

The doctrine of God's providence, as it is in itself, has thus far been under consideration. The developing power of true views of it upon the life and character, or the subjective relations and uses of this great doctrine, which is the necessary complement of its objective characteristics, as herein presented, is a branch of the subject reserved for a subsequent Article.

ARTICLE V.

WHEDON ON THE WILL.¹

BY F. H. NEWHALL, PROFESSOR IN WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY, MIDDLETOWN, CT.

THE deepest and most fascinating problems of philosophy arise from the struggle, or rather the antithesis, between our moral and intellectual faculties. The loftiest and profoundest speculations of which human nature is capable, have been elicited, the highest powers of the very mightiest sons of men have been taxed to the utmost tension, to harmonize man's logical deductions with his moral intuitions. In fact, it is the instinctive effort for this harmony that has given rise to the whole fabric of metaphysical theology.

The work of Dr. Whedon is one more contribution towards the settlement of one form of this manifold problem, namely, "the reconciliation of the sense of responsibility with our intellectual conclusions concerning the nature of choice" (Preface). Although for many ages this problem has been slowly approximating solution, yet the sphinx still propounds her riddle, and devours the souls of men. Dr. Whedon does not step forth as the Oedipus that is to

¹ *The Freedom of the Will, as a Basis of Human Responsibility and a Divine Government*, elucidated and maintained in its issue with the Necessitarian Theories of Hobbes, Edwards, the Princeton Essayists, and other leading Advocates. By D. D. Whedon, D. D. 8vo. pp. 488. New York: Carlton and Porter. 1864.

silence the ancient sibyl forever, but expresses the modest belief that he has "brought the difficulty nearer to a solution."

Before discussing the views presented in the work before us, it may be well briefly to review modern philosophical opinion upon this subject. Perhaps the problem around which has raged this far-resounding conflict, may be most concisely stated in terms like these: "How can man's will be free, and yet his volitions be effects?" All who are interested in this discussion admitting not only human freedom, but also the axiom that every event must have its cause, and that volitions being events, must in some way come under this axiom, feel the necessity of so defining freedom on the one hand, or causation on the other, as to show an otherwise inevitable contradiction. Those who have taken their position on the intuition of freedom, and have endeavored to explain the axiom of causation from that point of view, we here designate Freedomists; while those who follow the reverse process, taking ground on the axiom of causation, and viewing the intuition of freedom from that point of view, we style Necessitarians. Of course this phraseology is not intended to assume the chief point in discussion, namely, that the latter party all deny, or that the former exclusively maintain, man's volitional liberty.

NECESSITARIANISM.

Hobbes, the philosopher of Malmesbury, who has been called the father of English psychology, leads the array of English necessitarians. Starting from the above-mentioned axiom of causation, he held that the will is inevitably decided by the strongest motive.¹ As to liberty, he affirmed that it cannot be predicated of will at all, and is applicable only to external actions, signifying their *necessary* connection with volitions.² More closely, he defines liberty as "the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsic quality of the agent,"³

¹ Hobbes's Works (Bohn's ed., London: 1841), Vol. V. p. 344, etc.

² Ibid., Vol. V, *passim*.

³ Ibid., Vol. IV. p. 273.

e. g., as he afterwards illustrates, water is free to run down a river-channel when no impediments are placed across the stream. Concerning the theory of a self-determining will, he says that this supposes the will to be determined by a prior will, and that for the same reason by a will prior to that, and so on in infinite series. "If a man determine himself, the question will still remain: What determined him to determine himself in that manner"?¹ etc. He also held that "denying necessity destroyeth both the decrees and prescience of God Almighty."² As to man's moral intuitions, Hobbes, it is well known, made short work with them: "Fire is to be blamed for burning, and poison for killing, as much as are men for sinning."³ Hobbes, according to Priestley, was the inventor of the doctrine so well known as "philosophical necessity."

Locke, in like manner, denied that freedom can be properly predicated of will, and even ridiculed the great question before us as absurd. He says that the question "whether man's will be free or no is altogether improper, and it is as insignificant to ask whether man's will be free as to ask whether his sleep be swift or his virtue square."⁴ But it is well known that Locke fluctuated in his views of this subject. He elsewhere says explicitly: "Though I cannot have a clearer conception of anything than that I am free, yet I cannot make the freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free, *though I see not the way of it.*"⁵

Collins, the contemporary of Locke, vindicates himself from the charges of immorality and atheism by defining liberty precisely as did Edwards after him. "Though I deny *liberty* in a certain meaning of that word, yet I contend for liberty as it signifies a power in man to do as he wills, or pleases. When I affirm *necessity*, I contend only for *moral*

¹ Hobbes's Works, Vol. V. p. 35.

² Ibid., Vol. IV. p. 278.

³ Ibid., Vol. V. p. 53.

⁴ Essay, Book II., Chap. XXI. Lect. 14.

⁵ As quoted by Stewart, Encycl. Brit., Vol. I. p. 143.

necessity, meaning thereby that man, who is an intelligent and sensible being, is determined by his reason and senses; and I deny man to be subject to such necessity as in clocks, watches, and such other beings, which, for want of sensation and intelligence, are subject to an absolute physical or mechanical necessity."¹ He then proceeds to show that his theory of will (the same as that of Hobbes), so far from being inconsistent with moral desert, rewards, and punishments, is really their sole foundation. This theory of will and the doctrine of philosophical necessity have been defended by essentially the same arguments until the present time, — arguments best known to the world, however, as expanded and applied, with matchless logical power, by the elder Edwards.² The mystic piety of Bonnet, and the pure spiritual intuition of Edwards, saved them from pushing their theory to the pantheistic extreme of Spinoza on the one hand, and the fatalistic conclusions of Belsham and Diderot on the other.³

FREEDOMISM.

The freedomists, on the other hand, have, as above intimated, taken their stand firmly upon the intuition of liberty,

¹ Philosophical Inquiry, Preface.

² Yet Edwards never read Hobbes, and expressly repudiates his fatalism. See Inquiry, Part. IV., Sec. 6.

³ That this theory of Will is far older than Hobbes may be seen in Lucretius. First we have the causal axiom:

"De nihilo quoniam fieri nil posse videmus."

Then he states the problem:

*"Denique, si semper motus connectitur omnis,
Et vetere exoritur semper novus ordine certo,
Unde est hæc (inquam) fati avolsa voluntas,
Per quam progredimur, quo ducit quemque voluptas,"* etc.

