

stenberg calls it, a piece of mosaic-work, leaning upon quotations from the more ancient sacred scriptures, and comprising a description of Jehovah's appearance in judgment against idolaters. Though Hengstenberg, influenced apparently by the same misapprehension about Heb. i. 6, endeavors to connect it, in some way, with Messianic hopes, he is obliged to confess that "judgment alone is brought prominently forward in this Psalm;" and he has conclusively shown, in our quotation from him above (p. 308), that it was *idols* and not *angels* (and we may add, *Jehovah* and not *Jesus*) to whom vs 7 refers.

From what has been said, we think it will appear: *First*, that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, whether correctly or not, did copy this proof-text from the Septuagint of Dent. xxxii. 43.

Second, that there is no decisive evidence against his having done this consistently, and with the sanction of divine authority.

ARTICLE V.

THE OLD SCHOOL IN NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY.

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WHEN age had ripened his judgment with rich experience, the Rev. Dr. Humphrey expressed the opinion that evangelical writers differ more in their use of terms than in their views of truth. Many other good men, of every denomination, are finding that the principles that unite them are broader and stronger than those which separate them. Hence they are beginning to seek out and intensify their agreements, and let their divergencies disappear in the background. The late Dr. William Nevins gave fine expression

to this beautiful catholic sentiment. "I don't belong, exactly, to either of the schools. I am something of an eclectic. There are many things about the Old school that I like, and I am of opinion that it is none the worse for being old. There are some things about the New school that I don't greatly object to. I suspect, after all, that both the schools have the same Master, though in each some things are learned, as is apt to be the case, which the Master does not teach. I think the scholars of both schools ought to love one another. . . . Oh, I wish they would. I desire it for charity's sake. I desire it for truth's sake; for the way to think alike, is first to feel alike."

It is, however, necessary to know *what* men think, in order to know how far they are united, and in what they differ. Hence the practical value of clear and exact theological statements. When discreetly made, they often subserve the ends of truth and charity much better than argument or exhortation. Men are much more likely to be drawn towards agreement, when they correctly and fully understand each other, than when they do not. And they are never more sure to miss truth, and descend to personalities and mutual repulsion, than when misunderstood and misrepresented.

To present the Old school in New England theology as distinguished from the New school, from Hopkinsianism, and the Old school Presbyterians, is a difficult task. And it is the more difficult because it requires us to define, in a degree, the systems from which it differs. We are more confident of an honest purpose in the undertaking, than of entire success.

By New England theology we mean the system of doctrines which, from the founding of the colonies, has been held by the Congregational churches of New England. By the Old school is understood those who have accepted this system, for substance, as expressed in the Westminster Confession, adopted first, at Cambridge, in 1648, and after-

wards re-adopted, in 1680, at Boston, and, in 1708, at Saybrook. Edwards and Bellamy were the defenders of this type of doctrine, and leaders in this school, in the last century. Drs. Woods, Humphrey, and Tyler may be taken as fair exponents of it in the present. The doctrines are sometimes called "Old Calvinism," to distinguish them from Hopkinsianism, which was termed "New Calvinism." It came to be designated as the Old school because of its adherence to the old Puritan theology, as set forth in our confessions and maintained by the elder Edwards, and to distinguish it from certain "improvements," called "new theology," of which Dr. Taylor was, at his death, the accredited and the ablest representative.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL DOCTRINES.

The Old school takes, as the basis of its anthropology, the three following facts :

1st. Man was created, in God's image, a rational and a perfectly holy being.

2d. He fell from this normal state by transgressing the law of his Maker.

3d. His posterity are born in that state of moral evil into which he fell, Jesus of Nazareth being the only exception.

These facts preface and explain the anthropological *doctrines* of which they are the historical basis.

1. *Original Righteousness.*

God created man holy, morally as well as physically, a perfect being. The first holiness in him was that of his *being*, and concreated. It was an upright disposal or disposition of his moral nature, as really pleasing to God as the righteous volitions that followed from it. This was original righteousness in the strict sense. It was first in the order of time, and it was the origin of all that preceded the fall. As created *being* preceded creature-action, faculties, their exercise ; so created holiness of being, in the first man, was the logical antecedent of his holy activities. Thus

the old doctrine of original righteousness connects itself with the ancient record, that God "created man in his own image."

II. *The Federal Headship.*

As a doctrine, this rests on the fact that Adam's offspring are born in the state of sinfulness and misery into which he fell. The peculiar *fact* proclaims and proves the peculiar doctrine, — a covenant connection, ethical as well as natural, of the first man with his descendants. The union is not the identity of persons, which some have imputed to the school, but an organic continuity in one human race and nature. Adam is no more the same person with Cain, than Cain is with Abel. Yet he is connected with them, and with all his posterity, *representatively* and by covenant, as no other father has been or can be with his children. Identity and federal representation are incompatible ideas. But though federal headship does not allow a personal, it does require a moral or legal, identity, as the members of a corporation are, in law, *one* with their agent. They are responsible for his transactions. Their fortunes are involved in his well or ill management. For all corporate purposes, to a certain extent, they are *one* legal person. So Adam, as the federal or corporate head of the race, for which he acts, as well as for himself, is sometimes spoken of by men of this school, as a "public person," — as the root, of which his descendants are the branches.

The Old school Presbyterians, some of them at least, have of late given up the "root theory," and thus diverged from Turretin and the Assembly's Confession, as well as from the old New England theology. The New school recedes in the opposite direction, and drops altogether the covenant and the federal headship. Dr. Emmons resolves the whole into an absolute decree, according to which, if the first man, who was created holy, should sin, all his descendants were, by direct divine efficiency, to be created sinners.

III. *The Imputation of Adam's Sin.*

This doctrine falls back on the moral or covenant unity of the race, and is the complement of federal headship. But the term, as employed by the school, needs explanation. The words "impute" and "imputation" have good usage in two quite distinct significations. One ascribes to a person the actions or qualities which are properly his own; as the guilt of murder is imputed to the criminal, because he is the guilty actor. The other use is, in reckoning to one's advantage or disadvantage, on the ground of some compact or connection, natural or moral, or both, certain actions of another, or their consequences, which are not properly his. This latter is the accredited use of the word to express the imputation of sin. The sinful agency of Adam, in his first transgression, as *a personal act*, was placed solely to his account. None of his descendants took part in it, for none were in existence. But certain disastrous consequences of his act passed over to them, as really as they came upon him. It affected them, in certain respects, as it did him. On account of it, he became a sinful being, and subject to temporal and eternal death; and so do they. The first evil disposition, which led to the evil choice, was not only confirmed in him as an individual, but also as a quality of human nature, and it re-appears, successively, in each one of them. In short, it gave him a posterity, fallen like himself. Thus his sin is imputed to them. They, as well as he, suffer the consequences of it; but without the transfer of his actual guilt. And the effects or consequences of it came upon them in that want of original righteousness and corruption of nature which "is commonly called original sin" It is not a sin to be born sinful; but the sin with which men are born is, nevertheless, sinful. We are, strictly, guilty only for our own sin; but the sinfulness with which we are born is as *really* ours as if it originated in our act.

The term "guilt," *reatus*, is also employed, in this connection, in a secondary sense. Primarily it denotes ill-desert for

one's own acts. It also signifies a liability to penal evil on account of another's acts; as when the members of a corporation suffer from the ill management of its agent. There may be no participation with the offender in the fault, — certainly no personal identity. But there is always a corporate oneness where there is this common liability, this corporate guilt. Adam's guilt for his offense was personal and literal. That of his descendants, on account of it, was federal and corporate, as, by a common liability, they are partakers of the evil consequences. Thus it is that by one man's disobedience many were made sinners; thus, and thus only, that they "sinned in him, and fell with him, in his first transgression."

