

genuineness; and 4. That it would be far more difficult to show, both in general and in particulars, how an impostor could have prepared three such epistles as these are, both in contents and in form, and foisted in the name of the Apostle Paul, than it is to prove their genuineness. No evidences for their post-apostolic origin exist; they accordingly hold their place in the Canon as Pauline epistles.

## ARTICLE V.

### HICKOK'S RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

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[Concluded from p. 217.]

THE rapid sketch we proposed to make of this work was brought down, in the previous number, to the Second Division of the Second Part, or the Understanding in its Objective Law. The survey then taken of the first portion will give the reader a fair view of the writer's method. It may, therefore, be sufficient here to state in the most cursory manner, that the general plan is carried out, in all the mental departments, with the same rigid intellectual symmetry. The investigation of the understanding in its idea is concluded by two chapters of the highest interest — "The *à priori* Principles in a Nature of Things," and an "Exposition of False Systems of a Universal Nature." We have then, as in the sense, The Understanding in its Objective Law, followed by an ontological demonstration of the valid being of the notional and its objects.

The same method again meets us in the study of the Reason. We have, first, the idea, secondly, the law, and thirdly, the ontological demonstration of the absolute verity of those objects of which reason takes direct and exclusive cognizance, or, in other words, of the supernatural. The sense envisages, or distinguishes quality and conjoins quantity in space into phenomena; the understanding substantiates, by connecting phenomena into a nature of things; the reason gives meaning to, and comprehends, the whole operation of both, and the objects of both.

To comprehend nature, we must obtain for nature an origin and an

end, and thus some existence, not only before nature, and above nature, but reaching beyond it. In the sense we had the pure intuition, in the understanding, the pure notional, and here we must attain the pure idea, or the ideal. This must rise above space and time, and because it would comprehend the natural must be supernatural (ch. II.). Again,—in the sense we found our first *à priori* position in the primitive intuition of space and time remaining indestructible for the intellect after the abstraction of all that has come into consciousness through sensation; in the understanding we took our second *à priori* position on the notion of the space-filling force, remaining indestructible for the intellect after a like abstraction of everything involved in the conceptions of substance and causality that had come to us through experience; and here, in the reason, we obtain our third and highest *à priori* position in an idea which resolves into its own simplicity the duality of the space-filling force, and gives origin to the substance of nature. This is the idea of The Absolute.

Next for the elements of comprehension. Here the trine method again presents itself. In the sense operation of conjunction, the three *à priori* elements were unity, plurality, and totality. In the operation of connection in the understanding they were found to be, 1st, substance in space or source and event in time, 2nd, cause and effect, and, 3rd, reciprocity in action and reaction. In like manner the elements of this higher operation of comprehension are found to be, pure spontaneity, pure autonomy, and pure liberty. Pure spontaneity is simple act standing above all conditions of force, and thus not under a necessity as nature; although essential to personality it is not of itself sufficient for it. Pure autonomy is end above nature, a law to its own action found in the behest of its own intrinsic worthiness. In the syntheses of these three is found something distinct from both, making the third element, or pure liberty. In these we have a completed personality determined *à priori* to the Absolute (Sec. II.); and in this pure personality of the Absolute we have the *à priori* comprehension of nature. This pure personality, we may remark, altogether transcends the first cause of the naturalist, and this comprehension of nature is a distinct thing altogether transcending all natural science. It is a comprehension of nature, not only in its beginning, but in its continuance and its consummation. It is the highest rationality that the Absolute Reason be himself the end of all ends. This is, too, the opposite of pantheism. It is pure holiness, or perfect separation from nature, not only as originating power, but also in the finalities, whether moral or artistic, for which it acts. It is,

in other words, in the language of the Bible, the catechisms, and the old theology, — the glory of God.

To sum up then briefly the substance of several sections — Sense conjoins into phenomena, but cannot tell whence they came, nor whither they go, — in other words what they are. The understanding connects phenomena in their substances and causes, but cannot tell what they mean. Something within us affirms that they have a meaning, and that this meaning and the elements of its comprehension, may be thus found in the ideal of an Absolute Personality and finite personalities, and the relations existing between them, — in other words, in God, the soul, and immortality.