Then comes the testimony of consciousness:

*"Declinamus item motus, nec tempore certo
Nec regione loci certa, sed uti ipsa tulit mens."*

Cousin might have written the next lines, though with a deeper meaning:

*"Nam, dubio procul, hiis rebus sua quoique voluntas
Principium dat; et hinc motus per membra rigantur."*

But the Roman's rigid materialism does not allow him to slip from the ada-

and attempted in various modes to adjust it to the causal axiom. The opponents of Hobbes and Collins, having much to say of "self-determining power," and of the "contingency" of volitions, stereotyped these phrases to such a degree in this controversy, that, in one meaning or another, they have ever since been regarded as embodying the doctrines of freedomism. The two great metaphysical difficulties of the freedomists have been so to frame the "self-determining" theory as to avoid the infinite-series argument, suggested by Hobbes,¹ and so skilfully elaborated by Edwards; and so to explain the doctrine of "contingency" as not to deny the axiom that every event must have its cause. The unfortunate efforts in this direction made by the Arian, or rather deistical, freedomist Chubb, have been immortalized by the merciless castigation that they received at the hands of Edwards. Kant affirmed the freedom of the will as a matter of *consciousness*, but avowed his inability to reconcile it with the "general law of natural necessity."² Stewart took the ground that an external motive could not properly be designated an efficient cause. As mind only can have *efficiency* and be a *cause*, in the sense of the axiom, "consequently it is absurd to ascribe the volitions of mind to the efficiency of causes foreign to itself."³ Reid and Hamilton both held that the will is free from external causation, and has "power over its own determinations," and that this constitutes liberty.⁴ Cousin, following M. de Biran,

maintains a chain, and so, though abjuring necessity in name, he gives us a perfect picture of what was afterwards called the "Liberty of spontaneity," the liberty of Hobbes:

"Sed, ne mens ipsa necessum
Intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agundis,
Et, devicta quasi, cogatur ferre, patique.
Id facit exiguum clinamen principiorum," etc.

Here we see the will *fatis avolsa*, yet fixed by a primordial *clinamen*. — De Rerum Natura (Edit. Delph, et var. Valpy, 1830), Lib. II. 251, etc.

¹ Hobbes's Works, Vol. V. p. 35 (see above).

² Critic of Pure Reason (Eng. ed. and trans., London: W. Pickering, 1838), p. 412, etc.

³ Stewart's Dissertation, Encycl. Brit., Vol. I. p. 266.

⁴ Hamilton's Discourses on Philosophy and Literature

in considering will as the self, the personality, makes it a cause which has the power to produce volition directly.¹ Tappan advances from Cousin's position, and makes the important point that it is the special quality of this cause called will "to have the power to make the particular determination without being necessarily correlated to the object."² Hamilton, in reviewing Cousin's theory, insists on liberty of will, but declares that, as an absolute commencement is to him inconceivable, the mode of that liberty is incomprehensible.³ Bledsoe denies that volition is, properly speaking, an effect.⁴ He considers it a phenomenon by itself, and proposes to establish for it a distinct and separate metaphysical category. Cousin's category of cause and effect he proposes to subdivide into two, one giving the relation of cause and effect, and the other that between agent and action.⁵

DR. WHEDON'S WORK.

We are now prepared to indicate what has been accomplished by the work before us. Written confessedly from the freedomist point of view, it yet differs in essential particulars from all the works noticed above. Making new and vital distinctions in ideas hitherto blended under common terms, unfolding with precision and perspicuity thoughts after which others have often been groping in the haze of a cloudy phraseology, it not only gives, from the philosophical and theological points of view, the most thorough criticism of the necessitarian scheme that has yet appeared, but also presents the freedomist scheme as a harmonious and logically compact system. Promptly rejecting, as vague and unsatisfactory, Kant's illusory offer of a "*noumenal* liberty," analyzing the idea of cause more closely than Stewart, and availing himself of the happy thought of Tappan, avoiding the meshes of the infinite-series argument, which it is so

¹ Elements of Psychology (American ed.), Chap. IV.

² Review of Edwards's Inquiry, etc., p. 222.

³ Hamilton's Discourses on Philosophy and Literature (Harper's ed.), p. 587.

⁴ Bledsoe on the Will, sec. 7.

⁵ Bledsoe's Theodicy, p. 154.

hard to shun when we say, with Reid and Hamilton, that the will "has power over its own determinations," holding, with Cousin, that mind has been constituted a cause, and that this is its essential characteristic, and so analyzing the idea of "contingency" that, while holding to it in one sense, he can yet admit as fully as the most rigid necessitarian that volition is an effect, our author takes up his position by admitting, in full force, all that can be claimed by the intuition of freedom on the one side, and by the axiom of causation on the other.

Before proceeding to develop the main positions of the work, we remark that, as a whole, it has evidently been wrought with great care and deliberation, in the patient study and reflection of many years. All sides of the subject seem to have been carefully scrutinized, and whatever success the reader may judge the author to have had in meeting objections, or in maintaining his own position, he will at least, as we judge, award him the merit of candor in stating the objections of his celebrated opponents, of honest fearlessness and conscious power in grappling with all the difficulties of this mighty subject, and of a wise humility, as the vast theme inevitably brings him to the verge of those undiscovered and perhaps undiscoverable regions, whose walls our reason vainly seeks to scale or penetrate.

The work is in three Parts. Part I. states the issue between the freedomist and the necessitarian theory; Part II. reviews the necessitarian theory—mainly as it is stated by Edwards and the Princeton Essayists—under three heads, called respectively the causational, the psychological, and the theological argument; Part III. gives the positive argument for the author's view.

The issue may be stated thus: All admit that the operations of the intellect and of the sensibilities are necessitated. Thought and feeling arise in the mind, when the appropriate objects are presented, as inevitably as any physical effect follows its cause. Is volition, in this sense, dependent upon motive? The necessitarian says "Yes,"

and the freedomist says "No." Some necessitarians state the connection between volition and motive as "philosophical necessity"; others, as "secured certainty"; but it is our author's aim to show that the alleged distinctions between the different kinds of necessity cannot logically be maintained. This brings us at once to the author's reconciliation between the intuition of liberty and the axiom of causation. This is grounded upon

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THE WILL.

Will is simply soul intentionally acting: the "power by which man becomes properly an AGENT in the world." It is carefully discriminated from *desire* by our author, under eight heads, which we need not recapitulate, as the distinction—though here defended by new arguments—is now so generally admitted among metaphysicians;¹ and we quote only the remark of Coleridge, endorsed by our author, that "we can conceive a being full of co-existing and contending desires and emotions, but without any power of volition, and so hemmed forever into a circle of passivities."

