

ARTICLE V.

DID PAUL MODEL HIS LANGUAGE AFTER THAT OF DEMOSTHENES?

Translated from the German of Dr. Friedrich Köster of Stade.¹

THE late De Wette has pronounced it improbable that the Apostle Paul acquired any appreciable benefit from the old Hellenic learning and literature. In like manner, Winer affirms it to be "now pretty generally conceded, that no Greek culture can be ascribed to Paul, any more than to the Jews generally, who dwelt in Egypt and Palestine," although this language is qualified by the remark, that "he has, to be sure, a greater degree of skill in Greek style and composition than the other apostles (e. g. Peter and Matthew), which he probably obtained in Asia Minor, where his intercourse with native Greeks, many of whom were learned and distinguished men, was so extensive and intimate." We believe, however, that we must advance a step further, and admit the probability of his having not merely read, but become familiar with, several of the old Greek writers, and more particularly that he has modelled the language of his Epistles, to a considerable extent, upon the Orations of Demosthenes.

On account of the importance of this point to a correct judgment of the intellectual culture of the Apostle, and of the light it throws upon his character as an author, we shall endeavor to exhibit with more precision, the reasons which appear to us to speak in its favor.

And first, let us call attention to the course of his mental training from youth upwards. Paul was born, it is true, of Jewish parents, who dwelt, however, at Tarsus, a celebrated commercial city in Cilicia, in which Greek learning flourished; and, as his father had acquired the privileges of Roman citizenship, he would seem, to a considerable extent, to have overstepped the bounds of Jewish bigotry and exclusiveness. Judging from the analogy of the dispersed Jews generally, it is even possible that Greek was the vernacular language of the boy Paul, while, as

¹ This Article is from the second Number of the *Studien und Kritiken* for 1854.

the son of an orthodox Jewish family, he was duly instructed at school in the Hebrew and Syro-Chaldaic tongues; and, if we may assume this to be true, he would in all probability have read Greek works in early life. Be this, however, as it may, we have next to view him as the zealous pupil of the Rabbi Gamaliel at Jerusalem, who was miraculously converted on a journey to Damascus, and received a Divine call to labor as a messenger of the Gospel among the Gentiles, and especially among the Greeks. If, then, in obedience to the heavenly mandate, he conceived the great design of liberating Christianity from the bonds of Jewish sectarianism, he thereby, at the same time, imposed upon himself the task of effecting a transition in his own mind from oriental to Greek modes of thought and feeling. Would he not, therefore, be compelled to seek some degree of acquaintance with the latter? And, as he devoted years to the labor of preparing himself for his difficult missionary enterprise (three years in Damascus and Arabia, Gal. 1: 18; fourteen years in Cilicia, Gal. 2: 1; one year in Antioch, Acts 11: 26; and, later still, a considerable period in Cesarea, Acts 24: 27), is it at all credible that, during this lengthened season of preparation, he devoted no attention to the habitudes of thought and expression peculiar to those, to whom he wished to preach? To him, as a public speaker, a knowledge of the every-day language of the Greeks must, indeed, have been of preëminent importance; nor could he have neglected entirely the Greek literature, inasmuch as this people placed so high a value upon its writers, and was, it may be said, intellectually governed by them. At any rate, some familiarity with their works would open up to the Apostle, throughout the whole cultivated world of that time, Rome herself not excepted, a readier access to the hearts and feelings of mankind. Even if it be supposed that the more strictly learned writings of the Greeks did not fall in his way, we cannot imagine this to have been the case with their popular writers, whose subject-matter and diction offered him numerous opportunities of establishing a connection between their statements or phraseology, and his glad mission of salvation in Christ.

