

junction is the same, so that no man can for a moment doubt the precise law in Exodus, which is referred to by Paul in writing to Timothy. He could not therefore, in referring to it, have wholly distorted its meaning, its application. He could not have made so great a mistake as that of levelling against the very foundations of slavery and the slave trade, a law published originally and intended of God for the protection of slave property. He could not have interpreted in behalf of the rights of men against slave-holders, a law intended to secure the rights of slave-holders against men.

[To be continued.]

ARTICLE II.

PERPETUAL SIN AND OMNIPOTENT GOODNESS.¹

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How can perpetual sin consist with omnipotent goodness? The apparently inherent contradiction of the two terms of this question, is the Conflict of Ages; the attained harmonious unity of the two will be the Problem Solved.

Merely as a speculation, there is here opened a wide field for profound thinking and ingenious theorizing, which might have secured for itself an unfailling intellectual interest. But the interest in this question has been much more quickened and perpetuated, because it involves considerations which take hold on the most controlling susceptibilities of the hu-

¹ The Conflict of Ages: or, The Great Debate on the Moral Relations of God and Men. By Edward Beecher, D. D. Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1853.

The Problem Solved, or Sin not of God. By Miles P. Squier, D. D., Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy, Beloit College. New York: Published by M. W. Dodd, Corner of Spruce Street and City Hall Square.

man mind, and deal with its deepest convictions and profoundest emotions. If we admit the being of God, we must recognize our subjection to him and our dependence upon him. How perplexing, then, if his very creation and providence intimate that he is destitute of benevolence, or wanting in equity! Or, should we admit the integrity of the Divine character, how perplexing still, if he seem to us to be so bound in the necessities of nature, that he cannot preclude nor control sin and suffering! What distress, if forced to the conclusion that our Sovereign has no power to shut the object of his deepest abhorrence from his realm; or that, having the power, he yet has not the heart to deliver his creatures from their deadliest enemy! Must the fact of sin logically force us to atheism, by directly concluding against either omnipotence or benevolence? Or, if we retain our faith in God, must we be logically shut up to accept the doctrine of universal restoration, against the plain testimony of Scripture? If we reluctate all such conclusions, must we then be obliged eternally to witness sin and misery, and be able to find no principle by which we can defend the honor of God's sovereignty, or the goodness of his government, in the permission of sin, to our own satisfaction or the conviction of others?

We shall not silence such perplexed and anxious inquiries by saying, "Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight;" for the very inquiry involves the determination whether there be for us a "Father," and that what seems "good in his sight," is at all worthy of him and kind to his children. Nor can we meet the captious and cavilling objections which here originate, by saying, "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?" Such a reply assumes the admission of a wise and holy God; but the rebuke can have no force against that mind which takes the very existence of sin and misery as an argument against the existence of any sovereignty which is wise and righteous. Neither a desponding nor a cavilling scepticism can be effectually met by any dogmatic reply; for the sources of the doubts are quite back beyond the reach of the dogma vainly

applied to exclude them. We may even say that it is all a mystery, and that we must leave the whole for the light of eternity to explain; but the infidel can then as boldly say: "that coming light will vindicate the witness of sin and misery against the superstition of an assumed existing Deity," as the believer can say: "that his assumed Deity will then vindicate his perfections and clear his character, against all the false inferences that have been derived from the facts of sin and misery."

The pantheist may argue, that a connected justice always follows and metes out the deserved retributions for all the actions of men, and thus all the iniquities of humanity are fully equalized and adjusted by the penalties which come judicially up from the ongoings of nature. The Hegelian pancosmist may say, that sin is the necessary result in the developments of the great world-spirit, and has its uses as really as the thorn on the rose, or the viper-fang and its secreted venom. A fatalist may reason that in the very conception of opposites, one is conditional for the other; and that there can be no even without the odd, no light without darkness, no pleasure without pain, and no virtue without vice, and thus if there be a world with holiness, so also must there be its contrast in sin. And finally, a physical deteriorationist may affirm, that all finite things tend to decay; matter tends back to nihility, and all virtue tends to degeneracy; and if God would have a created material world, he must perpetually renew the creative energy; and if he would have a finite moral system, he must repeatedly infuse new virtue into it, and, at the best, the finite will have evil. But if we keep our faith in the being of a free personal Jehovah, the great conflict of ages on this point cannot be settled, nor the grand problem be solved, till we have found some way of carrying a clear principle through all the facts, and fairly reconciling the creature's sin and suffering and the Creator's power and goodness with each other. This is no easy task, but from the vital importance of the solution, we may safely infer that it cannot be a hopeless undertaking.

In the "Conflict of Ages," Dr. Beecher includes not only the fact of an original entrance of sin, but more especially the perpetuation of it through successive generations of men depraved in infancy. The origin of sin, indeed, is soon passed over as having in itself no great difficulty, and the whole difficulty is made to rest, and the whole attention turned upon the discordance of the divine perfections with the existence of infant depravity. The eye is perpetually fixed upon the opening of human life, and, as in all cases this opening of life is in helplessness and ignorance, and under constant and strong bias and influences to transgression, and with a certain issue in sin of every completed trial, the inquiry becomes most urgent, and is followed up most seriously and anxiously. How can such depravity be consistent with honor and right on the part of God?

An extended and very able and thorough examination is made of the many forms in which the doctrines of original sin and infant depravity have been presented by various theological authors. This is, moreover, accompanied by a very acute analysis of the different philosophical theories, and their modified phases, by which it has been sought to account for, and explain the facts of, human depravity consistently with divine integrity. In this protracted and careful investigation, there is apparent an intentional candor and impartiality, which wins much upon the interest and confidence of the reader. Indeed, the determination to be honest and fair has manifestly, at times, been overstrained, and by an excess of liberality, more has been accorded to theories with which he does not sympathize, and less to those with which he more nearly does, than the exact truth will warrant. There is also a spirit of deep earnestness, seriousness, and at times of tender and touching sadness, which effectually excludes all the sharpness and tartness too often found in connection with theological controversy. This patient and comprehensive examination of declining and of now prevalent theories, leaves his own mind still unsatisfied. They do not reconcile the facts, as given by them, with the claims of honor and right in God. They do not give

to him a Deity whom his heart can love, or his soul revere and worship with confidence and gladness.

In Dr. Beecher's apprehension, the two great moving forces of revelation and christianity are, human depravity, and God's integrity of character, and that those have been most unhappily "misadjusted," and made comparatively ineffective by an early and unfortunate assumption, "that men as they come into this world are new-created beings." The "readjustment" of these great forces is to be secured only by a denial and rejection of such assumption. "If in a previous state of existence, God created all men with such constitutions, and placed them in such circumstances as the laws of honor and right demanded, if then they revolted and corrupted themselves, and forfeited their rights, and were introduced into this world under a dispensation of sovereignty disclosing both justice and mercy, then all conflict of the moving powers of christianity can be at once and entirely removed."

