

who shall finally reject Him, shall appear to have accomplished one of the everlasting purposes of God's love. Christian preachers shall be seen to have been the instruments of its accomplishment. To the height of this great argument, they shall justify the ways of God to men.

ARTICLE IX.

BRETSCHNEIDER'S VIEW OF THE THEOLOGY OF SCHLEIERMACHER.

Translated from Bretschneider's *Handbuch der Dogmatik*, p. 93 etc. 4th edition.

THOUGH Schleiermacher never acknowledged himself a disciple of Schelling, his system has so close a relationship to the philosophy of that distinguished writer, that it is impossible not to perceive its influence. The fundamental idea, which is the starting point of his system, is his conception of religion. He maintains that religion, or, according to the expression which he usually prefers, piety, the pious affection, does not consist in knowledge, or action; but in feeling, or in a certain determination of feeling. In his view, moreover, feeling and immediate self-consciousness are identical. By feeling, says he, I understand immediate self-consciousness, as it occupies principally, though not exclusively, any portion of time, and occurs, for the most part, under the opposite forms of the agreeable and the disagreeable. He uses, therefore, feeling, consciousness, emotion as interchangeable expressions.

The common attribute of all pious feelings, and consequently, in his view, the essence of religion, is this, that a man is conscious to himself of being absolutely dependent; that is, that he feels himself dependent on the Absolute [God]. This he explains as follows: There is in man no pure self-consciousness; that is, none, in which a man is conscious of his "I" by itself. The "I" always presents itself in relation to something else, to the "not-I." Now either the feeling remains herein [in relation to the "not-I"] always entirely the same in the course or constant recurrence of the relation to the "not-I," and thus indicates the relation of dependence; or it is

changed into an inclination to opposition, and thus indicates the relation of opposing or reciprocal action. Now in all objects, and even in the whole world, as the totality of all bodily and spiritual finite being, opposition is possible and allowed. Perfect dependence, which is interrupted by no reciprocal action, supposes, therefore, simple and absolute infinity [the Absolute, God] as its object.

Against this fundamental idea of religion, which makes it consist in a feeling of absolute dependence, in which no opposition is possible, which is the corner-stone of the ingenious theological system of Schleiermacher, the following remarks may be made: Feeling and immediate self-consciousness [that is, according to the author, a consciousness inherent in man, and not first brought to him from without] are, it is true, allied to each other, but not identical. Feeling is a state of the life, commonly connected with consciousness, which supplies a permanent unity for all the feelings, thoughts and activities, but it is not necessarily the same with it. Thus in plants, and even in men in the state of sleep, fainting fits, and diseases which deprive the patient of his senses, there exists unconscious feeling. Consciousness is not feeling, but as the word itself (*bewusstsein*) denotes, the knowledge of being, which may be either a feeling, a thought, or an action. Consciousness, therefore, is the knowledge of every mode and condition of our being. In persons who are apparently dead, or who have fainted, feeling is first excited through the application of stimulants, but it may continue a long time without consciousness. But when the sick person connects the feeling with the conception of his "I," there arises a knowledge of his situation; in other words, consciousness comes back, he comes to himself; that is, the "I" has again found itself in the consciousness. Schleiermacher appears to be in error, therefore, when he represents feeling and self-consciousness as identical.

With as little propriety can it be maintained, that piety consists solely in feeling, and not in knowledge, or action. It is not mere knowledge, it is true; for this may leave the mind in a state of indifference. Neither is it mere action; for that implies the being affected by something, and thus the knowledge and feeling of an object. Piety, then, is not first nor altogether feeling, but knowledge, feeling and action united. The first element in it is knowledge. Feelings arise through the impression made upon us by some object, thereby producing pain or pleasure. In feelings having reference to the senses, there is not of necessity a previous knowledge of the object. On the contrary, the knowledge of the object may follow

the feeling. Hence the consciousness sometimes remains uncertain whence the impression which caused the feeling arose. But in respect to idea, and consequently in respect to the idea of God, the apprehension of the idea in the consciousness, or knowledge, must precede, and the feeling follow. Because the feeling refers to a conception, which as a conception must be in the mind before the influence which it has on the mind. Feeling could precede knowledge, only in case the being of God should touch the human mind before it knew God. In this case, however, a man would have only the feeling of an obscure something, not the feeling of God. This last feeling could be gained, only when the idea of God, perceived in the reason, became the subject of consciousness. The obscure feeling of an indefinite something could by no means be called piety; for, in that case, all obscure feelings might receive the same appellation. But the reference of the feeling to God implies the previous entrance of the idea of God into the consciousness. The first element of religion, therefore, is not feeling, but knowledge, or an apprehension, dark or clear, correct or incorrect, of the idea of God; which can be attained only through an exercise of the reason.