The act of willing is precisely defined as the *volitional* act, between the preceding intellection, emotion, etc. (called the *pre-volitional* conditions), and the subsequent acts of body and mind, which are *post-volitional* or *voluntary*. In every act, then, we have three distinct elements: first, the pre-volitional conditions; second, the volitional act; and, thirdly, the voluntary act. We note here, in passing, a distinction that solves some fallacies, that the act of willing, itself, is not *voluntary*, and so dependent upon a previous act of will; it is simply *volitional*. "In will, alone of all existences, there is an alternative power. Every species

¹ Plato makes this distinction, showing how desire may draw in one direction and yet will decide in another: e.g. a man may desire to drink, and yet determine not to drink. Cf. Rep. Lib. IV. 439, A. (ed. Stallb.). Aristotle has set it forth so distinctly, that it is surprising how any succeeding philosopher could have missed it. He shows how desire may oppose choice, and so argues a distinction between *ἐπιθυμία* and *προαιρέσις*. He says, *προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιούται, ἐπιθυμίᾳ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ*. Cf. Eth. Nicomach., 40, 14 (ed. Bekker).

of existence has its own one and singular property. Matter alone has solidity; mind alone has intelligence; cause alone has efficiency; and will, alone of causes, has an alternative or pluri-efficient power. It is the existence or non-existence of this power in will which constitutes the dispute between the necessitarian and the freedomist" (p. 14). It is the nature of a physical cause that it is potent for one only effect, i. e. that it is "*unipotent*"; and as we argue concerning mental phenomena from material analogies, we are prone to carry this conception of "*unipotence*" in causes from the realm of matter into that of mind. But universal consciousness, or at least the universal convictions thence arising, correct this conception, and assert that whenever will chooses one of several objects presented, it had full power at that moment to have chosen either of the others *instead*. And, let it be noted, a psychological question like this is not to be settled by deceptive analogies drawn from observation of the outer world, but by a careful scrutiny of the internal phenomena. Because causes are "*unipotent*" in material nature (i. e. because every cause there is followed invariably, under the same conditions, by the same effect), and because, while philosophizing on material phenomena, we can infallibly predict a given effect when we see a given cause, or affirm that such must have been the cause when we see the effect, it by no means follows that we can carry the same principles of reasoning into the infinitely diverse realm of mind. Now the axiom that every event must have a cause, when urged against the freedomist theory of will, has no force, except from the involved assumption that "every cause is unipotent," — the very point in dispute. In fact, in this assumption is the whole system of necessitarianism.

Now, as a unipotent cause accounts fully for its one invariable effect, so an alternative cause accounts as fully for either of its several alternative effects. Will is such an alternative cause, — the only one that we know. When, then, we are asked what caused a given volition, the true and sufficient answer is, "will." To ask still further, what caused

will to produce this volition, is as irrelevant as to ask what caused any other cause to produce its effect; that is, it is to ask "what causes causation?" Under given conditions of atmosphere, etc., the unipotent cause which we call electricity produces certain effects of light and heat; and, under given external and internal conditions of desire and motive, etc., the alternative cause called will produces either one of several volitions; and if we are asked to account for the uniform sequence in the one case, or the alternative sequence in the other, the answer in both cases is the same: "such is the nature of things"; or, "such is the nature of causation." No philosopher feels bound to explain causation.

Having exposed the necessitarian paralogism, and shown that an alternative cause, adequate for either one of several effects, is as truly within the limits of a legitimate causation as a physical or unipotent cause, he proceeds to answer the successive questions: "What causes will to act"? "What causes particular volition"? "Why not the contrary volition"? "What explanation for alternative diversity of results"? He here assumes to show that as a complete unipotent cause truly accounts for its one solely possible result, so a complete alternative cause is an adequate accounting for either one of several possible results. And as it is absurd to ask what causes a unipotent cause, in its proper conditions, to produce its one sole result, so it is absurd to ask in regard to an alternative cause, in its proper conditions, what caused it to put forth its alternative results. A complete cause, whether unipotent or alternative, accounts for its effect, "*for all complete cause puts forth its effect uncausedly.*" Nor is it any more difficult to explain how a free cause attains its alternative result, than how a unipotent cause is limited, circumscribed, and made to converge to its one sole possible effect. That is, free volitional causation is just as explicable as any causation whatever. The author then proceeds, in successive chapters, to refute and to retort the charge of atheistical consequences; to demon-

strate that freedom involves not chance, and that the power of contrary choice is liable to no charge of uselessness.

PLAN OF THE WORK.

At the start, our author takes the position (and this forms the hinge of his whole argument), that the power of counter-choice is indispensable to responsibility. The main body of the work, constituting Part II., considers the necessitarian objections against the existence of this power. Having removed these objections, freedomism may be deemed established by the sense of responsibility, of which it is an indispensable condition. Part II. assumes freedomism, and shows that it is not invalidated by the necessitarian arguments. Part III. proves it by positive argument.

As it is impossible, within these limits, to follow out with any degree of fulness the author's plan of treatment, we shall endeavor only to present his leading positions, following still a topical arrangement, which will bring out the fundamental points in controversy.

FREEDOM OF WILL.

The definition of liberty as given by Hobbes, "I acknowledge this liberty, that I can do if I will,"¹ repeated by Collins, as quoted above, and endorsed by Edwards,² simply makes the freedom of will the same thing as freedom of external action. Now the question is not, whether the body can do what the mind wills; that is, not whether the body is under restraint or coercion in carrying out the commands of the will, but whether the will itself is necessarily limited to a sole volition. In other words, the freedom of which Hobbes speaks is not *volitional* but *voluntary* freedom.

Some necessitarian philosophers, especially the extreme school of Lock, who state explicitly that this liberty of *voluntary* action is all that man is capable of, and that liberty can in no sense be predicated of will, have at least the

¹ Hobbes's Works, Vol. IV. p. 240.

² Inqui

merit of logical consistency; but there is no propriety in professing to prove freedom of *will*, and then proceeding at once to prove an external freedom to obey will; i. e. freedom of *external* or post-volitional *action*. Calvin saw this impropriety, and pointedly rebukes the absurdity of calling a man's will free because his voluntary action is not hindered. He says, it is very true that we may say a man possesses "free-will" because he acts voluntarily; but asks, "*what end could it answer to decorate a thing so diminutive with a title so superb?*" "Egregious liberty indeed!"¹ he ironically cries out. It is not generally realized that Edwards does not pretend that the will is free. He follows Locke in asserting that liberty cannot properly be predicated of will. "To talk of liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very will itself, is not to speak good sense; if we judge of sense and nonsense by the original and proper signification of words."² He shows, on the other hand, in various ways, what could scarcely ever have been doubted, that his "philosophical necessity" does not hinder *voluntary* action, while the real objection to it is, that it effectually and necessitatively controls *volitional* action. One of the "prevailing notions concerning the freedom of the will" which he bent his giant energies to dissipate, was, that it is not to "speak good sense" to "talk of liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very will itself." Yet many imagine that his great work shows how the will can be free, while yet all its volitions are necessitated. But this last task he was too keen a logician to undertake.