In this way, the peculiarities of the language employed by Paul in his Epistles, find a satisfactory explanation. For, while its *material* groundwork was Judaic, its *form* was borrowed from the Greek. As a zealous Jew and a disciple of the Pharisees, Paul adhered most closely to the mode of expression, which

characterized the sacred writings of his nation; and that he was also able to deliver a public oration in the Syro-Chaldaic, or mother-tongue of the Palestine of his day, is expressly stated in Acts 21: 40. Hence, for example, he begins and ends all his Epistles with the Hebraic formula of salutation, and avoids the Greek *χαίρειν*; hence his diction (particularly in the Epistles to the Romans and Galatians), whenever he reasons from the Old Testament, or avails himself of the forms of Rabbinical disputation, assumes a marked Hebraic coloring; hence, lastly, he occasionally quotes the Old Testament in conformity with the original Hebrew text, and not the Greek translation. As a general rule, however, he employs the latter as his fountain-head; and that, generally speaking, the Greek was more familiar to him than the Hebrew, is shown in all those passages of his Epistles, where he is less dependent upon the Old Testament, or where he enters upon the mention of present circumstances (as in his closing exhortations), or in which he speaks with more than ordinary fervor. The Greek he uses is for this reason the common popular language of the Hellenists of his day, the so-called *κοινή*, in the form of the Macedonian-Alexandrine dialect, which is based upon the Septuagint. But, with how much greater purity, delicacy and freedom, than we meet with in that Translation, does he know how to handle the Greek idiom! This is most clearly shown in his Epistles to the Corinthians. Now it is certainly true, that he acquired this dexterity in the employment of the language principally from intercourse with learned and distinguished Greeks; but that he derived it also from some acquaintance with the Hellenic literature is betrayed, as we shall see, by evidence the most unequivocal. And what branches of this literature may those have been, which thus attracted his attention? As an inspired orator in the service of Christ, he would scarcely have concerned himself either with the mythological and philosophical, or in any way with the purely scientific, writings of the Greeks. The philosophy of the Hellenes (e. g. the Stoics and Epicureans, Acts 17: 18), was probably not entirely unfamiliar to the great Apostle, but could have had no preponderating importance in his estimation, inasmuch as he designed to bring unto the wisdom-seeking Greeks nothing except the "foolishness" of "preaching Christ crucified" (1 Cor. 1: 22). He does not, however, reject philosophy in the abstract, but only its perversion, in his deprecatory exhortation that no one should

allow himself to be led away from Christ through it (Col. 2: 8). On the other hand, for the end he had in view, the assistance derivable from the historians, national poets, and, above all, the popular orators, must have been regarded as exceedingly important; the historians, in making him better acquainted with the character of the Greeks; the poets, in enabling him to render his preaching attractive, by connecting it with favorite expressions from their songs; and the popular orators, by instructing him by what means this remarkably acute and gifted people could most surely be convinced and influenced. The interpreters have often shown that his language, in numerous passages, presents striking resemblances to that of Thucydides, Xenophon and Plato.¹ From the popular poets he has borrowed passages on three occasions: Acts 17: 28, from the *Phaenomena* of Aratus: *τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν*; 1 Cor. 15: 33, from the comic poet, Menander: *φθειρόουσιν ἦθη χρησθ' ὁμιλίαι κακαί*, and Titus 1: 12, from Epimenides of Crete (whom, on account of the truth of his dictum, he calls a "prophet"): *Κρητες αἰεὶ ψευῶνται, κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί*. But in respect to the popular orators, it may be assumed that Paul had read several of them, and, assuredly before all others, the noblest and most celebrated of their number, Demosthenes of Athens. For in his speeches he found that *δεινότης*, power of illustration, acuteness of reasoning in weighing arguments *pro* and *contra*, and powerful mastery over human feeling, in which he surpassed all others of his countrymen; to him he must have felt attracted as to a kindred spirit by his moral earnestness, strict sense of truth, and lively veneration for the Deity.² It is well known that Aeschines, the inveterate opponent of Demosthenes, trusted more to dazzling displays of rhetorical art; and Paul, on account of the rivalry between these two great masters of eloquence, had perhaps perused his speeches. The frequent use of rhetorical interrogation, of asseveration, and of objections introduced in the form of dialogue, Paul has in common with Demosthenes. We call

¹ Cf. Wetstein's *Commentar zum neuen Testament*. C. L. Bauer, philologia Thucydeeo-Paulina. Hal. 1773. G. Raphelii, annotationes in N. T. e Xenophonte, Polybio, etc. Lugd. Batav. 1747.