That not feeling, but rather the knowledge of God, is the original element in piety, appears also from this consideration, that we cannot come to the consciousness of absolute dependence through feeling, but only through the reflecting reason. Feeling indicates only a *present* limitation, and that this limitation cannot *at present* be overcome. But it does not decide, that the limitation may not generally, or at another time, be overcome. The feeling of dependence exists, therefore, only in the present, and is consequently only a relative, not an absolute feeling. It is only the reflection of the reason, which can refer those limitations to something absolute; since it is *à priori*, or from the reason itself, that the absolute is developed. Without the activity, the reason in forming ideas, the mere feeling of dependence might lead to materialism, as has in fact been the case.

Neither is the conception of simple and absolute infinity identical with that of God, as Schleiermacher maintains. Simple and absolute infinity cannot be eternal wisdom, goodness and justice according to this system, because the author maintains that the knowledge of God is first derived from the feeling of dependence. Absolute infinity thus remains a wholly indefinite idea, whose only characteristic is that of irresistible power. It can therefore excite in us no other feeling than that which absolute evil excites, namely, the feeling of an absolute invincible limitation of our activity, and thus fear

and trembling before such power, and sorrow on account of our entire dependence upon it. Before we can love it as good, or trust it as wise, and thus be subject to it with joy, we must perceive and know that it is good and wise; that is, reason must bring the idea of God to the consciousness. Otherwise, absolute infinity is either something empty and formless, or something terrible. Thus it appears that Schleiermacher's conception of religion can never be the foundation of a theory of the Christian faith. For Christianity represents the essence of religion as consisting in the love of God, which even casts out fear. But the love of God has only one true and pure fountain, which is, not the feeling of dependence, but the fact that the reason perceives in God [not the irresistible but] the highest good, or the sum of all perfection, and thus perfectly develops the idea of God. Religion consequently begins with knowledge. †

Finally, it is by no means certain that the feeling of absolute dependence may not exist in relation to the finite world. The author says: "In the feeling of dependence upon anything finite, even upon the whole world, opposing and reciprocal action may be conceived of as possible. To the feeling of absolute dependence, not only the divided and endlessly diversified infinity of the world, but simple and absolute infinity, excluding all opposing action, is necessary." But there is in outward nature much that admits of no opposing action on our part; for instance, the motion of the heavenly bodies, the progress of time which is thereby measured, the principle of gravity which holds the planets together, and the necessity of old age and death. Against these no opposition on our part is conceivable, unless it be called opposition for one to have at least the will to defy nature, on which he feels himself dependent. But this also may be the case in relation to the infinite God. The sinner, the hardened offender may exercise such a voluntary defiance to the Almighty will of God. Sin in general, in a comprehensive sense, is the opposition of the irreligious man to God. The feeling of absolute dependence, therefore, directs us rather to the finite world and the powers of nature than to God.

Proceeding on the foregoing fundamental idea of religion, Schleiermacher maintains, that the Absolute, on which we feel ourselves dependent in our pious affections, cannot be communicated to us in an outward manner as something opposed to us; since in that case, as in respect to the finite world, opposition would be possible. But in the feeling of dependence upon God, all opposition is excluded. Since now this feeling of absolute dependence actually exists, it fol-

lows, that it must be regarded as innate in man, consequently as a feeling immanent in the very essence of human nature. Hence it follows, that the whole consciousness of man should be an uninterrupted series of pious affections. In point of fact, however, it is found that the sensuous feeling forms a successive series of sensuous affections, and that the religious feeling may be driven back, or suppressed, though never annihilated. It is not annihilated, since in that case the connection of our being would be irrevocably destroyed. It appears, therefore, that there is in man a contradiction or antagonism; since, on the one hand, the feeling of absolute dependence should be uninterrupted, and, on the other, the sensuous feeling, or the feeling of relative dependence, forms a successive series of affections.

These positions of the author are the more important, because, on the solution of this contradiction, or antagonism in man, he founds the necessity of redemption. The feeling of absolute dependence, or the pious feeling, the author calls the God's-consciousness, or the Divine consciousness (*Gottesbewusstsein*), which is not to be confounded with the consciousness, that is, the knowledge, of God. When he maintains that this pious feeling, or Divine consciousness, is innate in man, and always existing in him, he means that it is the immanent life of God himself, manifested in man in the form of spiritual consciousness. It cannot, therefore, according to the author, come forth as anything sensible or objective, and consequently ought to be perpetual and unbroken. But this last opinion is in contradiction to the nature of feeling and consciousness. It implies an impossibility, a contradiction to nature, and consequently is without foundation. It is the nature of feeling to change. Experience teaches, that no feeling, whether sensuous or moral, is uninterrupted. For the consciousness, when it comes to a certain degree of activity, is so completely filled with one subject that every other fades from it. The learned man who is solving a problem in his science, the poet who is delineating a great character or a great destiny, or the historian who is describing a great event, has in his mind nothing but the particular subject of his contemplation. He is in the condition of the devotee, who, wholly given to the contemplation of God, entirely forgets the world, and has God only in his soul. But no one of these mental conditions can be uninterrupted and permanent; since, in that case, the consciousness would become insanity (a fixed idea), and thus the consciousness, as self-consciousness, would be destroyed. Nor will the case be different, if, with Schleiermacher, we regard the Divine consciousness as immanent in man. The sensuous and spir-