The objection, that representation implies the consent of the represented, is ruled out by the nature of the case. Such consent was simply *impossible*. No man can choose his own father, or whether he shall have any father, and no one sees in this any injustice. It was not, either, *necessary*. God needed not to ask leave of his creatures to bring them into being, nor to get their consent to any of the links by which they are connected, or laws by which they are governed.

Not a few who seem to have dissented from the school on this doctrine, have only somewhat emphatically agreed with it in discarding some of the errors and absurdities which have been unfortunately associated with it; partly through its uncared friends; but oftener by the misconstructions of its enemies. Of this class was Dr. Dwight. He repudiated the idea of personal identity, — of action before being, and the literal transfer of Adam's sin to his descendants. This, however, is little else than the standing repudiation of the school.

Dr. Hopkins did not employ the word "impute" in reference to Adam's sin, though he did in respect to the righteousness of Christ. But no man maintained more strenuously than he the doctrine denoted by it. He earnestly defended the federal headship, — the trial of the race in the first parents on the ground of the covenant, and the transmission of a

morally depraved nature. Dr. Emmons, with his sharp logic, cut the knot, and resolved imputation into absolute decree. He rejected all ideas of a covenant, of federal headship, of representation, and of hereditary or transmitted depravity. God created the first man holy. Because he sinned he creates all the rest sinners.

The Princeton school holds to *immediate* imputation, and makes less of the natural connection of Adam and his posterity than did Edwards and the old theology. The New England theory combines more the physical and the ethical—one as the medium of the other. The moral constitution, logically the antecedent, is yet inseparable from the natural, and works itself out upon that, as its basis. The law violated by Adam as the covenant father, goes on to its penal consequences in the generations that proceed from him as the natural father. Thus original and imputed sin are, as Edwards says, not two sins, one real and the other unreal, but one *verum peccatum*.

The New school sets aside the whole doctrine of imputation, both of sin and righteousness, as “a fiction,” “a phantasm.” It admits, indeed, a connection of the sins of his descendants with the first sin of Adam, and it calls theirs a consequence of his. But it is scarcely more than a *sequence*; certain, indeed, and necessary, in the sense that God could not prevent it. It was not a penal consequence from a legal relation, nor was it a moral consequence from a federal relation, nor according to any hereditary or moral law. In this aspect, the Old school is broadly distinguished from the New.

THE DOCTRINE OF SIN.

As a general term, the word “sin” is employed by the school to denote the *status*, and consequent activities, into which man fell. In its essence it is the contradiction of God, and the opposite of holiness. It includes the violation of known law. But it consists primarily in what lies deeper and more central,—in a wrong bias or bent of the *will*,

which becomes action in the violation of law. It has a negative and a positive side. Negatively, it is a want of the righteousness in which the race commenced its existence. Positively, it is the moral deterioration or corruption of nature into which it fell. By the generally accepted definition, it is "a want of conformity unto, or a transgression of, the law of God." This presents its relations to the precepts of the law, and also to its prohibitions. It defines it as both debt and trespass, original and actual. It includes everything in the moral being not perfectly coincident with the moral law, whether by excess, deviation, or defect. The apostle gives the same double element in the two words *ἀμαρτία*, aberration or violation of law, and *ἀνόμια*, non-conformity to law.

Some of the old writers, not very carefully, speak of sin as a *nature*. The New England theology neither accepts the idea, nor employs the language. The phrase "sin a nature," is capable of a Manichean construction, and is liable to mislead. But as used by Prof. Shedd and some others, it means only that sin *pertains* to fallen nature, as a super-induced quality, or *proprium*. This is the old New England doctrine. The substance of the soul is not sin, nor are any of its faculties. None of these constituted man's holiness before, neither do they constitute his sin since, the fall. But, as original righteousness belonged to his rational nature, — the affections and will, — and consisted in a disposal of these in harmony with God's nature, so sin, by which man lost that original disposition, belongs equally to his nature. The nature was not holiness in the one case, but it was *holy*. Nor is it sin in the other, yet it is sinful. We say, therefore, that sin belongs to human nature, just as we say that it is a quality of a human being.

There is a sense in which the school regards all sin as voluntary. The effects of the fall reached to the centre of man's being, to the will-principle, the *voluntas*. All sin, even original, is in this sense voluntary. It belongs to the voluntary principle. The states of the will are, therefore, as really

voluntary and moral as its acts; but they cannot, in strict propriety, be called acts.

The depravity of nature, the first sinfulness of the child, consists in this voluntary deflection of the will from God. It is not choice, for this implies antecedent knowledge of law, and a comparison of right and wrong; but it leads to choice, and is the generic moral *force* concentered and determined in choice to a specific object. Hence we call a disposition to sin a sinful disposition. It is the primal force, the central dynamic oppugnancy to God which works itself out in all the actualities of evil.

This abnormal condition is hereditary. It is transmitted from father to son and thus from the first of the race to the last. We are born in the image of *fallen* Adam. There is no charterless middle ground for us between sin and holiness; no innocent depravity, or sinless disposition to sin. There are no first months of mere animal existence in human history, within which the child is no subject of moral government. The commencement of a rational soul and the beginning of subjection to moral government are held to be simultaneous. Both these, in the Old theology, are natal. Man is a rational and a moral being by birth. And at birth begins his need of forgiving love, of renewing and purifying grace. In this view of native rationality and depravity, the Old and the New Calvinists were in essential agreement, the latter making original sin *actual* as well as voluntary.

Some of the points by which the Old school is distinguished from the New, on the doctrine of sin, are as follows:

1st. The Old predicates sinfulness of human nature. This the New denies. The nature is only the non-moral *occasion* of sin, and is not sinful.

2d. The Old affirms sin to be a wrong status, or bias of the will, as well as a violation of known law. The New confines sin strictly to acts. "Guilt pertains solely to the action of an agent who acts. There can be no other sin than actual."

3d. The Old theology adheres to the doctrine of hereditary moral depravity. The New sets it aside as obsolete. Men are not born with moral depravity, but as free from any real sinfulness as Adam was at his creation. With an innocent constitutional desire for happiness, prompting an act of the heart or will, they make themselves depraved as soon as they are capable of violating known law.

4th. It is a doctrine of the Old school that the disposition or subjective motive, in the descendants of Adam, which dictates their first sinful act, is discordant with the divine law, and therefore sinful. The New pronounces this motive an impulse of self-love, not discordant with the law. All moral acts, holy as well as sinful, are prompted by the desire of one's happiness as their ultimate end.

5th. The Old includes new-born infants as human beings, and subjects of moral government; the New allows them no more subjection to moral government than doves and lambs. They are not morally depraved, and are not capable of either sin or holiness.

6th. It is the general belief of the Old school that those who die in infancy, before actual transgression, are renewed and saved by the blood of Christ; that a great multitude of infant voices swell the choral anthems of heaven in praise to the Lamb. By the New, it is possible that those who die in infancy may have a future life; but if they should, it will be "in angel purity," having escaped both "the *character* and the doom of a sinful world"; but we cannot know what becomes of them. They may be annihilated. And it is only a "presumptuous curiosity" that asks what is their state.

7th. The Old includes temporal death as a part of the penalty for sin. The New postpones this penalty wholly to the future state, and limits it to eternal death.

MORAL AGENCY.