Thus we have the reason in its idea. We have, or may have, this ideal comprehension of nature and the universe. It is a glorious idea. Without it existence is an enigma, nature thick darkness, and man a dream. To some minds there would be, in this thought alone, proof abundant of its objective realization. But in the consummation of his admirably sustained scheme, the author next proceeds to an examination of the facts which go to verify this idea in its objective law. These are traced, 1st, in respect to a finite, and, 2nd, The Absolute Personality. Under both of these, without noticing the divisions and subdivisions in which they are arranged, we have aesthetic facts, mathematical facts, philosophical facts, psychological facts, and higher than all, ethical facts. There are, moreover, the ready assent to the fact of final causes in nature as a reaching forth to something beyond nature, although it may not carry us out of nature, — the easy recognition, in all ages of miraculous interpositions, — the order of nature's formation by a combining of natural development with the addition, from time to time, of new forces from the supernatural, as evinced in geological facts, — the recognition of a free personality in humanity — the comprehending facts of an ethical system. In these we have the reason in its law.<sup>1</sup>

To the whole is appended an ontological demonstration of the solid being of the supernatural as deduced from the harmony of such a law of facts with such an idea. It is briefly presented under three heads, the valid existence of God, the valid being of the soul, and the validity of the soul's immortality. For the valid being of the soul, there are two sources of argumentation. 1. The fact of a comprehending agency. 2. The facts as given in an ethical experience. For the

<sup>1</sup> In this, which is one of the most interesting sections of the work, the author has anticipated some of the most striking arguments of a late remarkable volume entitled "The Footprints of the Creator."

valid existence of God, there are three lines of demonstration. 1. The fact that all atheistic speculations are from the autonomy of the discursive faculty as understanding. 2. The fact of new forces originating in nature. 3. The fact that an ethical system is in being. For the soul's immortality, the line of argument is briefly this: God is,—a future state, in view of the moral demands of this soul, *ought* to be; the existence of God is a guarantee that what *ought* to be, *will* be. And thus we have the science of our entire being, including the functions of the sense, the understanding, and the reason: in other words, a *Rational Psychology*.

On the argument against the materialist, we have already dwelt. The confutation of the idealist is a work of far more difficulty. We will state concisely what, unless we have utterly mistaken his meaning, we must regard as the substance of the author's proof of an objective world, as given under both the sense and the understanding. He shows how perception is possible, and how, if it is at all, it must be. The same demonstration is given in respect to an experience. If there is an objective world, thus, and thus, will its phenomena be perceived by us, and thus, and thus, will its things and events, its substances and causalities, become the objects of our experience. Sensation and experience have put us in a position to construct such a proof, but the proof, when found, is also found; just as conclusively, not to depend for its certainty on either, but to exist in indissoluble connection with certain intuitions, notions, or knowledges, which we cannot separate from the mind itself, and which we cannot even conceive of as separate. Hence, such proof, *in regard to the soul*, is justly called *à priori* and necessary.

But, secondly—thus do we actually perceive; and such is really our experience. The objective law which we find the soul actually following, corresponds precisely to the *à priori* idea which had before been thus conclusively proved, as not only a possibility, but the only possible process. But this involves the conception of an external world as a necessary part of the ideal theory. The objective world, therefore, which *seems* to enter into the actual perception and experience, is as real and necessary a part of such experience, as the hypothetical or ideal objective world (if we may use the strange expression) which actually entered, and necessarily entered into the *à priori* idea (thus found) of the sense and the understanding.

This certainly proves that an objective world *may* be; but does it show that it actually *is*? One cause is adequate to the effect; does this exclude every other? Is the actuality, and, in a certain sense,

the objectivity, of the perceiving and experiencing, the actuality or reality of their apparent objects? In other words, does the hypothetical objectivity necessarily make perception and experience what they are, or might they not have been, or is it impossible to show that they might not have been, just what they are without any corresponding real objectivity? Now, we *know* that there may be perceptions, to *all appearance*, and experiences, which have every known characteristic of objectiveness, and yet wholly subjective. There are the cases which have been presented from the time of Heraclitus down to Hume, such as the phenomena and experiences of dreams, of reverie, of disease, of madness, and, in short, of all that are called false perceptions. "Have you never heard," says Socrates to his pupil, — as though it were a question which had come down from the olden time, and was familiar to all who had ever thought — "have you never heard it asked what proof we can give that we are not now sleeping, and that what we now say and do, may be but a dream, from which we may hereafter awake and find it so? and do you not see that the same ground may be taken in respect to madness and disease?"<sup>1</sup> In all these cases, then, are conjunctions of quantity, and distinctions of quality, and notional connections of substance and causality, and yet they have, in themselves, no mark by which they can be distinguished from those that are supposed to have a real objective ground. They may differ in many respects from other states of the soul, but in nothing on which we can rest as a distinct characteristic of true outward objectiveness. They may appear less rational, less coherent, less vivid, but these, it may be said, are but their *appearances* to some other subjective state, and such judgments may be, after all, but the delusions of one subjective condition of the soul claiming to decide upon the experience of another.