itual powers of our nature are immanent in man; but they do not on this account form uninterrupted series of sensuous and spiritual affections. Our life is neither an uninterrupted series of knowing and willing, nor of sensuous affections. For it is certain that the sensuous consciousness suffers an interruption in sleep, in fainting, and whenever the spirit is in deep meditation. It appears, then, that the proposition, that the Divine consciousness should be uninterrupted, is contrary to nature, factitious, and consequently groundless. Hence, also, the contradiction or antagonism, which the author finds in the circumstance that the sensuous consciousness tends likewise to be uninterrupted, appears to be without foundation.

Of this contradiction in the nature of man a solution is regarded as necessary. In other words, on this contradiction the author grounds the necessity of redemption as the means of life in God. The contradiction between the pious feeling, that is, the uninterrupted Divine consciousness, and the sensuous feeling, can be removed only by both feelings becoming in the same moment one; and this union can be effected only when the higher (the pious) feeling "takes up" the lower (the sensuous) feeling "into itself" [in sich aufnehmen]. The meaning of this expression is first cleared up by the following considerations: The life of God, as spiritual self-consciousness, should be immanent in us, not interrupted or disturbed by anything whatever. Such an interruption and disturbance do, however, take place, because man, as a sensuous being, has also a sensuous consciousness, which likewise tends to be permanent, that is, to constitute a personal or individual sensuous life, by which the Divine consciousness in us suffers a check or hindrance (hemmung). This will of man, as a sensuous being, to be something personal, this independent existence of the flesh, or this existence of the flesh in itself considered (fürsich-gesetzt-sein des Fleisches), and the consequent hindrance of the Divine consciousness in us, by which dissatisfaction with the same is produced, is sin, and the feeling of sin. This also appears to the mind as guilt; since every one must necessarily regard this hindrance of the Divine consciousness as his own act. But the power, with which the Divine consciousness arises within us, appears on this account as something imparted, as grace. Hence is developed in man the feeling of the necessity of redemption, or the desire to see the hindrance to the Divine consciousness removed. This redemption consists in this, that the Divine consciousness, which is sunk in the sensuous life, and thereby hindered and made impure, is freed from such oppression and made predominant. In other words,

the sensuous-personal feeling experiences such a change, that man as a sensuous being, feels himself no longer a separate, independent person, but in a common feeling regards himself as a part of that general spiritual life, which should subsist through the being of God in the form of spiritual consciousness in all men.¹

Such a life existed in Christ, who, though he had the entire sensuous nature, yet possessed within himself the Divine consciousness (the Divine nature), that is, "the pure being of God in the form of consciousness and conscious activity" (Vol. II. p. 208), which predominated over the sensuous nature in every moment of his life. Thus it was, that God became man in the Redeemer, and every moment of his being was a state of God-becoming-man, and God-made-man (*jeder moment des daseins des Erlösers war in sofern ein solches Menschwerden und Menschgewordensein Gottes*) in such a sense, that generally and always the Divine revealed itself in him through the human. Christ was thus the type of the perfect man, of man as he ought to be.

Redemption is effected partly in this way, that "the essential sinlessness of Christ comes to exist in the faith of the Christian as fellow-feeling and appropriation,"² and partly that in feeling we regard ourselves as included in that Divine collective life established by Jesus, viz. the church; whereby we renounce our sensuous personality and individuality. "Since," says the author (Vol. II. p. 252), "the inward being of our divided or separate life is only imperfection and sin, we can be conscious of our communion with Christ only when we are not conscious of our separate being [as sensuous persons, as separate, independent individuals]." "As the Redeemer was Christ [God-man] (p. 256) in so far as in no moment of his life a human consciousness arose in him of itself, but always through the inspiration and impulse of the Divine nature [the being of God in him in the form of consciousness], so we are redeemed only in so

¹ Of this definition of redemption, it is best to subjoin the original German. "Die Erlösung bestehe nun darin, dass das Gottesbewusstsein, das in das Sinnenleben versenkt und dadurch gehemmt und verunreinigt sei, von dieser anterdrückung befreit und herrschend gemacht werde, oder mit andern Worten: dass das sinnlich-personliche Gefühl eine solche Umwandlung erleide, dass der Mensch, als Sinnenwesen, sich nicht mehr als ein persönliches, Selbstständiges fühle sondern sich in Gemeingefühl als ein Theil desjenigen allgemeinen geistigen lebens fühle, das durch das Sein Gottes in der Form des geistigen Bewusstseins in allen Menschen bestehen solle."

