to tickle by means of them, and thus to glorify one's self rather than to serve God and one's fellow-men; or the words, being through frequent use deprived of their soul, become at last 'as sounding brass.' To this danger is the clergyman more than others exposed. Since he is required by his vocation so often to hold up the word of God to others, and to have always at hand, and to give expression to, those truths and ideas which are most of all suited to move, startle, and penetrate men's hearts, it is only too apt to be the case that these truths lose for him their terribleness, so that their force and effect on his own heart is neutralized or weakened, and the constant direction of his attention to others keeps him from watching himself, so that while he works on the hearts of others he neglects his own, and lets the weeds in it grow up unheeded. ..... My later observations and experiences have only too much confirmed my opinion of the greatness of the danger, and taught me how many of the most gifted clergymen fall a prey to it, and how prevalent has become in our time the plague of using set phrases without thought, which serves more than everything else to make men insensible to the power of the truth, and disinclined to struggle after an earnest and more profound conviction, and which explains the readiness with which now, at a given signal, 'testimonies' and 'confessions' are made at wholesale, often in rapid succession and in contradictory directions. Hence so little deed Christianity, and so much mouth Christianity."

Hupfeld died an easy death at noon of the twenty-fourth of April, after fully completing his seventieth year, in consequence of a stroke of apoplexy supervening on an inflammation of the diaphragm.

ARTICLE IX.

THEORIES IN REGARD TO THE NATURE OF THE WILL.

We propose to state in the present and in subsequent Book Notices, various theories entertained by various writers more or less recent in regard to the will. The present notice is confined to two works, which differ widely from each other in various particulars, but agree with each other in the theory that *choice is not an act of the will.* The first of these books is entitled:

Essay on Catholicism, Liberalism and Socialism, considered in their Fundamental Principles. By Don Juan Donoso Cortès, Marquis of Valdegamas; from the original Spanish. To which is prefixed a Sketch of the life and works of the author. From the Italian of G. E. De Castro. Translated by Madeleine Vinton Goddard. 12mo. pp. 335. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co. 1862.

The introductory sketch states that the author of this work was born at Valdegamas, May 6, 1809; pursued the study of the law at the University of Salamania; received a high political office in 1832; was active as a political journalist and author at Madrid; was the Spanish minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Prussia in 1848; became a religious man at the age of forty; and the present work is the result of his religious meditations. He commences the work with the words of M. Proudhon: "It is surprising to observe how constantly we find all our political questions complicated with theological questions" (p. 17). "Sophisms," he says, "produce revolutions, and sophists are succeeded by hangmen" (p. 20). He divides his volume into three books. In the first and second chapters of the second book he discusses the subject of the will. He says: "The opinion generally entertained respecting free-will is in every respect false. The will does not consist, as is commonly supposed, in the power of choice between good and evil, which importune man with contrary solicitations. If free-will consisted in this faculty, the following consequences would necessarily result, the one relative to man and the other relative to God, and both evidently absurd. The consequence respecting man would be, that the higher the degree of excellence he attained the less free he would become, as he could not advance toward perfection without becoming subjected to the influence of good, and he could not yield to the sway of truth without removing himself from the rule of evil." "Man being free, and at the same time aiming at perfection, he cannot preserve his freedom without renouncing perfection, neither can he become perfect without losing his liberty." "As relates to God, the consequence of this hypothesis would be this, that God, not being subject in his nature to contradictory solicitations, would not be free, if freedom consisted in the full power to choose between opposing solicitations; and if, according to this supposition, he must have the power to choose between good and evil, between sanctity and sin, in order to be free, then there exists between the nature of God and liberty, thus defined, a radical contradiction and an absolute incompatibility. And, as it would be an absurdity to suppose, on the one side, that God cannot be free if he is God, and that he cannot be God if he is free; and on the other that man cannot attain perfection without losing his liberty, nor be free without renouncing perfection, it follows that the idea of liberty that we have just examined [of liberty as consisting in choice] is altogether false, contradictory, and absurd" (pp. 94–96).

Choice, then, according to this theory, is not an act of the will; and if so, the soul must be divided into the intellect, sensibilities, the power of choice, and the will, four departments instead of three. The formal freedom of the will does not consist in choice; still less does the material freedom. Where is liberty then? The author proceeds: "The error that we have just exposed consists in placing freedom in the faculty of choice, when it really rests in the faculty of will, which supposes the faculty

of understanding. Every being endowed with understanding and will is free, and his liberty is not a distinct thing from his will and his understanding, but the two united. When we affirm of a being that he has will and understanding, and of another being that he is free, we assert with regard to both the same thing, expressed in two different ways.