² A firm belief in the gracious providence, as also in the inexorable justice of the gods, breathes through all the orations of Demosthenes (cf. *Epist.* 4, p. 1487, Reiske). The admirable tract of Theremin, entitled "Die Beredsamkeit eine Tugend," speaks more fully upon this subject.

to recollection only such questions as *τί οὖν ἐστὶ* (cf. *Leptin.* p. 530) in 1 Cor. 5: 12: *τί γὰρ μοι, κ. τ. λ.* (*adv. Conon.* p. 729: *τί ταῦτα ἐμοί*; quid haec ad me pertinent?), and *τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν*; in Rom. 4: 1. 6: 1 (cf. *pro Coronâ*, p. 287: *τί οὖν φημί δεῖν*). Both resemble each other, moreover, in subtle delicacy of expression, as e. g. when Paul avoids self-praise, or softens the severity of the censures he pronounces upon his readers, and in their irony amounting almost to sarcasm, as e. g. when he extols the strength of the Corinthians by contrasting it with his own weakness (1 Cor. 4: 10), or when he asks the Corinthians, whether the word of God went forth from them, or came unto them alone (1 Cor. 14: 36). Both pay great attention to the arrangement of their proofs or illustrations, and prefer to place those on which they lay least stress in the middle of the argument. In this, Demosthenes followed the Homeric dictum: *κακούς δ' εἰς μέσσον ἔλασεν*; and so, too, Paul, when he uses a passage of the Old Testament allegorically (e. g. 1 Cor. 14: 21, where the historical sense of the text quoted from the Psalms is not so much considered, as the aptness of the expressions employed for illustrating the matter in hand); for this was to him rather a popular elucidation than a formal example. Such similarities of language may probably be explained by a certain resemblance in the character of the two men; but when, in addition, numerous, and, in great degree, quite characteristic parallels with Demosthenean forms of expression, as well in particular words as in the construction of entire sentences, are met with in the Pauline Epistles, it must be thought extremely probable that the Apostle had read the Attic orator, and has interwoven involuntary reminiscences of such reading in his writings. Some of these parallelisms have been collected by Kypke, in his *Observationes sacrae*, Wratislav. 1755, and more can be discovered by an attentive reader of Demosthenes. We will here bring forward a few of the most remarkable, and, in so doing, follow the order of succession of the Pauline Epistles.

Romans.

1: 29, *μεστὸς φόβου, φόβου, κ. τ. λ.* Cf. Dem. *adv. Androt.* p. 603: *ἀνθρώπουσιν ὀνειδῶν καὶ κακῶν μεστός*.¹ In both passages a

¹ We quote according to Reiske's pages. But Kypke, in the cases in which we refer to him, has employed an earlier edition.

union of secret and open vices is described; "a sentina of shameful lusts and deeds *fills out*, so to speak, their whole being."

2: 14, *ἔσθη φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιεῖ*. By *φύσει* a "natural impulse," or instinct, is denoted. So Dem. pro Coron., p. 26: "a fondness for hearing others defamed, rather than praised, *φύσει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑπάρχει*."

2: 5. Here, as in 3: 5, *ὀργή* is evidently "punishment," after a frequent usage of Aeschines and Demosthenes. Cf. in Mid. p. 391: *εἰς δὲ δράσαντι ὀργὴν ἔταξεν ὁ νόμος*.

5: 7. In this remarkable passage, Paul seeks to express the incomparable love of God in yielding up His Son to death, by a climax (*μόλις, τάχα*), and, indeed, from an Hellenic point of view. For this reason, *δικαίον* and *ἀγαθόν* cannot be masculines; for the notions of the "just" and "good" man run into each other (Cic. de Offic. 2, 11: *ex justitia viri boni appellantur*; cf. Rom. 7: 12). Both are rather neuters, and *δικαίον* is "a right" (Dem. in Mid. p. 515: *ἐπιζῶ τὸ δικαίον ἔξαι*), but *ἀγαθόν* has the article to designate "what is evidently, notoriously good." It may be that the case of Chabrias presented itself here before the mind of the Apostle, of whom Demosthenes, Leptin. p. 481, explicitly affirms: "Chabrias died as commander in a battle, *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, φιλόπολις ὄν*." In our text, then, *ὑπὲρ* before *δικαίον* denotes the motive (as in 2 Thess. 1: 4, 5). "For hardly will any one die for others *on behalf of their (mere) right*; rather, perhaps, *on account of the evident good, which they possess*." For "Right" is the object of *cool reflection* or consideration; only "goodness" can inspire a *higher enthusiasm* (e. g. Leonidas died at Thermopylae for the salvation and honor of his native land). But Christ died for godless and wicked men, of whom, to say nothing of a right, one can in no way predicate the possession of what is truly good.