² Dass die wesentliche unsundlichkeit Christi in dem Glauben des Christen als Mitgefühl und Aneignung sei" (Vol. II. p. 367).

far as we have no personal self-consciousness from ourselves [that is, from our sensuous individuality], but have it only from communion with the Redeemer [with the Divine consciousness, which was immanent in him and should be immanent in all men], in which communion he [that is, the Divine consciousness] who was originally the active principle, is thus the animating or inspiring principle." One who thus feels himself absorbed into the general life of God, the author calls the new man, the regenerate, the new religious personality. Accordingly he ascribes to Christ a "person-forming agency," by which, however (p. 318), the unity of the sensuous life, as such, must be destroyed. One should here call to mind the sentiment, that the development of the world is the progressive personality of God, that is, the process through which God becomes personal.

From this account we may be able to form a more definite apprehension of the otherwise unintelligible propositions of the author respecting the relation of Christians to the Redeemer; in particular, his propositions concerning the atoning agency or work of Christ. We have only to recollect that, in his view, Christ is the type of man as he should be, that is, of man in whom the feeling of the sensuous life [the human nature] is absorbed in the pious feeling [the general Divine consciousness which the author calls the Divine, and to which the personality must be sacrificed]. The atoning agency or work of Christ consists in reception to the communion of his blessedness (Vol. II. p. 259). The redeemed in their collective life with Christ stand in the same relation to him, as the human nature in him stands to the Divine. Since now the feeling of the activity of the Divine in Christ must necessarily be blessedness, it follows that reception into the life of Christ, and reception to the enjoyment of his perfect blessedness, must be one and the same thing. Moreover, as Christ, through the union of his human nature with the Divine, was at no moment filled with the consciousness of evil, and as evil still less found in him a consciousness of sin with which to connect itself, it follows that, in relation to the redeemed person who is in communion with Christ, the connection of evil with sin is at an end. There is thus for him no more punishment. He feels himself free from it; and every impression beginning as suffering, is, in the participation of the blessedness of Christ which dwells in the redeemed, changed before it reaches the inmost consciousness. The atoning work of Christ thus specially consists in the establishment for all believers of a common feeling of blessedness, in which at the same time their former personality, as the isolation of their feeling in the individuality

of their life, expires. Since now the contradiction or antagonism, which, according to our author, exists between the sensuous and the spiritual consciousness, is thus done away, sin also is done away (which consists in the will of the sensuous feeling to be an individual one¹) and consequently all evil loses the nature of punishment.

Hence also we may understand the author's view of the active obedience of Christ; on which he says (Vol. II. p. 287): "That the actions of Christ alone perfectly answer to the Divine will, or express the Divine consciousness in human nature, is the circumstance on account of which we need redemption and on account of which Christ alone is able to redeem us; so that, viewed apart from his connection with Christ, no individual man by himself, nor any particular period of the collective life of men, in and by itself, is righteous before God. But in living communion with Christ every one gives up being anything in and by himself [a person], and thus ceases to wish to be regarded by God in and by himself. He wishes to be viewed only in communion with Christ, as one animated by him, or as a part of his manifestation still in the process of development. Christ, therefore, presents man pure before God by means of his own perfect fulfilment of the Divine will [that is, because the Divine consciousness has in him swallowed up the sensuous consciousness]. This perfect fulfilment of the Divine will through our having a common life with him [through our feeling ourselves to be a part of the manifestation of the immanent Divine consciousness comprehended in its development] becomes ours also, so that in connection with him we become the objects of the Divine complacency."

The active obedience of Christ is not regarded by Schleiermacher as vicarious, but only his passive obedience. On this point he thus expresses himself in Vol. II. p. 290: "In every human community there is as much misery as sin. But every individual does not suffer the misery that stands in connection with his personal sin. Another often suffers it. Hence, on account of the mutual connection of the whole community, it may be said that one man suffers for another. Now Christ has entered into the human community, and has in this community experienced the evil which is ever the consequence of sin. Since now he was without sin, it may be said that all the evil, which he suffered in this community, was suffered for all those with whom he was connected; that is, for the whole race of man."

Hence, too, is developed the author's view of the church, as a collective life in the Divine consciousness, which life was established by

¹ Die eben darin besteht, dass das sinnliche Gefühl ein individuelles sein will.