Such fact of preëxistence in sin reconciles, to his mind, with God's rectitude all the attendant circumstances of ignorance and weakness and tempting occasions which the infancy of human life encounters. These infants are already sinners in a former sphere of action, and they deserve even worse conditions of existence and severer retributions than such as are here imposed; and besides, they are placed here under a dispensation of mercy and with the opportunity of a fresh probation, in which multitudes of those already lost spirits will be rescued and brought back to God. The great and glorious employment of this redeemed church, is then to be a ministration of diligent instruction and pious nurture. Myriads of new-created beings successively come under their charge, and the story of the divine dealings with them, and their gracious recovery to righteousness, together with all the holy counsel and culture bestowed, will avail to restrain all those myriads from sin, and keep them in perpetual holiness and uninterrupted happiness. God thus gloriously justifies his ways to men.

Now, it can hardly be questioned that this assumption of

human preëxistence must almost universally, upon its first announcement, meet with incredulity and repugnance. It is so unlikely that such previous agency should have existed without leaving some traces upon our consciousness, that it will be spontaneously rejected by the common mind. In ancient times, and not very unfrequently since, it was proposed to human conception as a pagan superstition, or a philosophical myth, or a veritable christian dogma, but in no form has it been competent to give to it general currency, nor even that it should obtain credence from any considerable number of speculating and imaginative persons. It is a good argument against it, that common conviction always rejects it. It must be worked under the strong pressure of seeking relief from some uncomfortable dogma; or it can never make any progress, even as an hypothesis, and nothing can probably give to it general acceptance as a veritable fact. But there are other direct reasons for rejecting it as a satisfactory method for reconciling human depravity with the divine perfections.

In the first place, the general scope of Scripture statement and teaching is very strongly against it. The history of man's creation carries with it the evidence, that the writer of the first two chapters of Genesis supposed that Adam and Eve then began their being. The statement of their trial and fall has all the directness which belongs to a narration of real occurrences; and if any should be disposed to consider it as a myth, or a figurative representation, such would still be obliged to admit, that the writer meant to comprehend the fall of the race in one progenitor, and not that it can be interpreted as a typical allusion to myriads of distinct and separate transgressors. Neither Moses, nor any other Scripture writer, gives the faintest traces of any recognition that Adam came into Paradise a sinner, nor that this Paradise and fall were in some previous state of being. The most forced and unnatural interpretation must be given to the Bible, on such an hypothesis, carrying with it the evidence that there is some supposed exigency, making it necessary to attain a meaning by violence. It is indeed quite as appa-

rent that such is a forced interpretation, as when the attempt is made to sustain the doctrine of universal salvation to be the meaning of the Bible. Neither of the one nor the other do the writers say any such thing; nor say anything which implies that they thought of it; while they do say many things which evince that they did not believe it.

We have the recognition of preëxistence in the Lord Jesus Christ, but this only for his divinity, not his humanity. We have also the intimation that, in some sense, John the Baptist was Elijah, the old Hebrew prophet; but we are not given to believe that the same soul existed in the two bodies, and that Elias and John were but one and the same person. The spirit and power of Elias came upon John the Baptist, much as his spirit rested upon Elisha when he caught the falling mantle. Once only, is there a pretty fair allusion to the notion of human preëxistence in the Scriptures, and then the notion is at once denied by the Saviour. "Master, who did sin, this man, or his parents, that he was born blind? Jesus answered: Neither hath this man sinned nor his parents; but that the works of God should be made manifest in him" (John 9: 23).

But if such supposition give the only method for reconciling the facts of depravity in man with the principles of honor and right in God, the doctrine of preëxistence should have been fully revealed. Nothing else can give the inquiring and anxious mind relief; and this is no principle of reason, which may be attained by careful study and thus applied in elucidation of the mystery. It is a fact beyond consciousness, which no powers of recollection can call up, and no testimony but God's can establish. Surely it should not have been left to conjecture, but have been made a plainly-revealed truth.

Again, if benevolence be the same as honor and right, there is no assistance in the assumption of preëxistence. As a matter of fact, so many of the human race are lost, and so many saved, either without or with this hypothesis. There is no change made in the sum total of human happiness by its introduction. It is introduced for no such purpose as ac-

counting for any changes, or effecting any, after the birth of man upon the earth. It is precisely one and the same fact, one and the same onward progress and issue, with two suppositions of origin. Benevolence really gains nothing by adopting the notion of preëxistence ; why then introduce it ? you answer : To save the perfections of honor and right in God. But if the highest attainable happiness be the ground of honor and right, they are safe already, and this supposition adds nothing to them. If you are troubled with questions of honor and right, they must come from some other source than considerations of greater happiness, for you actually get no greater happiness by any such hypothesis.

Once more ; the assumption of preëxistence recognizes only individuals, and admits of no conception that there is any higher unity in man. All acted and sinned in their isolation on a previous stage, and all begin action here with each his own depravity brought down from a former sphere of being. All stand out in separate individuality, with no headship in Adam, no unity of race, no one humanity, but only manifold and discrete personality. But such is not the Bible representation of man ; such is not the philosophical truth ; such is not the empirical fact. The Bible repeatedly and most emphatically recognizes some headship in Adam. Philosophy ever contemplates man as a concrete ; humanity entire in its unity. Experience, with its broadest inductions, confirms the existence of a law above that which reigns in the individual, and which binds all individuals in one community. The perpetuation of human form, and mental faculty, and relative proportions of sex, and the one stream of historic development for man, all evince that there is a prevalent and persistent causality before and above all individual peculiarity. This higher unity in humanity, above all distinct personality, need not be viewed as holding the sin and guilt of all in the aggregate, and distributing it in positive demerit to each as he emerges in separate identity ; but only as holding all under the same generic *liabilities* while leaving each to his own distinct *responsibilities* ; and yet such higher unity there is, and it may not be over-

looked in the investigation of what honor and right demand from God in the perpetuations of depravity. Adam's pater-
ternity of the race connects him with all, and has that in it
which conditions all in common, and, quite back of the in-
dividuality and personal consciousness of each, pours its
stream of influence down upon each, and works its modify-
ing results in each, and makes all of a generation not a
mere *collocation* of separate men, but a *concretion* of exist-
ing mankind; and also makes of successive generations, not
a mere *sequence*, but a *linked series* of being. This fact of
generic unity must be regarded in the moral as well as in the
physiological history of the human race, and must throw its
light upon all our philosophizing.

