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ARTICLE I.

ATHANASIUS AND THE ARIAN CONTROVERSY:<sup>1</sup>

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§ 1. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

No doctrine that combines both philosophical and also religious elements, has ever engendered such violent contests in Christendom as those which succeeded the introduction of Arianism. They convulsed alike the Oriental and the Western church; they were maintained during a period of more than half a century; and, while they continued, political influences were as actively exercised as those which proceeded from the church. The struggle necessarily assumed, during its progress, such vast proportions. For Arianism was not simply a heresy which a single individual—an energetic agitator—endeavored to promulgate, but is rather to be viewed as a new conflict between the spirit of the world and the spirit of revelation. That conflict had originally possessed an external character during the three

<sup>1</sup> This Article presents the substance of Chap. I., Second Division, of H. Veigt's recent work: *Die Lehre des Athanasius von Alexandrien* [The Doctrinal System of Athanasius]. The author exhibits in the First Division the general points of faith, as held by Athanasius, and in the Second describes, in detail, his controversies with the Arians, the Sabellians, the Pneumatomachians, and the Apollinarians.

centuries which closed with the public recognition of the social rights of the church; it was now renewed in the very bosom of the church, and imperilled her doctrinal life. It was in reality the whole spirit or character of the oriental people, who had been only partially converted to Christianity, that rose up in opposition to the fundamental truths of the Christian revelation, and which merely assumed the form of Arianism. The party which adhered to the views of Arius long after his death, had not been created by him; he had only been the first who gave a distinctly defined form and body to prevailing hostile sentiments respecting the doctrine and the authority of the church.

The intellectual and spiritual atmosphere of the East contained at that time two opposite elements: the one was from above — from the Spirit of God; the other was from below — from the spirit of the natural man; the former was the Christian revelation; the latter, pagan philosophy. The two had, during three centuries, been compared by many thoughtful minds, and their respective value had been determined with different degrees of success. At the present era, when other theories had been either modified or discarded, two opposite systems divided the interest and zeal of men between them. The one held that philosophy constituted the substance, and that the Christian revelation was simply an *accident* — a non-essential quality; the other, which was fully developed and sustained by clear and satisfactory reasons, held that the truths of revelation constituted the substance, and that philosophy was a mere *accident*, by no means essentially necessary to the existence of the substance. The former was embodied in Arianism; the latter, in the Athanasian creed. That these were the relations which the two parties sustained to each other, is demonstrated alike by the difference in the sources from which they respectively deduced their arguments, and by the difference in the essential character of their respective doctrines.

Arius adopted philosophy as his teacher and guide, in so far as he declared that reason was the original source of our

knowledge of divine truth, and he noticed the scriptures in those cases alone in which they appear to confirm the results which the processes of his understanding had already furnished. He and his associates believed that the chief element of success consisted in the attempt to represent the doctrines of their opponents as contrary to reason. Athanasius, on the other hand, and with him the church, recognized, unalterably and unconditionally, the scriptures as the true source of all our knowledge of divine things; the question whether the latter could always be comprehended by the human mind, he regarded as of no essential importance, inasmuch as the answer could not essentially affect the convictions of a believer, or the doctrine of the church. The difference in the essential character of the doctrines of the two men respectively is still more striking. Arius viewed God as *the absolute Simplicity*, as opposed to that which is composite or complex; as a Being sustaining relations to no others, tolerating no distinctions in himself, and immeasurably exalted above the world, or the kingdom of manifold life. Consequently, as God is absolute *Existence* and can admit of no internal distinctions, he cannot be both Father and Son, and therefore the Son cannot be *true God*. But he gladly welcomes the Son as an intermediate being, since the latter now occupies the vast chasm between God and the world, and thus brings these two into a certain relation to each other. Nevertheless, he distinctly admitted the *reality* of God, while he maintained that no distinctions or relations could be predicated of him.

The church, on the other hand, guided by the testimonies of the scriptures, and enlightened by the progressive revelations of the latter, viewed God as the fulness of life, on whom the world with all its manifold life depends, and with whom it is already intimately connected, without the intervention of any third existence. While it, accordingly, received the doctrine of the unity of God, the church found no difficulty in distinguishing, in accordance with the plain doctrine of the scriptures, the three persons, Father. Son.

and Holy Spirit, although the limits of human thought did not permit it to solve the mystery of revelation — the unity and the tri-unity of God. These appear to be the fundamental differences in the Arian and Athanasian systems.

## § 2. ORIGINAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

We proceed, after these introductory remarks, to present the Arian doctrinal system in detail, and the mode in which it was controverted by Athanasius. The direct sources from which our knowledge of the former is derived, are, first, an epistle addressed by Arius to Eusebius of Nicomedia; it has been preserved by Epiphanius (*Haeres.* 69. 6) and by Theodoret (*Hist.* I. 5); secondly, an epistle of Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, which has been preserved by Athanasius (*De Synod.* 16), Epiphanius (69. 7. 8), and Socrates (*Hist.* I. 6); thirdly, the treatise written by Arius, and entitled *Thalia*, undoubtedly the latest of his writings, and preserved in substance by Athanasius (*c. Ar.* I. 5, 6, 9; *de Synod.* 15); fourthly, an epistle addressed by Arius to Alexander, and preserved by Athanasius (*de Synod.*) and Epiphanius (69. 7). The writings of the former contain, besides, numerous quotations from Arius, without special mention of the precise source (*contra Arianos, Orat.*; *Synodi Nic. Decr. contra Haeres. Arian.*; *de Synod. Arim. et Sel.*). The writings of Arius himself primarily claim our attention.

The epistle to Eusebius has not descended to us without various readings. Voigt, to whom we are indebted for our materials, adopts, for instance, immediately below, a reading which differs from the usual text. The translation of the Greek ecclesiastical historians (Eusebius, Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, and Evagrius) published by Bagster in 6 vols. London, 1844, presents this letter in Vol. V. p. 23 sqq. The translation, when compared with the portion furnished by Lardner (*Credibility, etc.* Vol. III. p. 576. London: 1838) shows that the respective texts varied, or that the translator of Theodoret performed this part of his work in a somewhat slovenly manner. We furnish the original, after the model

of Voigt, where the *ipsissima verba* of Arius are technical and important. Arius says :

"Inasmuch as Ammonius intends to visit Nicomedia, I considered it my duty to inform you, through this opportunity, of the severe sufferings and persecutions which the bishop [Alexander] causes us to endure ; he has even expelled us from the city, as if we were impious men. The cause lies in our refusal to concur with him in the following propositions, which he publicly maintains : 'Αεὶ ὁ Θεός, αἰεὶ ὁ υἱός· ἅμα πατήρ, ἅμα υἱός· συνπαρχει ἀγενήτως<sup>1</sup> ὁ υἱὸς τῷ Θεῷ, ἀειγενής ἐστιν, ἀγεννητογενής ἐστιν· οὔτε ἐπιτεία, οὔτε ἀτόμῳ τιμὴ προάγει ὁ Θεὸς τοῦ υἱοῦ· αἰεὶ Θεός, αἰεὶ υἱός· ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ υἱός. And as thy brother [bishop] Eusebius of Caesarea, Theodotus [of Laodicea], Paulinus [of Tyre], Athanasius [of Anazarbus], Gregory [of Berea], and Aetius [of Lydda, afterwards called Diospolis], and, in general, the bishops of the East maintain that God had an existence without beginning prior to that of the Son (ὅτι προῦπαρχει ὁ Θεὸς τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀνάρχως), they, too, have been condemned, with the exception of Philogonius, Hellanicus, and Macarius, who are unlearned, heretical men, of whom some say that the Son is an effusion, others, that he is an emission, and others, again, that he is [like the Father] unbegotten (τῶν τὸν υἱὸν λεγόντων, οἱ μὲν ἐρυγῆν, οἱ δὲ προβολῆν, οἱ δὲ συναγέννητον). But we teach that the Son is not unbegotten, nor a part of the unbegotten in any manner. Nor is he made out of any pre-existent (lit. *subjacent*) thing ; but by the will and counsel [of God] he subsisted before times and before ages, fully God,

<sup>1</sup> ἀγενήτως = in an unbegotten manner, ἀγεννητογενής = beginning to exist without having been begotten. Voigt holds that these forms constitute the correct reading, and neither ἀγενήτως nor ἀγεννητογενής, since Arius afterwards introduces the antithesis : "But we teach that the Son is not begotten, ἀγέννητος. Arius, as Voigt adds, regarded the terms "not come into existence" and "unbegotten" as equivalent, and hence ascribed both to Alexander, who adopted only one of them. The verb εἶμι, as in the Arian formula ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, admits of both translations, to be and to exist ; the verb γίγνομαι, — to which the German *werden* corresponds, if translated with strict precision, in this controversy, — should, for want of an English verb that exactly corresponds, be rendered to become, according to the style of the translators of the English Bible, e.g. Matth. xxi. 42 ; Mark i. 17 ; Rev. xi. 15, that is, to begin to be, to come into existence (Robinson's Lex. ad verb.). In such a New Testament sense, as illustrated, for instance, in John i. 3, rather than in a classical sense, the word was employed in the Arian controversy.

only-begotten and unchangeable; and, before he was begotten or created, or designed or founded, he was not (did not exist), for he was not unbegotten. We are persecuted because we say that the Son has a beginning, but that God is without a beginning. For this we are persecuted, and because we say that he is from nothing (out of non-existent things). We thus teach, inasmuch as he is neither a part of God, nor of any pre-existent (subjacent) thing. (ὅτι ὁ υἱὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγέννητος, οὐδὲ μέρος ἀγεννήτου κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον, οὐδὲ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς · ἀλλ' ὅτι θελήματι καὶ βουλήν ὑπέστη πρὸ χρόνων καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων πλήρης θεός, μονογενής, ἀναλλοίωτος, καὶ πρὶν γεννηθῆναι, ἢτοι κτισθῆναι, ἢ ὀρισθῆναι, ἢ θεμελιωθῆναι, οὐκ ἦν · ἀγέννητος γὰρ οὐκ ἦν · διωκόμεθα, ὅτι εἶπαμεν · ἀρχὴν ἔχει ὁ υἱός, ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἀναρχὸς ἐστὶ · διὰ τοῦτο διωκόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι εἶπαμεν, ὅτι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐστίν, οὕτως δὲ εἶπαμεν, καθότι οὐδὲ μέρος θεοῦ ἐστίν, οὐδὲ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου τινός).