Christ. The pervading spirit,¹ which, according to the author (p. 394), lies at the foundation of this collective life, is the Holy Spirit. This common spirit could not be developed before the departure of the Redeemer from the earth. Thus the Holy Spirit first came to believers after the death of Jesus. "The Holy Spirit (p. 446) is the union of the Divine Being [the Divine consciousness] with human nature [the sensuous consciousness of the individual personality] under the form of the common spirit [gemeingeist] which animates the collective life of believers." Thus the inspiration of Scripture is "the influence of the common-spirit upon the will of an individual in the production of a particular work." Thus the essential meaning of the Trinity is, that the second person is the being of God in Christ, and that the third is the common-spirit of the Christian church, which denotes the union of the Divine Being with human nature. Hence now we understand his seemingly strange assertion (Vol. I. p. 187), that the natural heresies of Christendom were the Docetae and Nazaraean, the Manichaeism and Pelagian. The essential element of Christianity, according to him, consists in the redemption in the person of Christ as God-man (in the sense explained above). In order to this, an essential resemblance between Christ and us is necessary. If now the essential resemblance of his human nature to us is denied, this is Docetism. If, on the other hand, the Divine nature [the predominant Divine consciousness] in him be denied, this is Nazaraeism. Since, also, it is the design of redemption to remove that which hinders the union of the sensuous consciousness with the Divine consciousness, it follows that what human nature wanted for its redemption belongs to it; that is, the capacity to instil this pious feeling of dependence into all human relations. This is denied by Manichaeism, which supposes something of itself evil, and not dependent upon God. If, on the other hand, the capacity to receive redemption is supposed to be absolute, then grace and the necessity of redemption are denied, as was done by Pelagianism.

Since God is the Divine consciousness in men, according to Schleiermacher, he has not, like most theologians, exhibited the Divine attributes in their connection, but treats of them according to the relations, in which he views the Divine consciousness in men. His whole representation of the subject falls under two heads. I. The pious feeling of dependence in itself, before any opposition exists with it. Under this head he treats, 1. of creation and providence; 2. of the eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence and omniscience of God,

¹ Der gemeingeist; that is, to use a secular term, the *esprit de corps*.

and 3. of the original perfection of nature and of man. II. The Divine consciousness, when the opposition to it is formed, which is to be removed. Under this head he treats 1. of sin, and of the holiness and justice of God; 2. of grace, of Christ, redemption, the church, the Scriptures, the ministry, the sacraments, the consummation of the church (the last things), and of the Divine attributes of love and wisdom, to which as a corollary he appends an investigation relating to the Divine Trinity.

This may be considered a sufficient statement of the fundamental views of the system of Schleiermacher, so far, especially, as they affect the principal points of the dogmatic theology of the church.

In his view of redemption, the first point of importance relates to the conflict or antagonism in man, which the author supposes to exist between the sensuous and spiritual consciousness, in which antagonism he makes sin to consist, and on which he founds the necessity of redemption. This conflict, as maintained by Schleiermacher, arises from his doctrine requiring that the Divine consciousness in man should be immanent, or that it should influence every moment of his life, although the sensuous consciousness forms likewise a successive series of affections. But this requisition, as we have seen, is unfounded, and thus a necessary conflict between the sensuous and the Divine consciousness, and the consequent hindrance of the later, appears to have no existence. This we shall show in some additional remarks.

The characteristic of consciousness is perfect unity, or the knowledge that a man in all his changes remains the same person. A man has either no consciousness of himself, or a union of his sensuous and spiritual consciousness must take place at the moment when both enter the consciousness. A sensuous and a spiritual consciousness in man, which are separate and distinct, are inconceivable. Having only the former, he would feel himself to be a mere beast, and having only the latter, he would feel himself to be entirely God. The opinion cannot be maintained, therefore, that the spiritual or Divine consciousness ought so to absorb the sensuous into itself, as that a man can no more feel himself to be a sensuous individual. As man he must have both consciousnesses alike. A natural and permanent separation between the sensuous and the spiritual consciousness is conceivable only on the Manichean ground of regarding the sensible world as something in itself evil and opposed to God. But if the sensible world and the sensuous consciousness are the work of the Creator, then is the sensuous consciousness as truly Divine, condi-

tioned by God, and dependent on him, as the spiritual. It cannot, therefore, stand in natural conflict with the being of God, or the Divine consciousness in us. Besides, it must be in conflict with God himself; since the being of the Creator is the form of spiritual consciousness in us, and the hindrance which thence arises must thus be experienced in relation to the Divine consciousness, so far as it is in God, as truly as it must, so far as it is in man. This supposed conflict can only take place when, on the principle of the Manichaeans, we attribute to the sensible world a nature and activity independent of the Divine will. But the principle of Manichaeism, Schleiermacher would be far from admitting.