6: 7, *ὁ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας*. A proposition borrowed from civil legislation, to wit, that by death every transgression is atoned. So Dem. Epist. 3, p. 1478: *πάντων ἁμαρτημάτων ὄρος τελευτή*.

7: 18, *τὸ θέλει παράκειται μοι, τὸ δὲ κατεργάζεσθαι τὸ καλὸν οὐκ εὐρίσκω*. The opposition here generally set forth is referred to a special case in Dem. Epist. 5, p. 1490: *τὸ εὖ βούλεσθαι πάρεστιν, οὐ τοῦργον*.

14: 7, *κυρίῳ ζῶμεν*. What is here principally meant, is, not our dependance upon the Lord, but a complete *self-devotion* to Him.

A passage in Dem. ad epist. Philippi, p. 66 (Kypke), serves to elucidate this expression, where it is said of the Athenian ambassadors who had been bribed by King Philip: *ὁὐκ αἰσχύνονται Φιλίππῳ ζῶντες.*

14: 15, *ὁ ἀδελφὸς λυπεῖται.* Not "he is troubled," but "*he suffers injury.*" Hence *ἀπολύειν*, referring to his ruin, follows. Dem. pro Cor., p. 246: "if Philip had departed *τῶν Ἑλλήνων μηδένα λυπήσας.*"

First Corinthians.

4: 13, *καθάρματα*, "refuse," "offscourings," as a designation of despised men. How strong the expression is, may be seen from the additional epithets in Dem. in Mid., p. 578: "all other men are looked upon by him as *καθάρματα καὶ πτωτοὶ καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνθρώποι.*"

4: 4, *οὐδὲν ἔμαντῶ σύνοικα.* Literally so Aeschines: *μηδὲν αὐτῷ συνειδώς*, and similarly Dem. Epist. 2, p. 112: *ἐπνοικῶν ἔμαντῶ σύνοικα.*

6: 4, *καθίζετε*, according to the context: "set ye them as judges?" Cf. Dem. in Mid., p. 415: the judges, *ἐπόσους ἂν ἡ πόλις καθίζῃ.*

6: 18, *ὁ πορνέων εἰς τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα ἀμαρτάνει.* Cf. Aeschin. in Timarch., p. 176 (Kypke): *ὅσα εἰς τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἡμάρτηεν.* Here the orator is speaking of the so-called "cinædus," who, however, is not excluded by the language of the Apostle.

12: 23. To the less honored parts of our body *τιμὴν περισσοτέραν περιτίθεμεν.* Better *clothing* is meant. But Demosthenes, Orat. amator., p. 1417, uses these words figuratively: "know, that good speeches *τοῖς εἰποῦσι δόξαν περιτιθένται.*"

14: 16, 23, 24. *Ἰδιώτης* in Demosthenes (e. g. adv. Mid., p. 325) is frequently a man who has no public office; Paul uses it to denote *the hearer*, in opposition to the teacher who appears in public.

16: 15, *εἰς διακονίαν τοῖς ἁγίοις ἔταξαν ἑαυτούς*, "they devoted themselves voluntarily to the service of the saints." Dem. de falsa legat., p. 201: *εἰς τίνα τάξιν ἔταξεν ἑαυτὸν ὁ Αἰσχίνης ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ.*

Second Corinthians.