The Epistle to Alexander, which is fuller and more important, is preserved by Athanasius and Epiphanius (l. c.) in the following form :

Ἡ πίστις ἡμῶν ἢ ἐκ προγόνων, ἢ καὶ ἀπὸ σοῦ μεμαθήκαμεν, μακάριε πάπα, ἐστὶν αὕτη · οἶδαμεν ἓνα θεὸν μόνον ἀγέννητον, μόνον αἰδιον, μόνον ἀναρχον, μόνον ἀληθινόν, μόνον ἀθανάσιον ἔχοντα, μόνον σοφόν, μόνον ἀγαθόν, μόνον δυνάστην, πάντων κριτὴν, διοικητὴν, ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον, δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθόν, νόμου καὶ προφητῶν καὶ καινῆς διαθήκης τοῦτον θεόν. γεννήσαντα υἱὸν μονογενῆ πρὸ χρόνων (begat an only-begotten son *before eternal times*) δι' οὗ καὶ τοὺς αἰῶνας καὶ τὰ ὅλα πεποιήκε · γεννήσαντα δὲ οὐ δοκῆσει, ἀλλὰ ἀληθεῖα (not in appearance but in truth), ὑποστήσαντα (setting him forth) ἰδίῳ θελήματι ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον κτίσμα τοῦ θεοῦ τέλειον (a perfect creature of God), ἀλλ' οὐκ ὡς ἐν τῶν κτισμάτων (but not as one of the other creatures) ; γέννημα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὡς ἐν τῶν γεννημάτων (γέννημα = that which is *begotten*) ; οὐδ' ὡς Οὐαλεντίνος προβολὴν τὸ γέννημα τοῦ πατρὸς ἐδογματίωσεν, οὐδ' ὡς ὁ Μανιχαῖος μέρος ὁμοούσιον τοῦ πατρὸς τὸ γέννημα εἰσηγήσατο (a part of the Father, that is, of the same essence), οὐδ' ὡς Σαβέλλιος τὴν μονάδα διαμῶν υἱοπάτορα εἶπεν (dividing that which is unity, oneness, speaks of a Son-Father), οὐδ' ὡς Ἰέρακας λύχρον ἀπὸ λύχρου, ἢ ὡς λαμπάδα εἰς δύο, οὐδὲ τὸν ὄντα πρότερον, ὕστερον γεννηθέντα (nor that he who already existed, was afterwards begotten), ἢ ἐπικτισθέντα εἰς υἱόν, ὡς καὶ σὺ αὐτὸς, μακάριε πάπα, κατὰ μέσσην τὴν ἐκκλησίαν καὶ ἐν συνεδρίῳ πλειστάκις τοὺς

καὶτα εἰσηγησασμένους ἀπηγόρευσας, ἀλλ', ὡς φάμεν, θελήματι τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸ χρόνων καὶ προ αἰώνων κτισθέντα καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εἶναι παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς εἰληφότα, καὶ τὰς δόξας συνυποστήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ πατρὸς· οὐ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ δοὺς αὐτῷ πάντων τὴν κληρονομίαν ἐστέρησεν ἑαυτὸν, ὡν ἀγεννήτως ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ· πηγὴ γάρ ἐστι πάντων, ὥστε τρεῖς εἰσιν ὑποστάσεις, καὶ ὁ μὲν θεὸς αἴτιος τῶν πάντων τυγχάνων, ἔστιν ἀναρχος μονώτατος (there are three hypostases, but God, the author of all, is most emphatically alone without a beginning). ὁ δὲ υἱὸς ἀχρόνως γεννηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς (before time was), καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων κτισθεὶς καὶ θεμελιωθεὶς, οὐκ ἦν (did not exist) πρὸ τοῦ γεννηθῆναι, ἀλλ' ἀχρόνως πρὸ πάντων γεννηθεὶς, μόνος ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑπέστη. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐστιν ἀίδιος, ἢ συναίδιος (co-eternal), ἢ συναγέννητος (unbegotten like) τῷ πατρί· οὐδὲ ἅμα τῷ πατρί τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, ὡς τινες λέγουσι τὸ πρὸς τι, εἰς ἀγεννήτους ἀρχὰς εἰσηγούμενοι· ἀλλ' ὡς μονὰς καὶ ἀρχὴ πάντων, οὕτως ὁ θεὸς πρὸ πάντων ἐστί, διὸ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐστιν, ὡς καὶ παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθήκαμεν κατὰ μέσσην τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κηρύξαντος· καθὼ οὖν παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ εἶναι ἔχει καὶ τὰς δόξας καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὰ πάντα αὐτῷ παρεδόθη, κατὰ τοῦτο ἀρχὴ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ὁ θεός· ἀρχὴ γὰρ αὐτοῦ, ὡς θεὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὢν· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐκ γαστρὸς καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐξήλθον καὶ ἦκω (expressions like those in John viii. 42) ὡς μέρος αὐτοῦ ὁμοουσίου καὶ ὡς προβολὴ ὑπὸ τινων νοεῖται, σύνδετος ἔσται ὁ πατὴρ (would be composite, made up of parts) καὶ διαίρετος καὶ τρεπτὸς καὶ σῶμα κατ' αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸ ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τὰ ἀκόλουθα σῶματι πάσχων ὁ ἀσώματος θεός.

These epistles present the following as the doctrine of Arius when he first came in collision with the church:— The Father alone is *God* in the proper sense of that word. As such, he alone is the unbegotten One (*causa sui*), and he alone is eternal, without beginning and immortal, alone wise and good, alone almighty, the Ruler and Judge, and, in accordance with his nature, alone unchangeable. The Son, on the other hand, is the begotten One, that is, created, and then existing by the will of God. He is a creature, but nevertheless of a peculiar nature, and not like other creatures, so near to God that he is *πλήρης θεός* and *ἀναλλοίωτος*. At one time he did not exist: he had a beginning which preceded all the ages of the world, but God was before him. He came forth out of nothing and, according to the

proceed from God by emanation nor by any partition of the divine being or essence; neither was he a special manifestation or modification of God. Hence Father, Son, and Spirit are indeed three divine beings or hypostases, but God the Father is the cause or author (*αἴτιος*) of the second and third, while he himself is absolutely God. Arius evidently has a twofold object in these epistles: first, to establish the point that the Father alone is God, and, secondly, to assign to the Son the highest possible position within the sphere of the Deity above all created objects; hence he employs the terms *πλήρης Θεός*, and *ἀναλλοιώτος, ἄτρεπτος*. There is obviously a discrepancy between these positions of Arius respecting the unchangeableness of the Son, and those which are assigned to him in the contemporaneous epistle of Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, his earliest opponent, addressed to Alexander, bishop of Constantinople. It is given by Theodoret, *Hist. Eccl.* I. 4. Alexander makes the following charge:

“ They (Arius and his associates) say: *ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, γέγονεν ὑστερον πρότερον μὴ ὑπάρχων, τοιοῦτος γενόμενος ὅτε καὶ ποτε γέγονεν, οἷος καὶ πᾶς εἶναι πέφυκεν ἄνθρωπος· πάντα γάρ, φασίν, ὁ Θεὸς ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησε, συναναλαμβάνοντες τῇ τῶν ἀπάντων λογικῶν τε καὶ ἀλόγων κτίσει καὶ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ· οἷς ἀκολούθως καὶ φασιν, αὐτὸν τρεπτῆς εἶναι φύσεως, ἀρετῆς τε καὶ κακίας ἐπιδεκτικόν· καὶ τῇ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ὑποθέσει καὶ τὰς θείας συναναροῦντες γραφάς, αἱ τὸ ἄτρεπτον τοῦ λόγου καὶ τὴν Θεότητα τῆς σοφίας, τοῦ λόγου, σημαίνουσιν, ἃ ἔστι Χριστός· δυνάμεθα γοῦν καὶ ἡμεῖς, φασίν, υἱὸν γενέσθαι Θεοῦ, ὡς περ κἀκεῖνος . . . . οὔτε γὰρ φύσει υἱὸς τίς ἐστὶν τοῦ Θεοῦ, φασίν.*

“ They say, that there was a time when the Son of God had no existence; and that, not having existed from eternity, he must have had a beginning; and that when he was created, he was made like all other men that have ever been born. God, they say, created all things, and they include the Son of God in the number of creatures, both rational and irrational. To argue consistently, they, as a necessary consequence, affirm, that *he is* by nature *liable to change*, and capable both of virtue and of vice. Their hypothesis, of his having been created, contradicts the testimony of the divine scriptures, which declare the immu-

tability, the divinity, and the wisdom of the Word, which Word is Christ. We are also able, they say, to become, like him, the sons of God . . . . for God, say they, has not any son by nature." —Bagster's *Eccl. Hist.*, Theodoret, Vol. V. pp. 8, 9.