We are compelled to say, that we do not perceive the conclusiveness of the author's reasoning on this head. He makes a distinction between what he calls an ideal and an actual phenomenon, p. 303. The first only *seems*, the last actually *appears*. But what is there which makes one a *seeming* and the other an actual *appearing*? It is not anything in the phenomena or experiences themselves. There are the same conjunctions, the same distinctions, the same connections in both. Is it, then, something in the constructing mind itself, and which transcends all these operations? In the case of an ideal circle, (which is the author's example,) the mind, it is said, "has given a product which stands out separate from the agency that pro-

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<sup>1</sup> Plat. Theætetus, 158 B.

duced it, and, as other than itself, is object to itself in its own intuition," p. 301. "But, is there no difference," he proceeds to ask, "between this ideal form and the phenomenon of a material ring with its given content in the sensation," that is, "no difference in the consciousness?" Is there not, however, some content in sensation even in the case of the ideal form, only by an inverted process of the mind upon the sensorium, instead of having come from without, as we endeavored to show in the previous number of our review, (note, page 187,) and is not the statement too strong that "no intellectual (or spiritual) act can give content to avoid sensibility?" Again, says the author, "the intellect has given all it may to the pure form to make it objective, and yet *most manifestly* the phenomenal ring has something more in its objectiveness than the pure circle, and this something more must have been given to it from some other than a mere intellectual operation." We have been so carried along with the author's general method of investigation; we have become so intensely interested in his work, that it is, with feelings of strong disappointment, we find ourselves unable to follow him in any of his conclusions; but we can only say, it is not most manifest to us. It seems, on the contrary, the very thing to be proved. Again he says, "in the ideal, however complete in the construction and vivid in the imagination, there is not what the real phenomenon possesses." But wherein do they differ, quasi phenomena, if alike in completeness and vividness, and of course in the power of accompanying belief, though it be but for a moment? They have both been constructed by the same laws. Both, according to their vividness, exclude other objects, whether actual or ideal. Both, whilst they exist, limit alike all our thinking respecting them. We cannot think anything inconsistent with the ideal, any more than with what we call the real circle.

The difference then, if it exist at all, must be in their origin, and here there does seem to be something of which consciousness may claim to take cognisance. One is cognized as being with volition, the other without. Both meet in the sensorium, but, to use the author's expression of the difference, "one is *produced* by the intellect, the other is *found* by the intellect." True, here *is* a difference which may be traced in certain cases. It is, however, even here, a difference, not in the phenomena, but in the mind's, or rather the will's, relation to them. Still it does not seem to reach the idealist's position. He maintains that sense is the intellect giving objectivity to its own creations. This is sometimes done with volition; and then we seem to be conscious of the process. But may not the spiritual

energy do the same, or a similar thing, without volition, or without a consciousness of volition; and then the perception would appear to be *first*. It would, too, be according to those laws of construction which are the same for all cases, and then how are they to be distinguished? There are ideal creations of the soul which seem to come without our volition, just as much as those we choose to style real perceptions. We know that this is sometimes so; why may it not then be done in all cases that would seem to involve objectivity? If men had never dreamed, — if there had never been such a thing as false perception, the proof might have been deemed (for us) satisfactory, if not conclusive against all possibilities. But we have had dreams, and consciousness at the time, has had no doubt of their real objectivity. Consciousness has had no doubt of the reality of the madman's subjective world. And yet, all these dreams, and all the false perceptions of that subjective world, have been constructed and connected in strictest obedience to the *à priori* scheme of the sense and the understanding which the author has so scientifically demonstrated.

Had there never been, we say, these strange phenomena in our strange existence, had there never been distinct and vivid subjective states to which we know there was no outward, idealism might with some justice be regarded as that absurd thing which certain schools would represent it. But with such facts forming so large a part (almost one half we were tempted to say) of our existence, there is a natural ground for the mode of thinking which has led to such conceptions. There is much in this life of ours to lead the soul, at times, to the thought that "man walketh in a vain show," and that we need some other assurance of reality than can be found *alone* in the sense and the understanding.