"If liberty consists in the faculties of will and understanding, then perfect liberty consists in a perfect will and understanding. These are the attributes of God alone, from which it follows, as a necessary inference, that God alone is perfectly free.

"Again, if liberty consists in the faculties of understanding and will then man is free, because he is endowed with will and intelligence; but he is not perfectly free, as he is not endowed with an understanding and will infinite and perfect. The imperfection of his understanding is, that it is limited on the one hand, and on the other subject to error. The imperfection of his will is, that he does not desire all that he ought to wish for, and that he may be importuned and conquered by evil. From whence it follows that the imperfection of his liberty consists in his power of choosing evil and embracing error; that is to say, the imperfection of human liberty lies in precisely that faculty of choice which, according to the vulgar opinion, constitutes its absolute perfection" (pp. 96, 97).

"If the above is true, it is certain that the faculty of choice bestowed upon man, far from constituting a necessary condition of freedom, endangers liberty, since through it arises the possibility of a renunciation of good, and of falling into error; of a denial of God, and of a subjection to tyranny. All the efforts of man, with the assistance of grace, should be directed to the keeping of this faculty under, so that he may even lose it, if possible, by inaction. He alone who loses it understands good, desires it, and performs it; and he alone who does this is perfectly free; and he alone who is free is perfect; and only he who is perfect is happy. None of the blessed have this faculty of choosing between good and evil, neither God, nor his saints, nor the choirs of angels" (p. 99).

Throughout this volume are found frequent contradictions of the statement that liberty does not consist in choosing, as on pp. 150, 273. The volume abounds with acute remarks, rich apothegms, but is on the whole declamatory, rather than scientific. It is an earnest defence of the Roman Catholic dogmas, and a spirited attack upon the theories of Socialism. In its tone and style it is signally unlike the second work which we here notice, and which is entitled:

FREEDOM OF THE MIND IN WILLING; or, every Being that wills, a Creative First Cause. By Rowland G. Hazard. 12mo. pp. 455. New York: D. Appleton and Co.; London, 16 Little Britain. 1864.

The author of this work is an enterprising manufacturer in the State of Rhode Island. He certainly merits our respect for his interest in moral,

as well as in physical science. He has evinced in the present volume a sharp and vigorous mind. His style is not always clear, and is too redundant. He does not always conform to the established usage of words, but is satisfied with his own nomenclature. His speculations are the more interesting as they are pursued from a point of departure not commonly taken. He has divided his work into two books. The first book he devotes to an explanation and proof of the "Freedom of the Mind in Willing." He is a stout advocate of human liberty. Hence it is the more singular that he should exclude the act of choice from the sphere of will. He considers choice as "the perception, the knowledge, that one thing is superior to another," and is, therefore, antecedent to the act of willing; and he regards all liberty as consisting in the mind's willing, and not at all in the mind's choosing. He strenuously and persistently objects to "the confounding of choice and will" (p. 440). "Will is the power or faculty of the mind for effort" (p. 24), and in this effort consists the mind's freedom. Freedom is "that condition in which the mind directs its own action or movement." He considers the moral character also as residing, not in the choice, but in the effort, the willing. If a man wills to do an act which is good and noble, it matters not concerning his virtue whether his effort be successful or otherwise; the effort is, itself, the triumph in him of the good and noble over the bad and base" (p. 152). "As in the *moral nature* the willing, the persevering effort is itself the consummation, there can in it be no such failure [as there may be in his external relations]; and the mind in it is therefore not only a creative, but a supreme creative first cause" (p. 152). "As the moral quality of the action lies wholly in the will, and no other being can will for him [man], to be morally good without his own efforts is an impossibility; all that any other being can do for him in this respect is to use means to excite his wants and increase his knowledge; and thus induce him to put forth his own efforts. Even omnipotence can do no more than this; for doing more, the making man virtuous without voluntary effort of his own, involves a contradiction" (pp. 153, 154). "A man habitually holy, who has eradicated the conflicting wants, loses the power to will what is unholy; and as he cannot be unholy except by his own voluntary act, he has then no power to be unholy" (p. 158). Mr. Hazard still maintains that the mind is free in willing to be holy, even when it has no power to will otherwise.

Mr. Hazard devotes his second book to a review of Edwards on the Will. Of course he differs radically from this divine; for Edwards considers free-agency as consisting, not in imperative volitions, but in choice; whereas Mr. Hazard considers free-agency as consisting, not in choice, but in imperative volitions. We do not think that the interpretation which the author of this volume puts upon Edwards is correct; still it is similar to that which is sanctioned by many other critics. Quite a remarkable passage in the second book is found on pp. 393–395. We subjoin a few

passages illustrating Mr. Hazard's independence in thought and in style.