Still less, in reference to moral considerations, can this natural and necessary conflict between the sensuous and Divine consciousness be admitted. Sensuousness and reason, being united in one being, stand, considered as impulses to action, in a mutual relation to each other. Their relation to each other is then only unnatural and sinful, when the one will not acknowledge the claims and intimations of the other. It is then, that sin and discord in the inner man first arise. If they were in themselves conflicting and contradictory, then must the conflict and contradiction be charged upon the Creator, and lie in his own essence. In the first place, as to the impulses of the sensuous life, they are not in the least contradictory to the Divine consciousness in us. Reason must regard all the requirements of the sensuous nature, in themselves considered, as right, and therefore place the satisfaction of them in the number of human duties. Otherwise, sensuous impulses would belong to absolutely forbidden and immoral affections. Reason lays no claim alone to fill the consciousness, alone to be the motive to action, and to aim to remove the sensuous impulse as something in conflict with herself. Otherwise reason would be a disease, yea, it would be insanity. All that she requires is, that the impulses and energies of the sensuous nature should not come into conflict with her own existence and claims. When this is the case, sin begins. On the other hand, as the rational stands in necessary connection with the sensuous life, it follows that reason also sins when she denies the natural rights of the sensuous life, and aims to oppose it in its legitimate activity. Being naturally connected with a sensuous life, she cannot be absolute without destroying her own individuality. Thus the requirement of Schleiermacher, that a man should give up his own personality, and fuse it into a general Divine consciousness, becomes impossible. This doctrine that the sensuous life stands in necessary conflict with the spir-

itual, and the attempt to make the spiritual element absolute, were the legitimate foundation of the unnatural monkish morality, which occasioned such abuses of life, as often terminated in a refined self-murder. Nor do those cases form an exception, in which we are under obligation to risk and sacrifice our sensuous life as a duty. For these duties are incident to man only so far as he lives in a community, and have, therefore, as their remote end the preservation of the common life. If then there is and should be no sensuous life by itself, as little should this be the case with respect to the spiritual life. If then there is no natural conflict or antagonism between them, of course no redemption from such a conflict or antagonism is necessary.

The same judgment must be formed concerning Schleiermacher's doctrine of sin and grace. He says (Vol. II. p. 6): "The distinctive peculiarity of Christian piety consists in this, that we feel conscious that the repugnance of our sensuous affections to receive the Divine consciousness into them, is our own act, but that our fellowship with God is something imparted to us by the Redeemer. Every part of life which, regarded as a whole, is our own act, without having the Divine consciousness in it, is sin. But the ability to develop this consciousness, as being imparted, is grace." But the sensuous life as well as the Divine consciousness is felt in our consciousness to be imparted. Our consciousness affirms that our whole life, sensuous as well as spiritual, has a beginning and is dependent in relation to nature or to God. Hence the author, in his doctrine of original or hereditary sin, has been obliged to represent the sensuous nature as something imparted. But our consciousness testifies, that particular affections arise either from our own inward activity, or from the impressions of outward things. It never refers them to God. He is never felt immediately as a cause, and can only be inferred to be such by the reason. Besides, experience instructs us, that we are more dependent upon ourselves in the excitement of the Divine consciousness than in that of the sensuous affections; the latter being often forced upon us with irresistible power by outward objects. If then the sensuous affection is our own act, still more so is the spiritual.

With as little propriety can it be maintained, that every part of life which is our own act, without being accompanied by the Divine consciousness, is sin. That part of life, which the mathematician devotes to a problem, the artist to his work and the mechanic to his labor, may be wholly separated from the Divine consciousness with-

but partaking of the nature of sin ; just as that part of life which is devoted to a speculative theory of the Divine consciousness is not, on that account, grace. Moreover, if the being of God in man, in the form of consciousness, is merely something imparted, then the want of it can be no sin ; at least it can involve no guilt. No one is responsible for not having what has not been imparted to him, and which he cannot have unless it be imparted. The author, therefore, in order to give to sin a moral character, thus modifies his definition of it (Vol. II. p. 18) : " In general, we have the consciousness of sin, when our self-consciousness is, in consequence of the presence of the Divine consciousness, in a state of dissatisfaction." But by this definition, the matter is entirely changed. It is now, not the mere absence of the Divine consciousness from any moment of life, which constitutes sin, but the manner in which the presence of the Divine consciousness is felt. According to this, sin arises, not from an original incongruity between the sensuous and Divine consciousness, that is, from the circumstance that each forms a successive series of separate affections, and aims to prevail exclusively of the other, but from a subjective feeling of dissatisfaction caused by the presence of the Divine consciousness. Thus the author has abandoned all which he has before maintained concerning the original antagonism between the sensuous and Divine consciousness, or set it aside as useless. He might have omitted all which he has said about the one or the other consciousness considered by itself, and what is connected with it, and have set out from this position, that the sensuous consciousness, when the Divine consciousness is present to it, is in a state of dissatisfaction, and that this is a state of sin, from which redemption is to be sought. But, independently of these considerations, this new definition of sin is unsatisfactory. It would follow from it, that the very condition which the author regards as the most sinful, namely, that in which the Divine consciousness is wholly wanting, is not at all sinful. For in that case the dissatisfaction, which according to the author is produced by the presence of the Divine consciousness, could not exist. Thus the man, sunk in sin, who has either extinguished the Divine consciousness, or so enfeebled it that it creates in him no dissatisfaction, would, according to this definition, have no sin. It would also follow that the pious man, who, under the influence of the Divine consciousness, subjects himself to great pain, and thus to the feeling of dissatisfaction, comes into a state of sin. Thus the author, by his second definition of sin, has introduced what is foreign to his speculation.