We wonder not, therefore, that there has always been in the world a tendency to such idealism. He can hardly be called a thinking man who has not, at some periods of his life, been more or less drawn to the indulgence of some of its peculiar contemplations. We have no doubt that it has often been the dream of musing childhood, and that it has not unseldom come over the soul of the aged when he looks back upon his long sojourn in this seeming land of shadows, and begins to live almost wholly in a subjective recalling of the past. It has ever, too, been a speculation more or less attractive to men of an introspective or philosophical habit of thought; and it is not, therefore, to be driven out of the world by any such stubborn dogmatism as that of Reid and Brown, nor by any such superficial witticisms as those of the Rev. Sidney Smith. It can never be laughed away by

any ridicule of Berkeley, neither will it regard as a conclusive answer the stale joke, such a favorite among a certain class of writers, about running ideal heads against ideal posts.

And so also, we may say in respect to the doctrine of mediate or representative perception. It still keeps its place in the world. It appears in the structure of all languages. It has created metaphors, instead of having been derived from them, according to the easy explanation so often given. They are the natural offspring of this innate and universal *pre-judice* of a representative correspondence between the soul and the outward world. Hence, too, the thought, noticed by the earliest writers, and which must have occurred to every man who thinks, that our sensations, though unvarying correspondences for the same sentient, may be very different for different sentients;<sup>1</sup> so that as far as the sense is concerned the dogma ascribed in the Theaetetus to Protagoras, τὰ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον μόνον δοξάζειν, that each man has his own seemings, may be strictly true. It is a striking fact, too, that those who show so much contempt for the old and universal doctrine, cannot state their own positions without running into inconsistencies of thought and language, — a sure evidence that they are at war with nature and the laws of the human mind. The witty Sidney Smith thinks it as easy to make Berkeley ridiculous as to raise a vulgar laugh against the noble Carey and the Baptist mission. And yet after a lecture devoted to these “images from the moon” we find him gravely making this distinction between the senses of sight and hearing. “In the latter,” he says with all seriousness, “we hear only a sound which experience leads us to refer to the bell as its cause.” But why may we not hear an external world, if it make a noise, and even smell an external world, as well as see an external world? An affection, then, produced in us through undulations in the air only authorizes us to infer a cause; an affection produced in us through undulations in a finer medium is thereby raised to the rank of an immediate perception; in reading a book we are conversing directly with an outward world; in hearing a speaker, we are following an association of ideas through which we infer its existence. And yet this writer attempts to be facetious about “metaphysical lunatics,” as the best name he can bestow upon all those to whom such nonsense as his own is utterly inconceivable!

To return, however, to the general position of the idealist — the

<sup>1</sup> Ἡ σὺ διάχωρισμο ἄν ὡς οἶον σοὶ φαίνεται ἕκαστον χροῖμα τοιοῦτον καὶ κινῆ καὶ ὄψον ἴδω; ΘΕΑΙ. Μα Δι' οὐκ ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; ἄλλω ἀνθρώπῳ; Theat. 154, A.

method of argument our author employs against it, is of a much higher and more serious kind, and as far as it goes we are willing to yield our assent to its force, if not to its conclusiveness. Taking the general view we presented several pages back, it might be maintained, that although it fails, or seems to fail, in respect to the sense and the understanding, there is about it a conviction of conclusiveness when viewed in reference to the department and objects of the reason. An idea of a process of perception and experience, although it includes the hypothesis of an objective world, is not proof of such objective world, however exactly such idea may seem to agree with an actual law of perception and experience. The law of perceiving may be in itself real and actual, in one sense, and yet wholly subjective; or the law and the idea may be but two aspects of a coinciding unity. It is because such objectivity, although included in the idea, is not included as an absolute necessity. It is yet to be ranked among contingencies. The seeming, or the appearance even, may come from some unknown operations of our minds acting instinctively, or without volition, and without consciousness, or they may be produced by some higher mind acting upon our sensorium. In other words, the idea of a sense and an understanding may be consistent, we think, with the contingency of their objects. But in respect to the reason, the case would seem to be carried, or rather, to carry itself, to a higher tribunal. Here the very idea would appear to include the non-contingency of its objects, either on the ground of necessity or impossibility. Certainly may this be said of the highest of them. The true thought of Deity as the Absolute, would seem to necessitate (for our mind) its actual existence. The Glorious Idea must have objectivity, on the ground of there being (for our minds, we say again) no alternative between its actual reality and its impossibility. What we call nature, *may be*, or *may not be*. So, also, as a *fact* merely, some most exalted being, far higher than man, yet still finite and imperfect, may be or may not be. But that which, if true, is the highest of all truths, the source of all truth, the truest of all truths, if truth admit of degree, cannot itself belong to the class of contingent verities. We do not put it forth as any mystical or transcending thought. It seems to us, that if one place the mind intently and steadily upon it, he must see it, in its own light, as a certain and intuitive axiom. It cannot, we say, belong to the class of contingent verities. If not contingent, it must be necessary or impossible. If not impossible, therefore, it must be actual. In other words, if we cannot affirm its impossibility, as we certainly cannot, then are we