A moral agent is one who has the powers which qualify him for moral acts, either good or evil. These powers, by

the analyses of the schools, are commonly classed as affections, understanding, and will. The moral life-force is in the first; the perceptive or *regulative* in the second; and the *determinative* in the third. Together, they constitute a free moral agent—one who wills as he pleases, and acts as he chooses. This is the old doctrine of freedom, external and internal. It is what Edwards means when he says that no being, not even the Supreme, can have more liberty than this. And this freedom is as complete in man since the fall as before. The change of moral status did not alter or weaken this essential law of his being. We do not mean that man since the fall is free from the influence of motives, or the law of choosing according to the greatest apparent good, or from the divine influence, or the certainty of events pre-established by the operation of moral causes. Nor was he free from these before the fall. Neither are the unfallen angels thus free. These, however, are not restraints upon liberty, but its conditions and wholesome regulations.

The certainty of events, called sometimes metaphysical necessity, is charged with infringement of freedom, and with fatalism. But we believe it is not fairly open to this objection. Men choose to do, in their utmost freedom, what, from the operation of moral causes, in perfect harmony with their liberty, it was certain they would choose to do. The crucifixion of Jesus was the act of perfectly free moral agents. Yet it rested on as sure a ground of antecedent certainty as did the eclipse of the sun that attended it. The freedom of the actors took up into itself, as the woof of its evil web, causes and influences adapted to bring on just such a trial of their character, in the fullest exercise of their liberty. They had all the liberty possible to any being,—liberty to do as they pleased,—all possible “power for a different volition instead,” except a different disposition. They were not *forced* to the issue by any foregone certainty, but delighted in it from their own intense desire. They welcomed the providential course of events—the very decree

that conspired with their plans to deliver him into their power, and thus they gloried in their shame.

Such is the harmony of metaphysical necessity and moral freedom — of God's purpose of good and man's intent of evil — in this central fact of Christian history. Thus remote, too, is the doctrine from fatalism. All the operations of mind are necessarily free, though not the less certain, or foreknown to God and connected with a pre-established order of the moral universe. The regularity of the divine administration never infringes the flexibility of man's free will. In working good, as in inflicting evil, the Creator keeps this inviolate.

This freedom the school carefully distinguishes from what the Arminians call the self-determining power of the will. The will, as distinguished from the mind, has no power. It is a power, a faculty, and cannot have as its property what it is in its essence. Edwards defines it as that by which the soul chooses or refuses anything. President Day and others view it in essentially the same light. It is not an agent, but an implement; not a determiner, but a something that is determined. By the self-determining power of the will is generally understood the power of determining its own volitions, and whether to act or not act, independently of all causes, motives, and influences. But this seems to involve, first, an infinite series of volitions; and, secondly, a volition before the first; and, thirdly, it resolves the will into an agent distinct from the mind, and independent of it. From this, the Old theology dissents. The will cannot separate itself from the antecedent disposition or desire which moves it to a choice. It cannot will this inclining status or moving power into being, and it cannot will it out of being. Nor can it stand still in a dead indifferentism between two antipathetic impulses, not choosing or refusing either. In short, the will is not an autocrat, as this self-determining power would make it, but a subject of the mind and a servant among its fellow-faculties. The mind, the only agent, possesses all the autocracy of which our mental science takes any cognizance. It determines its volitions

freely and sovereignly. It wills and nills, loves and hates, as is most pleasing, and suffers no insurrectionary claimants among its subordinates.

The Old school distinguishes, also, this freedom from the power of contrary choice. It does not allow any such power. Choice is the preference of one of two or more objects. A contrary choice, as distinguished from simple choice, is the preference of an object and the opposite of the one which is preferred. Or, in another form, choice is willing as one does, *or* otherwise. Contrary choice is willing as he does *and* otherwise, — choosing as he does and as he does not. This, in strictness of speech, is the only intelligible distinction between choice and contrary choice. If a man chooses simply as he does, though with a disposition to choose differently, it is only choice. If he had chosen otherwise than he did, it would have been nothing but choice — a later choice contrary to an earlier one. But if he should choose as he does, and at the same time otherwise, that is, as he does and as he does not, he would exercise the power of contrary choice in the only sense in which it is distinguishable from simple choice. The power of *choice* includes everything but this idea of an opposite or double choice. For, to choose one thing at one time, and its contrary at another, is to exercise the power of choice. It is the ability for any *single* mental act which the agent pleases to put forth. But this power of a contrary choice is the ability to put forth *two* acts at the same time; of choosing as one does, and as he does not. This we regard as an impossibility. It is pure idealism.

If the power of contrary choice be taken in the sense of choosing according to the *least* instead of the greatest apparent good, — from a weaker against the force of a stronger motive, it is equally disallowed by the Old school. Men often choose against the greatest real good, but never against the greatest apparent good, or what, on the whole, is most agreeable. It is held as a law of the mind that choice follows the ruling disposition, or love. The mind always

wills as it pleases, and never the contrary, or as it does not please.

Thus we hold that simple choice exhausts the potencies of the will. It is fully adequate to all the exigencies of moral freedom. The power of contrary choice is speculative and impracticable. Mind is no more constructed to work in opposite directions at the same time, than a locomotive. It can suddenly reverse its operations, — change its choices as it will; but it has no power to move forwards and backwards at the same time, or to obey the weakest motive-force against the strongest. This view may explain the answer we give to Fletcher's question to Toplady. "Is the will at liberty to choose otherwise than it does, or is it not?" The man who affirms the first member of this question, says Dr. Whedon, is bound to be an Arminian; the affirmant of the latter member, must, we suppose, logically be a Calvinist." Putting the question in a little more exact form — Is the moral *agent* at liberty to choose otherwise than he does? — the old New England theology affirms "the first member of this question." A man is at perfect liberty to choose otherwise than he does, if he wishes to. And when he has chosen, he can "put forth another act in its stead," though not another and the same at the same time. And this is something more than the power to will as we will. It is the power to will as we wish to will — to choose what we like rather than what we dislike. It is the very essence of volitional freedom. Even Whitby defines liberty as the power of doing what we will.

ABILITY AND INABILITY.

The powers of moral agency constitute what, in the Old school, is termed Natural Ability. This ability defines man's relation to God, as an accountable creature, and is the subjective ground and the measure of his responsibility.

Moral ability is, in addition to these natural faculties, a disposition which, as a motive-force, puts them in action, and determines the moral quality of the action. Natural

and moral ability together, furnish all the conditions of moral agency, and constitute power in the sense of efficiency, energy, or plenary ability. Power, in the proper sense, is therefore more than mere faculty. It is the force that energizes the faculty in action. There can be no moral action without both, and hence no *adequate* power for such action. Natural ability, as thus distinguished from moral, is often denoted in the school as "natural capacity," "capability," "powers," and "faculties." In the creed of the East Windsor Seminary it is called "natural strength," and in that of the Associate Founders at Andover, "corporeal strength."

Natural inability is the incapacity for moral actions arising from the absence or derangement of the faculties of moral agency, as in idiots and maniacs, and is incompatible with obligation.

Moral inability lies in the depravity of moral beings, and is in proportion to the fixedness and intensity of this depravity. It is moral, because it is in the disposition, and it is voluntary, because it takes hold of the will. It is a real inability because the agent has no self-corrective or regenerating efficiency. The natural powers are *sufficient*, as faculties, to this end, but not efficient. And yet the obligation is unimpaired by the inability because it is only moral, and consists in a fixed will—in opposition to good. The claim of the divine law is primarily for this elementary, central obedience. It demands first this very *dispositional* ability, whose absence indicates the sinner's deep-rooted opposition to God.