Hobbes, as before mentioned, more precisely defines liberty thus: it is the "absence of all impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsic quality of the agent."³ It is here that he gives the much-quoted illustration: "water is said to descend freely, or to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way, but not across, because the banks are impedi-

¹ Inst. Christ. Relig., Lib. II., Cap. 2.

² Inquiry, Part I., Sect. 5.

³ Hobbes's Works, Vol. IV. p. 274.

ments. And though the water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the *liberty* to ascend, but the *faculty* or *power*, because the impediment is in the nature of the water and intrinsic." So if man be free from *extrinsic* necessitation, though all his volitions be *intrinsically* necessitated, he is by the definition of Mr. Hobbes enjoying all the liberty of which he is capable. Let there be no external impediment in the way of the *manifestation* of the volition, and no matter how man comes by the volition, whether by adamantine causation crowding in upon the will from without, whether by creation, or fatalistic necessity; yet, by the theory of Hobbes, and of Edwards also, the man is not only free, but has all the liberty of which human nature is capable.

PROFESSOR HAVEN'S THEORY OF FREEDOM

The definition of liberty given by professor Haven, in his generally excellent Mental Philosophy, is essentially that of Hobbes, although his application of it is widely different. "Any faculty of the mind or organ of the body is free *when its own specific and proper action is not hindered.*"¹ Professor Haven, however, carefully discriminates between freedom of action and freedom of will, and in application of his definition makes it the "specific and proper action" of the will to put forth volitions according to the "inclination."² When there is no hinderance to our putting forth volitions "as we are inclined," the will is free. But this "inclination" is of course necessitated, for all the action of the sensibilities is necessitated. Circumstances fix the inclinations, the inclinations fix the choice, and the choice fixes the volition. Here, to use Dr. Whedon's illustration, are four ninepins in a row. No. 1 (representing circumstances) knocks down No. 2, No. 2 knocks down No. 3, and that No. 4, which is the volition. No. 4 is (by the theory) "free," in falling, but that freedom "consists in the absoluteness of its being knocked down by No. 3, as that is by its predecessors." The lengthening of the series only pushes the necessitation

¹ Mental Philosophy, p. 538.

² *Ibid.*, p. 544

further out of sight, but there it is, after all. But Professor Haven tells us that we may indirectly modify these "inclinations" by *shaping our character*.¹ But how can we shape our character except by volition, and is not that volition determined by previous "*inclinations*"? This theory, then, only gives us liberty in words; it makes a promise which it cannot fulfil.

AUTHOR'S DEFINITION OF FREEDOM.

Our author thus defines freedom of will: "Supposing a given volition to be in the agent's contemplation, it is the unrestricted power of putting forth, in the same unchanged circumstances, another volition INSTEAD" (p. 25). The last word in this definition is important, as showing the true meaning of the phrase "power of contrary choice." By this is *not* meant "ability to put forth two acts at the same time; choosing as one does, and as he does not,"² but ability to put forth another volition instead of the one actually put forth. This the author shows (as we judge) to be the freedom necessary as the foundation of moral obligation, the freedom assumed in all allegations of responsibility, in all expressions of praise and blame,—the freedom that makes God's moral government a possibility.

In defining freedom, our author also, in peculiar phraseology, marks a distinction, of which he makes great use throughout his work. He sets it forth thus: "Freedom is exemption. Either it is exemption from some impediment to the performance of some act, which is freedom *to* the act; or it is an exemption from a limitation, confinement, or compulsion to perform the act, and this is a freedom in direction *from* the act. To non-volitional objects there belongs only the first of these two freedoms. All mechanisms are free only *to* the sole mode of act or state in which they are, or are about to be. The clock that strikes is free not *from* but only *to* the stroke. The river that flows (and this remark meets precisely the illustration of Hobbes) is free

¹ Mental Philosophy, p. 548.

² Bib. Sacra, Vol. XX. - ***

only *to* the current, but not *from* An agent, exempt only from impediment, and so free only *to* the act, has not the proper freedom of a volitional agent, but of a machine. As the clock-hammer, in the given case, is free only *to* the stroke, so the agent, in the given case, is free *to* the given volition, and not also in direction *from* it. He has only the freedom of a mechanical object, not the freedom of a volitional agent" (pp. 23, 24). Now it will be found that no necessitarian scheme yet invented embraces both these kinds of freedom at the same time. When closely analyzed and logically run out, every such scheme proves to be simply the clock-hammer liberty, and no more.

THE INFINITE-SERIES OBJECTION.¹

It will be noticed that the distinction between "voluntary" and "volitional" avoids this objection entirely. Because our outward acts are always preceded by a volition, it by no means follows that the same thing is true of volitional acts. Yet this is the assumption on which the infinite-series objection is based, and from which comes all its force. The famous phrase, "self-determining power of the will" is, however, highly objectionable, from its manifold ambiguities, and is consequently discarded by our author, unless when carefully explained. Thus "self" may refer to "power," or to "will," or to the agent possessing both; and "will," in this phrase, sometimes means the faculty, and sometimes the act of the faculty. It is not wonderful that so skilful a logician as Edwards found the phrase to involve infinite absurdities.

Edwards proposes the question: "What determines the will?" yet really proceeds to discuss the question: "*What causes the particular volition?*"² Our author is the first, as far as we know, to point out that these two questions are really identical, — the same question in different words. Hence they are met with the same answer. The will, in its proper conditions, is a complete cause of its effect. When it

¹ See Edwards's Inquiry, Part II., Sect. 1.

² *Ibid.* Part I. Sect. 1.

is asked then, "What determines it to that effect?" i.e. "What causes it to cause that particular effect?" the answer is "NOTHING WHATEVER," for a complete cause needs nothing to cause it to cause its effect. A cause needs no subsidiary cause to cause it to cause. The will therefore, when in its proper causal conditions, requires no determiner; and thus "the tail of the infinite series is at once cut off."

Of the several "evasions" which Edwards invents and bestows upon Freedomists, Dr. Whedon accepts neither, since his answer differs from them all. If the will, in its conditions, is not determined at all, then it is unnecessary to tell how or by what it is determined.

NATURAL AND MORAL ABILITY.