driven to the belief of its reality. Or to present the statement more formally: If God, the Absolute, the Infinite, the All-perfect, the All-wise, the All-good, the All-holy, *may be*, HE IS, because *necessity* of being, both by itself, and as included in *perfection* of being, is involved in the very idea, as it is not in the ideas of sense and nature. The proposition, GOD IS, must surely be of as high a rank as the one that maintains that *the sphere is two thirds of its circumscribing cylinder*, and if so, it cannot be *dependent* for its proof, to any mind, on any inductive or *à posteriori* reasoning.<sup>1</sup>

The argument against the materialist, we have said, is comparatively easy. There is that in the perception, which could not have come from the sense. We ask him, whence it is, and he cannot tell us. Here, however, the position is reversed. There are some things in the perception, or experience, that could not have come from the mind. This we affirm against the idealist, but it is not so easy to maintain it, as the other proposition. He brings up certain facts, and very startling facts, too, which go to show that there may be perceptions and experiences possessing in consciousness every known *appearance*, or characteristic of objectivity, and yet known to have no other origin than the mind itself.

Let us, then, endeavor, in the first place, to ascertain what consciousness truly reveals. If it cannot affirm directly that some phe-

<sup>1</sup> This argument which we have here presented in our own way, and in the most concise form, may be found more fully stated in Cudworth's *Intellectual System*, Vol. III. p. 390, Eng. ed., where it is given as a modification of the Cartesian. The closest examination has never enabled us to detect its fallacy. There is another which has been suggested to us by a passage in the *Parmenides*. *Truth* is inseparable from *thought*; *thought* is inseparable from a *thinker*. The first is inconceivable without the second; the second is inconceivable without the third. There are certain truths which the laws of our minds (out of which we cannot think) compel us to regard as independent of time and space, and all created things; in other words, as necessary and eternal. Necessary and eternal truth cannot be conceived of by us, except as necessary and eternal thought; necessary and eternal thought is inconceivable by us except in connection with an eternal thinker, or rather with an eternal intelligence. If we think steadily upon it, we shall find that by the laws of our minds, we cannot take the one without taking the other. But we are compelled to take the one; therefore we must take the other. If we sever the chain, all collapses and falls to the ground, the first proposition as well as the second. The word, *truth*, loses its meaning, and only gets vitality again by connecting it with *thought* and *mind*. *Ὅντι ἔχει λόγον νοήματα ὄντα, ἀνόητα εἶναι* (132 c). And again, *ἀδύνατον νόημα εἶναι, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός*. The view is just as conclusive, whether we regard *οὐδενός* here as expressing the *object* or the *subject*. There cannot be *truth*, except as *νοητόν*; there cannot be *νοητόν* without *Νοῦς*.

nomena are from without, it certainly does lie within its power and acknowledged office to make distinctions between those that lie within the spiritual realm, whether some of them come originally from without, or not. And this it surely does. We know it by an internal light ("a lumine aliquo interiori ostendente verum,") as Descartes calls it in distinction from a blind impetus, "spontaneo quodam impetu me ferente ad credendum." There are certain constructions, envisagings, etc., which the mind knows to have been preceded by its own volitions; others have had no known connection with the will. All *may* be from the mind. Consciousness can utter no denial of this. But all are not from the soul's direct volition. That she knows and affirms. Here, then, is an interior difference which is well stated by Descartes, in the passage to which we have already referred, and where he sums up the whole in this distinction of voluntary and involuntary. "Ita videor doctus a natura, et præterea experior illas non a mea voluntate pendere. Sæpe enim vel invito obversantur, ut jam sive velim sive nolim sentio calorem, etc. . . . Deinde quamvis ideæ illæ a voluntate mea non pendeant, non ideo constat ipsas a rebus extra me positas necessario procedere; ut enim impetus illi de quibus mox loquebar, quamvis *in me* sint, a voluntate tamen mea diversi esse videntur, ita forte etiam *aliqua aliæ est in me facultas nondum mihi satis cognita istarum idearum effectrix*, ut hætenus semper visum est illas, dum somnio, absque ulla rerum exter-  
narum ope in me formari."<sup>1</sup>