4: 17, *τὸ παραντίκα ἑλαφρὸν τῆς θλίψεως* is not: "the transitively (Luther: zeitlich, temporarily) light affliction," but "the

present light." For the future forms the antithesis. Cf. Dem. Philipp. 2, p. 28: ἡ παρανίκα ἡδονὴ μείζον ἰσχύει τοῦ ὕστερον συντίσσειν μέλλοντος. [This use of παρανίκα is frequent in Thucydides; e. g. 2, 64: ἡ παρανίκα λαμπρότης, καὶ ἐς τὸ ἔπειτα δόξα. 8, 82: τῆν τε παρανίκα ἐλπίδα. — Translator.]

5: 20, ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ πρεσβεύομεν, we are ambassadors, not *in Christ's stead*, but for Christ's sake, *for his cause*. For what follows: "as if God exhorted by us," is uttered by the Apostle as an ambassador *in God's stead*. The same usage occurs in Demosth. de f. legat., p. 244: ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καλῶς ἐπρέσβευσαν, "for your interests they have well performed the embassy."

8: 5, ἑαυτοὺς ἰδωκαν πρῶτον ἐφ' κυρίῳ καὶ ἡμῖν. A fine expression of self-devotion or complete self-sacrifice to the beloved. We find a striking parallel in Dem. pro Cor., p. 344 (Kypke): "many celebrated orators as there have been in Athens, yet οὐδεὶς τούτων πάποτε διαπαντὸς ἰδωκεν ἑαυτὸν ἐπὶ πόλει. Very significant, also, is the πρῶτον of the Apostle: "what was destined for the suffering Christians, that they gave first (i. e. above all, principally) from love to God and to me."

9: 12, ἡ διακονία τῆς λειτουργίας, "the service of collecting the alms." Λειτουργία occurs frequently in Demosth. (e. g. in Lep- tin., p. 463, 12) of a public *contribution*, furnishing the means required for some branch of the public service; but διακονία is the *Jewish* designation of the same thing (cf. 8: 4. 9: 1, 13), for in the synagogues the collection of the alms was the business (ἡγεμονία) of the *servants* or *deacons* (Vitranga de synagoga, p. 933).

13: 8. "For we have no power *against* the truth (κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας), but *for* the truth (ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθείας)," i. e. on behalf of, in furtherance of the truth. The two prepositions are opposed to each other in the same sense by Demosth. in Epist. 2, p. 1469: οὐ καθ' ὑμῶν δεινός ὤν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν.

Galatians.

1: 6, 10. The peculiar use of μετατίθεσθαι, to shift one's place (as e. g. the wind), for "to change one's resolution," and likewise of πείσαι, to persuade, for "to seek a person's approbation," is found also in Dem. pro Cor., p. 338.

2: 6, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων εἶναί τι (ὁποῖοί ποτε ἦσαν, οὐδὲν μοι διαφέρει). The preposition ἀπό, interrupted by the parenthesis, is an instance of anacoluthon, very suitable to the excited feel-

ing of the Apostle, and for this reason a special explanatory clause follows: *ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν προσανέθετο. Οἱ δοκοῦντες εἶναι τι* (those who pass for something great) is genuine Greek (Xen. Hier. 2, 1: *τῶν δοκούντων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι*, who are looked upon as true men). But the words of the parenthesis, spoken in a depreciatory spirit ("what they really did, was matter of indifference to me"), have their analogy in Dem. de contribut., p. 175: "if any one of you know the families of Aristides and Miltiades, *ὁμοῖά ποτ' ἐστί*, how insignificant their present qualifications are;" and contra Theocrit, p. 512, in Olympiodor, p. 696 (Kypke): *οὐδὲν μοι διαφέρει*, it makes no difference to me, is all one and the same to me.

