

lations of God, with a feeling that they all bear the impress of the same Master mind.

Especially is this subject worthy of the attention of those who minister at the altar. Says Hugh Miller: "The battle of the evidences will have as certainly to be fought on the field of physical science as it was contested in the last age on that of the metaphysics." If so, it certainly becomes those set for the defence of Zion to gather their munitions of war and hold themselves ready to do battle for the Lord of Hosts. They cannot do this effectually without a general knowledge of the mode of attack and of the means of resistance. They cannot do it without a thorough acquaintance with the natural sciences.

ARTICLE V.

ON THE USE OF THE PREPOSITION *εἰς* IN THE PHRASES *εἰς κατάκριμα* AND *εἰς δικαίωσιν ζωῆς* IN ROM. 5: 18.

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THE difficulty that has been felt in the interpretation of this passage has been to render it in simple accordance with those teachings of Scripture which affirm that a portion of mankind will fail of justification and eternal life. Commentators who have dealt with it, may be ranged in three classes.

1. Those who hold with McKnight, that the "condemnation" (*κατάκριμα*) is limited to temporal death, and that the "justification" (*δικαίωσις*) is simply antithetic; extending no further than to that respite which mankind enjoy from immediate death, and that restoration from the dominion of death that awaits them in the resurrection.

2. Those who maintain with Chalmers, that the *πάντας ἀνθρώπων*, here said to be involved in the calamity of the fall, are not identical with the *πάντας ἀνθρώπων* upon whom "came the free gift unto justification of life;" the former denoting "all men," in the widest sense, as represented by Adam; while the latter is restricted to the "all men" of all nations and kindreds and people and tongues who were represented by Christ, i. e. the elect.

3. Those who maintain with Calvin, that whatever is affirmed in

either part of this passage, is affirmed of "all mankind," in the common and obvious sense of the terms; but understand the latter affirmation to mean nothing more than that salvation is provided for all, and freely offered to all.

The first of these explanations seems to have found but few advocates, and may probably now be regarded as obsolete.

The two that remain have ranged the great army of commentators in opposing ranks of nearly equal strength. And the blows which each has dealt at the fabric of the other, seem to us to have left little to be desired by those who would rejoice in the demolition of both. It has been shown, on the one side, that if πάντας ἀθρώπους means literally "all men," in the first member of the passage, it cannot in the same argument, and the same sentence, have so lost its proper significance as to denote only a part of mankind; especially, as there is nothing in the grammatical construction to indicate such a change.

With equal clearness, it has been shown, on the other side, that δικαίωσις ζωῆς cannot be restricted to the mere idea of the provision and proffer of salvation. The present argument does not contemplate putting either of these *verba vexata* to the torture anew; and we are happy to leave them to their easy repose in the most ordinary and obvious meaning which the reader of the authorized version gives them.

The question before us is, simply, what extent of meaning is to be attributed to the preposition εἰς in the expressions εἰς κατάκριμα and εἰς δικαίωσις in this passage. If it can be shown that εἰς does not of necessity denote the actual attainment of the end to which it points, but only a tendency toward it—a tendency which counteracting causes may interrupt and defeat—the entire difficulty is removed. The most rigid orthodox will consent that "all men" shall mean "all men," and that "condemnation" and "justification" shall mean precisely what they ought to mean.

1. Let us go back, then, to the primary use of εἰς after verbs of motion, and see if it is applicable in cases where it is not intended to be affirmed that the end is reached.

In Luke 13: 22, the English version has so rendered it as to indicate nothing more than *progress* in the direction specified. "He went through the cities and villages teaching, and journeying *toward* (εἰς) Jerusalem." A similar rendering would better express the sense of Luke 19: 28: "He [Christ] went before going up *toward* Jerusalem." The movement which it describes, terminated, as we learn from the next verse, before he reached Jerusalem.

In the parable of the good Samaritan, it is said: "A certain man went down from Jerusalem (*εἰς Ἱερουσόμην*) toward Jericho." This man did not reach Jericho. He was waylaid and disabled by robbers, who found the fastnesses of that lonely and rocky thoroughfare exceedingly convenient for their purpose. The Samaritan was "journeying" (*ὁδευῶν*) when he found him. In each of these cases, the meaning of *εἰς* is correctly expressed by the English preposition "toward." It has reference to a movement that was interrupted before the terminus indicated was reached. Of course, *εἰς* does not, in the case of verbs of motion, by its own proper force, determine whether the end to which it points is attained.