Here Alexander accuses Arius of holding the doctrine that the nature of the Son was liable to change. As the statements of the former are as fully entitled to credit as those of the latter, Voigt explains the apparent contradiction in the following manner. Athanasius specifies among the errors of Arius which led to his excommunication, the proposition: "The Son is capable of change (*τρεπτός*) as to his nature (*φύσει*), but as to his own free will (*αὐτεξουσίῳ*) he remains good (*καλός*)," Athan. Ep. Encycl. 12. Such terms might allow Arius to maintain with apparent consistency, that he regarded the Son as unchangeable, and the circumstances under which he composed the Epistles requires a distinct expression of the latter view. Alexander could, nevertheless, according to his conception of the subject, with justice ascribe the opposite opinion to Arius; for, if the nature of him who is unchangeable only by virtue of his own free will, still remains itself subject to change, that free will may at any moment determine itself otherwise, and hence to describe merely the free will as unchangeable is a *contradictio in adjecto* [as if, for instance, a man should speak of a *square* globe]. Arius became aware of this circumstance himself, and aimed at greater accuracy and precision in his language in his *Thalia*. He composed this work when all his attempts to reconcile his views with those of the church, and to be restored to fellowship with Alexander had been unsuccessful. He addressed himself in this feeble essay to the public in general, and courted the favor of the latter by adopting a low and inelegant style — *ἔγραψε Θαλαίαν ἐκτεθλυμένοις καὶ γελοίοις ἦδ' ἐσι κατὰ τὸν Αἰγύπτιον Σωτάδην, de sent. Dion. 6.* From this work Athanasius (*l. c.*) quotes the following:

Οὐκ αἰεὶ ὁ Θεὸς πατὴρ ἦν, ἀλλ' ἦν ὅτε ὁ Θεὸς μόνος ἦν καὶ οὐπω πατὴρ ἦν, ὡς τὴν δὲ ἐπιγέγονε πατὴρ· οὐκ αἰεὶ ἦν ὁ υἱός· πάντων γὰρ νενομένων ἐξ

οὐκ ὄντων, καὶ πάντων ὄντων κτισμάτων καὶ ποιημάτων γενομένων, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Θεοῦ λόγος ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων γέγονε, καὶ ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἦν πρὸ γένηται, ἀλλ' ἀρχὴν τοῦ κτίζεσθαι ἔσχε καὶ αὐτός. ἦν γάρ, φησί, μόνος ὁ Θεός, καὶ οὕτω ἦν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ σοφία · εἶτα θελήσας ἡμᾶς δημιουργῆσαι, τότε δὴ πεποίηκεν ἓνα τινά, καὶ ὠνόμασεν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ σοφίαν καὶ υἱόν, ἵνα ἡμᾶς δι' αὐτοῦ δημιουργῆσθαι. δύο γοῦν σοφίας φησὶν εἶναι, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἰδίαν καὶ συνυπάρχουσαν τῷ Θεῷ, τὸν δὲ υἱὸν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ γεγενῆσθαι καὶ ταύτης μετέχοντα ὠνομάσθαι μόνον σοφίαν καὶ λόγον. ἡ σοφία γάρ, φησί, τῇ σοφίᾳ ὑπῆρξε σοφοῦ Θεοῦ θελήσει. οὕτω καὶ λόγον ἔτερον εἶναι λέγει παρὰ τὸν υἱὸν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ τούτου μετέχοντα τὸν υἱὸν ὠνομάσθαι πάλιν κατὰ χάριν λόγον καὶ υἱὸν αὐτόν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τῆς αἵρέσεως αὐτῶν ἴδιον φρόνημα, δηλούμενον ἐν ἑτέροις αὐτῶν συγγραμμάσιν, ὅτι πολλαὶ δυνάμεις εἰσὶ · καὶ ἡ μὲν μία τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστὶν ἰδία φύσει καὶ αἰδῖος, ὁ δὲ Χριστὸς πάλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθινὴ δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ μία τῶν λεγομένων δυνάμεων ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτός, ὡς μία καὶ ἡ ἀκρίς καὶ ἡ κάμητι οὐ δύναμις μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγάλη προσαγορεύεται · αἱ δ' ἄλλαι πολλαὶ καὶ ὁμοιαὶ εἰσι-τῷ υἱῷ, περὶ ὧν καὶ Δαβὶδ ψάλλει λέγων · κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων (Ps. xxiv. 10). Καὶ τῇ μὲν φύσει ὡς περ πάντες οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ τρεπτός, τῷ δὲ ἰδίῳ, αὐτεξουσίῳ, ἕως βούλεται, μένει καλός, ὅτε μέντοι θέλει, δύναται τρέπεσθαι καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς περ καὶ ἡμεῖς, τρεπτῆς ὡς φύσεως. διὰ τοῦτο γάρ, φησί, καὶ προγινώσκων ὁ Θεὸς ἔσεσθαι καλὸν αὐτόν, προλαβὼν αὐτῷ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν δέδωκεν, ἦν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔσχε· μετὰ ταῦτα, ὥστε ἐξ ἔργων αὐτοῦ, ὡς προέγνω ὁ Θεός, τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν νῦν γεγονέναι πεποίηκεν. εἰπεῖν δὲ πάλιν ἐτόλμησεν, ὅτι οὐδὲ Θεὸς ἀληθινός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος · εἰ δὲ λέγεται Θεός, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀληθινός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μετοχῇ χάριτος, ὡς περ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς λέγεται ὀνόματι μόνον Θεός. καὶ πάντων ξένων καὶ ἀνομοίων ὄντων τοῦ Θεοῦ κατ' οὐσίαν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ λόγος ἀλλότριος μὲν καὶ ἀνόμιος κατὰ πάντα τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας καὶ ἰδιότητός ἐστι, τῶν δὲ γενητῶν καὶ κτισμάτων ἴδιος καὶ εἰς αὐτῶν τυγχάνει. ὡς ἄρα καὶ τῷ υἱῷ ὁ πατὴρ ἀόρατος ὑπάρχει, καὶ οὔτε ὄραν οὔτε γινώσκειν τελείως καὶ ἀκριβῶς δύναται ὁ λόγος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὃ γίνωσκει καὶ ὃ βλέπει, ἀναλόγως τοῖς ἰδίοις μέτροις οἶδε καὶ βλέπει, ὡς περ καὶ ἡμεῖς γινώσκομεν κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν δύναμιν · καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ υἱός, φησί, οὐ μόνον τὸν πατέρα ἀκριβῶς οὐ γινώσκει, λείπει γὰρ αὐτῷ εἰς τὸ καταλαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ υἱὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίαν οὐκ οἶδε · καὶ ὅτι μεμερισμένοι τῇ φύσει καὶ ἀπέξενωμένοι καὶ ἀπεσχοινοσμένοι καὶ ἀλλότριοι καὶ ἀμετοχοὶ εἰσὶν ἀλλήλων αἱ οὐσίαι τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος, καὶ ἀνόμιοι πάνπαν ἀλλήλων ταῖς τε οὐσίαις καὶ δόξαις εἰσὶν ἐπ' ἄπειρον · τὸν γοῦν λόγον φησὶν εἰς ὁμοιότητα δόξης καὶ οὐσίας ἀλλότριον εἶναι παντελῶς ἑκατέρων τοῦ τε πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου

πνεύματος · καὶ δεηρημένον δὲ εἶναι καθ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀμέτοχον κατὰ πάντα τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἔφησε. ταῦτα μέρη τῶν ἐν τῷ γελοίῳ συγγράμματι καμμένῳ μυθιδίων ἐστὶν Ἀρείου.

Arius proceeds in the *Thalia* on the principle that the Son is a creature of the absolute God and Father in every aspect, and now maintains the changeableness of the Son without any reservation. His general theory may be thus expressed: The Father is God, the Son is a creature; the latter at one time did not exist, and had a beginning of existence. He was created from nothing. Without him God has reason and wisdom and power, and he bears the latter name only in an improper sense, like the locust and the palmer-worm mentioned in Joel ii. 25. [Arius here refers to the text of the Septuagint, which renders ἡ ἰσχυρία, “my host,” or “my army,” thus: ἡ δύναμις μου: comp. his words as given above, ὁ δὲ Χριστὸς πάλιν, κ. τ. λ.]. In his nature and will he is changeable, and remains good (*καλός*) only during his own pleasure. But as God foresaw that he would remain good, he bestowed his own glory on him anticipately, and the Son also gained that glory subsequently, as man, by his virtue. He consequently bears the name of *God*, not as being true God, but as all others, because he shares in the divine grace. Like all creatures he is in his nature different from God, and co-essential with other creatures. Therefore he does not know God with entire accuracy, nor indeed does he know himself perfectly.

No essentially new features were afterwards added to this theory by the representatives of the heresy of Arius, who himself disappeared at a comparatively early period from the field of battle. The most obstinate among them, as Aëtius and Eunomius, paraded indeed their sophisms in connection with the technical terms *begotten* and *unbegotten*; and it is worthy of notice, that, when they discussed the abstract conception of God, and the degree in which he may be known and understood, they ultimately adopted views that were precisely the reverse of those of Arius; for Eunomius boasted that he knew God perfectly. Other Arians

resorted to the expedient of teaching the *similarity* of the nature or essence of the Son to that of the Father [the Homoiousians] instead of the difference, and thus attempted to approximate to the church doctrine.

§ 3. THE FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINE OF ARIUS, AND ITS RE-  
FUTATION BY ATHANASIUS.