But this assumption of preëxistent sin not merely rejects,
but annihilates, all such generic unities. All originally be-
gan in complete independence of all other; and all sinned
alone under no connections of headship or race; and each
had his completed character and confirmed habit before his
birth from Adam. So far as depravity is concerned, Adam
and all his children stand to each as disjoined as the fallen
angels. Such conclusions are neither consonant with Scrip-
ture, philosophy, nor fact.

But more than all the above, the hypothesis, if true, could
not at all touch the point of perplexity and anxiety. The
great difficulty is with such as are finally lost. They will
justly complain that their trial has not been fair, nor God's
treatment of them honorable and righteous. We now would
shut their mouths by letting them know, what they have all
along been wholly unconscious of, that they sinned in a pre-
ëxistent state where they had a fair trial, and that their pre-
cedent sin has been the ground of all God's severe condi-
tions in their infant temptations and onward trial. Their
old guilt remains upon them, and they have incalculably
augmented this in all their subsequent sinning under a dis-
pensation of grace. The penalty of the whole is now to be
rigorously executed, and their preëxistence and sin is to
make God's whole transaction clear and just when he judges
and condemns.

“It would have been just,” any one of them might admit, “to have punished me according to my demerit in my former estate, but why put me in the new state of trial with its augmented responsibilities, and under its hard conditions of weakness, ignorance, and surrounding temptation, and with the certainty that in me the trial would wholly fail, and I should sink at last to a deeper doom?” The answer is: “you deserved harder conditions than those you received, and your severities in a mitigated form were in punishment for your former sins.” But he answers: “I knew of no former sins when such penalty was inflicted, and it is the same penal enormity as that which should hang the murderer when he has become an idiot.” Besides, “I now see that it was the old depravity which wrought out its issues in my new probation, and that what I brought with me hurried me on in sin when I did not know whence it came, nor that the madness was of my own procuring; and must I now suffer for that?” The answer may be, “yes; it is but holding the drunkard responsible, when sober, for the deeds of his drunken frenzy.” But he will reply again: “the drunkard’s sin is not in his drunken agency, but in the voluntary pollutions which induced the madness; and here, you yourself have put me into this state of unconscious delirium.” Shall he then be told: “but your sin in your new probation was voluntary, and your rejection of offered mercy has been wilful.” May he not then answer: “I admit it, so far as sin has wrought out itself in consciousness, and my just desert should follow; but that is cutting off completely all the connections of my preëxistent state, and dealing with me for sins originating entirely within the body.”

In conclusion, it may be said, that, if so violent a supposition could be turned to any good account, still it would be unnecessary and undesirable. A better way is more easily opened. The whole difficulty is really in the permission of the first sin, and when we have accounted for the existence of sin at all, we shall be able to meet all consequential difficulties with comparative facility. We cannot regard this hypothesis of preëxistent sin as at all needed; and, more

than this, we would say that it stands out to our apprehension as unnatural, unphilosophical, unscriptural, and even admitting it to have its application, it would be still unsatisfactory.

We turn now to the consideration of what is given to us in the "Problem Solved." Here is nothing of the mental conflict and distressing perplexity which we have witnessed in the former work. Dr. Squier takes at once a position which puts him quite out of the range of such contemplations and conclusions as had disquieted Dr. Beecher. He goes directly and intrepidly to the moral source of all sin, and finds the responsible origination of it ever to be in the finite, and never from the Infinite. He presents God as an Absolute Agent, originating acts unconditioned by anything back and out of himself; and his acts, both of plan and adoption, of purpose and execution, are ever right and worthy of his approbation and acceptance. In his unalloyed holiness he can have no complicity with sin in any way whatever. Sin is altogether separate from, and exclusive of, God's agency, and exists at all only in spite of God's planning, and purposing, and working against it.

Finite creatures are dependent upon God for their being and their natural attributes. They are wholly of his constituting; but as moral beings they have their existence and attributes in such a manner that they themselves are competent to originate actions and events. A moral agent, though dependent in his being, is yet a complete cause, competent from himself to go out in effects without being caused to do so. Such produced effects, or originated events, as come from such agents, are their own, and wholly at their responsibility. Here, and here only, sin originates. It comes from the creature, and is wholly at his responsibility, and there is no occasion to go back of this finite agent and make any inquiries about other responsibilities. The absolute agent only creates and upholds the finite moral agent, while this moral creature as thus upheld puts forth sinful acts in which God has no share, and his character needs no defence from any difficulties or contradictions

which have seemed to grow out of the introduction of moral evil. The tares are in the field with the wheat, but an enemy sowed them while the Lord of the field sowed only good seed; keep, then, this enemy solely responsible for the evil of the existing tares, and give to the lord of the field all the credit for the wheat.

Every sinner is thus viewed as himself the sole author of his sin, and the only responsible actor in anything that has demerit, and there is, therefore, no opportunity to raise the question: How is sin, or infant depravity, consistent with honor and right in God? The question is wholly dispensed with by dissolving all connection between its terms. The problem is solved by altogether separating God from the sin; or rather, by this previous solution, the whole problem is annihilated. Such is a very summary presentation of what we find to be the substance of the "Problem Solved."

Now we admit the truth of the general principle contended for by Dr. S., that sin is wholly from the finite, and not from the Infinite, so far at least as any participation of agency is concerned in that which has any demerit. We recognize the force and admire the clearness with which he sometimes puts his conclusions to our convictions — that God is an originating cause; that he is not the only cause, but that finite agents are also causes competent to originate, and actually do originate sin from themselves. We have also been interested in the manner of putting objections to opposite conclusions, and the point with which he sometimes hits an adversary; but it is wholly a mistake to assume that in all this the real Problem is solved. God is not so wholly disconnected with sin, as to leave no occasion for the question of consistency between its existence and his integrity of character. To go the length to which Dr. S. would seem to carry it, would eliminate sin, not merely from the sphere of his direct agency, but also from his sovereignty and his universal purposes altogether. God is not the actor and originator of sin; but yet the creature who does sin is from God, upheld in being by God when he sins and after he is a sinner, and the conditions under which he sins are

within God's directing agency ; and we need some further solution than any which is effected by merely referring the direct origination of sin to the finite. There must be reasons for creating and so creating and conditioning the finite agent who does sin, that, in their light, the Creator shall stand, to himself and all other intelligent beings, justified and honored.

Sin is in the system of which God is the Author and Governor. He must be the author of very much misery, and inflict grievous suffering on its account. He must have much to do with sin, and endure much from it, and in many ways have circumstantial complicity with it, and hence the question must remain to be settled: How can this be, and his attributes not be impeached by it? An Enemy sowed the tares while men slept ; but why did the Lord of the field suffer it? Did he, too, sleep? or was he awake, and, knowing what this Enemy was doing, did he connive at it?