Speaking of the Berkeleyian hypothesis, that all sensation is itself purely mental the author says: "This is affirmed from the want of such an *à priori* cognition of sensation as may make it competent to show that no possible intellectual subjective agency can induce sensation, nor give to any ideal creations the characteristics of real objective phenomena." But has this been shown, or can it be shown? Are there not startling facts in our being which show just the contrary? Is there not real sensation in dreams? We mean not the half-felt bodily states of which we are more or less conscious in slumber, but sensation connected directly with the visions and perceptions of the subjective dream itself. Is there not often, not only sight and hearing, accompanied, as we have every reason to believe, with an affection of the sensorium, but also intense pleasure in the sentiency and intense pain. Is there not sensation (a real affection even of the *material* sensorium) in false perceptions, in spectre-seeing, in imagi-

<sup>1</sup> See Reid's view of Descartes's doctrine, ch. VIII. p. 140.

ned sounds,—and this not arising merely from a diseased condition of the material organ, but derived from the previous originating action of the spiritual mind? We mean, is there not, in all these cases, or may there not be, an affection in that very same sensorium which is the seat of all sentiency derived from without? In other words, may not the soul by thinking *make the body feel*, or produce an actual content in the sensibility? This is the hinge question, on which the validity of the demonstration must wholly turn. But there is this difference, it may be said,—the subjective states, so called, are imitations, suggestions, or reminiscences which imply a *previous* objectivity and would never have been without it. This, however, would be assuming that the objective is already proved on independent grounds; otherwise, as was said before, it is only the judgment of one state upon another, both of which may be equally subjective, equally destitute of any ground for deciding upon their mutual relations.

We come back, therefore, to the distinction before taken, and which is the only one we can find. Some perceptions or rather some constructions of the sense (for the propriety of the word perception may be denied) have been preceded by an exercise of will, others have not. Of these latter, some have, for a time, all the seeming characteristics of what we call objectiveness; afterwards they take the appearance of subjectiveness (that is, when another seeming objective world is in possession of the mind) and are recognized as such. In others, the “objective characteristics,” to use the author’s phrase, endure for a longer period; but certainly this is not a question to be determined by longer or shorter continuance; otherwise an indefinitely prolonged dream would, by that very circumstance, become reality.

The distinction of consciousness, then, is not between constructions *ab extra* and from within; but surveying them all as lying within the mind, and in this respect alike, she acts within her own province in pronouncing some voluntary, and others involuntary. It is not, then, so much a direct recognition of a world *without* us, in the first place, as of a power *above* us,—of something which is independent of our will. There has been an attempt to cut the knot of the difficulty by maintaining that perception directly involves an antithesis. There is the famous German flourish of the *me* and the *not-me*. But this is only the dogmatism of another school. It escapes no difficulty as long as we admit that the subject may create its own object, and give to it all the appearance of objectiveness, or that there *may* be real

acts of the soul which are nevertheless without volition. But *will* and *not-will* is a distinction falling within the spirit regarded as embracing all its objects, and within the direct light of consciousness. It is not a direct cognition of an external world, but it is a direct cognition of something which is not my will, and through this there is a path to the recognition, if not the proof, of another and a higher will by which my perceptions are affected, whether through an objective world, or through laws and operations of my mind which although carried on by me are not under my will, and must therefore have received their origin and their action from another.

Thus there springs up in the soul the *thought of a causality above* us rather than of a world *without* us. If there were no external world, a variation in the soul's own subjective states, running back to a period of not being, would suggest the same idea of a power which is not our power. It may be objected that this is giving precedence to the later and more metaphysical conception. And yet the notion of causality may be the origin of that of outwardness, although the latter, when born, grows much more rapidly, and by being thus more early and distinctly developed, comes, at last, to be regarded as the first-born, whilst the former is comparatively obscured, and therefore placed among later and more difficult conceptions. The ideas of space and time present a similar case. The latter, as connected with the inner sense, precedes the former which belongs more to the outer, and yet the intuition of space is sooner developed in distinctness, and thereby assumes the appearance of having been more original and fundamental in the soul.

A similar method is employed in the work, to prove the valid being of the notional, and of the objects of the understanding. The law corresponds to the idea. Nature is as we are compelled to think her. That is, if there is an objective nature, thus, and in no other way, can we have an experience of her, or understand her to be. This is proved in a series of demonstrations exceedingly clear, beautifully illustrated, and without a flaw that we can detect. Yet still we have a difficulty similar to that which met us in the field of the sense. There might have been, or rather, it is impossible to show that there might not have been, just such notionals, just such an understanding, comprising just such an experience, and yet wholly subjective. Can the soul by its own energy create content in the sensibility? That was the turning point before. Can the soul, by its own energy, create within its own experience, a phenomenal of an-

*agonism*<sup>1</sup> which shall correspond to the understanding conception of *force*? That is the hinge-question here. If the negative of this can be shown, the author's argument is perfect. It not only proves a possibility, but invincibly shuts out all opposing possibilities.