In the third place, what the author has said in relation to original sin, is peculiarly foreign to his system. It is introduced solely on account of the system of the church. The author is thus obliged to abandon the path of psychological speculation, on which his system is founded, and to enter the province of outward experience; from which nothing can be concluded in relation to inward self-consciousness. He maintains (Vol. II. p. 163) that sin is not essential to human nature, but that on the original consciousness of human nature has been implanted both the possibility of a sinless development, and also the possibility of sin. This last is occasioned by "the onesidedness of the race and the inequality of the affections or propensities, in consequence of which the Divine consciousness may be overpowered by sin and sunk in it." Should this be conceded to the author, it would inevitably follow, since he does not by any means suppose a deterioration of human nature commencing with origin and progressive in its course, and a change of its original type, that both possibilities may be alike realized, one perhaps oftener than the other. For a possibility, which is limited by a permanent talent, which can never be in a state of action, must be an impossible possibility, that is, nothing. One cannot, therefore, without surprise, observe how the author seeks to help himself in explaining how it is, that in all human individuals only the possibility of sinning is realized. He says (Vol. II. p. 25 etc.): "The disproportionate exercises of the different functions and tendencies of sensuousness in each individual against the higher activity of the spirit [the Divine consciousness], are founded on an innate difference in these tendencies in each individual, which contributes to constitute his personal constitution. We may see that differences of this kind propagate themselves in races and in the formation of new families by the union of different races. We may also see such differences permanent in great masses of men, as the peculiarities of tribes and nations." "Every race of men (p. 89), every people, every tribe and every family, has its particular traits of onesidedness, which being transmitted and renewed in it form sinful tendencies." Now these assertions are wholly empirical. Consciousness affirms nothing in relation to them. They are, therefore, without support from, and connection with, the system of the author, resting upon the analysis of consciousness. Experience can never prove that onesidedness and incongruities of the sensuous nature were implanted in the first men, which were developed, and became permanent, defective types only in the progress of time. On the contrary, all history teaches that the sensuous nature of men is

in all ages and all nations reproduced according to one constant type, and that the minor differences which go under the name of constitution, national character, etc., are as often directed to good as to evil. It is, on the contrary, the spiritual principle within us, in which different ages and nations manifest the greatest difference. The sensuous nature has, as in animals and plants, its unchangeable type, according to which, without our agency, it is generated and formed. The sensuous nature, accordingly, comes in general into vigorous maturity spontaneously, independently of our will. It is quite otherwise with the spiritual life. This grows only through instruction and education, and not without our own exertions. It is, therefore, shown to be sometimes progressive, sometimes retrograde, and sometimes stationary, in different nations and ages. The reason, therefore, assigned by Schleiermacher, why only the possibility of sin is realized, cannot possibly be well founded.

This conclusion was in fact felt by the author, who retracts what he has here said, when he comes to speak of the sinlessness of the Redeemer in its relation to the sinlessness of the first man. In order to ascribe a true humanity to the Redeemer, and to establish the possibility of redemption [the unlimited dominion of the Divine consciousness in man], the author was obliged (p. 25 and 163) to suppose the possibility of the wholly sinless development of men in general. Since now he ever regards the Divine consciousness as grace, that is, as imparted, the question arises, how it is that the exclusive dominion of the Divine consciousness could be realized only in the soul of the second Adam, and not in that of the first, and of his posterity. No answer can be given, except that it must be attributed to grace, to its being imparted. This answer the author has in fact given (Vol. II. p. 198), when he says: "The gift of the Spirit [the Divine consciousness] to the human race, which was implanted in the first Adam, was insufficient, or inadequate (*unzureichende*), so that the spirit remained sunk in sensuousness, and scarcely manifested itself for a moment. But in the second Adam the work is completed by a second, but equally original gift, which stands related to the first as a second momentum, or higher power" (p. 170). Well, then, the fault lies not, as the author first maintained, in the imperfect type in which the sensuous nature had formed itself, but in the circumstance that grace was not imparted, in sufficient measure; and consequently the Creator, through an original parsimony, imposed upon himself the labor of redemption through Christ, which

he might and should in reason have spared himself. With respect to this view, however, the following dilemma occurs.

Either God intended, according to the supposition of the author, that the Divine consciousness should form an unbroken continuance of the feeling of absolute dependence, and should take up and absorb into itself the feeling of the sensuous life, or he did not intend it. In the first case, he must with the end have willed also the means, that is, he must have implanted in man a Divine consciousness *adequate* to this object. For a later bestowment of it through Christ, if understood to have been originally in the Divine counsels, must be regarded as a mere aid and amendment to the original gift. If, on the other hand, the Creator did not intend that the sensuous consciousness should be absorbed by the Divine, then no second Adam, no participation of a higher power, no redemption would be necessary to such a condition; for God appoints no means for that which he does not will.