Dr. S. himself sometimes betrays that he feels the necessity for this further solution. He says that which implies that, after all, the Problem is yet *to be* solved: "Certain it is that God will vindicate himself to all goodness and righteousness in the matter of wrong in the finite, and do all that infinite wisdom and benevolence suggest in the premises, if not all indeed that the inherent relations of the subject admit." (p. 178). And he goes on to suggest that "he may let it work out its own problems ;" "let sin work for instruction to others ;" "for warning to the universe to stand in awe of it," etc ; thereby hinting at modes of solution to a question still remaining, which regards God's integrity, though sin be from the finite. We know, indeed, from clear distinctions repeatedly given in his work, that Dr. S. would attempt no justification on grounds of mere prudential expediency, or considerations of highest happiness, for he lays the basis of all morality in ultimate principles of intrinsic excellency and dignity ; but just how he would make such complete solution, he has not told us. He indeed assumes that the Problem is solved in showing that sin is wholly from the finite, but unconsciously admits, at times, that there both needs, and may be, this higher solution. He has gone over

a part of the ground, but by no means the whole of it, nor indeed the most difficult part of it.

Sin is ; God is : these two truths admitted, the inquiry is still left, urgent and irrepressible : How can the two consist with each other ? How can sin and suffering be where Omnipotence and Goodness also are ? Admit the sin to be wholly from the creature, yet the question remains : Could not Omnipotence preclude it ? or, did not the Divine Goodness wish to prevent it ? Leaving, then, the peculiar methods of both these authors, we proceed in our own way to find a solution. The attempt is to attain a thorough and conclusive answer, and for this purpose it will be necessary to go over the whole field opened in the inquiry ; but we will strive to make our course as direct as possible, consistently with clearness and fullness of investigation.

There are two and only two general methods practicable in prosecuting this investigation : one takes *the greatest happiness*, and may be called THE THEORY OF BENEVOLENCE ; the other takes *the highest worthiness*, and may be known as THE THEORY OF RECTITUDE. The distinction is radical between the *bene* and the *recte*, though commonly entirely disregarded. Most American, and especially New-England theologians, have worked at this problem somewhere within the theory of Benevolence ; and yet in defending or refuting they have perpetually applied principles which can legitimately be found and used only within the theory of Rectitude. That a true psychology teaches such radical distinction, and that it is necessary accurately to mark the sharp discrimination, will be made manifest as we proceed in the discussion.

The theory of benevolence, through all its modifications, has these leading facts : Happiness is gratified susceptibility, and is the desire of all sentient being. The greater amount of sentient life, whether in One Being or in the aggregate of many beings, gives capacity for the greater happiness, and the sum total of sentient existence in its greatest happiness is the highest good, and the ultimate end to be regarded in all action. To wish this is benevolence, and in this is

the essence of all virtue. On the other hand, that the individual should regard his own happiness, in any way, in conflict with the greatest sum total of happiness, is selfishness, and in this is the essence of all sin. To encourage self-denial in the sacrifice of individual for universal happiness, it should be understood that such particular self-denial will react in individual happiness to a greater degree than any self-indulgence could have reached, and thus benevolence is always prudence—a wise expediency for all men in all cases.

If this theory use the words *right, obligation, duty, etc.*, the meaning should be interpreted strictly within the ends of greatest happiness. That is ultimate, and the moral measure of all things. This end is also one with God and all his creatures, comprehending his own infinitude of being and that of all his finite creatures; the highest degree of happiness attainable, in the aggregate, is God's ultimate rule of action. He is benevolent, and in this he is righteous, in seeking the greatest attainable happiness upon the whole. Let it be carefully noted, that happiness is ever gratified susceptibility, supplying a sentient craving; satisfying a want, and that as the nature of the sentient being is, such must be the line to its greatest happiness and the motive to its action. The whole root is in nature; as God or man finds the greatest sum total of happiness to be attainable, that is the end of the inquiry, and the end of duty; the nature found has determined all. And now we say, that on this theory of Benevolence, a number of hypothetical positions may be taken, from which to reconcile the existence of sin with the perfections of God.

The line to be pursued may, at the outset, be indicated. Sin is an evil because of the suffering it induces, and benevolence must desire to exclude all unhappiness, and the power must be exerted to effect it. But if a position can be attained from whence it can be seen that, in the very *nature of the case*, the greatest attainable happiness involves still some unhappiness, and that no conceived application of power can remedy it, then are we at the point we wish. Benevolence gets all the happiness that any power can, and such remaining un-

happiness is no impeachment of any perfection. This is the general guide in the taking of a position, and several such positions may be assumed. The theory itself limits the number, and we may find all and make our examination completely exhaustive. Some of these may be untenable, and we may force the theorist from one to another. We may in fact thus logically drive him through, and out of, the whole sphere of Benevolence, and allow him no rest till he stands fairly and intelligently on the only firm footing of the ultimate Right.

We first assume, under the general theory of Benevolence, a position that looks to *the nature of Benevolence itself*. We suppose, here, that God directed both his creating and controlling agency, in the attainment of greatest happiness, by the nature of Benevolence. The greatest intensity of the benevolent desire is of the most value, inasmuch as it must produce the greatest happiness. This is to be estimated by the trials it will endure and the sacrifices it will make. That being who will practise self-denial strongly and promptly under the application of tempting motives, has a higher intensity of benevolence, and of more value for happiness, than he who perseveres in a benevolent course only amid the most favoring circumstances. God, then, so makes and disposes all the agents in his system, that obedience to the law of benevolence, in those very circumstances, will attain the highest aggregate intensity and value of benevolence, and he, of course, desires and requires obedience in every case.

But he also foreknows, that in these circumstances the motives will not be sufficient to secure benevolent action in all cases. Sin and misery will enter; yet he also foresees, that on this entrance of sin he can introduce other motives of chastisement, punishment, atonement, etc., which shall be sufficient to induce an augmented intensity of benevolence, in the aggregate exactly to counterbalance the evils of the still prevalent selfishness. He, thus, makes the issue equal in intensity of benevolence, and value in happiness, that universal obedience would have originally gained. The problem is herein solved. Sin is; but the interpositions, by

God himself, consequent upon its entrance have attained an equal value in benevolence and happiness to the highest, the entrance and prevalence of present sin notwithstanding.

From such a position, we can reconcile the present degree of sin and unhappiness with the power and goodness of God, if we can stand upon it. But here is the difficulty; the position is assailable and indefensible. To God, it must be a matter of indifference which course should be taken, for it comes out equal in value in both cases; but the Scriptures nowhere tolerate the notion that God was indifferent whether Adam sinned or not. It involves palpable absurdities. Benevolence is right; but here are two courses equal in benevolence, and of course both must be right. It is in itself just as right to have the system with sin as that without. Moreover, the process under the two suppositions necessitates endless absurdities. God desires all to obey on the first supposition, and when he brings in his measures after sin has entered, he still represents himself as desiring obedience and not sin; and if so, he must still keep the alternatives open with equal values on each side. There must then be a perceiving of equivalents through all the permutations of quantity that may be made of all moral agents, and of all points of activity in all moral agents!