It is a universal conviction of man's moral nature, that power must underlie obligation. If then, man ought to choose what he does not, he must have volitional power adequate to such choice. If volition always follows the strongest motive, then God always requires of the sinner a volition contrary to the strongest motive-force. What now is the basis of this requirement? By the hypothesis there is a volitional powerlessness, called by necessitarians "moral inability;" and is any basis for God's requirement of volition furnished by showing that the sinner has power to perform some outward act *after* he has willed? It is *volitional* act that God's law requires; and by the hypothesis there is no volitional power. And, be it noted, it is *volitional* rather than *voluntary* acts that all God's commands require. Every man who is punished for sin is punished for not resisting the strongest motive; a thing that, by the Edwardean theory, no man ever did or ever can do. The conclusion does seem inevitable, that, upon this theory, in every case of disobedience, God's command is disobeyed because he has so constituted things that it cannot be obeyed. The "ability" which Edwards makes the basis of human responsibility he himself shows to be as utterly out of man's reach, and therefore unavailable, as if it were in another world. To

command a human sinner to do a holy deed does seem, on this theory, as inconsistent as to command him to grind corn with a water-power on the planet Herschell.

Our author gives an extended and thorough criticism of the whole Edwardean doctrine of "natural and moral ability" (pp. 239 - 271). Edwards is shown, conclusively as it seems to us, to have made here a distinction illusory, if not sophistical; and first, to have demonstrated in behalf of the doctrine of necessity the non-existence of volitional power against the strongest motive force, which he calls "moral inability;" while secondly, in behalf of the demands of responsibility, he contradictorily maintains that this "inability" is properly no inability at all, for, as he says, the word cannot properly be applied to choice, but only to actions sequent upon choice. Our author shows that this so-called "moral cannot" has no basis in human language or literature; that the whole theory is metaphysically baseless, and leads to pulpit sophistry and equivocation.

POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE.

"Contrary choice" is another objectionable phrase, giving rise to the plausibly sounding objection: "What is the use of a power that is never used?" The question might be retorted with some pertinence upon the advocates of a "natural ability" which is declared to be the basis of responsibility, and yet is ever utterly out of reach. But the force of the objection vanishes when it is seen that by "*contrary choice*" is meant simply *alternative* choice,—power to choose something else instead. But again, and this reply is unavailing for those who maintain the "invariable sequence theory," the objector presupposes that there is a certain class or kind of motives which is never used, while the fact is that no such class exists *previous* to volition. The unused class is constituted such by the very act of volition. The question then is irrelevant, for all motives are alike "used" in the volitional act. This leads us naturally to the

NATURE OF MOTIVE INFLUENCES.

Though such a criticism should be made with extreme caution, in examining the conclusions of so close a reasoner as Edwards, it yet seems difficult to extricate his fundamental argument from "the vicious circle." In answer to the question: "What determines the will?" he replies: "It is that motive, which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is strongest."¹ And then, when he comes to define and settle the meaning of the phrase "strongest motive," he includes in it everything in the external world and in the mind itself which has "strength, tendency, or advantage to move or excite"² the will. Is not this saying simply this: "The will is determined by that which determines it?" And who would, who could, dispute this? Certainly it may, with great justice, be claimed that Edwards never has been and never can be answered, if his fundamental argument is an identical proposition.

Dr. Whedon does not, however, take any advantage of this fallacy of statement; but proceeds at once to give the necessitarian doctrine of motives the most critical and thorough review that can be found on record. At the outset he warns us against the danger of error from the abundant use of physical terms in this discussion, such as, "highest," "strongest," "weightiest," as applied to motives. Mathematics cannot be applied to quantities and weights of thought. This assumption of perfect commensurability of motives, and consequent power of accurate calculation of volitions, provided there be a perfect insight of motives, is altogether baseless. "The qualities of thought may be comparable without being commensurable."

"The comparability of motives may be supposably ascertained either from extra-volitional or from volitional sources. Thus we may compare the different degrees of excitement in an emotion, a moral feeling, a desire, a fear, a sense of obligation. Some we may know to be prevolitionally and

¹ Inquiry, Part II., Sect. 2.

² Ibid.

intrinsically intenser than others. But prevolitional impressions are not so properly motives in themselves, but in their relation to the will. What is, in truth, meant by the highest or strongest motive must be derived from the will itself; and thence we have this definition, which is all-important to this discussion, that *the so-called strength of a motive is the comparative prevalence which the will assigns it in its own action.* Or, otherwise, it is *the nearness with which the will comes to acting according with or to it.* Volitionally considered (the only true mode of consideration), the so-called strength of a motive may be again defined the *degree of probability that the will will choose in accordance with or on account of it.* And it is most important to remark that the result is not always, nor in most cases necessarily, as the highest probability. The will may choose for the higher or the lower. And as the will may choose for a lower rather than for a higher probability, so it may choose on account of what is called antecedently a weaker over a stronger motive. . . . That result is not necessarily as the highest probability is shown in the doctrine of contingencies, or probabilities. The chance may be improbable, and yet may prove successful. So the volition calculably improbable may become the actual. On the contrary, there may be the highest probability and yet a failure. And this is equivalent to saying, that there may be the strongest motive and yet the will reject it. . . . Relatively to the prevolitional faculties the strongest motive often fails; relatively to the will the strongest motive is but another term for the accorded motive" (p. 129, etc.).

Estimating, then, the influence of motives upon the future decisions of a given human will is but a calculation of probabilities. The highest probability may fail, the lowest succeed. Here then we come upon the real meaning of the word "contingency" as applied to volitions. As thus applied it is to be carefully discriminated from "accident" and "chance." Viewed from without, volitions may be styled contingent, because to the observer it is uncertain which

way they will turn ; but, viewed from within, there is nothing accidental about them ; they are simply free. " While freedom is the intrinsic quality of the agent in volition, contingency is the exterior view of the same thing." We call events accidental because we are ignorant of their causes ; for even the upturning of a given face of a die depends on hidden causes, such as delicate muscular movements, etc., which, could they be repeated, would give the same result again. We call it " chance," because the cause is concealed from us ; but volitions are contingent because of the very alternative nature of the cause. " There is a phenomenal resemblance" between freedom in volitions and " chance," but it is only phenomenal, for "*the essential base is different.*" Edwards's objections to what he calls " Arminian contingency" (cf. Inquiry, Part II., Sect. 8) are thus completely obviated.