In the fifth place, the speculative theory of the author relating to the God-man, or the Divine and human nature in Christ, is untenable in itself, and irreconcilable with the New Testament. What the author understands by this doctrine, has been already stated. He has now to show how it is that, in a life truly human, the Divine consciousness should exclusively influence all the moments of that life. On this point he thus expresses himself (Vol. II. p. 187): "The Divine consciousness of the Redeemer was imparted to him as to all men originally, and not first in the course of his education. But in the beginning, that is, in his earliest childhood, it existed in him only as an unconscious power. During its development, it exerted its influence over the sensuous consciousness to that degree only, in which it was itself developed. But the force with which it pervaded and influenced everything, was never doubtful or in conflict. In every moment, the growing Divine consciousness controlled, in the most perfect manner, all the developments of the sensuous life, so that no action of the life of Jesus could have proceeded from sensuousness alone.

Although the author understands by the Divine consciousness, not the consciousness of God, that is, the knowledge of him, but "the being of God in man in the form of consciousness and conscious activity," still a Divine consciousness, which may exist in man as an unconscious power, sounds very much like the expression *wooden iron*. For if the Divine consciousness is the form of spiritual consciousness and conscious activity, then it cannot be an unconsciously working

power. When it does not exist as consciousness, it does not exist at all. The author, therefore, has here essentially changed his view, and conceives of the Divine consciousness only as a Divine instinct, which, like that of animals, acts unconsciously, or as a natural talent. The Divine consciousness in Christ becomes thereby something which has not the least connection with moral duty. In this way, if the sinlessness of Jesus is regarded not as the work of his freedom, but of a Divine and necessary instinct mightier at every moment than all the sensuous affections, he ceases to be the type of believers. For they receive from Adam only an "inadequate" gift of the Divine consciousness. He is now no longer a man, but a God, whom man may reverence, but not imitate.

The course of the development of Jesus, which is maintained by the author, is also contradictory to all human experience, according to which the sensuous consciousness in a real man always develops itself before the natural consciousness. It is only in conformity with the Apollonian hypothesis, according to which the Divine nature in Christ takes the place of the human soul, that the opinion of the author can be maintained. By his doctrine, in fact, he reverses the law of the Creator. By the law of the Creator man begins with the sensuous consciousness. At a later period, the Divine consciousness in him follows, and the full dominion of the last over the first is the end of his destination and development. But the author requires that man should stand at this end immediately from his birth, and have no moment of his life in which the Divine consciousness does not prevail throughout. Thus he virtually declares a law of the Creator to be sin, original sin, and makes redemption by Christ consist in redemption from this law.

The view of the author is also inconsistent with the Gospel history. There are recorded moments in the life of Jesus when he felt, and actually was, in conflict, as a man; and consequently, according to the theory of the author, sinned. For even if we put out of view the temptation of Christ at the beginning of his ministry, which is probably a parabolic representation of an inward temptation which could not have proceeded from the Divine consciousness, there yet remains to be explained, the conflict of spirit which he experienced in the garden of Gethsemane; a subject to which the author does not allude. The prayer, "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me!" could not have proceeded from "the being of God in Christ in the form of consciousness." There is also to be added the exclamation: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me!" which cer-

tainly cannot be set aside by the unsatisfactory remark (p. 296), that, although it is to be regarded as Christ's own exclamation, it is to be considered only as the deepest expression of sympathy. This is an arbitrary interpretation. The express words: "He began to be sorrowful and very heavy" (Matt. 26: 37) and "My soul is exceeding sorrowful even to death" (v. 38), testify against the author's explanation. In Hsb. 5: 7, 8, we also read *ἔμαθε τῆς ὑπακοῆς*, he learned obedience, as a son, amid cries, lamentations and sufferings; a representation which certainly implies conflict.

If what has been said be well founded, it follows that redemption, in the sense in which it is explained by the author, is neither necessary nor real. Nor can it be accomplished by the redeemed in the manner set forth by the author. The Christian, according to him, must give up the feeling of his own sensuous individuality, and be conscious of being only a part, a manifestation, of the general Divine life of the spirit. This has been already shown, in the remarks on the philosophy of Schelling,¹ to be impossible. The author has also conceded that the dissolution of the unity of the sensuous life, and thus redemption from sin, cannot be accomplished in the life on earth, and that sin consequently cannot come to an end. But, according to this doctrine, one cannot perceive why redemption, which has reference to living men, was ordained; or why there should be any need of a living person, Christ, in whom it was accomplished. In order to excite men to strive after it, it would have been as effectual a way, if God had taught us by any prophet what the author has unfolded with so much ingenuity.

¹ In a part of Dr. Bretschneider's work which is not translated.