2. Let us now advance a step further, and see if it is not used tropically with the same latitude, i. e. if it is not used to denote a tendency toward an end, without rendering it certain that the end is attained. We affirm nothing new when we take the ground that it is used to express the aim or design with which anything is said to be, or to be done. The lexicons have said this. And examples clearly decisive of the point might be cited from a great variety of sources. Such are the following. Iliad, 8, 376: *εἰς πόλεμον θεσπέζομαι*. "I will arm for the war." Rom. 13: 4: "He is the minister of God to thee (*εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν*) for good;" also "a revenger or punisher (*εἰς ὀργήν*) for wrath to him that doeth evil." Rom. 15: 4: "Wheat written for our instruction." 2 Cor. 10: 8: "Our authority which the Lord hath given us for edification, and not for your destruction." In each of these examples, the force of *εἰς* is chiefly contained in the simple idea of aim, intention, or purpose. This is too obvious to require argument.

We next adduce a class of examples which furnish a kind of transition from this use of *εἰς* to the one which we propose to establish; a class in which it is not easy to say which is predominant, the idea of aim, or that of tendency. Rom. 1: 5: "We have received grace and apostleship (*εἰς ὑπακομήν*) for obedience, or to promote obedience, to the faith among all nations." 1: 11: "That I may impart unto you some spiritual gift (*εἰς τὸ στηριχθῆναι ὑμᾶς*) for your being established." 8: 28: "All things work together (*εἰς ἀγαθόν*) for good, to them that love God." 1 Cor. 11: 17: "Ye come together (*οὐκ εἰς τὸ κρεῖττον, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ ἥττον*) not for the better, but for the worse." We have in these passages the idea even of an inherent fitness in the cause, or of an actual working toward the given end, as well as the design or aim to secure it.

Our next advance brings us directly to the point on which our

main argument turns. We are to show a use of *εἰς*, in which it indicates simply tendency, irrespective of design. The following examples are submitted. Luke 21: 13: "It, i. e. the persecution just predicted, shall turn to you *for* a testimony." Here the very form of the statement (*ἀποβήσεται*, "it shall turn") denotes a deflecting of the operating cause from the original design; and *εἰς* expresses a tendency in an entirely different direction. The same reasoning is applicable to the next example. Phil. 1: 19: "This," i. e. the attempt to add affliction to the Apostle's bonds, "shall turn to me (*εἰς σωτηρίαν*) for salvation." Its real tendency, or working, would be for good, instead of the evil designed.

A formula much resembling this, occurs Phil. 1: 12: "The things which happened to me, have fallen out rather (*εἰς προκοπήν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου*) for the furtherance of the Gospel." His sufferings at Rome instead of checking the advance of the Gospel, which was the result intended, were operating to promote it. Here, again, *εἰς* affirms a tendency which is irrespective of, and in opposition to, the aim indulged. Rom. 2: 4: "Not knowing that the goodness of God incites thee (*εἰς μετάνοιαν*) toward repentance." Here the tendency coincides with the design, it is true, but the idea of design or aim is not prominent. It is the appropriate influence or tendency of the Divine goodness to incite toward repentance. Rom. 7: 10: "The commandment which was ordained for life, I found to be (*εἰς θάνατόν*) for death." Here is another plain case in which the idea of tendency expressed by *εἰς*, is manifestly dissociated from that of design. The design or aim of the commandment is declared in the most explicit terms to be the direct opposite of its alleged tendency.

Let us now review the several steps of the argument, and note its bearing on Rom. 5: 18.

1. *Εἰς* often denotes, in its most primary use after verbs of motion, simply *progress toward* the terminus that is indicated; a progress that may or may not be interrupted. So that *εἰς* does not of itself render it certain that the terminus to which it points is actually reached.

2. To prove an analogous feature in its tropical use, it has been shown, (a) that it is used where nothing more is indicated than the aim or purpose to attain a given end; (b) where both an *aim* and a *tendency* toward the securing of the given end are indicated, and (c) where such a tendency alone is indicated, irrespective of any corresponding aim or purpose.