But the real difficulty is more radical than its indefensibility; the position cannot be used for its purpose without itself sliding away and changing to quite another hypothesis. While we are applying the nature of benevolence and determining its value, we are obliged to see that no such determination can be made without estimating the motives employed. One set of means will augment, and another diminish, the intensity of the benevolence, so that, after all, the whole must turn upon the nature of the means to be applied, and this logically places us in quite a new position.

We are thus forced to a *second* hypothesis, and find ourselves in this position: *the nature of the means* must have guided the author and governor of this system of benevolence. The nature of the means to be employed cannot be determined without regarding the subjective excitability, and

the congeniality of the objective appliance. Motive has its strength according as the susceptibility is quick and the appliance pungent. Subjective excitability and objective appliance might be so low, as not to endanger selfish gratification, and thus the system would be kept free from all sin; but such a torpid susceptibility and weak appliances would exclude not merely all sin, but also the very means necessary to the highest benevolence. The very measures which minister to the man's or the angel's highest happiness and benevolence, endanger also his selfish perversion and fall into sin. God has therefore so tempered both the subjective and objective motives, as to secure the greatest practicable amount of benevolence with the least selfishness. Better the present order of means with the consequent sin, than any lower means and less or no sin and misery, but with also the less benevolence and happiness. The question is in this solved. Power and goodness attain all the benevolence and happiness that the nature of the case admits. God must work by means, and he gets all the good that the nature of the means to be used can secure, and with as little evil.

We might, perhaps, object to this hypothesis, that, begin with as low excitability as there might be, it is the nature of mental capacity to grow with its own activity, and that, at some augmented stage of susceptible being, selfish gratification would be induced, and sin come in and run on in its indefinite aggravations; or we might suppose that, with a given degree of motive on one side, infinite wisdom and power might effectually counterbalance the conservative motives on the other, and then, though happiness should grow, yet selfishness would never come in, but the real happiness of the position is, as before; it will not stay in its own use. It glides away while we are attempting to take our observations from it; for we are forced, in looking, to see that the means must be estimated altogether by the helplessness that is to be attained. The happiness is in the nature of the sentient system; if we find the greatest amount to be in one order of gratification, the means must conform to it, and the highest intensity of benevolence will be in thus carrying the

wishes forward; but, if we mistake in that which is the highest happiness, we shall doubtless apply the wrong means and dash both the happiness and benevolence forever. We cannot stand looking at the nature of the means, any more than, before, we could at the nature of the benevolence; for the nature of that happiness, to which the system finds itself intrinsically adapted, must determine both.

We are thus logically turned to a new position, and must stand upon *the nature of happiness*. Benevolent happiness must be gratification in imparting, and not in directly receiving; and as this is now to guide in all the agency of the Deity, we have to contemplate its direction in its own tendency according to its own nature. God finds himself with a benevolent nature that can gratify itself only by imparting; and this impartation must be of that which he has to communicate. He is alone in his own benevolent perfections; he must thus create other beings than himself, to whom he may communicate himself. They must be intelligent, as only such can come in communication with him. He must impart, not literally a transfer of his own benevolent perfections, but a manifestation or display of them. He can gratify his benevolent nature in no other manner. This impartation cannot be satisfactory to the benevolent desire by mere narration or description; it must be made in veritable fact. There must be such beings as shall bring out a manifestation of all his benevolent attributes in their own actual experience; and, as this cannot be done by displaying all his perfections in any one case, there must be varieties fitted to each manifestation. Some must display directly the benevolence of God in the various ways of rewarding them for their benevolence; and, as benevolence itself can never adequately manifest itself, but by displaying its hostility and hatred to its opposite, it must have such selfish beings as may afford the opportunity for manifesting this hatred to selfishness, in their punishment. There must, even in the very consummation of divine benevolence, be different vessels, "some to honor and some to dishonor;" "vessels of mercy afore prepared to glory," and "vessels of wrath fitted to destruction." The

highest happiness of God's benevolent nature cannot be gained without such displays of both his love and hatred; and the highest happiness of his creatures, in the aggregate, cannot be secured in any other manner. He must have benevolent beings enough for displaying his love, in the varieties of his rewarding, and selfish beings enough for adequately displaying his hatred, in the varieties of his punishing. Thus sin and suffering are in the system to just the degree and manner dictated by Infinite Benevolence itself. The problem is solved: Omnipotence cannot gratify Infinite Benevolence in any other way. God's nature cannot prompt the exertions of his power in any other direction. The necessities of a benevolent happiness are, only in this, met and executed.

Here, then, terminates all legitimate theorizing, under the general form of Benevolence. There can be no other positions taken, in the proposition that Benevolence is the means to highest happiness, but, successively, on the nature of benevolence; its means; and its happiness; and, by a logical necessity, the first two must be determined from the last. The theory of Benevolence culminates in this point; and whatever modifications may be made in any of its three hypotheses, they must at length come out substantially in the above form. An advocate of the theory will, of course, make all its repellances as little prominent as possible; but in the collisions of controversial discussion, they will all be made to disclose themselves in their proper shapes and places. We shall have sin as the necessary means of the greatest good; obedience to the divine law no guide to the best result; the existence of two contradictory wills in the Divine Being, one preceptively forbidding selfishness, and the other decretively securing it; and especially the absurdity of being willing to be damned in order to the securing of the greater good. All these are involved in the system; and, if the foundation in highest happiness be true, they are both justified and reconciled in the system. The lost ought to "wish themselves accursed from Christ," for the sake of others' and God's greater happiness. Yea, they ought to be

the happier in and for their eternal misery; it is only self-denial for highest happiness' sake; bearing the cross, benevolently, for others' greater good. The absurdity is much higher up than in the terms of these propositions, even rooted inherently, in the doctrine itself, of greatest happiness as ultimate end.

The important defect of the whole theory is, that it can possibly give no moral system. It is all founded in a constitutional nature. The happiness is from gratified susceptibility; and as that is, and the motives which reach it, such must the action be. God finds himself with a taste gratified in benevolence, and he is miserable except in following out its impulses; and he goes out, in action, in the same necessity of nature as the ox to his fodder. Motive governs everywhere, both in God and his creatures; and the objective motive is determined in the subjective susceptibility; and this susceptibility is an imposed constitution in the creature, and only not imposed in God's constitution, because the philosophy arbitrarily stops short of the causal constituting, and simply finds it already done and the taste already there. All is *cause caused*, and there is no free originating cause — *a cause causing* — in the universe. Dr. Beecher would ask for "principles of honor and right;" there is no place for them. The Psychology will not admit of them. There is nothing but a want — an appetite; there is no intrinsic worth, no claim as an imperative. The Highest finds himself the most happy in benevolently imparting himself to his creatures, and he has nothing higher to guide him. The simple prompting of this appetite is "honor and right."