Athanasius does not specially examine the various modifications of Arianism in his controversial writings, but discusses the system itself in its ultimate principles, as an aggregate of errors. The contest was not confined to a single department of theological science, but involved speculative philosophy, exegesis, doctrines, and ethics. The manifold and abundant materials before us cannot be satisfactorily exhibited in their true relations to each other, unless they are previously arranged according to some system. In the opinions of Arius a discrimination must be made between his fundamental doctrine and the inferences which he deduced from it. We propose to exhibit primarily the mode in which Athanasius assailed the former by arguments derived from various sources; we may then observe his mode of dealing with the inferences of Arius; and, lastly, listen to the appeal which, in reference to the entire Arian system, he makes to the established doctrine of the church.

The leading proposition of Arius, which comprehends in itself all the details of his system, is the following: *The Father alone is God, and the Son is his creature*; the latter is distinguished from all other creatures by three circumstances: the Son, as a creature, is morally perfect; he is exalted to divine glory, and through him all other created objects were made. Of the significance and importance of this proposition, the parties were fully aware at the commencement of the contest.

It assumes a prominent position in the epistles of Arius given above. Athanasius expressly says (c. Ar. 2. 19) that Arius had maintained against Alexander that the Son is a creature; he traces the other two propositions which Arius

maintained against Alexander — first, that the Son was produced from nothing, and that at one time he did not exist — to the fundamental principle that he belongs to the class or kind of creatures (c. Ar. 1. 19). When Athanasius further quotes (c. Ar. 1. 5) the entire heresy of Arius, as exhibited in the *Thalia* of the latter, he asserts that Arius denies the Son of God, and counts him among other creatures; he describes the whole tendency of Arianism when he says. (c. Ar. 1. 22) that it separated the Son from the Father, and held the former to be like a creature. It was at this point that the combatants made their most vigorous efforts; while the Arians labored chiefly to maintain this position, it was assailed by Athanasius in the following manner.

The entire Christian doctrine of the Trinity, Athanasius proceeds to say, must be abandoned, if the Son of God is a creature, as such did not exist at one time, and was produced from nothing. For if he is a creature, the Triad itself is of the nature of a creature, belongs to time, is dissimilar in itself, and subject to change; hence, the Triad must be still further capable of an infinite accretion, and, conversely, of a decrease also, even to a monad (c. Ar. 1. 17). The Arians have, however, in reality, two Gods — a created and an uncreated God; and, on account of such a plurality, as well as of the creature-like nature of that which they worship, they must be regarded as pagans (c. Ar. 3. 16). The doctrine of Arius, further, destroys the whole Christian doctrine respecting man's salvation. For, if the Son is a creature, man must continue, even after the Son finished his work on earth, in a state of separation from God; for, how can one creature restore other creatures to communion with God, since all are alike needy and helpless in themselves? If the Son is a creature, and, as such, had been made the Son of God, then God the Father would have sent us no *Mediator*, but could have at once converted us also into his sons. But if, on the other hand, our help comes through the Son alone, if we receive the adoption through him, he cannot be simply a creature, for as such he could not have been capable of

aiding us (c. Ar. 2. 67-70. 41). But, as the Arians allege, God had himself created the Son *immediately*, and all other objects through him, that is, *mediately*. What an absurd explanation! Had God, perhaps, grown weary of the work of creating? Or did he deem it beneath his dignity to give existence to the other creatures? Surely that God who led Jacob to Egypt and "spake unto Moses face to face" (Gen. xxxiii. 11), is not a haughty God. Who then shall dare to discriminate between the works of creation which God himself made and those which the Son made? He, the one God, creates alike that which is great and that which is small, in his Logos, the Son (de Decr. 7). He still preserves the whole world by his protecting care, provides for the fowls of the air, does not forget the sparrow upon the house-top, and cares even for the lilies and the grass of the field; so that the whole world protests against the declaration that it is unworthy of God to occupy himself with the world (c. Ar. 2. 25). But it would be unworthy of God to allege that he needed a mediator in producing a creature, for he would then resemble the carpenter who cannot proceed in his work without the instrumentality of his axe or his saw (c. Ar. 2. 26). But they now pretend that the other creatures could not have endured the direct operation of the mighty hand of God. But we ask: How then could the Son have been created without a similar intervention? The creation of him would, by a parity of reasoning, have also required a mediator, and ultimately no creature could have come into existence (de Decr. 8). Further, if the Son was created only on account of the other creatures, he really owes his existence to us; and now that we do exist, his own continued existence has become unnecessary; indeed, we would occupy a higher rank than his own is, for the means are always subordinate to the end (c. Ar. 2. 30). If, however, the priority of his creation elevates him to a higher rank than our own, Adam, the head of our race, must have essentially differed from us; but such a view would be contrary to the whole tenor of the scriptures (de Decr. 9). But the Arians

attempt to secure themselves by borrowing from the Greeks the term *ἀγένητος*, and hope to be able by its aid to count the Son among creatures. But they do not seem to be aware that the Greeks applied this term alike to the absolute and sovereign Good, and also to the *νοῦς* which proceeds from him, and, indeed, likewise to the *ψυχὴ* which proceeds from the *νοῦς* (de Decr. 28). For they inquire : *ἐν τῷ ἀγένητον ἢ δύο*;<sup>1</sup> When any one who is unacquainted with their craftiness, replies, *ἐν τῷ ἀγένητον*, they suddenly spit out their poison, and quickly retort : “ Then it follows that the Son belongs to the class of the creatures, and we are correct in saying that he did not exist before he began to be.” For they confound all things together for the purpose of separating the Logos from the Father, and counting the former among creatures.

While the Arians accuse the Nicene Fathers of having employed expressions which do not occur in the scriptures, they are themselves guilty of the same fault, without however understanding the several significations of the expression which they borrow from the Greeks. For *ἀγένητον* signifies, first, that which is possible (*τὸ μηδέπω μὲν γενόμενον, δυνάμενον δὲ γενέσθαι*), as, e. g. wood which has not yet become (been made into) a vessel, but can become a vessel ; it, secondly, designates that which is impossible (*τὸ μήτε γενόμενον, μήτε δυνάμενον γενέσθαι ποτέ*), as, e. g. a triangle cannot become a square, nor an even become an uneven number ; it designates, thirdly, that which exists, but which proceeds from nothing else (*τὸ ὑπάρχον μὲν, μὴ γενηθέν δὲ ἐκ τινος, μὴ δὲ ὄλως ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ τινα πατέρα*), as indeed the sophist Asterius, who belongs to their party, says : it is *τὸ μὴ ποιηθέν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ὄν*. In which sense shall we, then, receive the word ? If *ἀγένητον* designates, in the sense of Asterius, that which is no creature, but always is, then the Son must likewise be called *ἀγένητος*. But if the Arians take it in the sense of

<sup>1</sup> Voigt here rejects the reading of some manuscripts, *ἀγένητον*, *unbegotten*, on the ground that the course of the argument and the antithesis to *γενητός* (from *γένεσθαι*, not *γεννάω*) require the reading given above in the text.

that which exists, which is not born of another, and has no father (κατὰ τὸ ὑπάρχον μὲν, μήτε δὲ γεννηθὲν ἔκ τινος μήτε ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα), then we answer that the Father alone is ἀγέννητος, meaning, at the same time, not that the Son is γεννητός, but that he is a γέννημα. For the word γεννητός, which may be applied to all creatures, does not describe the Son as the image of the Father, which he really is, since the Logos is like the Father who begat him. Precisely as the terms "Almighty," "Lord of hosts," refer to the relation of God to his creatures, and not to his relation to the Son, so, too, the word ἀγέννητος refers to his relation to the creatures, whereas in reference to the Son, God is called the Father. The term *Father* is far exalted in sense above that of ἀγέννητος, as the Son himself is exalted above all creatures. Whatever use the pagans may make of the word, our Lord has taught us to pray, not Θεὸ ἀγέννητε, but Πάτερ ἡμῶν, and commanded us to baptize, not in the name of the ἀγέννητος and the γέννητος — the Creator and the creature, but in the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Hence all the Arian arguments, as Athanasius says, which are derived from the word ἀγέννητος are absurd and frivolous (c. Ar. 1. 30 – 34; de Decr. 28 – 31).

The Arians were conscious that if the Son is merely a creature, God the Father, in view of his spiritual nature, cannot be said to need the existence of the Son. Arius accordingly, while appealing for support to Dionysius of Alexandria, asserted that, in addition to the Son, God possessed in himself a Logos, viewed as reason, wisdom, and power, and that the Son, like the world, had received existence through this Logos. The latter was without beginning, and consequently did not come into existence in time, whereas Christ, although he was the first-born, and the only-begotten, belonged to the class of the numerous *wisdoms* (σοφίαι) and powers which this Logos had called into being. Athanasius replies thus: The scriptures speak of only *one* Logos of God, through whom all things were made, and who was made (ἐγένετο, became) flesh (John i. 3,

14). The word of God recognizes no other wisdom save the Son, and none of the Fathers had knowledge of any other. That wisdom which Arius describes as ἀγενήτως συννηπάρχουσα τῷ πατρὶ and as δημιουργός is solely the Son (c. Ar. 2. 39, 40). It is in vain that Arius appeals to Dionysius of Alexandria, whose views he does not understand, since that writer had distinguished the Logos of God only from the *voīs* of God, as the stream is distinguished from its source; he did not, however, *separate* them, but taught that the Logos and the Son were alike in essence, being born of the essence of the Father, and also eternal and inseparable (de Sent. Dion. 23. 24). It hence appears that Arius made so wide a distinction between the person of the Father and that of the Son, that, as a result of his theory, each was a complete being, an ego, in itself, whose self-consciousness and self-determination were independent of the other. Consequently, as Arius was unwilling to expose himself to the charge of Dyotheism, his theory compelled him to assert the complete subordination of the Son to the Father, and assign to the former the rank of a creature.