3: 22, 23, *συνέκλεισεν ἡ γραφή τὰ πάντα ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίας*, and *ὑπὸ νόμον ἐφρουρούμεθα συγκεκλισμένοι*. The latter expression borders very closely on that of Dem. in Philipp. 1, p. 18: *ἂν πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν νόμῳ κατακλείσῃτε*, "if you will bind the whole force by law." For *συνκλείειν*, "to enclose," "embrace," with *ὑπὸ* following it, is said of the ruler, who brings prisoners, under supervision of a jailor, into safe custody. Such a ruler is "the scripture," i. e. God, whose will it announces, and the jailor is in the first verse "sin," and in the second "the law." Now the last held all men under obligation, which being unable to fulfil (v. 19), they were thereby "all concluded under sin." But both took place for a salutary purpose, viz. to keep men in safe custody for that higher liberty, which they were afterwards to attain through faith (*ἐφρουρούμεθα* must be joined with *εἰς τὴν μέλλουσαν πίστιν*).

5: 1, *μὴ πάλιν ζυγῷ δουλείας ἐνέχεσθε*. A shameful bondage is alluded to. For in the verses cited by Dem. pro Cor., p. 322, the sense is similar:

— ὡς μὴ, ζυγὸν αἰχῆνι θέντες,
δουλοσύνης στυγεράν ἀμφὶς ἔχουσιν ὕβρον.

The yoke *shews in* (*ἐνέχει*) the neck, surrounding it on both sides (*ἀμφίς*).

6: 17, *κόπους μηδεὶς μοι παρεχέτω!* Dem. de republ. ordin., p. 69: *μὴ θορυβήσῃ μοι μηδεὶς!* [So also De Pace, p. 60: *καί μοι μὴ θορυβήσῃ μηδεὶς πρὶν ἀκούσαι*. The same *προδιόρθωσις*, or *anticipative* request is met with in 8, 32. 13, 3. 57, 59, ed. Bekker. — Translator.]

Ephesians.

4: 19. In the same way as ἀσελγεια, "lasciviousness," is here joined with ἀκαθαρσία, so it is found with ὕβρις, in Dem. in Mid., p. 514.

5: 12, τὰ κρυφῆ γενόμενα ὑπ' αὐτῶν αἰσχρόν ἐσσι καὶ λέγειν. The delicate aversion to make explicit mention of their shameful deeds, which is here expressed, is betrayed also by Demosthenes, e. g. in Conon., p. 729 (Κυρκε): ἃ πολλῆς αἰσχύνῃς ἔχει καὶ λέγειν, μὴ ὅτι γε (the same particles as in 1 Cor. 6: 13) ποιεῖν. Olynth. 2, p. 23: shameful deeds, οἷα ὀκνῶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὀνομάσαι.

6: 19, ἵνα μοι δοθῆ λόγος. Meyer and many commentators understand this as a supplication for Divine communication of the meaning and purport of the utterance. But such a communication Paul always needed, while he here emphasizes the fact of his being an ambassador in bonds (ἐν αἰχμασίαι). We shall, therefore, refer these words more correctly, with Wolf and others, to the opportunity for speaking, which in Col. 4: 3 is called θύρα λόγου. For Paul, when a prisoner at Cesarea, enjoyed a certain amount of liberty (Acts 24: 23), although the privilege of speaking in public was denied him; and for one, who is in bonds, it is difficult to speak with boldness. The sense, then, is as follows: "pray also for me, that an opportunity to speak be given unto me,—an opportunity, that is, of opening my mouth boldly (whenever I wish to speak) to proclaim the mystery of the Gospel, for which I am an ambassador in bonds; (pray, I say) that I may declare myself as boldly in respect of the Gospel, as I ought to speak." The close of the oration against Leptines furnishes an elucidation of the Apostle's language: "I indeed shall marvel if (θανμάζω, εἰ) you punish with death those who utter counterfeit coin, but are willing to give the word (δώσετε λόγον) to those, who make the whole city false and not trustworthy." We ourselves employ the same phrase as a parliamentary expression. Demosthenes hopes that the assembly will not confer the right of speech upon Leptines and his associates, for in this way, as the commencement of the oration informs us, the proposal of the Leptinean law was rejected without further ceremony.

Colossians.

1: 18, ἵνα γένηται ἐν πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς πρωτεύων. The ἐν πᾶσι must be neuter (as in English version), inasmuch as τὰ πάντα stands in the preceding and following context. So Dem. orat. amator., p. 1416: "consider it your interest, τὸ πρωτεύειν ἐν ἅπασιν."