Although here is logically the consummation of the theory of benevolence, yet it were not possible that the human mind should be satisfied with it. This susceptibility to benevolent happiness is not the highest principle in man or God. Rational spirit can, from its own insight of what it is, determine at once what is due to it, and what is worthy of it; and can thus sit in judgment and pass sentence upon its benevolent gratifications, and decide whether the happiness that is sought in imparting is a virtue or a vice; con-

sistent with honor and right, or dishonorable and wrong. There is thus a power over, and thereby a freedom in, all this pathological benevolence, and the being knows that he is morally held to control all his happiness, even that of benevolence, by a regard to his own true dignity and worthiness. The man will thus judge his logical theories, and not seldom does he find his logical and his moral convictions directly in contradiction. If his logic irrefragably proves, that the sentient nature determines the motive which must be the strongest and must govern, and that thus he can act only as he is *pleased* to act; his moral being will as irreversibly decide, that he feels the constraint of an imperative above all his sentient being, and that this very *pleasing* to act is still under a liberty that keeps him consciously responsible for it. His rational spirit knows a law and an alternative force, which his logical understanding cannot find nor comprehend. It was thus to have been an anticipated probability, that this spiritual conviction of freedom should induce a higher hypothesis than any which the controlling efficiency of constitutional motives could tolerate, even before it had fully discriminated the peculiarities of its own origin. The nature of free-agency may be taken as a position, and yet all the really contradictory assumptions of the greatest-happiness principle be retained. The advance footstep will be in the theory of rectitude, while still the other foot lingers uncomfortably on the theory of benevolence.

This fourth hypothesis then is, that *the nature of free-agency* is such, that God cannot have more holiness and less sin. The very essence of free-agency is, a power to the opposite; and thus in its nature it is that which may sin in any possible appropriate circumstances of its being. In the absence of all proof but such as can be derived from the nature of free-agency, no one is warranted in assuming that sin is not somewhere incidental to the ongoing of a free system. This may be assumed to have been the only alternative to God, on the morning of creation, no moral system, or a moral system in which sin will be. The free-agency *might* ever keep itself holy, but no one can say from itself

that it ever *will*. God, as benevolent, will secure more holiness and happiness on the whole, than sin and misery, or he would withhold his creative act; but all that can be claimed is, that he exclude as much sin and include as much holiness as he can himself. He would desire all holiness and no sin, if his free creatures would voluntarily so act, but inasmuch as they will not, he takes the work into his own hand, and, through the grand means of gospel redemption, recovers from as much sin to as great holiness and happiness as is possible to himself to effect. The question is, then, hereby solved. There is sin; for, from the nature of free-agency it is, to any application of power that does not destroy it, impossible to prevent sin; but benevolence secures all the holiness, and excludes all the sin that is possible. God is good; and this limitation of power, in the nature of free-agency, is no imperfection in the divine being.

The objections to this hypothesis have been mainly by such as have viewed it only from the theory of benevolence, and hence it has certainly been more ably defended than attacked. The objections have been mostly derived from the limitations of power and of blessedness in God which are involved in it, but those are readily obviated by showing that such limitations of power are no defect, and that their own hypothesis involves equal limitations; and that God's blessedness is not diminished by any hindrances to benevolence, which lie in the nature of the case. It is no perfection to assume an ability to do absurdities; and it is no loss of any bliss that is wise, if it could only come through contradictions. It has moreover added to itself, in corroboration, the arguments of analogy, and conformity to Scripture and common sense. Sin has entered the present system, and substantially its elements must be in all systems of moral beings; from analogy we may infer that sin would enter any. The efforts to exclude sin from the present system, and which have been ineffectual, might lead to the safe conclusion that no *ab extra* efforts could exclude it from any. All the facts and declarations of Scripture, and all

the dictates of common sense, it is alleged, harmonize with it.

But the inherent impotency of the hypothesis is, that it is a hybrid, and cannot perpetuate itself in the line of either parent. It cannot retain its greatest-happiness principle, and transmit its freedom; it cannot keep its free-agency and hold on to its paternity in benevolence. If God's highest principle of action is the gratification of a benevolent susceptibility, then he must go on, communicating what he finds within himself as he is prompted by the wants of his own nature, and can never go back and judge this nature by any ethical principles, nor control its working by any considerations of "honor and right." Himself and the benevolent system he makes are both conditioned in a nature already given, and there is no alternative from the creating to the terminating act. There is only the sentient craving and the unerring judgment of what will satisfy it; and the unavoidable issue is that the agency must go out to get it. There is else perpetual wretchedness. God originates nothing; he only develops the nature he finds in himself.

But, on the other hand, if God be truly a free agent and the personal originator of a free system, then must he have seen within himself a principle higher than his want of happiness in the gratification of a benevolent susceptibility, and which both prompted him to, and guided him in, his work, above all the impulses of nature. A higher light must have been given in the insight of what was due to his own essential dignity and glory, and in which he might judge when the going forth of his benevolent impulses were consistent with "honor and right;" and in this only could there have been the free capacity to guide his search for benevolent happiness, and make his benevolence in this way to be, not a constitutional sentiment, but a moral attribute, an ethical virtue. The attempt to stand here, on the nature of free agency, and yet holding that agency by the judgment of what is greatest happiness through the cravings of an inbred nature, will inevitably share the same fate as all the former hypotheses; the position, while taking a full-sighted observa-

tion from it, will logically transmute itself to another, and, instead of the delusive freedom of a constitutional susceptibility, we shall go over to the true liberty of a rational spirit.

We enter then entirely another sphere, and place ourselves completely within the *Theory of Rectitude*.

We contemplate God as an Absolute spirit. He is spontaneous activity; going out in action from an intrinsic capability of originating, and which does not need a nature already caused, that can only unroll and thus uncover what has been already committed to it. He is First Cause, in the sense of originating cause; putting out utterly new things without another causality causing him to do so. But he is not mere blind spontaneity; going out in actions that have no directory. He knows himself thoroughly, and comprehends himself completely. He sees within himself the archetypes of all possible consistent existences, and has thus the patterns or ideals of all possible being, and can thereby work as an architect from his own rules. He has also an exact and immediate insight of what is consistent with the excellency and dignity of his own being; what is due to himself, and in his own producing, what it will be fit for himself to accept and approve; and he is thus a moral Being, who finds his own ethical laws within himself. The spontaneous activity, thus, ever goes out in action, self-directed. He is a law to himself. Not, now, is our conception of God as of a being who has a kind and tender susceptibility which craves to gratify itself in acts of benevolent impartation to others; going out under the impulse of a pathological feeling which must satisfy itself in supplying its want, as an appetite, or be miserable; but much more elevated: a being with an intrinsic dignity, who acts from a knowledge of his own worthiness, and that he may fulfil the high behest of his own excellency and be holy; a rational, not a sentient being; whose motives for imparting good are reasons, not sensations; and whose acts are virtues, not instincts nor impulses. The Benevolence is no more a sentiment, but a rectitude. God, thus controlling his activity by a self-law, is spiritual, rational, and free.