This explanation of the real meaning of " motive strength" lets in light on many obscurities, and dissipates many sophistries. Take for instance the problem of Sir William Hamilton :

" On the supposition that the sum of the influences (motives, dispositions, tendencies) to volition A is equal to 12, and the sum of counter-volition B equal to 8, can we conceive that the determination of volition A should not be necessary ? We can only conceive the volition B to be determined by supposing that the man creates (calls from non-existence into existence) a certain supplement of influences. But this creation, as actual, or in itself, is inconceivable, and even to conceive the possibility of this inconceivable act we must suppose some cause by which the man is determined to exert it. We thus in thought never escape determination and necessity. It will be observed that I do not consider this inability to volition any disproof of the fact of free-will."¹ Here is a problem that Hamilton deemed insoluble ; but in the light of the above explanation of the true meaning of " strength of motive," we

¹ Note to Reid, p. 611.

find this solution which we are confident must satisfy every mind.

“No creation or calling-power from nonexistence is, we reply, needed in the case. The numerals 8 and 12 are but representations of the different degrees of anterior probability that the will will decide in favor of A or B. It is a chance as two to three that the agent will decide for A ; but this does not settle the question as in a counter-action of mechanical forces. The weaker probability may, in strict accordance with the doctrine of probabilities, receive the accord of the will, and B may, without any contradiction to any existing truth, be chosen. What is wanting is not creation of new power, but use of power already in existence” (p. 138).

The relative strength of motives, it will be seen, becomes from this point of view relative degree of probability that the will will choose thus or thus ; and to ask as does Edwards : “What motive can there be to choose for the weaker motive ?” is to ask : “What probability is there in favor of the lesser probability ?” Edwards’s questions, whether there can be choice without motive, and against superior motive (as in the supposed case of the man with two different kinds of food before him, for one of which he has a superior appetite), his argument by approximation (if invincible inducements destroy liberty, half as strong inducements half destroy it, etc.), and his argument that if motives do not necessitate volition exhortations are in vain, all find satisfactory answer here. The commensurability of motives is then amply discussed, wherein it is shown that while the necessitarian theory supposes an accurate balance and measurement of conflicting motives to be possible, yet a cold intellection and a warm emotion, a sense of duty and a sentiment of taste, a moral obligation and a physical appetite, are as incomparable and as incommensurable with each other as, “a pound and a rod,” or as “the weight of a rock and the honor of a gentleman.” Under this head it is also shown that the will is not always as the “greatest ap-

parent good." Having settled these principles the author then proceeds to refute the main arguments on which Edwards depends to prove that motives necessitate volition. Here are met the assumptions that for the will to act *in accordance* with a motive, and for it to *be caused* to act by the motive, are the same; that "if the acts of the will are excited by motives, then motives are the causes of their being excited," and "necessary causes" also. Edwards's argument from a series of equivalent terms, or pseudo-synonymes, in reply to Mr. Chubb, his objections that if the will be not causatively necessitated, then it is insanely loose from all reason, and that freedomism involves a "heap of inconsistencies," are thoroughly discussed, and, as we judge, fairly refuted. Still further, we have chapters on uniformities of volition, and on double volition; and Edwards's elaborate and finely spun argument concerning the necessity of the Divine volitions (Inquiry, Part IV. Sect 8) crumbles utterly away, as it is shown to confound *similarity* and *identity*.

Will is the real cause of volitions; motives, the normal conditions. The motive may exist, and yet there is full power in the will to put forth or to withhold the volition. But if the motive influence be solely on one side, and no alternative present to the mind, then there are not the requisite conditions for counter-choice. Here there is, in the given case, an objective limit to freedom. That is, on this supposition, freedom and responsibility vanish together. But, it is important to add, if the absence of these conditions indispensable to a right volition is itself the result of the agent's free action, then is he justly held responsible for depriving himself of the power of right doing.

The Edwardean (i.e. the Hobbesian) theory of the causal character of motives naturally leads us to the subject of

PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY.

Sir William Hamilton has said (what all will admit) that "the assertion of absolute necessity is virtually the negative of a moral universe, consequently of the moral governor of

a moral universe ; in a word [it is the assertion] of atheism. Fatalism and atheism are, indeed, convertible terms. The only valid arguments for the existence of a God and for the immortality of the soul rest on the ground of man's moral nature ; consequently, if that moral nature be annihilated, which in any scheme of necessity it is, every conclusion established on such a nature is annihilated also." ¹ Now as Hobbes, Belsham, Diderot, Hume, and Comte make this identical theory of strongest motive force to involve "absolute necessity," it is a most interesting question how Edwards, whose whole religious nature repudiated such a consequence, could yet logically avoid it. He calls his doctrine "philosophical necessity," which he tells us is properly no "necessity," but only "certainty." But is not this a distinction in name and not in nature? What is this "philosophical necessity"? He gives us, as illustrations of it, things "necessary in their own nature," as the attributes of God and mathematical axioms ; things that have already happened, historical events ; things "surely and firmly connected with something else that is necessary" in one of these respects. ² In regard to foreknown volitions, he tells us that it is "impossible" but that they should come to pass, "as impossible that they should fail of existence as if they had already existed." ³ With still greater decisiveness, if possible, he states that the difference between natural and moral necessity "lies not so much in the NATURE of the connection as in the two terms connected." ⁴ Can necessity be conceived more absolute than this? In fact, does not the last quotation admit that *all* necessity, by whatever adjectives qualified, is in *nature* one? With what propriety, then, is it asserted that this is "improperly" designated necessity? If volitions are as necessary as the attributes of God, or as the equality of the radii of a circle, as necessary in *nature* as any physical events whatever, could any fatal-

¹ Lectures on Metaphysics (Gould and Lincoln's ed.), Lect. XL. p. 556.

² Inquiry, Part I., Sect. 3.

³ Ibid., Part II., Sect. 12.

⁴ Ibid., Part I., Sect. 4.

ism make them more so? Whether this be "properly called" necessity or not, is a comparatively trivial question of lexicography; but we are now concerned with the infinitely graver question: Have we not here the *fact* which men usually express by the words "absolute necessity"? Hence Dr. Chalmers tells us that Hume, Kames, and the fatalists of that day "triumphed in the book of Edwards, as that which set a conclusive seal on their principles."¹ Edwards, of course, expressly disclaims fatalism;² but if the foregoing quotations are set by the side of this disclaimer, they only show, as it seems to us, that he attempted to hold both sides of a logical contradiction. The fact is, that Edwards disclaims only the belief in any restraint or coercion upon man's *external action*. He objects to the words "necessity," "impossible," etc., because they seem to imply a resistance of the will,³ while *his* necessity goes deeper than this, and controls the will itself. He says, speaking of the Stoics, "whatever their doctrine was, if any of them held such a fate as is repugnant to any liberty *consisting in our doing as we please*, I utterly deny such a fate."⁴ We know of no fatalist on record, at least in modern times, who did not believe in as much freedom as this. The very gist of fatalism is, that there is an external power fastened, *not* upon the bodily machinery, which carries out volitions, but upon *the will itself*. Thus, for example, writes Diderot, in which quotation it will be noted that unconstrained *voluntary action* is granted, while yet freedom is utterly denied:

"There are not, and cannot be, free beings We can no more conceive a being acting without motive, than we can one of the arms of a balance acting without a weight. The motive is always exterior and foreign, fastened upon us by some cause distinct from ourselves. What deceives us is the prodigious variety of our actions, joined to the habit which we catch at our birth, of confounding the VOLUNTARY and the FREE." And Diderot's conclusion from this is, "if

¹ Inst. of Theol., Vol. II., Chap. 11

² Ibid., Part I., Sect. 3.