This distinction between natural and moral ability and inability, has been held by some as of great practical value. Dr. Tyler so regarded it, and made free use of it. Dr. Woods was accustomed to use and explain it more cautiously. Yet they agreed with each other and the school, and also with the earlier Hopkinsians, that fallen man has *powers* adequate to his duty, but that he is "morally incapable of recovering the image of his Creator which was lost in Adam."

In this distinction the New England theology differs, in form at least, from the old school Presbyterians, and from the old Dutch and Scotch divines. These generally do not allow the distinction, though it is found essentially in Calvin, Augustine, and all the old theology. The Princeton school admitted it thirty years ago as substantially correct. It regards it now with disfavor, as ascribing too much to man, and leading to Pelagianism.

The New school diverges from the Old towards the other extreme. It emphasizes natural ability in order to secure responsibility, and so loosens moral inability, if it does not let it slide altogether. It adopts as an axiom, that power, in the sense of plenary ability, is necessary to obligation. It holds that, over and above the powers and opportunity of right action, unregenerate men have a power at any moment to commence using their powers in right action — a natural ability to remove their moral inability; that they can successfully resist all God's recovering influences, can sin in defiance of all possible hindrances, and repent despite all obstacles.

Dr. Stephen West, and some other Hopkinsians, adopted similar sentiments, but viewed from the point of divine efficiency, rather than human ability. Dr. Emmons, who carried the exercise scheme to the fullest extent, says that men are as able to embrace the gospel as to drink, to do right as wrong. But it was because doing right and wrong are simply the creations of God; hence man, as *man*, can no more do one than the other. As such, he has no ability, no will or character or nature or being, except what consists in these divinely created exercises, and he is nothing else. Thus the scheme entirely ignores the psychology of the Old school, and attenuates its anthropology to a mere continuity of created exercises, each one of which is purely good or entirely evil.

The relation of the old theology on this subject to the Arminian or Methodist view is scarcely less peculiar. In respect to man's primitive holiness, the federal headship of

Adam, the fall, and original sin as a positive and hereditary corruption of nature, the two schemes are essentially Augustinian. Edwards and Wesley occupied common ground in their simultaneous and noble defense of these catholic doctrines against Dr. John Taylor. On the inability of man to good works, the Articles of the Methodist Episcopal Church are as explicit and full as the Westminster Confession. But the two theologies differ.

1st. On the *nature* of inability. The inability to good held by the old, is in the fixedness of man's indisposition to good, which yet implies a perfect obligation to it, and responsibility for evil. The Arminian doctrine admits the indisposition, but implies that it is incompatible with obligation, and that it destroys responsibility. This difference is occasioned by the axiom in Methodist theology that power to the contrary underlies all responsible action.

2d. There is an equal diversity on the question of natural ability. The New England theology regards natural ability—the powers of moral agency—as constituting a perfect obligation to right action, and blameworthiness for wrong. But Arminianism entirely discards natural ability in fallen man as a ground of responsibility. The fixedness of his natural repugnance to good cancels his obligation to it, and the strength of his disposition to evil destroys the guilt of his evil.

3d. There is a further difference in respect to what Arminianism calls a gracious ability. This ability consists in some redemptive provision or appliance, and *constitutes* man a responsible agent. He was organically free before, but not responsible. The New England theology allows no need of any such ability for such a purpose. Man needs not grace to become what he already is by nature—as free to choose good as evil if he pleases, and hence blameworthy for the evil which pleases him, and bound to the good which does not please him. A child, by the old view, needs only growth to make him guilty of actual sin. But by this he needs growth and grace too.

Just how much, and what, is meant by this gracious ability is not perfectly clear to us. Does it include only an objective provision of salvation? It seems not. For this does not remove the inability of will, the disinclination to salvation. It gives, it is true, another object of choice, an external motive, but no power of a choice to the contrary, and hence no responsibility.

It may be, then, that this gracious ability is *subjective*, and identical with what is called the power of contrary choice — a disposition to good, conjoined by grace with a disposition to evil, placing the will *in equilibrio*, between two opposite forces. This counter disposition removes the inability, and, on the theory, creates the obligation to good by imparting an *inclination* to it. Without this disposition, this gracious ability, or power to the contrary, man is, properly, neither sinful nor holy; nor is he capable of becoming either one or the other. He chooses evil spontaneously, and has no disposition to the contrary, hence no power to the contrary, and hence no blameworthiness for not choosing the contrary.

By the Calvinian philosophy, redemption presupposes a really sinful subject needing to be redeemed. By the Arminian, a proper sin in the subject presupposes the antecedent provision of redemption. The one *starts* with the idea of sin, in a reference to the divine law and to man's powers of moral agency, and proceeds from it to the grace that provides salvation. The other, denying responsibility to the power of choice, and also sin to all volitions of the fallen in a non-redemptive dispensation, starts with grace as a factor, and responsible sin as the product. According to the one we are saved by grace. According to the other, we first become really sinners by grace, and then may be saved by it.

REGENERATION.

There are a few points in relation to this doctrine, which are generally accepted as settled by this school:

1st. Regeneration (*παλιγγενεσία*) is the act of God. He is the sole agent in it. The immediate effect of this act is a new and holy principle of action in man, leading to repentance, or conversion, as the first holy act of the regenerate.

2d. It is *instantaneous*, that is, there is no point of time at which the subject is neither regenerate nor unregenerate, in which the new life is neither commenced nor uncommenced. Sanctification is the continuance and completion of what is begun in regeneration. This is progressive, and by the use of means.

3d. The subject of regeneration is passive, but only in respect to the act by which he is regenerated, on the principle that a child cannot co-operate in his own generation—cannot act before he exists. Beyond this, the school affirms no passivity. There is no creation of new faculties, nor change in the substance of the old. There is no suspension of rational, responsible activity, no infringement of freedom, no sudden shock; but the silent in-breathing of a new and governing moral life. “The grace of regeneration,” says the Synod of Dort, “does not act upon men like stocks and trees, nor take away the properties of the soul, nor violently compel it while unwilling, but it spiritually quickens, heals, corrects, and sweetly, and at the same time powerfully, inclines it. “The will is drawn,” as Char- nock felicitously expresses it, “as if it would not come, and then it comes as if it were not drawn.”

4th. The divine agency in regeneration is *invincible*. Some have been accustomed to speak of it as irresistible. It is not, however, implied, that the sinner opposes no resistance, for it is plain that he does. This resistance makes the conflict. But in regeneration, God, the stronger will, prevails; man, the weaker, submits, and the contest ends. The divine free-will so magnetically touches the human free-will, renewing and effectually persuading it, that it *loves* to yield. But this only shows the sovereign invincibility and conquering power of God’s will over man’s, where they come into the fullest opposition.

“Irresistible grace” does not accurately express the idea, for grace is resistible and is resisted, and by some, to its final rejection. Unless carefully defined, the phrase may be perplexing. Nor does invincibility express all the truth. It conveys only the idea that God’s will cannot be conquered by man’s, but not the further and peculiar truth of his sovereign power to subjugate to his will the free-will of his subject-creatures.

5th. The principle of holiness introduced in regeneration looks directly to infinite excellence — as the ultimate end of all holy action. It does not exclude a regard to happiness, but excludes it as the *ultimate* end. It does not, either, require one to be willing to be *lost*, in order to be saved. It seeks holiness, the *moral* good, as the ultimate and chief end, and happiness, the merely natural good, as subordinate.

6th. Infants are capable of regeneration, and need it for a positive sinfulness, though not for actual sin. Upon all these leading features of the subject, the Hopkinsians and the Old school are, we believe, in essential harmony.