The controversy, however, on the subject whether the Son was or was not a creature, was not conducted with arguments furnished exclusively by philosophy: both parties sought for all accessible exegetical aids; and here the churchly character of Athanasius gave him greatly the advantage. When the Arians attempted to demonstrate that the *origin* of the Lord was that of a creature, they appealed to passages in which he seemed to be described as one that had been created or came into existence in time (Prov. viii. 22; Heb. iii. 2; Acts ii. 36; Heb. i. 4; Phil. ii. 7; John i. 14). The *nature* and *character* of his being and his life as a creature, they endeavored to prove by passages which refer to his bodily growth, trouble of soul, defective knowledge, weariness and sleep, etc. (Luke ii, 52; John xii. 27, 28; Matt. xxvi. 39; Mark xiii. 32, etc.). Athanasius repelled such arguments by showing that all these passages referred to the human nature in the person of Christ; and he characterized the

Arian mode of interpreting them as a revival of the old Jewish delusion, that the divine and the human were incapable of being united (c. Ar. 3. 27).

He discusses the passages of the former class in his second discourse against the Arians. "If the Arians," he says (c. Ar. 2. 1) "had understood the character of Christianity, they would not have been taken captive by the unbelief of the Jews; they would have learned that the Logos was in the beginning, that the Logos was with God, and that God was the Logos; they would, further, have understood that when it pleased God that the Logos should become man, it was rightly said of him: *ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*, and *κύριον καὶ Χριστὸν αὐτὸν ἐποίησε* (Acts ii. 36); and *κύριος ἔκτισέ με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ* (Prov. viii. 22); and *τοσοῦτῳ κρείττων γενόμενος τῶν ἀγγέλων* (Heb. i. 4); and *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε μορφὴν δούλου λαβὼν* (Phil. ii. 7); and *κατανοήσατε τὸν ἀπόστολον καὶ ἀρχιερεα . . . Ἰησοῦν πιστὸν ὄντα τῷ ποιήσαντι αὐτόν* (Heb. iii. 2); for all these expressions have the same sense; they refer to the deity of the Logos, and, because he also became the Son of man, to the predicates of his human nature (*τὴν θεότητα τοῦ λόγου καὶ τὰ ἀνθρωπίνως λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτοῦ*)."

According to this general principle Athanasius then proceeds to examine each of the passages in detail, after premising the following general proposition: It is an erroneous procedure to form a conclusion respecting the nature or being of the Son from expressions like *ἐποίησεν*, *ἐγένετο*, *ἔκτισεν*, κ. τ. λ., as the latter are obviously to be explained in accordance with the true nature of the Son, and are not themselves the authoritative guide in defining that nature, since the characterization of any object is not anterior in time, but posterior, to the object itself. If the Son were really a creature, then expressions like *ἐποίησεν*, etc., should be literally understood; but if he is *γέννημα* and *υἱός* as to his essence, then *ἐποίησε* is not to be literally understood, but is used instead of *ἐγέννησε*. The scriptures, Athanasius continues, often term sons *δούλοι*, and servants *τέκνα*; Sarah

called Abraham *lord* (1 Pet. iii. 6; Gen. xviii. 12), although she was not his bondmaid, and Paul terms Onesimus a *brother*, although the latter was a slave (c. Ar. 2, 3). Now if we, nevertheless, do not call servants sons, nor sons servants, nor employ the other terms just mentioned as they are employed in these exceptional cases, neither ought we to deny the true nature of the Son and Logos of God, when the scriptures employ the language respecting him which has been adduced. And yet, when the scriptures apply to Christ the terms *γέννημα* and Logos of God, the latter are misinterpreted and denied; while, on the other hand, when the scriptures speak of Christ as *ποίημα*, the Arians disingenuously at once declare that the Son is by nature a creature (l. c. 4).

Athanasius then explains the words in Heb. iii. 2 as teaching that the Father had made his Son a human being, and sent him to be our high-priest; this was the result when the Logos, although he was the creator of the world, assumed a body that was created and that had a beginning of its being. Hence, in the beginning the Lord was the Logos, was with God, and was God; and then, when it pleased God that he should become a sacrifice for us, he was made flesh. Now, even as it could be said of Aaron on a certain day: "To-day Aaron is made [has become] a high-priest," without thereby conveying the sense: "To-day Aaron has become a human being," so, too, the language: "The Father has made him, the Son, a high-priest," cannot be interpreted to mean that then the Logos had been first created, and, as the Logos, had had a beginning (c. Ar. 2. 7, 8).

While Athanasius referred Heb. iii. 2 to the sacerdotal office of Christ, he explained Acts ii. 36 as an indication of his kingly office, which the Lord also acquired through his incarnation. He appeals to the Greek version of Gen. xxvii. 29, 37, where, as he maintains, the phrase *κύριον ποιεῖν* refers, not to the *οὐσία*, but to the *ἐξουσία* of Jacob and Esau; so, too, the words in Acts ii. 36 specially refer to the Lord's

authority over us, and his royal rank, which he gained through his incarnation. "He was previously already both Lord and King (Ps. cx.); but after the law, with its curse, and death, had acquired dominion over us, he was made flesh, completed his redeeming work for our benefit on the cross, and communicated its blessings through the mission of the Holy Spirit; in this manner he became our Lord, and we became his subjects in a special sense. His eternal dominion over us, which he possessed as the image and Logos of the Father, and as the creator of the world, was manifested anew through his incarnation and redeeming work" (*τὸ ἐποίησεν Ἰσὸν τῷ ἀπέδειξεν*, c. Ar. 2. 12-18).

No scriptural passage, however, occupied so prominent a position as Prov. viii. 22-25, and specially vs. 22: *κύριος ἔκτισέ με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἔργα αὐτοῦ*. The Arians appealed to this passage, not only for the purpose of substantiating their general doctrine that the Son is a creature, but also for that of proving that God had created the Son for the work of completing the creation of the world. As the Arians regarded the passage as their stronghold, Athanasius devotes almost the whole of the succeeding portions of his second discourse against the Arians, or eighty-two chapters, to the work of exposing the errors of the Arian interpretation. Voigt, who has hitherto been our guide, occupies more than eight pages with a statement of this particular controversy. As neither party, however, appealed to the original Hebrew text, and as the Septuagint, on which both depended, does not here reproduce the original with entire accuracy, we omit this portion of the controversy in its exegetical form.

The Arians had also appealed to Col. i. 15: *ὃς ἐστὶν εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, προτόκος πάσης κτίσεως*; they maintained that, while the Son was here termed the first-born of the whole creation, he was still regarded as belonging to that creation, as a part of it, and was classed with other creatures in respect to his nature. "But if this were really the case," Athanasius replies, "he would, with respect to

his nature, be a brother of irrational creatures also, and could be classed even with inanimate objects (*ἄψυχα*), being in that case distinguished from all these only by the difference in the time of his origin. The passage obviously calls for a different interpretation. The Son is both *μονογενής* and also *πρωτότοκος*; now he could not receive both predicates, unless the reference in each case were peculiar and respectively different. The term *μονογενής*, namely, refers to his generation by the Father, while *πρωτότοκος* is to be understood as indicating *εἰς τὴν κτίσιν συγκατάβασιν καὶ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν ἀδελφοποίησιν* (creation and redemption). As *the only-begotten* he has no brethren, but as *the first-born* he has many. He receives the former appellation from his relation to God (John i. 14; 1 John iv. 9), the latter, from his relation to the world. The latter relation he assumed in consequence of the love of the Father to men, since God desired not only that all things should "consist" (Col. i. 17) by his Logos (creation), but also that through him "the creature should be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God" (Rom. viii. 21). By such a process he becomes the *first-born*, not only of those who are the children of God, but also of the whole creation" (c. Ar. 2, 62-64).

The words in Heb. i. 4 (*τοσοῦτω κρείττων γενόμενος τῶν ἀγγέλων, ὅσῳ διαφορότερον παρ' αὐτοὺς κεκληρονόμηκεν ὄνομα*) were also involved in the controversy. The Arians laid an emphasis on the word *γενόμενος*, which, as they alleged, implied that the Son began to be in time, like the angels, although he is of higher rank than they are. Athanasius replies that *γενόμενος* is to be interpreted, not as an independent phrase, but in its intimate connection with *κρείττων*, which latter term marks a difference, not in degree but in kind—a difference in the nature or being of the Son. Thus, in Prov. viii. 11, where wisdom is compared with precious stones, the language [of the Septuagint] is: *κρείττων σοφία λίθων πολυτελῶν*, while there is confessedly an essential difference in the nature of wisdom and of precious

stones respectively. The Son, accordingly, describes the Father, in John xiv. 28, not as *κρείττων* but as *μείζων*, because they are not different in their nature or being. There is no affinity between the nature of the Son, on the one hand, and that of angels or creatures, on the other; for the apostle could not have otherwise described the former as God, the creator of the world, and eternal (Heb. i. 8, 10, 11). The contrast here made between the Son and the angels presupposes, not a similarity, but a difference, of nature or being; the sense is: The service of the Son is as much exalted above that of the angels, as the Son differs in rank and character from a servant. For the law, which was ordained by angels, made no one perfect (Gal. iii. 19; Heb. vii. 19), whereas the incarnation of the Son perfected the Father's work. Furthermore, during the time of the law, which was received by the disposition of angels, death reigned, from Adam to Moses (Acts vii. 53; Rom. v. 14), whereas the manifestation of the Logos abolished death (2 Tim. i. 10). At an earlier period God was known in Judea alone, but now the whole earth is full of the knowledge of the Lord; the disciples have taught all nations, and the words are fulfilled: "They shall be all taught of God" (John vi. 45). So, too, in other passages of the epistle (Heb. vii. 22; viii. 6; vii. 19; ix. 23), the apostle refers to the exalted character of the office of Christ as compared with that of the angels, as well as to their essential difference, and again employs the term *κρείττων*. Thus this term is applied, throughout the whole epistle, to the Lord, for the reason that he is different from all creatures (c. Ar. 1. 55 - 59).