All that is material to the point before us, is contained in the last

distinction, and in the fact that *eis* does not, in either of these uses, determine that the end to which it points, is actually attained. If we know, in any given case that it was attained, we arrive at that knowledge by other means than any conclusive signification of *eis*.

Applying these results to Rom. 5: 18, we find the passage at once relieved of the difficulty which has led to those forced and unreasonable constructions cited in the introduction of this Article. If we supply the ellipsis, indicated by the italics, as in the common version, and render *eis* by "for," as our translators have often done, instead of "unto," the passage will read: "Therefore, as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men for condemnation, even so, by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men for justification of life;" i. e. as the judgment that fell upon the race in consequence of the sin of Adam, works fearfully toward the condemnation of all men, in like manner, the gratuitous salvation bestowed through the righteousness of Christ, has a potency, and in some sort, an actual working toward the justification of all men.

If, instead of *κρίμα ἦλθεν* and *χάρισμα ἦλθεν*, which are supplied by our translators, and are not well suited to the simplicity of the passage, we adopt the more natural suggestion of Winer and supply *ἀπέβη*, the sense of the text becomes still more obvious, and its connection with the entire argument more apparent. This will give us the formula actually adopted in Luke 21: 13 and Phil. 1: 19. And adopting the rendering of the authorized version in those passages, we obtain the following: "Therefore, as by the offence of one, it turned in regard to all men, for condemnation, even so, by the righteousness of one, it turned in regard to all men for justification of life." Or in a brief paraphrase: "As there results, from the offence of one, somewhat that works toward the condemnation and ruin of all men, in like manner, there results, from the righteousness of one, somewhat that works toward the justification and salvation of all men." The emphatic words, in this verse, as is apparent from the course which the argument of the Apostle takes, are "all men." In v. 15, where he begins his contrast of the act of Adam with that of Christ, he presents them in their nature; the one as a death-dealing work, and the other as securing an overflowing abundance of grace. Of the extent of either, he says nothing definite. It is sufficient for his purpose to say that their influence is widely felt; operating upon "many."

In v. 16, he adopts a single offence as the measure of their efficiency. The one, operating for condemnation, had the potency of a single offence; the other, operating for justification, had a potency

above "many offences;" for, by its justifying power, it does the "many offences" away.

In v. 17, the one is represented as erecting a single throne, and giving empire to death; the other, as establishing many thrones; and elevating to kingdoms of "life," not one, but *many*; *all* those "who receive the abundance of grace" provided in the Gospel.

In v. 18, he declares the one, with the large superiority already claimed, to be adapted to as wide a range as the other. The one has an inherent fitness and tendency to reach as far as the other. As the one, if uncounteracted by remedial grace, would secure the condemnation and ruin of "all men," so the other, if unresisted by human perverseness, would secure justification and eternal life to "all men."

In v. 19, he fortifies this declaration of the tendency of the one to secure universal condemnation and perdition, and of the other to secure universal justification and life, by the consideration that human experience affords numerous *examples*, in which each of these tendencies is fully carried out, and its potency proved by the actual attainment of the end to which it points. As by the disobedience of one, many were permanently, irreclaimably (for *κατα* is doubtless intensive here) made sinners, so by the obedience of one, shall many be established forever in righteousness."

This renders the argument of the Apostle at once consistent, consecutive and plain. He presents two operating causes in contrast, the one as hostile to man and deadly, the other as benign, gracious, and largely abundant; the one as limited in its importance to the magnitude and potency of a single offence, the other as having a value commensurate with a multitude of offences; the one as imparting a sceptre to death, the other as bestowing innumerable crowns and thrones in the world of life; the one as having as real a tendency to bless and save the entire race of man as the other has to condemn and destroy them; and each, as proving the power of this tendency to boundless good or evil, by numerous examples of triumphant success.

The advantages of this interpretation are, that, besides suiting the logical exigencies of the passage, it attributes to no important word, nor to any word, an unusual or improbable meaning; it does no violence to the laws of language, and solves in a natural and easy way the problem suggested by the analogy of faith; annihilating at once the difficulty which other interpretations have only raised into importance.