Upon the following positions, the Old school is broadly distinguished from the New :

1st. That regeneration, in the theological sense, is the *act of man*, “a simple act,” “the sinner’s act,” “the ultimate act,” an “intelligent, free, voluntary, mental act.” In the popular use of the term, it is “a complete act.” This definition grows out of the philosophy of the school respecting the autocracy of the will. Man makes himself morally depraved when he is old enough, by an act of the will, and he reverses his state by a counter act. It is allowed, indeed, that God *produces* this act of the will, but not that God’s act is the regenerating one, or that anything is, except the act of the regenerated. The Old school emphasizes the distinction between regeneration and conversion, which the New confounds. The one is purely God’s act, the other, as purely man’s. God does not repent for man. Nor does he create the turning act in man, but the new life-*motive* which prompts it. By a law of secondary causation, man is the dependent

author of his own act in conversion, for he wills it from the holy principle, antecedently implanted in regeneration. But God is the independent, absolute author of his own act in regeneration. Thus the two definitions are not only different, but antagonistic. They mutually exclude, each what the other makes the sole agent. Yet it should be said, that the new philosophy recognizes fully the divine power in connection with regeneration, direct as well as indirect. But it is not the regenerating power.

2d. The ultimate end of this human act which constitutes regeneration, is *self-love*, or the desire of happiness. This is its "primary reason and cause." Right, and its synonyms, virtue and holiness, have no value either to God or man, except as *means* to happiness. Wrong, or vice, is evil only as a means of misery, and would be as good as virtue if it produced as much happiness. Virtue and vice are good and evil ministerially, or *relatively*. Nothing is good but happiness, and the means of it, and nothing evil but unhappiness and the means of it. Hence, nothing is absolutely good but happiness, nor absolutely evil but misery. Benevolence and selfishness respect simply the mode, or means, by which the desire of happiness, as the ultimate end of all moral action, is gratified. A benevolent act is worth to other beings just the value of its fitness to produce their highest happiness; and this act and this happiness of other beings are worth to the agent just the value of their use in promoting his highest happiness.

3d. Regeneration is *mediated*, as well as prompted, by self-love. The suspension of the selfish principle is supposed to take place *before* regeneration. The acts which precede this suspension, are sinful, and not means of regeneration. Those which follow it, and precede the regenerative act, are dictated by self-love, and are morally pure, and a means of regeneration. This feature grows out of the central idea of regeneration as man's act, and as prompted by self-love, and harmonizes with it. By the old doctrine, the selfish principle continues to operate and to rule till it is

displaced by the benevolent principle, and the first holy act is prompted by this holy principle, and not by a constitutional desire of happiness. There is no logical or chronological interval which admits of any such sinless self-love and irresponsible agency.

4th. That the act of regeneration is impossible to infants; "as impossible as that of calculating an eclipse." This view harmonizes with the non-moral being of infants. Thus, according to this definition and doctrine of regeneration, man is its author and happiness its final end. It begins, continues, and ends in self-love. By the Old doctrine, it begins and centres in God. The common view includes the human family, each in the first moment of his being, as capable of this change, and as needing it. And it is the general belief that those who die before actual sin do become the subjects of it. This, we admit, was not Calvin's view. But it is a point to which his principles of interpretation and theology led the way.

ATONEMENT AND JUSTIFICATION.

The Old theology finds the primary *cause* of the redemptive work in love. God was not moved to be merciful by the atonement, but the atonement is his marvellous device in behalf of the miserable and guilty. This is the view of the Augustinian and Calvinistic school, though exactly the opposite is often ascribed to it. Augustine says: "We must not think of the reconciliation of man as if God required blood in order to forgive, but that his love was the very cause of his sending his Son into the world." Calvin says, love "holds the first place as the supreme and original cause" of atonement and justification. While the love of God is thus clearly the ground of redemption, the *necessity* for providing it by the atonement is found in his justice. Both the ground and the necessity are in the ethical nature of God.

The atonement is taken, primarily, as a *provision*. It consists, essentially, in the life and death of Christ,—a

perfect conformity to the law, and the endurance of its penalty. "There is the very same need," says Edwards, "of Christ's obeying the law in our stead in order to the reward, as of his suffering the penalty of the law in our stead in order to our escaping the penalty." Justification is not, therefore, simply an act of sovereignty, but the result of a judicial process, which combines the exercise of love and justice, and satisfies perfectly the demands of both. The Holy One, from a dictate of love and justice, came and stood in the law-place of man, a servant and a sufferer. These two elements of the atonement, substitutionary obedience and suffering, constitute vicariousness — its distinguishing peculiarity — and furnish the ground of the two correspondent parts of justification, acquittal and acceptance. In each the virtue of his two natures was blended; and in each the Son of God was equally voluntary. The obligation to obey the law was not such as rests on all mere men, but assumed and gratuitous. Nevertheless, his obedience was a real substitution, and his death a real penalty; not the very *same* due to the guilty, but a substitute. A thing cannot be the same with that for which it is a substitute. But it should be an equivalent, and answer the same end, or a better one. Christ could not suffer the remorse and eternal pain due to the guilty. But he did suffer what, as a substitute, satisfied the justice of God, or a just God, as well, and honored equally the divine law. The Old theology, therefore, speaks freely of Christ, in the style of the sacred writers, as "suffering the penalty of the law," as "paying our debts." But it never implies that he was a sinner, suffering demerits, but always that he was spotless and divine, even while "being made a curse for us." "Our guilt and punishment," says Calvin, "being *as it were* transferred to him." Edwards says: "he suffered *as though guilty*." Hopkins calls Christ's sufferings "a complete equivalent for the penalty." Dr. Woods says, Christ suffered the penalty "virtually," that which had "a like value in God's moral government." It was "as though the curse of the law had been endured literally."

Incidental to the atonement, in the active obedience of Christ, are a perfect example and provision for divine sympathy. Possessing a veritable human soul in union with the divine soul, he laid his whole moral being open to the assaults of temptation, from circumference to centre, but without one leaning towards assent. Had there been, at any point in his history, a yielding instead of a resistance, a single taint or stain of evil, hereditary or actual, he would not have been either a perfect model, or have made atonement. He who needs salvation cannot be a saviour.

As a *provision*, the atonement is commensurate with the moral necessities of the race. The recovery provided by the Second Adam is generally believed, by the school, to be co-extensive with the ruin caused by the first. In this respect it makes a distinction between the atonement and redemption,—its sufficiency and its efficiency. It is sufficient for all. It is, or may be, offered to all; but it will not be made effectual in all. Calvin, in his commentary on the passage: "God so loved the world" (John iii. 26), is explicit as to the extent of the atonement. "Tametsi enim in mundo nihil reperietur Dei favore dignum, se tamen toti mundo propitium ostendit quum sine exceptione omnes ad fidem Christi vocat, quae nihil aliud est quam ingressus in vitam." Also on the text: "This is my blood which is shed for many for the remission of sins (Matt. xxvi. 28), he says: "Caeterum sub multorum nomine, non partem mundi tantum designat, sed totum humanum genus." The language of President Edwards is to the same effect, that "Christ, in some sense, may be said to die for all, and to redeem all visible Christians, yea, and the whole world, by his death." The limitation relates, not to the atonement (as a provision), but to its application. And this is what Edwards means by "something *particular* in the design of his death, with respect to such as he intended should be actually saved thereby."

If this is all the Old school Presbyterians intend by limited atonement,—that one general design was to pro-

vide salvation for all, rendering it objectively possible to all; and another, more specific, to secure the actual salvation of his people; the difference between them and the Old school of New England theologians is only nominal. With some of them, doubtless, this is all the difference. With others, the atonement is commensurate only with its application. It was provided for the elect, and had no relation, as a provision, to any others. In this view, the difference between the two systems is radical and important.