The Faculties of the Mind. "The mind has but one real faculty or power to do anything, and this faculty is designated by the term *will*" (p. 15). Thus memory "is but a condition, and a necessary condition, of knowledge of the past. Without it such knowledge could not exist. In this sense it is only an expression of one form of our knowledge. To say *I remember an event*, is to say *I know an event in the past.* If from any cause an event of the past comes before the mind, it is then a simple mental perception. When we make an effort to bring an event of the past into the mind's view, we call it an exercise or *effort* of *memory*, and this of course is an act of will, a *trying to do this thing*" (pp. 11, 12). It is the will only which makes an effort. An effort of the mind in forming a judgment is an act of the will. "The same may be said of reasoning, imagining, conceiving, etc. In the sense in which these are spoken of as faculties or powers, they are but names of varied modes of effort, or of efforts for *different objects*, made by the same unit — mind, manifesting its power to produce change by its efforts or acts of will" (p. 12). "As the mind cannot act except by exercising some of its powers, every act of the mind is an effort or act of will, and the phrases, 'acts of will,' 'acts of mind,' and 'mental action,' are really synonymes" (p. 424). According to Mr. Hazard, then, there is no *involuntary* effort. But do we not necessarily ascribe every act to a power of acting — an act of remembering to a *power* of memory, for instance; and is not the strenuous acting of any power rightly called an *effort* of that power?

"*We may know what is not true.*" (?) "In strict propriety" the term *knowledge* is "applicable only to those ideas or perceptions of the mind of which we entertain no doubt, and it is applicable to such even though they are not conformable to truth" (p. 18). Like most other words in frequent use the word *knowledge* has a variety of significations. It is often used to express a mere undoubting assurance. But, *distinctively*, it expresses the undoubting assurance of a fact, of a truth. Distinctively, it implies that the reality is as it is believed to be. When we have believed a proposition to be true, and afterwards discovered that it is false, we are apt to say, "We thought we knew it to be true, but we did not know so much as we thought we did." The omniscience of God is not his mere assurance of *propositions*, but his assurance of *truths*.

The human mind is a creator. "The finite mind of man, made in the image of God, has finite powers corresponding to omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, and other creative attributes of the Infinite; and, so far as we know, exerts these powers in the same mode and under the same conditions" (p. 49). "This creative power is exerted by the finite in the only way in which we can conceive of its exercise by the Infinite Intelligence, and under the same conditions" (p. 45). It is true, that we often speak of mental creations, the creations of genius, etc., but in the

proper sense we mean by creation, the bringing of some material or mental *substance* into existence. Some of the most eminent artists have recoiled from the use of this term in application to their works, and have insisted on limiting the word *creator* to Him who causes the beginning of substances.

We need not add, that while we cannot adopt the theories of the will which are contained in the two works here noticed, we still must regard them, and other theories hereafter to be noticed, as suggestive of many important truths.

ARTICLE X

THE TOPOGRAPHY OF JERUSALEM.

BY REV. SAMUEL WOLCOTT, D.D., CLEVELAND, OHIO.

THE Dictionary of the Bible edited by Dr. William Smith, and published in England in three large octavo volumes, is about to be republished entire in this country, under the editorial supervision of Professor Hackett of Newton, whose special qualifications for this service will be recognized by all. It is but fair to add that the paper here offered has grown out of an Article prepared by the writer, at his request, for the Dictionary — it being his purpose to render the American edition even more complete than the English. More than sixty of the eminent scholars in Great Britian, and a few in our own country, have contributed to its pages, and it embraces the fruit of more learned research than any other work of the kind which has been issued. It is, consequently, a necessity to every thorough student of the Bible, and an invaluable auxiliary to all who seek a fuller acquaintance with the word of God.

In most of the Articles we are presented with the latest *results* of Biblical science — ascertained facts, and not mere speculations and theories. On controverted or unsettled questions we are, in most instances, furnished with the facts or reasonings on each side, from a fair statement of which the reader is left to draw his own conclusion.

A portion of the Article on "Jerusalem" is an exception to this rule. More than forty pages with double columns are given to the general topic, and its importance justifies this extended treatment. It is mainly divided between two writers, one of whom presents *The Annals of the City*, from its foundation to its destruction by Titus (with a brief sketch of its later history by another pen), and the other devotes seventeen pages to *The Topography of the City*, of this portion the whole warp and