2: 23, αἰτιὰ ἐστὶ λόγος μὲν ἔχοντα σοφίας. In this connection λόγος is "the show" or "seeming," strictly, "the mere word," in opposition to ἔργον, the reality. Cf. Dem. orat. 1. in Onetor., p. 570. An exact parallel is found in Dem. Leptin., p. 462: ἴσθι δὲ τοῦτο λόγον μὲν τινα ἔχον· εἰ δὲ τις ἀκριβοῶς ἐξετάσειε, ψεῦδος ἂν φανείη. Hereby is explained also James 2: 14: εἰς πίστιν λέγει τις ἔχειν, ἔργα δὲ μὴ ἔχει, where a *seeming*, i. e. an unreal, *faith* is denoted by λέγει.

First Thessalonians.

4: 11, ἡσυχάζειν καὶ πράσσειν τὰ ἴδια. Here the words of Demosthenes, exord. oration., p. 143: ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερα αὐτῶν πράττειν, seem to have presented themselves to the mind of the Apostle.

First Timothy.

1: 19, δικαίφ νόμος σὺ κείται. Kypke explains the word κείται from the fact of the laws being frequently hewn among the ancients upon tables and columns. Cf. Habakkuk 2: 11. The objection to this explanation is that these pillars did not lie, but were set upright. The expression is rather the passive of νόμον τιθέναι (whence νομοθέτης; cf. Dem. Leptin., p. 498), and is, therefore, to be rendered: "for a righteous man the law is not given." Dem. adv. Timocrat., p. 465 (Kypke): νόμοι κείνται τοῖς ἀρχουσιν.

3: 3, πάροις might be "vino deditus" (as v. §). But Chrysostom has already explained it by ὑβριστής, and as standing in opposition to ἐπιεικής, and in truth the word is used of "petulantia" and "violentia," apart from the idea of vinous intoxication. So Dem. Epist. 4, p. 1483, has employed παροῦειν in the sense of "to outrage."

5: 17, διπλῆς τιμῆς ἀξιούσθωσαι. Here τιμή is not so much "honor," as an "honorary testimony" and "reward." Dem. Leptin., p. 367: δικαίως ἠξιώθη ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς (of this honorary reward).

6: 5, διεφθαρμένοι τὸν νοῦν are "irrational, senseless men." Dem. in Olympiodor., p. 697: διεφθαρηται καὶ παραφρονεῖ.

Titus.

1: 11, οἴκους ἀνατρέπονσι. Dem. in Aristogeiton, p. 496 (Κυρκε) has the same expression: ἀνατρέπων τὴν πόλιν, "to subvert, destroy the state."

We may further mention Hebrews 13: 17, where "ἀνσιταλγής, "unprofitable," is used as a less forcible expression for "very prejudicial," exactly as in Dem. Epist., p. 1482.

What shall we say concerning these numerous parallelisms between the language of Demosthenes and Paul? That the latter imitated the former, and adorned his writings with phrases and flourishes borrowed from the great orator? Far otherwise. But that Paul derived them all by mere accident from the conversational language of his day, is perhaps just as incredible. On the contrary, the assertion seems no longer too bold, that he had read, and was familiar with, Demosthenes, the model of Greek popular eloquence, and involuntarily appropriated many of his expressions. That he should have *named* him, or any other author, whose writings he had read, no one will be so unreasonable as to expect, inasmuch as no obligation or inducement could have existed for so doing. But does not our assumption militate against the derogatory opinion which the Apostle entertained respecting eloquence in general? We will see. He affirms, it is true, in 1 Cor. 1: 17, that he does not preach ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγον, and 2: 1 ff., that he had not come with excellency of speech or wisdom, nor with approbation-seeking (πειθοῖς, compare above on Gal. 1: 10) words of wisdom, but with the simple preaching of Jesus Christ, the crucified, and with demonstration of the Spirit and of power; lastly, he asserts, 2 Cor. 11: 6, that he was indeed unlearned, not professionally versed in speech (λόγῳ), yet not so in deeper insight, in real knowledge (γνώσει). He expresses himself, as we perceive, in modest or depreciatory terms concerning the rhetorical form and finish of his language, because many of his readers (1 Cor. 3, 1) preferred, on account of the outward character and expression, the teaching of Apollos, who was a learned Hellenist of Alexandria (Acts 18: 24 ff.), yet in respect of *doctrine*, which was the same thing, he boasts of his