The atonement is made available, in justification, by *faith*. This faith is called justifying or saving, because it is an act by which the sinner receives Christ, and relies on him alone for pardon and eternal life. It is so far a condition of salvation, that no one can be saved without it. It is a positive Christian virtue, but has no quality that can claim pardon and life as a right or recompense. It receives these altogether on the ground of Christ's obedience and death.

This is what our catechism calls "the righteousness of Christ imputed to us, and received by faith alone." It is not by an infusion of righteousness, but by a remission of the penalty. It is not a transfer of his personal acts to believers as theirs, but a reckoning of them to their account; so that they have acquittal from the charge of guilt, and acceptance with God as innocent. "Christ's perfect obedience," says Edwards, "shall be reckoned to our account; so that we shall have the benefit of it, as though we had performed it ourselves." According to Calvin, justification denotes "the legal state of one acquitted of crime by the favor of the judge, as though his innocence had been proved." There is a *covenant* union between Christ and the believer, and a oneness from sympathy; but no oneness of substance or personality.

When it is said that justification is by "faith *alone*," without the deeds of the law, the idea is simply that obedience to the law is not the *ground* of justification. It is by faith alone, because this is the *receptive* principle of the

soul. It is that by which the atonement passes from a mere historical fact, into the human consciousness, as a principle of life and peace. It receives Christ, not only as a sacrifice, but as the great High Priest; not a passive redemption, but a living Redeemer. Such a faith is never alone, but always holds Christ, and is accompanied by love and good works. It is "as impossible to separate good works from faith, as heat and light from fire." "It cannot be idle." "It must bring forth good works." So teach our old Protestant symbols. Luther says: "We must certainly hold that where there is no faith there can be no good works; and on the other hand, there is no faith where there are no good works." "The whole life of a Christian man consisteth, inwardly, in faith towards God; and, outwardly, in charity and good works towards our neighbor." Calvin writes: "True faith and repentance, though they may be distinguished, cannot be separated." Edwards: "True love is an ingredient in true and living faith, and is what is most distinguishing in it." So manifest is the misrepresentation that the old theology, excludes charity from a justifying faith.

In the Arminian system, the atonement holds the place of a "compensation," a recompense for losses sustained by sin. Man is not obliged to obey the law, or to repent of sin, until its provisions meet him. "If he had not come, they would not have known responsible sin," but would have been only "imputative," "irresponsible sinners."

Here Calvinism and Arminianism part. But not so widely as some imagine. It is indeed "a disgrace to Christian theology, and a dishonor to the human intellect," to teach, "that it is divinely just to create one being bad, or a race bad, and then damn them for being bad." But who has endorsed this dark caricature of the divine government? Certainly not "the Old school," which is charged with it. It ignores and abjures it as cordially as do our Methodist brethren. Its distinguishing doctrine of creation is, that God created all things "good," and man "very good;" that

he never created any being or race, bad, morally or physically; that he condemns men only for the evil which they were free in producing, and are free in perpetuating. God simply does not *annul* the constitutional law of continuity in the race, that each should bring forth "after his kind." When it had fallen, *he did not annihilate it*. But this is very far from *creating it bad*. Nor was the alternative, as a matter of justice, the extinction of the race, or provision for its recovery. For what could justice demand the atoning provisions as "a compensation" to man? For not being *annihilated*? God was under no obligation to destroy his last and best work because it had perverted itself. This might have been just, but it was not implied in the threatened penalty. Nor could the atonement be due to the race, or to any part of it, as a compensation for their *sin*. Service is the correlate of compensation. Sin is the moral opposite of this, and its correlate is penalty, and not pay. The Old theology admits sinful man's need of gracious ability — an atonement, and a disposition to accept it. This he needs as soon as he is born. But it denies that he is, for any reason or in any sense, entitled to it. It insists that man could not be saved without both the objective provision and the subjective renewal; but it also insists that neither of these possesses the slightest ingredient of "compensation," or the least power to constitute free-agency or obligation to repentance and a holy life.

Perhaps this chief difference between the Calvinistic and Arminian theories is occasioned by a different view of justice. The latter confounds it with benevolence. The former makes a broad distinction between them. Arminianism places a gracious ability to the account of justice, as a debt. Calvinism puts it entirely to the account of benevolence, as a donation, and on a principle of mediatorial interposition, that answers all the ends of justice as well as they could have been answered by the exact penalty, and those of love far better.

Dr. Hopkins was in essential agreement upon this subject

with the old theology. But his speculative habit led him to start some trains of thought, which others have carried out into distinct dogmas. In his sharp definition, he restricts the atonement to a provision for *pardon*, and confines it to the death of Christ, as the penalty of the law. In logical consistency, he was obliged to limit justification to *forgiveness*. But he allows that pardon is "only one part of justification," and that it leaves men "without any title to eternal life" or capacity to enjoy positive happiness. "It was, therefore, necessary that Christ should obey the precepts of the law for man, and in his stead."

Another of his speculative notions is, that those who have once sinned, though pardoned, remain as criminal as ever, and can never cease to deserve eternal destruction. This was little else, we think, than the astute metaphysician's emphatic way of saying that forgiveness is undeserved, and that it can never be true of one who has sinned, that he has not sinned and deserved punishment. In this it is not discrepant with the Old theology.

Still another peculiarity is, that the *full* penalty of sin, if it could be endured by the sinner, would alter his moral character, so that he would stand right in law, and on the principle of equation, have no need of a pardon. These speculations of Dr. Hopkins were held in check by his deep piety, and the strong evangelical character of his general teachings. But they led the way to more important deviations from the Old theology by the New.

Among these are the following :

1st. The atonement satisfied the *general* justice of God, but not his particular or distributive justice.

2d. It satisfied the honor of God as lawgiver and ruler, but did not answer the penal demands of the *law itself* upon the offender.

3d. The active obedience of Christ was not performed as a substitution, nor imputed to believers as satisfying the claims of the law upon them for a perfect obedience.

4th. Nothing can be imputed but one's own personal

attribute or act. All imputation, both of sin and righteousness, in any other sense, is impossible.

5th. Christ did not either obey the law for believers, or suffer its penalty. The penalty for transgression, in respect to the forgiven, is not, in any sense, executed. Neither the law nor the lawgiver can be satisfied with any substitute or equivalent for obedience in the subject.

6th. The atonement is not an equivalent for the objects of the law which is violated, though it is sufficient to maintain the right of the lawgiver. It does not accomplish these objects, and nothing can do it. The kingdom and blessedness of God suffer a loss by sin, for which there can be no adequate redress or remedy. The final objects of his government, including his own highest blessedness, he is obliged, hopelessly and forever, to abandon.

By the Old theology, the work of Christ, as the second Adam, is an adequate redress for the evils introduced by the first. The objects of the lawgiver will be more fully accomplished through the law and gospel, than any mere process of law would secure. The government of God as a Redeemer, is not a lapse from his original and ultimate end as a lawgiver to a restricted good, by a loss to the kingdom and his infinite blessedness; not a defeat, but a majestic advance, a more full, though mysterious, unfoldment of his eternal, unbroken plan, in a far greater general good than any mere law administration would have secured.

DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY.