On page 489 there is a distinction very strongly and clearly stated between the subjective experience of our dreams and our waking objectivity. "We cannot," it is said, "bring the times of our dreams into one connected whole of a dreaming time, or identify the times passing in our dreams with one objective universal time, except as we have some substantial source for phenomenal succession, and subject the times of our dreams to this one common standard which marks the progress of one universal time for all." This we think too strongly stated. We cannot, it is true, when in what we call the waking state, bring our dreaming into one such connected whole; but we cannot say there may not be, even in the same subject, a consciousness in which this is done, or which may connect into one universal time of its own all our dreaming experience, wild and incoherent as it may seem to be. What forbids there being in this way double or triple consciousness belonging to one subject (if we take something back of consciousness as the real personal self, or ground of identity) and yet so separate, that they never intermingle, and we know not in one state what we have known, as we knew it, in the other. On such a supposition, the experience of one state perduces *through*, or rather *across* all the intervals, and bridges over and connects all its chasms, however much they may seem to be severed by the intervention of others. That such a supposition, instead of being altogether a chimera, has some ground of possibility in our most mysterious being, would be shown by those facts (if facts) which are to be found related in certain books under the head of double consciousness. Such facts, however, should be attested by the highest evidence. None that we have ever read of have a profounder connection with some of the most important and fundamental positions in psychology.

We should like to dwell upon our author's very striking comparison of subjective time to mirrored spaces, either existing separately, or themselves regarded as appearing in one constant mirror supposed to contain them all. We can only refer the reader to it, and the simile of the current in the same chapter, as presenting matter of great interest, and as excelling in beauty and pertinency anything we ever met with in any similar work. But the limits of our review forbid.

<sup>1</sup> Not only a subjective *not-me*, but something further — that which is *opposed to me*.

The argument for a real objective time, as law to the idea, may be condensed into the following statement.

It is a fact that we *somehow* determine time to be perpetual and to have been continually passing during sleep and other interruptions.

This can be no intuition of the sense; it cannot come from any conjoining agency; I cannot *perceive* time passing, nor myself in the current.

Therefore I must *think* it discursively through some medium as data which lie beyond the subjective experience.

And finally, all the *facts* in our determination of the interrupted periods of our experience to be in one perpetual time, are brought in colligation by the notion of *perducing* source as time-filling substance.

This proves the notional, as a fixed part of our spiritual constitution; but does it prove its truth, or that it tells the truth. The notion says there is an outward *perducing* time, and we must either have no experience, or one that conforms to it. As clearly as the sense informs us that we are sailing on a river, so does this more interior oracle assure us that we are sailing down one steady stream of time. But one is no more infallible than the other. The notion is within us and may dream. Neither is it helped when another mind is brought to testify, not only to the existence of the same subjective notion, but to its outward realization in some fixed standard, through which alone the otherwise independent consciousnesses of the two can be reconciled. But this other mind is without us. How can we know its existence? All other men may be but phantoms floating in our subjective sensorium, or imaged in the glass of our minds, or we may be all mutually enmirrored and contained in the all inclusive mirror of Spinoza's dream.

The strong point, if it can be proved, is the necessity of some common objective standard which shall give "one time for us all." Otherwise there might be as many times as consciousnesses, or the same seeming objects might be for different subjects, in different subjective times, and yet, somehow, strangely thought into one, or what might seem to be, one common experience. And yet who knows, the sceptic might say, but that it is so? May they not be thought into one time, just as phenomena in all parts of differing spaces may be mirrored into one common space? I do this in my dreams. Scenes and events and thoughts long past I bring up and mingle with the present, without allowing a consciousness of separation. Nay more, I create a past wholly my own, wholly now in itself, and yet I somehow strangely invest it with that character we call *familiarity*, and which

is supposed to be the result alone of long experience. I people my subjective realm with other conscious agents, new yet seemingly well known. I fill it with space-filling forces. I give to all its associations the required consistency with their and my own one seeming common experience. I bring all this into simultaneousness, and thus clothe it with every characteristic of reality. Now can we certainly affirm that such may not be the simultaneousness of what we call our waking state? We may compare it to the effect produced upon our phenomenal experience by the varying periods occupied in the transmission of light; and by the operation of which a universe of past events, belonging to all periods of past time, may be now passing before us with all the apparent simultaneousness that may be claimed as belonging to our objective experience. It may be said that it is not, in that case, the past we now see, — for that would contradict the notionals of our understanding — but the present representation. And yet a whole experience may thus be made up of representations of what now *is not*, and never *had been* during the whole life of that experience. The comparison may be imperfect, and yet it is sufficient to show, that even in a physical world of admitted objectivity there may be such an arrangement, or organization, that what we regard as near in space and present in time, may, in one sense, be billions of leagues distant for the one, and billions of centuries remote for the other.<sup>1</sup>