The Arians also adduced Heb. vii. 22 (*κατὰ τοσοῦτον κρείττους διαθήκης γέγονεν ἔγγυος Ἰησοῦς*), as they claimed that the conception of Christ as a creature lay in the expression *γέγονε*. Here, too (Athanasius replies), the word does not, in the most remote degree, refer to the *οὐσία* of the Son, but to his incarnation and to his redeeming work, in view of which latter he was made [became] flesh; inasmuch as that which, according to Rom. viii. 3, the law of the old covenant

could not do, was performed by him, when he redeemed us from sin and death by his vicarious sufferings, and enabled us to walk in the Spirit (c. Ar. 1. 60). Even as we cannot assert of the Father that he had begun to be in time, in respect to his nature or being, when we read in Ps. ix. 10 (Sept.): ἐγένετο κύριος καταφυγή τῷ πένητι, or elsewhere meet with analogous expressions; so, too, expressions like the one just described in Heb. vii. 22, cannot be referred to the nature, being, or essence of the Son, but are to be explained in reference to that salvation which he wrought out for man (l. c. 62, 63).

No passage of the New Testament was, however, more frequently quoted by the Arians than Phil. ii. 5–11. The controversy, as far as this passage is concerned, was conducted by Athanasius, c. Ar. 1. 37–45. The Arians, he says, attempt to prove from Phil. ii. 9, 10 and Ps. xlv. 8 [Sept.; vs. 7 in the Eng. trans.], that the Lord was exalted as a reward of his virtue, and that in view of this exaltation he was called the *Son of God* and *God*. But if this be true, the Son would not be *the Son* in any other sense than that wherein others are such; he would be the Son, not by nature but by grace; he would continue to be the Son only so long as his moral deportment did not exhibit any change (l. c. 37). He would, moreover, be the Son of God only since the time of his incarnation, and of the obedience which, after that event, he rendered to God, for such is the source or ground of his exaltation, according to Phil. ii. 7, 8, 10. But then, what was he previously to his incarnation? Either he was somewhat else than the Son, or he did not yet at all exist. Now the latter is precisely the heresy of the Jews and the Samosatenians [adherents of the doctrine of Paul of Samosata], and, consequently, the Arians should, like the Jews, submit to circumcision, and resign the name of Christians. If Christ did not exist before his incarnation, or in consequence of that event acquired a higher character, how could all things have been made through him, or how could the

Father have been well pleased in him who had yet no complete existence? Or how could he himself have spoken of a glory which he had with the Father before the world was (John xvii. 5)? Accordingly, he was not a man, who, as such, afterwards became God; but he was God, and afterwards became also man. Athanasius next proceeds to interpret the passage itself, in order to demonstrate still more clearly the unchangeable divine nature of the Son. The apostle, he says, thus addressed the Philippians: *Τοῦτο φρονείστω ἐν ὑμῖν ὁ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, ὃς ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ἠρχῶν . . . . εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ πατρὸς.* What can be plainer than these words? He did not, as an inferior, become greater in rank or character, but rather, while he was God, he took upon him the form of a servant, and thereby he did not become more perfect, but rather "humbled himself." Where is there, at this point, any mention made of a reward of virtue, or of any progress, improvement, or aggrandizement in this state of humiliation? As God, he could not possibly be exalted. If God is the Most High, his Logos must be the same. He who is in the Father, and is in all things like unto the Father, can need neither any increment nor any exaltation. Why should he humble himself in order to receive that which he already possessed? What grace can he need who liberally communicates his grace to others? How could he *receive* an adorable name who had always been adored in his own name? Even before his incarnation the angels worshipped him (Heb. i. 6). In the beginning the Logos was, and the Logos was with God, and God was the Logos; but afterwards, for our sakes, the Logos was made flesh. Hence the term *ὑπερύψωσε* does not imply that the nature of the Logos had been exalted, for he always was and is equal to God; this exaltation, therefore, refers only to his human nature. Hence the exaltation denotes, not the period preceding, but the period succeeding, his incarnation. A state of exaltation can follow only a state of humiliation; and if the assumption of our flesh gives occasion to the mention of an exaltation, the

latter also can refer to the flesh or human nature of Christ alone. It was man who needed an exaltation. Now as the Logos assumed the form of a servant, and suffered death for our sakes, in order that he might thereby bring us to God, it is said in reference to these events, that he was exalted for our sakes as a man; so that as we, through his death, die in him, we might also be exalted in him, even as through him we arise from the dead, and enter into heaven, whither he has gone as our forerunner (Heb. vi. 20). When he says in John xvii. 19 that he sanctifies himself, the sense is, not that the Logos is to become holy, but that we also might be sanctified in him; so, too, the phrase: "God hath exalted him," does not imply that the Logos himself shall be exalted, but that we shall be exalted, and enter into the gates of heaven, which had been closed, not to him, but to us (c. Ar. 1. 40, 41). All that is said in vs. 9-11 respecting his name and worship, is to be taken in the same sense; it was not written for the sake of the Logos, who had been adored long before he became man. When he subsequently assumed our nature and received the name of Jesus, the whole creation still lay at his feet, and testified, in devout adoration, that the incarnation of the Logos and the death which he suffered in the flesh tended, not to the dishonor of his deity, but to the glory of God the Father. Hence the terms *ὑπερίψωσεν* and *ἐχαρίσατο* point to benefits which *we* receive. The former term may also be viewed as referring specially to his resurrection from the dead, in which case it would involve the following sense: He became man, and humbled himself even unto death; therefore God also exalted him through the resurrection. Even in this sense the word *διό* would not point to any reward of his virtue, but indicate the cause of his resurrection, namely the circumstance that he, although God, had become man. All other human beings die, because their descent is from Adam alone, and death rules over them; but he was "the second man, the Lord from heaven" (1 Cor. xv. 47), and he could not, in the words of Peter, "be holden of death" (Acts ii. 24

l. c. 44). If the Logos is represented as the subject of the exaltation, while in reality the latter concerned his human nature alone, the cause lies in the fact that his body, or human nature, which was immediately the subject of the exaltation, was not separate from his divine nature. While, however, in view of this fact, the Logos is said to have been exalted, it was the Logos himself who was the author of that exaltation, since all that the Father does and grants, he does and grants through the Son. Accordingly, the Son is both he who exalts, in respect to his divine nature, and also he who is exalted, in respect to his human nature (l. c. 45). "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever" (Heb. xiii. 18), who is eternally unchangeable, is the same who gives as the Logos, and receives as a man (l. c. 48).

While the Arians adduced these passages for the purpose of showing that the origin of the Son was that of a creature, they resorted to another series in order to prove that the nature and character of the Son were confined within certain limits, and were capable of further development, thus implying that he was a creature. How can *he* be the Son of God by nature, they asked, and be like God in his essence or being, who declares himself that the "power" (Matt. xxviii. 18), "the judgment" (John v. 22), and, indeed, "all things" (John iii. 35; Matt. xi. 27), had been given to him by the Father? If he were the Son of God by nature, it could not have been necessary that he should first receive all things. How can he be the true power of God by nature, who, in the period of his sufferings, said: "My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death. If it be possible, let this cup pass from me"? If he were the power of God, he would not have feared, but rather have endowed others with strength. If, further, he were the true wisdom of the Father, how could it be said of him: "Jesus increased in wisdom" (Luke ii. 52)? When he came to Bethany, he inquired where Lazarus lay (John xi. 34), and, at another time, he asked his disciples how many loaves of bread they had. How can he

be wisdom itself, who increased in wisdom, and was unacquainted with so many facts? Or how can he be the Logos of the Father, who exclaimed on the cross: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" and did not know the time of the judgment, whereas the Father is never without the Logos, and accomplishes nothing without his Logos? Because he was a creature he used such language and had various wants, such being the condition of creatures (c. Ar. 3. 26).

The Arians, Athanasius replies, in consequence of their unbelief and wickedness, are to be classed with the Jews. The latter ask: How can he who is a man be God? The former ask: How can he who was God become a man? The latter continue: If he were the Son of God he would not have suffered on the cross; while the former demand: How can ye call *him* the Son and Logos of God who suffered on the cross? The latter exclaim: Is he not Joseph's son? Do we not know his father and his mother? How can he, then, say: "Before Abraham was, I am." "I came down from heaven"? The former exclaim: How can he be the Logos and God, who sleeps as a man, weeps and laments as a man? Both the Jews and the Arians, in consequence of the sufferings which the Saviour endured in the flesh, deny the deity of the Logos (c. Ar. 3. 27). We, on the contrary, are Christians, and we understand the gospel narratives respecting the Lord in their proper sense. We do not stone him like the Jews, when we hear him speak of his eternal deity, neither are we offended, like the Arians, when he, as a man, employs for our sakes the language of human feebleness. It is, indeed, a peculiarity of the scriptures that they speak of the Saviour in a twofold manner, when they, on the one hand, set forth that he, as the Logos and brightness of the Father, always was God, and, on the other, explain that he afterwards became man for our sakes; this twofold view pervades the whole body of the sacred writings (l. c. 28, 29). He did not simply visit a man, as in the days of the prophets, for the purpose of sanctifying him,

and revealing himself, but he became also the Son of man. Hence all that is peculiar to human nature, such as hunger, thirst, and weariness, is ascribed to him, while at the same time he performs the works of the Logos, such as giving sight to the blind, or raising the dead. On the one hand, the Logos bore the infirmities of the flesh as his own, for it was his flesh; on the other, the flesh served the works of the deity, for it was the body of God. Hence the prophet truly says: "He bare (*βαρτάζεν*, Matt. viii. 17) our sicknesses," and not merely, he *healed* them, so that it might not seem as if he had been out of the body and healed it only externally (c. Ar. 3. 30, 31).

