it ought to go; if I can make but one inflection, I will work till I can make two; if I can make none, I will labor till I can make the whole, just when and where and how I please. The wretched, lullaby, sing-song monotony, which makes me perform the office of an opiate upon my auditors, I will somehow break up; and in the process of breaking it up, I will leave no resort untried." It was,

doubtless, a spirit and decision like this which sent our orator voluntarily down into that dark hole, there to assail the faults which hung upon him, and which brought him forth again to the world with a manner the most effective, probably, the world has ever seen. What if a man now cannot accomplish so much in this cultivation as the great Grecian did? Let him accomplish what he can. There is no reason, because he may not reach the highest point of excellence, in refusing to attempt any improvement; no reason, because he cannot rise to the power of a Chatham, in drawling and stammering like the boor. The individual who put into a napkin his one talent, because it was not five, failed of the justification on which he stupidly reckoned.

In aiming to do as well as we can in this particular, we learn from the Grecian that we should cultivate the manner of our style, as well as of our delivery. In order to make the nearest approximation to the Demosthenic delivery, it is necessary that we forge the Demosthenic sentences. There are two features in the style of our orator which adapt it to a powerful enunciation. One is, the variety, the range in the structure, admitting and demanding a corresponding range in the voice. In the sentences there are all degrees of smoothness and roughness; all degrees of length, from a single word to a whole page; all sorts of endings, requiring all sorts of tones and inflections. Let this character be brought into all our writing for oral delivery. Let the essay smoothness and evenness be broken in upon, and broken up, till we gain the ability to fit our paragraphs to the purposes to be answered by them — now yielding sweet music to the ear, now going like ruthless daggers to the heart.

The other marked feature of adaptation for delivery in the style of Demosthenes is the frequent, full, emphatic bringing up of his sentences at the period. They often come out, ordnance-like, heavy and strong, shaking down all opposition. This is a capital feature in a style to be spoken. Whereas the tapering style, as it may be called, in which nearly every sentence has a flimsy, dragging tail to it, sets

at defiance all the mouths that were ever fashioned. Neither a Roscius nor a Garrick could pronounce it effectively. Let the speaker see to it, and strive for these high and emphatic qualities of style; and, in connection, let the voice be trained to give execution to what the brain may conceive, or the pen put down. We say, again: Beware how you put your trust in matter alone, even though it be of Demosthenic stringency and power. Intense, prolonged, and painful labor alone can make the orator; but how amazing the power gained as his reward.

ARTICLE VI.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION.

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IN ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

NO. VI.

SEQUEL TO THE GOSPEL HISTORY.

By the Sequel to the Gospel History we mean the collection of writings known as the Acts of the Apostles, the apostolic Epistles, and the Apocalypse. We apply to them the epithet "sequel," not as implying that they were all written after the Gospel narratives (for the fourth Gospel, at least, is later than most of them), but as indicating that they followed naturally from the *facts* recorded by the four evangelists. The genuineness, integrity, and credibility of the Gospel narratives have been shown, in preceding Articles, to rest on an immovable foundation of testimony. We are thus prepared beforehand to expect not only a record of the labors of the apostles, and writings emanating from them, but also a record and writings resting on the same *basis of supernatural facts* as that which underlies the evangelic narratives. If the truth of the Gospel narratives can be denied, or the supernatural element eliminated from them, then the truth of the supernatural events recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, and