The terms Creator, Lord, and Redeemer imply not only government, but *sovereignty*. God, as the author of the realm of matter and of mind, is its sovereign. Infinite rectitude is the distinguishing property of his being. The ground of all moral distinctions is in the completeness of his moral nature, which is the standard of goodness and of all right government. There can be no foundation or source of these outside of God, either above or below him. His will is the exponent of these distinctions, and a perfect rule

of right and duty to his creatures. The chief end of creation is the manifested excellence and glory of the Creator, and the highest good of the intelligent universe. This end was prompted by the infinite benevolence of the sovereign, planned by his wisdom, and achieved by his power. These are taken as the elements of divine sovereignty, benevolence, wisdom, and power. And as these are infinite, they exclude the possibility of mistake or failure. They also bar out everything arbitrary, in the sense of reasonless or tyrannical, and constitute the most desirable moral ruler.

The school makes a distinction between God's knowledge and foreknowledge. The one relates to principles and the possibility of things, without necessary reference to succession or actuality. The other relates to facts or events, and takes in the element of time. It is *before* the event, but *after* the divine purpose which makes it certain. There is also a difference between foreknowledge and *decree*. The decree comes, in the order of nature, after the knowledge which is its preparation, or the material on which it acts, and precedes the foreknowledge which is its logical consequence.

This relation of God's knowledge and foreknowledge to his purpose is important to a just conception of his sovereignty. God could not foreknow an event which was dependent on his positive or permissive will until he had *purposed* to accomplish or permit it. He knew the possibility of a created universe, in the order of nature, before he decreed its existence, or before he foreknew that existence as certain.

Divine fore-ordination respects, primarily, God's acts, but is inclusive of his permission and disposal to his ends of the acts of his creatures. This is the import of the Catechism, where it says God "hath fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass." Fore-ordination in respect to God's works of creation, providence, and redemption, fixes them *causatively*, and makes him the immediate author. In respect to

man's *holy* acts, as repentance and faith, it involves a mediate causation, as these follow freely from the holy disposition implanted by God's act of regeneration. But, the fore-ordination of man's *evil* acts, as Adam's first sin, or the betrayal of Judas, conveys no proper idea of divine causation or authorship. The ordination here was non-preventive and negative, though the purpose not to prevent was positive. Man was the author of his own evil deed. His agency not only excluded, but even perverted, the divine agency. God fore-ordained man to be holy, and created him such; but he turned from that ordination, and made himself sinful. He created the garden, and placed Adam in it to keep it. He set aside a certain tree, under a prohibition, to develop and strengthen his virtue by trial. He endowed him with noble powers of knowledge, and aspirations after improvement. These are all God's causative fore-ordinations. They stand close to man's sin; they are the very conditions without which the sin could not have occurred. God, further, fore-ordained what disposal he would make of the sin. But in causative agency, these fore-ordinations of God are entirely distinct from the sin of man, and ethically opposite. Sin, in every instance, is in its nature counter to all the decrees of God, except his purpose not to prevent it, and to dispose of it in furtherance of the ultimate ends of his wise and perfect administration.

There is a sense in which God's acts and man's are *contingent*. They are acts of choice; and all man's agency is a dependent agency. The framers of our Confession employ the term in this sense, when they speak of the "liberty, or contingency of secondary causes," as not being taken away, but rather established, by God's "ordaining whatsoever comes to pass." But it is a principle of the Old school, that no event under the government of God, free or unfree, is contingent as being uncertain or unordained. All conceivable events are divisible into three classes: the *impossible*, the *possible*, and the *certain*. The first cannot be regarded as contingent, for they will not occur. The third class is

excluded from contingency, for they either *have* taken place, or certainly will. The other class, the possible events, is made up of those which may and *will* take place, and of those which might, but will *not*. The former are not contingent, because they certainly *will* happen. The latter are not, for it is equally certain they will not happen. Thus contingency, in the sense of uncertainty, according to the Old doctrine, is excluded. All things are certain, either to be, or not to be. There is nothing between. They cannot be both certain and uncertain, for this is a contradiction.

Further, God's foreknowledge extends to everything that is to occur. But foreknowledge implies antecedent certainty as its ground. God cannot foreknow an event as *doubtful*, for this would necessitate ignorance and doubt in him. And when it should be decided, he would pass from doubt to certainty, and to an increase of knowledge. But God cannot be in doubt respecting anything, — no more in respect to free acts than physical operations. This is one point of difference between the Old theology and Arminianism. The latter affirms contingency respecting the acts of free agents, and the former denies it.

Another point of difference relates to the *ground* of moral certainty. Arminianism places this in foreknowledge. God's foreknowledge precedes his predeterminations, as all "cause must precede its effect." "God, as foreknowing, must be viewed as preceding God as predetermining."

The Old order is just the reverse: God, as predetermining, precedes God as foreknowing, and for the same reason, i. e. that the cause precedes the effect. God did not first foreknow that he should create man, and then, as the effect of this foreknowledge, determine that he would do it. He decided to do it, and then foreknew it as certain to be done. So of all things that depend on his positive or permissive will. This seems a fixed law of the human, perhaps we may say also of the divine, mind. Every skilful architect first decides what he wishes to do, and then does it. God is the only

perfect architect. In the order of nature, he was first acquainted with all possibilities and materials, with all means and ends. Then he predetermined what it was best to do, and, in due time, did it.

The standing objection to this view of divine sovereignty is, that it destroys free-agency. To this the system has its answers:

1st. Fore-ordination, in respect to man's *holy* acts, is causation only in that mediate sense which perfectly harmonizes with his freedom. And in respect to his *evil* acts, it is not causation, but simple permission and disposal.

2d. Fore-ordination is accomplished *by means* of the free-agency of man. The first sin of the first man, which God had predetermined to permit, was as absolutely free as were any of his antecedent acts of holiness, in which God was equally predetermined to preserve him for a time. He had all the power for a different choice that he had while he did choose differently, except a disposition.

3d. The freedom of moral agents is one of the things most especially *fixed* by God's predetermination. Surely that which secures moral freedom cannot destroy it.

5th. The certainty which foreknowledge implies is open to this objection as really as is fore-ordination. It limits moral agents to "some one way, and no other, in which all free volitions will be put forth," that is, it makes them *certain*. Fore-ordination does no more. "Foreknowledge does not cause the free act to be unfree," nor "prove" it to be so. Neither does fore-ordination. So far as there is causation at all, it only makes man's free acts more free, by bringing them under the "perfect law of liberty." There is a kind of necessity, a moral *must be*, in what God foreknows will take place, as also in his fore-ordination; but no infringement of freedom in either. For, if it is not perfectly certain to be, his foreknowledge would not be "sure of verification," and he might be "deceived."

THEODICY.

A moral system may be defined as the government of a moral being over moral beings. Among the theodicic principles of the Old theology, the following, we believe, are generally accepted :

1st. All possible systems were open to the divine mind, and optional to him,—those in which holiness and happiness are universal; those in which sin and misery are universal; and those in which they mingle. Of these, God chose the last.

2d. This choice was prompted by infinite love, which would be satisfied with no other system than the best. It was planned by infinite wisdom, and executed by absolute, creative, and governmental power.

3d. Sin, which comes by man's free act, and against God's prohibitory law, yet exists by his voluntary non-prevention.

4th. This permission of moral evil, combining the joint action of love and wisdom, was chosen rather than the prevention of it, as resulting in a higher good to the universe, and hence in greater glory to the Supreme Ruler.

5th. Sin is no less sinful on account of its being made the occasion of a greater good. It is evil, and only evil, in its entire nature and all its tendencies. It is not chosen as, in itself, "better than holiness in its place," for it is nowhere better, but always bad *per se*. Hence God's treatment of it by prohibition and penalty is a stigma according to its nature, and a means of securing the good of its permission. Pardon by a vicarious atonement, making the stigma still more emphatic, is another means to the same end. The overruling of sin, against its nature, as an occasion of good, no more alters that nature than its permission sanctions it. It is not, properly, a means of good, although God's permission and overruling of it are good.