While the Arians, like the Jews, proceeded on the principle that a fully divine nature was not capable of being united with a complete human nature, Athanasius firmly adhered, in accordance with the scriptures, to the doctrine of the union of the two natures. All the expressions occurring in the scriptures respecting the Lord, he referred to one of the two natures, without excluding the other from its due participation. He accordingly adopted this course also in reference to the most grave objection which the Arians advanced, namely, that there were many things which the Lord did not know. It was not, he says, as the Logos, but as a man, that he was unacquainted with some things, for instance, the day of judgment (Mark xiii. 32). How should the Lord of heaven and earth, who appointed days and hours, not know them? That he did know them he indicated when he foretold (Matt. xxiv.) all that should precede the day and hour of the judgment. The want of a knowledge of all things is a characteristic feature of human nature. As the Logos, the Lord knows; as a man, he does not know. As a man, he was not ashamed to confess the ignorance of the flesh (c. Ar. 3. 42, 43). As the Father does all things through the Son, and through him, too, appoints the day and hour of the judgment, the Son must necessarily have known the latter. The Son is in the Father, and the Father in him, so that he knows all that the Father knows

(l. c. 44). When he came to Cesarea, and asked his disciples: "Whom do men say that I, the Son of man, am?" he previously knew the reply which Peter then made. For if the Father revealed it to Peter, he revealed it through the Son, since "no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him" (l. c. 3, 46). Hence, as the Son of God, he well knew the time of the judgment; if he nevertheless said that he knew it not, he may have possibly been influenced by the consideration that if he revealed it, man would in the intermediate time become negligent, and forbear to watch, to pray, and to prepare for the hour (Matt. xxiv. 42). At the same time he by no means uttered that which was untrue, for, as a man, he could truly say, I know not. But after his resurrection, when his flesh was changed, glorified, and freed from death, he no longer said that he knew not, but only: "It is not for you to know the times or the seasons" (Acts i. 7); for at the period of his ascension it was no longer fitting (*οὐκ ἐπιπεπε*) that he should speak *σαρκικῶς*, but rather *δεικῶς* (l. c. 47-49). If the enemies of Christ are not satisfied with this explanation, we would be justified in addressing another interrogation to them: In Paradise God called unto Adam and said: Where art thou? And to Cain he said: Where is Abel thy brother? Did God, perhaps, not know, when he asked these questions? The answer must be: He well knew. Is it then unreasonable and inconsistent that the same Son, in whom God then asked those questions, should afterwards, as man, propose questions to his disciples?

#### § 4. THE INFERENCES DEDUCED BY ARIUS FROM HIS FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINE, AND THEIR REPUTATION BY ATHANASIUS.

The foregoing statement describes the controversy as far as the fundamental principle of Arianism, that the Son of God is a creature, was concerned. Arius now proceeded to set forth a series of propositions containing inferences from

that principle, or presenting arguments in confirmation of it. These propositions, which assigned the attributes of a creature to the Son, and the mode in which they are assailed, present a striking analogy to the discussion of the main principle, as exhibited above. Arius derived his arguments in each case almost exclusively from reason, and in each, too, Athanasius repelled them by means of exegetical weapons.

1. "The Son of God is not from eternity, but has a beginning of his existence (*ἦν ποτε, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*), even as everything except God has had a beginning." Such was the original and oft-repeated assertion of Arius. God was not always, he added, the Father, but *ἦν ὅτε ὁ θεὸς μόνος ἦν καὶ οὐπω πατήρ ἦν, ὕστερον δὲ ἐπυθέγευε πατήρ*. For as all things were made of nothing, so, too, the Logos of God came into being out of non-existence, *καὶ ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γένηται, ἀλλ' ἀρχὴν τοῦ κτίζεσθαι ἔσχε καὶ αὐτός* (c. Ar. 1. 5; de Decr. 6). "It was," says Dorner (*Lehre von d. Person Christi* I. 814) "the main purpose of Arius to show that our conception of the Father and of his existence by no means necessarily implied the Son and his existence, but that his existence in his relation to the Father was contingent or incidental [and not an absolute necessity]." Hence Arius did not yet employ the formula *ἦν ποτε κ. τ. λ.* in his letter to Alexander, which is given at the commencement of this Article. As Arius, who asserted the *priority* of the Father, was anxious to avoid the appearance of connecting the conception of *time* with the existence of the Father, he carefully avoided the use of the word *χρόνος* in his favorite formula; this subterfuge, however, availed but little, for, as Athanasius correctly remarks, the conception of time unquestionably lies in the phrase *ἦν ποτε*. It may yet be added that the formula itself was not an original production of Arius, as both Origen and Dionysius of Rome had already assailed it (de Decr. 26, 27). The refutation of the Arian theory (represented by the rallying-cry of the party: *ἦν ποτε, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*) is found chiefly in the first discourse of

Athanasius against the Arians. He proceeds thus: Let us subject this phrase to an equitable test. What is, strictly speaking, the subject [or nominative of the verb] in *ἦν ποτε*? Is it *God the Father*? But this would be unblushing blasphemy. For the term *once* (*ποτέ*) cannot be used predicatively of him who is absolutely the self-existent One, whose existence is an unchangeable and eternal *now* (*ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν*). Or is *the Son* the subject in the phrase *ἦν ποτε*? That would be a palpable contradiction in itself, since he cannot possibly both *be* and *not be* at the same time. We can then only assume that *time* (*χρόνος*) is the subject, and complete the sentence thus: *ἦν ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ὁ λόγος*, as the word *ποτέ* authorizes us to do. The formula is then simply equivalent to another favorite Arian phrase: *οὐκ ἦν ὁ υἱὸς πρὶν γεννηθῆναι*, and both imply that time preceded the existence of the Logos. Now such language is diametrically opposed to that of the scriptures, which both maintain that the existence of the Son is eternal, without beginning as well as without end (*ἀεὶ, ἀίδιον*), and also represent the Son as eternally co-existing with the Father (John i. 1; Rev. i. 4; Rom. ix. 5) as his eternal power and Godhead (Rom. i. 20, comp. with 1 Cor. i. 24), c. Ar. 1. 11. We further find in the scriptures that when the Son speaks of his own nature, he always speaks in the present tense (*εἰμὶ*), and by it ascribes to himself an existence without beginning. He says: *I am* the truth (John xiv. 6), not *I became* the truth; *I am* your Master and Lord (John xiii. 13); *I am* the Shepherd (John x. 14); *I am* the Light (John viii, 12); *Before Abraham was, I am* (John viii. 58). Times and periods of time, like all things else, were first created through the Son, and when all things had not yet been created through him, time itself did not yet exist. How can we then conceive of time antecedently to the Logos? (c. Ar. 1. 12, 13). But the Arians allege: "If the Son is eternal as the Father, he is not his Son, but his Brother." How foolish and contentious they are! Their objection would be plausible if we simply held that Christ is eternal, and did not also teach that he is

likewise the *Son*; but how could we, in this case, conceive of him who is begotten as the *brother* of him who begets him? The Father and the Son are not begotten *ἐκ τινος ἀρχῆς προὔπαρχούσης*, so that they would be brothers, but the Father is the point of departure and the begetter (*ἀρχὴ καὶ γεννήτωρ*) of the Son: the former is Father only; the latter, Son only. When we now designate the generation by the Father as eternal, we do so with the strictest truth; for the essence or being of the Father was never incomplete, and the Son was not begotten as one human being is begotten by another, so that he would be posterior to the Father, but he is eternal as the eternal God, whose Son he is. Men beget in time, because their nature is not perfect, but God's nature is *ἀεὶ τέλειος* (c. Ar. 1. 14). If God had not always been the Father, and had only become so in time, he would be mutable, whereas we know that he is eternally the same (l. c. 22, 28). It is only folly to suppose that God is like a man. But as the foolish questions which the Arians ask may mislead the simple, we must offer a reply. They say to a woman: Hadst thou a son before thou broughtest forth? Then the Son of God did not exist before he was begotten (l. c. 22). So, too, they may ask a mechanic: Canst thou furnish an article without materials? Then neither can God do it. But they compare God to a man, only when we speak of his Son. When we assert that God creates, they refrain from such comparisons. Now even as God is not like man when he creates, so he is not like man when he begets (c. Ar. 1. 23).

2. "*The Son*," the Arians again held, "*was not begotten of the essence or being of the Father, but proceeded from an external source, and was created out of nothing, for the essence or being of God is indivisible.*" Here, too, Athanasius shows that the premises are false, since the divine act of generation does not resemble that of a man, and the limitations of the human body do not occur in God. He does not consist of parts like a man. If the Son proceeds from an external source (*ἐξωθεν*), then this source or object.

whatever it may be, intervenes between him and God, and is nearer to God than he is; Christ is then the Son of this object, which is distinct from the nature of God. And yet, as God terms him *his own son* (comp. τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ, Rom. viii. 32, and πατέρα ἴδιον John v. 19), he cannot proceed from a foreign source, but necessarily derives his origin from the essence or being of God (c. Ar. 1. 28, 15).