Under the guidance of what is right, does God, therefore, go out to his work of creating and governing: he makes the material worlds; he superinduces, upon the forces of matter, vegetable life; upon the vegetable, animal life; and upon the animal, human life. He also creates spiritual beings, whose life is not blended in the material and animal being. All rational spirits, whether pure or incarnate, are in his image, rational and free. Each has the capacity to know himself, and what is becoming and due to himself, and each is thus a law to himself, having a conscience excusing or accusing. The material, vegetable, and animal creation is subsidiary to the rational being; and, having no end in itself, this creation finds its end only in ministering to the spiritual.

Holiness and sin can be attributes only of the rational and free, and in their first activity it may be assumed that all new-created intelligences will put forth their action in accordance with the law of right. How, now, shall sin enter? "God cannot be tempted of evil." He has no possible openings as occasions for sin. Pure and absolute reason can possibly find no inducement to act unreasonably. Deity incarnate can endure temptation, but Deity absolute cannot "deny himself." This is not from the want of free capacity, but from the necessary absence of all occasion. Sin cannot enter through God.

It may enter through finite spirits; it must enter through some of them, if it come in at all. Sin is the spirit's activity turned away from the end of its true worthiness, and going out against conscience. As the true worthiness of the finite spirit is in obeying the absolute spirit, so "sin is any want of conformity to, or transgression of, the law of God." One such perversion sets the direction of the spirit, and this disposing the current of the spiritual activity perversely, becomes a permanent spiritual disposition, out of which come, perpetually, specific wrong acts. To pure finite spirits, there is occasion for strictly spiritual temptations. From their relative positions and subordinate stations, there may be jealousies, envyings, hatred, etc.; and so they may, "being lifted up of pride, fall into the condemnation of the devil."

In man, besides the opening to such entirely soul-sins, there are all the appetites of the flesh, to which the spirit may subject itself, and, in any of these directions, turn itself to a disposition of rebellion against God and right. So sin can enter any Paradise.

But how, it may be asked, when God is an omnipotent sovereign, can sin so come in and not implicate him, in either his participation or neglect? We answer, according to our theory of Rectitude, by this general hypothesis, and yet, when clearly apprehended we hardly deem that it can be held merely as hypothesis; but as exact truth: *that sin, in some form and extent, will be a certain result of God's dealings with his creatures according to what is due to himself.* In other words: If God always deal with finite spirits according to principles of "honor and right," there will be sin.

Finite moral beings, even beginning in holiness, must be disciplined to higher measures of virtue. If God act worthily by himself and them, as a Father, he will preside over his household, and propose high standards of attainment and excellency for his children. It is no part of parental dignity and honor to spare his child from the hardy discipline and rough exposures that are necessary to form a manly character. That fondness is ever a weakness, which withdraws its charge from all endurance, and perpetually interposes its own hand when times of trial come. Such neglect of all severe discipline can result in nothing but a weak and irresolute character. There must be times of stern and resolute holding of the child to the struggles and conflicts necessary to fit him for future duties, and give to him that firmness and decision which may be trusted in important enterprises. If the severity of this discipline be properly proportioned to the person and the occasion, the claims of honor and right are satisfied. Incidental to such strict but salutary and requisite discipline may be some disastrous failures; but neither the failing nor the enduring children can reproach the faithfulness of the father.

So God disciplined angels, righteously and honorably; and, while many endured the trial, and in their trial rose to

higher stations, some in their own supineness fell, and blasted the fruit of all this appropriate culture. So God also disciplined Adam, faithfully and fairly subjecting him to a trial every way adapted to his condition, and where manly valor might have earned its bright reward; but he ingloriously fell, and by his own perversion wrought his ruin. Yet in neither case can God be impeached as a cruel or a neglectful Parent. He should not have tried them less; he ought not to have helped them more. He did not love them the less in that he put them to this trial; he only loved the virtue they might and should have attained, the more. He did not desire their fall; he only would do what it behooved him to do for his own worthiness' sake, though they should fall and work their ruin. If he could, by any interpositions of his own power, have softened the rigor of the discipline, and at that time have saved their disastrous delinquency, it would have been at the dearer expense of withholding just that which the occasion demanded, and bringing into his own spirit the consciousness of an unworthy weakness. That stern trial must come again, if the raw recruit is ever to become the hardy veteran; and the confirmed point of unshrinking and unswerving manly valor cannot be reached without actually passing through and enduring the discipline; and the spirit that would cower and fail in one point, when just the right discipline only is applied, if then relieved by some misguided fondness, will doubtless more disgracefully fall in the next certain-coming and necessary exigency. If God do what his own dignity as a father and the highest virtue of his children demand, it may be a certainty, though it is no necessity, that some will basely fail and become sinfully and shamefully unworthy. And then, if God deal with the erring just as "honor and right" demand, it may further be, that the fallen will greatly aggravate their sin and sink in deeper degradation. The interposing power to stop this, had been a moral weakness, and was thus restrained in God by steadfast righteous principle. If sin so come in and spread, neither the holy nor the sinful can impeach Jehovah's power or goodness.

Sin has thus entered both heaven, and our world, and only God's rectitude has restrained God's power to prevent it. And we have only to keep the same principle in view, and we shall find all adequate relief from any distressing embarrassments, in reference to the complete integrity of God's character, in all the facts connected with the perpetuation of sin.

There need be no labored statement to defend the character of God against the perpetuated sin and suffering of fallen angels. If they originally fell, when God was dealing with them just as he must for his righteousness' sake, much less shall he be subject to any reproach when, for justice' sake to them and in salutary warning to all others, he holds them still in being, and visits them in retribution precisely in accordance with their penal demerit. To annihilate them, or to abate any measure of the tokens of his displeasure, would be a weakness and a reproach to himself in his own sight. He is only doing by the fallen angels, now as ever, just what is due to himself. He can do no less in holding them to their misery, and do right.

The great difficulty in reconciling the perpetuation of sin with the integrity of the divine character, will be in the point that has so much disquieted Dr. Beecher, and so many other good and thoughtful men; the facts and circumstances of human depravity. The fact of infant suffering cannot be denied; and the facts that universal depravity abounds, and that men go astray from the opening of their moral character, and that this character opens in weakness and ignorance and under many perverting influences, are all as truly seen in the light of natural experience as in that of divine revelation. How can such perpetuations of depravity be consistent with the power and the goodness of God? Let us follow out our principle here as carefully and completely as we may.