Vol. XXI. No. 83.

³ Inquiry, Part IV., Sect. 6.

⁴ Ibid., Part IV., Sect. 6.

there is no liberty, there is no action that merits either praise or blame; neither vice nor virtue; nothing that ought either to be rewarded or punished. Reproach others for nothing, and repent of nothing; this is the first step to wisdom. Besides this, all is prejudice and false philosophy."¹

And still more; Edwards asserts, with great emphasis, liberty of external action, while insisting with equal emphasis on necessitated volitions. Which is worse, to fasten fetters on the body or the soul? And if the value of the soul above the body can be estimated, that will show precisely how much worse is the necessity that he teaches, than the fatalism that he so earnestly repudiates.

NECESSITARIAN EVASIONS.

As already shown, Dr. Whedon's fundamental position is, that necessity is utterly incompatible with responsibility. In Part II., Sect. ii., ch. 11, he reviews at length various attempts to harmonize these contradictions. Dr. Emmons took the high, bold position that we are responsible for evil volitions, even though they were created and put into us. In this chapter our author shows that this view is as agreeable to the reason and moral sense as are any modern attempts at reconciliation between necessity and responsibility. The scheme which maintains responsibility for a necessitated *nature*, or that which, rejecting this, locates it in necessitated *action*; the theory of responsibility for a *spontaneous* necessity to put forth a given volition without any counter power; and that of spontaneous necessity by reason of *invariable non-usance* of counter power,—all are shown to exclude responsibility with equal effectiveness. No matter what the *source* of this necessitation, God or second causes; no matter what the *mode*, by creation, secondary causation, or insertion; the *point* on which it is imposed, body, mind, intellect, sensibilities, or will, or the *result* necessitated to exist, volition, nature, state, or action,—in every case it equally and totally excludes responsibility.

¹ Quoted from Stewart's Works, Vol. V

INVARIABLE SEQUENCES. SECURED CERTAINTY.

Our author devotes a chapter (p. 214) to Hume's theory of causation, as applied by himself, Mill, Comte, and the materialists generally to the phenomena of will, and also partially adopted by some Christian philosophers, who admit real causation in physics, but substitute therefor "invariable sequence," when they come to treat of volitional effects. Mr. Hume supposed that his removal of the idea of power from causation, and resolving it into the simple sequence of antecedent and consequent, would settle forever the controversy upon necessity. This is also Mr. Mill's plan of escape from the perplexities of this question. When we realize, he tells us, that this necessity in actions is but "uniformity in the order" with which they follow motives, and that there is no "mystical tie" binding the action to the motive, that is, no causal power in the motive, no one's feelings will object to the necessity of volitions. This idea of causal power, it is, he tells us, that "conflicts with our consciousness and revolts our feelings. We are certain that, in the case of our volitions, there is not this mysterious constraint. . . . But neither is any such mysterious compulsion now supposed, by the best authorities, to be exercised by *any* cause over its effect. Those who think that causes draw their effects after them by a mystical tie, are right in believing that the relation between volitions and their antecedents is of another nature. But they should go further, and admit that this is also true of all other effects and their antecedents. If such a tie be considered to be involved in the word "necessity," the doctrine is not true of human actions, but neither is it true of inanimate objects. It would be more correct to say that matter is *not* bound by necessity, than that matter *is* so."¹

On this theory, then, the will is no more necessitated to put forth a given volition than is the leaf to fall, or the stream to run down an inclined plane; but it is just as

¹ Mill's *System of Logic* (Harper's ed.), p. 522.

much so. Mr. Mill objects strongly to the word "necessity"; but yet admits, yea claims, that it is just as applicable to volitions as to any other effects. Certainly, to average mankind, this will furnish little relief.

We now briefly present our author's view upon this theory, that volitions alone, of all effects, are subject to the law of invariable sequence, and that the will possesses power for counter volition, but never uses it. The theory is, that an agent always *can* but never *will* choose otherwise. This is held to be the true *certainty* :

"All volitional certainty thereby presupposes a one particular kind of condition, namely, strongest antecedent motive force, and a particular kind of result, namely, obedience to the strongest motivity under a particular law, namely, invariable succession upon major force. Any event or futurity not under such condition or law is absurd chance or lawless uncertainty. Such law of uniformity or spontaneity of obedient action under condition of superior force is seen to be absolute, not merely in all experienced cases, so as to be an induction, but in all possible cases, so as to be seen super-experientially and intuitively true, and therefore it is self-evident and axiomatic. It would be intuitively true, as the contradictory of lawless chance, upon an infinite number of repetitions of an infinite number of cases; so that it is a strictly absolute and true universality. As the sole exemption from a self-contradictory chance, it is apodictical, and (so we infer) a necessity. But by them it is named *certainty*, and held to be the only true certainty, as distinguished from necessity on one side and chance on the other" (p. 220, etc.).

Our author makes seven points against this theory, which it would be injustice to him to merely recapitulate, and our limits will not allow us to give them with any degree of fullness. It will probably be more satisfactory to the reader to see one or two of them developed somewhat in detail.

The first point is, that the advocates of this theory must unite with the Arminians in refuting the main body of

Edwards on the Will. Edwards maintains, not the *non-usage* but the *non-existence* of counter-power. "At start, he excludes 'power of choosing otherwise in a given case' as an unthinkability.¹ His argument of the infinite-series boastfully reduces the *conception* of diverse power to infinities of infinities of contradictions.² His causational argument knows only inalterative cause, and the effect of any other sort of cause is (to him) a causeless effect.³ He identifies the necessity of a past event and of a future event as one.⁴ His reduction of free-will to atheism proves, if anything, that the supposition of the existence of a power of counter-choice logically supposes the non-existence of God. His identification of will with desire excludes the possibility of a counter-volition as truly as of a counter-sensation.⁵ His argument against liberty of indifference excludes all power for will to flow but in a certain channel.⁶ All activity is, with him, a passivity.⁷ All causality is exhausted in the result.⁸ Withdraw these arguments and what is left of Edwards? A valueless shell from which the kernel has been completely extracted. To deny that Edwards taught pure necessity as distinct from certainty, non-existence as distinct from non-usage [of counter-power], is as absurd as to deny that Euclid taught geometry" (p. 221, etc). It will, then, be seen that the theologians who teach non-usage in distinction from the non-existence of counter-power, must first unite with the Arminians in refuting Edwards, and then their issue with Edwards will be succeeded by an issue with the Arminians also.