3. The Arians further alleged: "*The Son came into being, like all things else, by the purpose and will of God*" (βουλήσει καὶ θελήσει γεγενῆσθαι τὸν υἱὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς, c. Ar. 3. 59). Athanasius maintains that this proposition depends on the foregoing, when he says: τὰ γὰρ μὴ ὄντα ποτὲ ἀλλ' ἐξῶθεν ἐπιγιγνώμενα ὁ δημιουργὸς βουλευέται ποιῆσαι (l. c. 61), and charges his opponents with the adoption of the heresy of the Gnostic Valentinus. His mode of argumentation here, however, as in some other cases, is comparatively undecided and feeble, as in his age theological science exhibited many defects, which have since been supplied.

4. In connection with these three propositions, the Arians also set forth the following: "*The Son does not possess an equality and a unity of essence or being with the Father.*" He is not like the Father in essence, they alleged, inasmuch as the Logos must, like other creatures, be unlike God (ἀλλότριος καὶ ἀνόμιος κατὰ πάντα τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας καὶ ἰδιότητος, c. Ar. 1. 6). Athanasius replies by referring to passages like John xiv. 9 and Heb. i. 3, "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father"; "who being the brightness of his glory," etc. The conditions and limitations of human nature should not be transferred to God. While human beings beget others in succession (κατὰ διαδοχὴν), and no human being is exclusively (κυρίως) a father or a son, the Father is Father only, the Son a son only. He who should ask why the Son did not, in his turn, beget a son, might with equal propriety ask why the Father had not himself a father before him (c. Ar. 1. 21, 22). The Arians also denied that the Son was *one* in essence or being with the Father (διηρημένον εἶναι καθ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀμέτοχον κατὰ πάντα τοῦ πα-

τὸς τὸν υἱόν, c. Ar. 1. 6). Athanasius replies: Who, that hears the words of the Lord and Saviour: "I am in the Father, and the Father is in me," and "I and my Father are one" (John xiv. 11; x. 30), will dare to put asunder what the Lord and Saviour has joined together and declared to be indivisible (de Decr. 2)? The Arians had interpreted such passages as referring to oneness of the will, and adduced the circumstance that the Son was one with the Father in thought, judgment, and will. But Athanasius replied: Then all the angels in heaven, yea, the sun, moon, and stars may be said to be *one* with God, since God's will was always their own, and their judgment and purposes coincided with his own. And yet, what angel would presume to say: "I and the Father are one" (c. Ar. 3. 10)? Consequently, the equality and unity in question must be understood of the very nature and being of the Son, that is, substantially, and not merely ethically. As the essence of the Father and the Son is one and the same, the Father visits saints when the Son does, and hence the latter says: "We [I and the Father] will come unto him," etc. (John xiv. 23). When the Father confers grace and peace, the Son confers them too, as Paul always expresses himself: "Grace and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ." If such divine gifts proceed in common from the Father and the Son, we have in this fact the evidence of the oneness of the Father and the Son (l. c. 11, 12).

5. The Arians also said: "*The Son of God, like all creatures, was subject to change, and really mutable, with respect to his nature; but with respect to his free will he remained good during his own pleasure.*" They added, that, as God had foreseen that he would remain good, he had, by way of anticipation, bestowed the glory on him which men receive only after they have demonstrated their virtuous tendencies (c. Ar. 1. 5). Athanasius refutes these views by referring to the Son's equality of nature or being with the Father. If the Father, he says, is unchangeable, and, accordingly, always remains the same, it necessarily follows that his

image (2 Cor. iv. 4; Col. i. 15; Heb. i. 3) must also remain the same, and undergo no change; as he is begotten of the essence of the Father, he will always correspond in his whole nature and being to that divine essence. The Arians indeed make this assertion only for the purpose of severing the image from the Father, and reducing the Son to the rank of a creature (c. Ar. 1. 22). Now if the Son were mutable, how could we through him know the Father who is immutable? For he says: "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father" (John xiv. 9), l. c. 35. The image of him who changes not (*τοῦ ἀτρέπτου*), must consequently also be unchangeable (*ἀναλλοίωτος*). To this the holy scriptures expressly give testimony, for we read in Heb. xiii. 8: "Jesus Christ the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever," and David thus gives praise to him: "Of old hast thou laid the foundations of the earth . . . . thou shalt endure . . . . thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end" (Ps. cii. 25-27). How could he be the Logos and the Truth of God, if he were subject to change? Or how could he be the Wisdom of God, if he did not always remain the same? For that which is true (*ἀληθές*) must continue to be the same (l. c. 36).

6. Lastly, the Arians held that the Son does not possess a perfect knowledge of the Father, inasmuch as he is himself of a different nature; they even maintained that the Son had not a perfect knowledge of himself. "The Father," said Arius in his *Thalia*, "is invisible to the Son; the Logos cannot fully and precisely behold and know his Father; the measure of his knowledge corresponds to his faculty of perception (*ἀναλόγως τοῖς ἰδίους μέτροις οἶδε καὶ βλέπει*), as our own knowledge corresponds in degree to our ability (*δύναμις*). Indeed, the Son does not only not know the Father precisely in consequence of the limits of his powers of comprehension (*λείπει αὐτῷ εἰς τὸ καταλαβεῖν*), but he has also no perfect knowledge of his own nature or essence" (c. Ar. 1. 6, 9; de Syn. 15). The Arians reached this conclusion by assuming that the Son, as a creature,

could not possibly fathom the infinite nature of the Creator of all. Athanasius arrived at opposite results in accordance with his system that no difference in essence or being existed between the Father and the Son. In opposition to the Arian statement which was subversive of all revelation, he appealed to the saying of Christ: "As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father" (John x. 15), and reasoned thus: If the Son does not know the Father, then, neither does the Father know the Son; it must follow that none of the revelations which Jesus Christ has given us respecting the Father can be worthy of our confidence (ad Episc. Aeg. et Lib. 16).

Thus Arius developed his fundamental principle to its last results — the destruction of Christianity itself; but by this process he in reality pronounced judgment against himself in the eyes of all who had through Christ found peace in the knowledge of God. It may indeed be objected that Arius had simply denied that Christ knew God perfectly and precisely (*τελειως, ακριβως*), while the revelations which he did give, might nevertheless be true, and proceed from his own knowledge, and that all must concede that the revelations which Christ has given in the scriptures by no means furnish us with entire objective truth or an absolute knowledge of God. However, it may be replied, that we, as creatures of limited powers, are not, here below, competent to comprehend perfect and complete truth, and that the latter is, accordingly, not presented to us; but when Christ reveals such knowledge as we may comprehend, it must be assumed that he himself was competent to know God perfectly, as, otherwise, those portions of truth which he did disclose, would have, to his own mind, exhibited obscurity or uncertainty.

#### § 5. THE APPEAL OF ATHANASIUS TO THE ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.

Arius was compelled to appeal to the authority of earlier teachers in order to escape the odium of having introduced

new and heretical opinions. He attempts to sustain his theory by quoting various terms and phrases employed by Hermas, Dionysius of Alexandria, and Dionysius of Rome. Athanasius accepts the challenge, makes an appeal himself to the established church doctrine, introduces additional authors, such as Theognostus and Origen, and refutes Arius with triumphant success. While he vindicates the character of the early writers whom Arius attempts to associate with himself, he proves that the latter is the sole source whence all the heresies of his party proceeded. Voigt has given many details respecting this part of the controversy, which, as our Article has already reached an undue length, we omit.

If we, in conclusion, summarily view the contest between Athanasius and Arianism, and investigate its results, we reach the following conclusion: In this contest respecting the most important and precious truths of the gospel, Athanasius availed himself fully of all the resources which were furnished to him by the theological science of his age; the truth that had been set forth in the Nicene symbol gained an abiding victory. Arius may have been a man of ordinary abilities; he simply represented distinguished individuals of the oriental church whose doctrinal opinions he was the first to proclaim openly with boldness and consistency. In him, all who sustained his views were defeated by Athanasius. The latter proved conclusively, when the doctrine of the church was assailed by dialectic arguments, that it by no means involved the contradictions with which its opponents charged it; while he convicted the Arian system of numerous contradictions, he demonstrated that the unexplored depths and the mysteries which the church doctrine confessedly, like many other subjects of human knowledge, presented to man, were to be ascribed to his limited knowledge, or to the limited powers of his mind. He preferred, however, to explain and defend his doctrine, not so much by arguments derived from reason, as by those which

the scriptures or revelation afforded. Sustained by the latter, he deprived the Arians of every available weapon, and surrounded the church doctrine with fortifications which were impregnable; this result is not enfeebled by the fact that his exegesis of various passages of scripture is obviously defective. The consciousness of the believer, too, whose hopes are founded on the redeeming work of the Son of God, supplied him with convincing arguments against the Arian scheme. And, finally, he proved that the faith of the church in Jesus Christ, as the Son of God, had uninterruptedly borne testimony against the fundamental error of Arianism.

Some weak points unquestionably appear in the apologetic and polemic statements of Athanasius, which may be ultimately traced to the imperfect development of theological science in his age. Nevertheless, the controversy in which he engaged, was, in view of its subject and its permanent results, a source of rich blessings to the Christian church. The reason of man, guided by its own dubious light, may still produce theories which exhibit in a greater or less degree an Arian taint; the church can survey the rise of such errors without alarm, for her whole history, since the age of Athanasius, gives her the assurance that they will soon disappear. The Nicene faith, founded on the rock of the word of God, and endowed with imperishable vitality in the consciousness of the believer, has been assailed in every succeeding age, and has triumphed in every contest; the attempts to overthrow it have invariably been ineffectual, and have simply resembled waves of the sea which the passing breeze temporarily calls into action, but which subside and disappear as rapidly as they arose.