real knowledge. What, then, he disclaims, are laboriously excogitated flowers of oratory, or the sophistical artifices of the degenerate rhetoricians of his era, but in no way the pungent expression, strict demonstrative reasoning, and mighty mastery over human feeling, for which Demosthenes was so distinguished. That Paul, too, was esteemed by his contemporaries as a great orator, is shown by the judgment of those inhabitants of Lystra, who worshipped him as the god Hermes, "because he was the chief speaker" (Acts 14: 12). But the power of his oratory laid almost exclusively in the original and overpowering fervency with which he proclaimed the truths of salvation that had been revealed to him by God. How strong his own conviction was upon this point, is testified by the sublime passage, 2 Cor. 10: 4, in which he declares that "although he walks in the flesh, he fights not with carnal weapons, but with divine, casting down every strong hold and lofty edifice (i. e. all sophistical knowledge which exalteth itself against the knowledge of God), bringing under captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ."

Hence, then, it will be evident that the influence, which his acquaintance with Demosthenes exerted upon his language, in no way destroyed his own individuality, nor his rabbinical erudition, nor the impulse of his fiery spirit, which hurries him forward with such facility into parentheses, anacolutha, and negligent arrangement of words (Winer, *Gramm.*, p. 433), that are far from Demosthenean. How very different is his language, generally speaking, from the smooth and polished style of Philo and Josephus! These writers emulated the Greeks in all things, and sought to pass for Greeks; Paul, on the contrary, attempts nothing more than to convince both Jews and Greeks that the Gospel is the power of God unto salvation, to every one that believeth (Rom. 1: 16).

So, too, no doubt is thrown upon the *inspiration* of Paul's Epistles by the Hellenic form of expression, which to a great extent prevails therein. For it may, at the present day, be probably regarded as established, that the inspiration of the sacred writers does not exclude their individual characteristics, nor a certain amount of diligent, artistic and stilistic preparation. In favor of this opinion we may cite, for example, the metrical construction of the poetical books of the Old Testament, and in the New the artistic arrangement of the Gospel of Matthew.¹

¹ Compare my Essay upon this subject in Pelt's *theologisch. Mitarbeiten*, Bd. I.

So, too, Luke, the disciple of Paul, commences his *λόγος α'* (the Gospel) with a strictly classic period: *ἐπειδήπερ πολλοὶ ἐπεχείρησαν, κ. τ. λ.*, and in like manner his *λόγος β'* (the Acts) with: *τὸν μὲν πρῶτον λόγον ἐποιήσαμην*. Indeed, the latter draws the picture of the diffusion of Christianity from the smallest beginnings to its dominion over the whole of the then civilized world (from Jerusalem to Rome) upon so systematic a plan, and with so classic a finish, that it may truly be compared with Thucydides.

Let me now be permitted to add one closing remark. If the great Apostle was not ashamed, in furtherance of the end he had in view, to learn something from the Attic orator, can it be unbecoming for our clergy to refresh and fertilize their minds by the study of the ancient classic writers? What Luther thought upon this subject is known to all. Yet in our day it would almost seem that many preachers considered the symbolic teaching of the church to be alone worthy of their diligence; and, as a general thing, knowledge, strictly so called, is now placed by theologians far too much in the background. It would be lamentable if this tendency should continue to predominate; for a thorough historico-critical searching of the Scriptures (John 5: 39) is the life-breath of Protestantism.

ARTICLE VI.

THE GENIUS OF HEBREW AND OF ROMAN LEARNING¹

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THE claims of sacred and classical learning as an essential part of a sound and liberal education, have been so able advocated by scholars and divines, and so fully acknowledged in our college halls and churches, both in this country and in Europe, that little additional argument is necessary. Viewed mentally

¹ A Discourse delivered at the last Commencement at Madison University.