Some of the Hopkinsians, putting the occasion for the means, have spoken of it as a "necessary means of the

greatest good." Dr. Stephen West presents it in this light. So do Drs. Emmons and Hopkins. The language of the last of these acute divines, is very strong: "No evil has taken place in the universe," he says, "nor ever will, which is not the occasion of an overbalancing good, so that, on the whole, there is more good than if there had been no evil; and in this sense all evil is turned into good, that is, it is on the whole, all things considered, not evil but good." Drs. Burton and Strong adopted a similar phraseology. But it was only a hyper-Calvinistic way of stating the simple truth, that sin is the occasion of, or is over-ruled for, more good than would have followed its prevention. Edwards and Bellamy did not employ the language. Nor did Dr. Woods or Dr. Tyler, though they held fast to the Old doctrine, that God's permission was good, and that sin was made the occasion of a greater good than would have followed its absence. We believe the phraseology is not now approved by any who may be classed as Hopkinsians, although the doctrine is held by the New Calvinists and the Old.

6th. God is possessed of adequate power to have prevented sin, if he had chosen to do so. The idea of permission implies the power of prevention. It would be preposterous to speak of God's permitting what he was not able to prevent. And we hold it to be equally peculiar to speak of God's permitting sin in a moral system, if he had no other way of preventing it, than by *preventing the moral system*; as the watch-maker can prevent friction in the wear of a watch only by not making the watch. We concede, also, that if sin were, in its nature and tendency, "a necessary means of good," there would be an equal impropriety in saying that God permitted it. It would, in that case, hold its place in the system by appointment, and not by mere sufferance and subjugation.

7th. The ultimate end of God, as a moral governor, is the manifestation of his infinite excellence and glory in the production of the highest good of the moral universe. By

the mingling of good and evil in the system chosen by God, this end is more perfectly secured than it would otherwise be. It brings out the gospel, as well as law, side of the divine nature,—a more complete development, so to speak, of God and man. Had there been no sin, there could have been no Saviour. If there had been no misery, there would have been no mercy; no experience of evil, no capability of that ineffable participation with the God-man in good, which flows from his incarnate love, and in which the redeemed are eternally confirmed. To bring good out of good, is only the law that “like produces like.” But to make *evil* produce good—so to treat all the sin in the world, through the incarnation of God, by mingled law and gospel, love and justice, that the result shall be a vastly greater sum total of good than if sin had not entered it—is an achievement possible only to infinite administrative skill. It is equally honorable to the goodness, wisdom, and power of God, and brings them all into exercise and the fullest exhibition.

Thus the conflict between good and evil is not a drawn battle, in which the combatants gain only partial victories and sustain about equal losses. Christ is more than a match for Satan. The seed of the woman will bruise the serpent's head. God is perfect master of the field, and of all the forces, and is directing the evil and the good, more and more, to the highest weal of the universe.

With these leading theodicy principles of the Old school, in New England theology, the Presbyterian, Hopkinsian, and Methodist teaching is in substantial agreement. The theodicy of the New school departs from them, somewhat essentially, in the following particulars:

1st. The chief and ultimate end of God in the government of the universe, is *happiness*, and the means to it is holiness.

2d. This chief end of moral government, by the best means, is not secured in the present system.

3d. The system which would have produced the most

perfect results, — a system without moral evil, — was not optional with God. It is conceivable, and cannot be assumed as an “impossibility.” Yet it was impossible to God. .

4th. Every system possible to God was conditioned on the necessity of sin. The evils that are in the world “arise from the *nature* of a moral universe itself.” A moral system “necessarily, in the nature of things, involves moral evil.” “In respect to divine prevention, it is incidental to a moral system,” which is “not only better than no system, but the best possible to God.”

5th. Hence, in deciding on a plan of government, the alternative was, a system with sin, or *no moral universe*. In reducing an unavoidable evil to the least possible limits, God shows that “he prefers, not the existence of sin to its non-existence, but simply its existence to the non-existence of a moral kingdom”; he shows “a purpose to permit its existence rather than to have no moral kingdom.” No reason can be given why God does not prevent all sin under a moral government, “except that he cannot without destroying moral agency.”

6th. The impossibility to God of securing the best end of moral government by the best means, is *absolute*. God “introduced redemption into a universe from which sin could not by any providence be excluded.” It is as impossible as to have a watch without friction in the wheels, or a clock without expansibility in the rod. The impossibility is as absolute as “to make a part equal to the whole”; as “that two and two should be five” or “the diameter of a circle be equal to its circumference.”

7th. God cannot prevent any more sin than he *does* prevent, nor secure any more holiness than he does secure. “Whatever a benevolent God does in any given instance, must be, not only better than to do nothing, but the best thing which he can do in that instance,” — “all the good possible to him.”

The root of these differences between the Old theology

and the New, lies in the essentially different view of the nature of a moral system. By the philosophy of the New, sin is essential to free-agency,—to the nature of a moral system. By the Old, it is only the *possibility* of sin that is thus necessary. Hence the alternative is not with the Old, as with the New — sin, or no moral universe; but the *capability* of sin, or no moral universe. The possibility, however, neither necessitates, nor makes certain, its actual existence. Beings who can sin if they will, are equally able to refuse to sin; and they may so refuse, and remain holy, in defiance of all possible influences to prevent.

The theory of a divine inability to prevent sin, was at first presented in the New school as “a possible alternative,” an “hypothesis,” which might solve the problem of evil more satisfactorily than the Old one did. But it soon fell into the dogmatics of the school, and was categorically affirmed; the old being denied as incapable of proof,—as false, dishonorable to God, and tending to infidelity. It was held as the only rational ground for the exercise of humiliation and repentance in man, and for defending the sincerity and benevolence of God. “Either he can prevent sin in the case, or he cannot. If he cannot, then he may be sincere in the prohibition of it in his law. But if he can, and does not, he cannot be sincere in its prohibition in any case in which sin takes place. Disobedience in the subject is decisive of insincerity in the lawgiver.”

This is explicit, and, with unmistakable clearness, defines the difference between the schools. It shows that the hypothetical divergence has become a radical antagonism. On the Old doctrine, by this theory, God is neither benevolent, nor sincere in prohibiting any sins which he does not prevent; that is, in prohibiting any sin which exists. And he is malevolent for punishing it. According to the New, God does the best he can in every instance, and therefore is sincere and benevolent. But he cannot do as well as he would. His governmental power falls short of his benevolence, by the sum-total of the sin and suffering which are

in the world, but which it was an absolute impossibility for him to prevent, if he created moral beings, and which he cannot even attempt to diminish without danger of increasing it.

The New theology claims to be an improvement upon the Old, and the Old to find its substantive doctrines in the Old and New Testaments, which cannot be improved. It counts no human creeds or compendiums perfect, and uses them only as helps. Welcoming all forms of expression that convey essential gospel truth, and finding the fundamental Christian doctrine in all the evangelical denominations, it holds fast to the catholic counsel of the elders at Saybrook: "to account nothing ancient that will not stand by this rule — the Old and New Testaments, — and nothing new that will."

ARTICLE VI.

THE CHURCH AND CHURCHES.

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THERE are few sentences which furnish a more fruitful theme of meditation than that which fell from the lips of Paul on Mars Hill: "in Him we live, and move, and have our being"; "We are His offspring." But more wonderful are those words of our Lord: "He dwelleth with you, and shall be in you." "That they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us."

What, to the ancients, was an uncertain theory, to us is a reality: "Now are we the sons of God." Despite the broken ties, there is yet a family of God on earth, made up of those within whom he dwells, and who have begun to be