Again: "It is also said to be true that *nobody does as well as he can*; and so there is a *can be* which never *will be*. Distributively or individually that is not true. People often do as well as they can. Our Lord testified of one that "she hath done what she could." People sometimes, but not usually, do as bad as they can in the given case. But

¹ Whedon, p. 29.² Ibid., p. 122.³ Ibid., p. 157.⁴ Ibid., p. 63.⁵ Ibid., p. 15.⁶ Ibid., p. 184.⁷ Ibid., p. 180.⁸ Ibid. p. 97.

the maxim may mean, collectively, *nobody through his whole life does as well as he can*. It may be true distributively (cf. p. 132) that an agent is able to choose, in each and every single instance, for the rightest and best, without being able to choose *always* rightest and best. This high collective *can*, therefore, is not true" (p. 225).

On the doctrine of "secured certainty" we simply extract a few sentences. "Pure certainty, as in the proper place we define the word, and as distinct from necessity, is not predicable of, nor to be identified with, invariable sequence, or with the relation between the antecedent and consequent of such a relation. This, our pure certainty, is the simple futuration of an event which is possible to be otherwise. To add that such a certainty is limited to a sole condition of strongest antecedent force, and is ruled and fixed by a law of sequence, and to a sole result, furnishes new elements not belonging to the idea of a pure futuration. This becomes a certainty of a special class of the entire genus, which is really no certainty at all. For if the so-called certain act is formulated by a previous fixed universal law, selecting a particular set or sort of facts, then to this law it *must* conform, and this is necessity. To secure a thing, truly and absolutely, is to make an opposite thing impossible. The securing the previous certainty of the event can be done only by *securing the event itself* in the future by which such certainty is caused or shaped, and to secure the event is to destroy the power of contrariety, and transform the whole into necessity" (p. 227). On this scheme of invariability, "all guilt has this excuse and justification, that there is no being in the universe, high or low, finite or infinite, that in the same category, namely of strongest motive, would not commit the same guilty act" (p. 235).

FOREKNOWLEDGE.

We can but allude to the "theological argument," constituting the third section of Part II. The necessitarian argument from foreknowledge is first examined through four

strong chapters, in which, while the author admits, as fully as the most rigid predestinarian, that God has entire and definite prescience of all human volitions, actual and possible, he yet insists that it is possible, in each case, for man to put forth a different volition. God having implanted in man this alternative power of will, knows in every given case that the agent willing a certain way has full power to will another way instead. His knowing, infallibly, which way the agent will choose, does not negative his knowing that the agent has full power for diverse choice. The whole question, then, becomes one concerning the nature of man, rather than the necessity of events. It is removed from metaphysics to psychology. If the alternative power of will be proved, and thus the psychological question settled, the metaphysical question will take care of itself. The question: "Can God foreknow volitions?" changes to this: "Can God make a being with alternative will?" We think that consciousness and the sense of moral obligation reply that he can. The whole necessitarian argument from foreknowledge goes on two assumptions: first, that God can know future events only as we do, by seeing them wrapped up in their causes, or, as our author expresses it, that God can know the future only by travelling thither "over the bridge of causation"; and second, that God is the real cause, mediately or immediately, of all that transpires. "He can know only what he has determined to do," is the gist of the argument.

NECESSITATED SIN AND VIRTUE.

We have also a chapter on the free moral agency of our Saviour, in reply to the argument of Edwards, that his character furnishes a decisive example of necessitated virtue.¹ Other chapters follow on the freedom of the divine will, the responsibility of obdurates, and the "equation of probational advantages." Whatever the reader may judge the author's success to have been, it is obvious that he has overlooked

¹ Inquiry, Part III., Sect. 2.

none of the difficulties of the subject. He has not rashly rushed among these awful themes; they have been the topics of his careful thought through studious and prayerful years. We can but glance at the

POSITIVE ARGUMENT AND CONCLUSION.

Here, in the first place, comes the argument from consciousness. It is objected that mind can cognize only its actual operations, and so cannot be conscious of volitions never put forth. But the claim is, that mind is conscious, not of these non-existent operations, but of *power* to put them forth; and of this it is certainly conscious, if conscious of any power whatever. Before putting forth any volition, mind is always conscious of this alternative power. We have, then, a positive argument from the possibility of the divine command. The "distinction between automatic excellence and moral desert" is then drawn, clearly and powerfully, and "created moral desert" is shown to be impossible. An argument follows from "God's non-authorship of sin," in which it is shown that while Edwards nowhere else in the Inquiry aggressively maintains necessitation, he recoils when he reaches this topic, and defends the Arminian theory of *non-prevention*. The work closes with the conclusion that freedom is the condition of a possible theodicy (or theodice, as the author prefers to spell the word). The system of necessity, in whatever form presented, must, when run out to its logical consequences, make God an automatic deity, and man an automatic creature, the universe a vast automatism. Whether this automatism be considered an "orrey that moves by a force from without," or one "that moves in the same orbit by an intrinsic force," in either case we reach the same fearful result,—responsibility is excluded, and moral government made impossible. "Either there is no divine government, or man is a non-necessitated moral agent."

In conclusion, we feel confident that this work will take its place as a valuable original contribution to the theological

literature of our land. The reader will find it no scrap-book of old statements, arguments, and opinions; everything has passed through the author's alembic; its faults and its virtues are all his own. Of course, doctrinal statements and inferences like these must expect to undergo a fiery ordeal of criticism. To expect that this work will pass unscathed through such a trial would be chimerical enough. In its style and expression, often quaint and sometimes eccentric, incidental verbal coinage, and occasional controversial sharpness, there will be found, by those who do not care to go deeper, ample material for one style of criticism; while the author's thorough handling of the most vital topics of Christian theology must inevitably bring him into collision with candid and long established opinions that are widely prevalent in the church. But there never before has been a time when all the brethren of the great Christian family have been so ready to sit down and calmly take counsel together. All stand to-day upon land shaken with mighty and far-resounding controversies; all alike hear the tremendous questions on whose solution hangs the possibility of a Christian philosophy; and as, age after age, we slowly penetrate these realms of awful shadow and baffling mystery, all alike, who are suffused with the Master's spirit, will hail with shoutings the faintest taper-gleam upon the path.