When Adam committed his first sin, it was in the very necessities of the case a fact affecting humanity, as such. This must henceforth settle the question for him and his posterity, if he shall have any, whether they are to stand in

their former and hitherto uninterrupted communion with God or not. It needed no covenant transaction thereby to make Adam a *federal* head of the race; by his very paternity he must be a *public* head of mankind. What he should do must settle many things that God should do with man. If any child had sinned, while he and other children had remained holy, that child's sin could not have reached the race; this can only be effected in the progenitor, and that by his first sin. Subsequent acts can only be as individual, for in the first transgression, the line of the divine procedure with him must have its determination. He must bring the sentence down upon Adam, and thus cut short the race in his perdition; or, if God spare, it must be in some provision of his own, and afterwards deal with Adam and his race on this new footing of his mercy. As regard to what is due to his own excellency, requires that God should execute justice and judgment upon Adam, or that, in providing redemption and sparing him to multiply his posterity, God should regard him and his posterity only within the terms of that plan of redemption which he had settled for them.

It must thus *ethically* follow that Adam's posterity shall begin their life and action under circumstances different and less favorable than he had done. They must be cut off from that direct communion, face to face, which he had enjoyed, and all those tokens of full approbation and complacency and approving care which had appeared in paradise, must now wholly cease. There must also *physically* follow all the natural effects of Adam's sin, and of God's righteous curses for it. "The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together," in consequence. Human life begins differently, and terminates differently on earth, and, from the first, runs on differently, from that which had been the experience of Adam, or would have been the experience of his posterity in innocence. Both *moral* and *natural* consequences, which it behooves God to secure, must now flow down to the race, and henceforth man must begin and continue his moral action under them. The principles of rectitude determine all this change of condition.

Now, such ethical and physical changes need not, and should not be considered as making humanity penally guilty in Adam's sin. Others may suffer in consequence of what one does, but penal guilt and demerit can only be personal and individual, and concrete humanity cannot so be guilty. Yet in the sense of liability, there may be such a corruption, or *vitium*, in the concrete race as shall greatly affect each individual's opening activity. This may be to such a degree that, inasmuch as Adam sinned in his condition, *à fortiori*, it may be affirmed, as the Scriptures teach, that all his posterity will thus sin, and become "by nature children of wrath." Our psychology here needs to discriminate the rational in the human soul from the animal, and, while it is quite a ready conception that the animal, as in nature and of nature, may be vitiated in the corruptions of nature, yet the rational can, as such, have no corruption or *vitium* from any casualty in nature, and only a moral debasement from violating the law of conscience which is in itself. Such corruption in the spirit, so far as physical changes can reach, may make it a certainty without any necessity, that the rational soul shall, with its first action, dispose itself perversely. The *psychology* will have thus an included *pneumatology*, and the physical corruption become the occasion for a voluntary moral pollution. Such a vitiated state of humanity is consequent upon Adam's first sin, and a regard to what is due to himself in rectitude requires God to establish and uphold such a connection. The ethical changes he ought to make, and the physical changes he ought not to break up, if he would be true to his own dignity and worth. He must punish in Adam and cut short the race in the progenitor, or perpetuate the race in such corruption.

But though it be not worthy of God to interfere physically and expel the corruption by new natural creations, or new laws of natural generation, yet how worthy of a God that which he did, and in the counsels of eternity always designed to do! The same principle directs in Redemption that had guided in creation; in the discipline of the first man; and in the connections of the first sin with all succeeding de-

pravity; that which his own insight sees to be due to himself; that which will be fit for his own approbation and acceptance in the end. A new headship is introduced into humanity: Immanuel appears, as Deity superinduced upon the human; and, while the old stream of Adam's headship passes down, this new headship throws down also other and recuperative energies, working out their salutary changes under which the action of the corrupted race is widely modified. The Holy Spirit is purchased and sent down, to put the hand over and back of all instrumentalities, and deal directly, but only morally, with the soul. This may act in the first rational agency of the human spirit, and sanctify its first disposing; or, in any subsequent state of the depraved disposition in the flesh, this Holy Spirit may work effectually in connection with established means, and win the lost soul to God through a spiritual regeneration. It would not have been worthy of the divine honor to have gone back and physically mended that which Adam's sin had marred; but oh! how worthy of God, to take occasion, from this sin of man, to put within humanity another and a divine life, which shall work out depravity and work in holiness, till the suffering Redeemer is "satisfied." This new headship, and its life by faith, becomes the central source of all hope and joy on earth, and all love and praise among the redeemed in heaven. The ultimate right, as seen by God in the claims of his own true dignity, has guided his counsels and their execution from eternity.

With God was "the residue of the [creating] Spirit," and it was thus due that what was in the absolute Deity, should be brought out in an existing creation. He governed and disciplined the moral beings he made, under the same ultimate rule as his directory. When man sinned, he followed solely the law of doing that which it became him to execute, and the facts of human depravity were thus connected with the first transgression. With a goodness infinitely higher than any craving of a benevolent susceptibility, or prompting of nature for happiness, and of a wholly distinct kind, even in the broad sense of a goodness that would have all that was

worthy for Infinite Excellency to receive, he planned and executed the work of the sinner's redemption, and only fails of attaining universal salvation in it, from the perverse rejection of sinners, in whose behalf his own honor will not allow his power and grace to work any longer nor any further. In this broad sense, rectitude demands more than justice, more than benevolence; it is a goodness that contains them both, and demands that they both meet and embrace each other for what the Lord Jehovah sees in himself is due to himself. Thus sin was, and much sin and misery ever will be, because divine power must work under the guidance of divine rectitude.

ARTICLE III.

○ SCIENCE AND THE BIBLE.

A REVIEW OF "THE SIX DAYS OF CREATION" OF PROF. TAYLER LEWIS.¹

By James D. Dana, LL. D., Silliman Professor of Natural History, Yale College.

"THE heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork." Thus spake the Psalmist in view of the revelation which God had made of himself in his works. With deeper emphasis may we now utter the same ascription of praise; for that revelation, as its records have been unfolded in these later days, has opened more and more glorious thoughts of the Almighty Architect, and appears as unfathomable in its truths, as God himself is infinite. The world in general is satisfied to see this glory as exhibited in form, color, magnitude, and other outside quali-

¹ *The Six Days of Creation, or the Scriptural Cosmology, with the Ancient Idea of Time-Worlds in distinction from Worlds in Space.* By Tayler Lewis, Professor of Greek in Union College. 12mo. pp. 407. Schenectady, 1855.