These very terms, distance, remoteness, it may be said, show a law of our minds compelling us to recognize this notional of a one universal space, and a one universal time, as involving an objective reference. True, it shows the validity of the notional, and it is much to prove this as involving something more than Hume's association, and Brown's voice of ceaseless prophecy. But still it proves only the notional, we think, and then we must go out of the sense, and out of the understanding, to that "behest of the reason" which requires faith in the Absolute, as the ultimate and sure ground of confidence in both. It is much in this sense, to prove the validity of the notional. So distinct, so uniform, so decided an utterance of the soul,

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<sup>1</sup> What shall we say of the subjective vision of the prophets? Sometimes they received verbal messages; sometimes they saw signs; at others they seem to be represented as beholding the real scene before it *was*. As in Num. 24: 17, "I see it, but it is not now; I behold it, but it is not near." The form of the tense in the passage would denote a present *seeing of the future*, rather than a prediction of a *future seeing*. What shall we say too of what is called the second sight? or is this all fable?

although *in itself* not infallible, could not have been given to deceive us with a mere show of substance and causality, if, after all, they are nothing but phenomena and sequences. Such a world might furnish an extensive science of shadows for the soul and for the understanding, too, but it would have no *meaning* for the reason or for faith. In one sense, "man walketh indeed in a vain show," (עָלָה עַל הַיָּדָיִם, ἐν εἰκόσιν,) but all is substantial when he truly believes in God.

If there is any truth in the view we have taken, we are indebted for it, and for much in the manner of stating it, to ideas received from the author's book: although we may have seemed to find difficulty in some parts of his argument. A regard to the symmetry of his work may have led him to attribute too much, we will not say to the sense and the understanding, but to considerations drawn solely from them. The ontological verity of their objects cannot, we think, be proved *by them*, nor *from them*. Taken, however, in connection with the higher department of the soul, it does seem to us that he has settled the great question of the reality of an objective universe. God meant that we should *ordinarily* trust the phenomena of the senses and the notionals of our understandings, as giving true intelligence of an outward world; but then, with all reverence be it said, we think we can see a reason why there were allowed to be those strange facts in our existence which would prevent an implicit reliance. The validity of the notional well settled, as not the mere offspring of association, or of a blind belief, but as a distinct part of our mental constitution, we are kept *ordinarily steady*, notwithstanding our dreams, to the common apprehension of our substantial external world, our space, our time, our universal common ground of experience for all. But, then, when we are compelled to think about it, the ultimate trust is not so much *in* the notional, as *through* the notional, in something higher. When the question comes before us in all its seriousness, we find, on the other hand, enough of a dreamy and subjective experience to make us flee to this strong hold, and feel, that as "*the Lord liveth*," so is the assurance that "*our soul liveth*," and that the objects of our senses and of our understanding have a true, and substantial, and *perduring* being.

This is not Cartesianism. The author's exceptions to that theory are well taken, and conclusively maintained. In it, "the Deity," as he shows, "is degraded to a physical force as cause in an understanding conception." "The divinity of the supernatural is brought down to the perpetual servitude of the natural;" or, in other words, "the Deity is needed only for holding nature in its place." A similar ob-

jection is also well taken to the "occasional causes," to which the doctrine of Descartes was carried by his religious follower, Malebranche. And yet, we think, there is a vast difference between them and the view on which we have been insisting. It is one thing to sink Deity into nature, or to elevate nature to Deity; it is another thing to derive from the idea of God a proof of the objective reality of nature, and of a real separate substance and causality in nature, as involved in the truthfulness of the notionals he has given us. A conviction thus derived, that there is a real nature of things with its real immanent powers aside from immediate divine agency, is very different from that hyper-pietism of Malebranche and others, which, in its making everything in the natural world proceed from the direct act of God, would confound Deity with nature, by absorbing the natural in the supernatural, just as certainly as Spinoza does, by developing nature out of the Deity.

God has given us these perceptions, and these notionals, and we therefore believe that there are real phenomena corresponding to the one, and real substance and real causation corresponding to the other. Thus viewed, the author's argument seems to us conclusive. With this thought ever held in connection, the proved correspondence of the idea and the law (which is his great argument) does give us, notwithstanding our occasional dreams, a real world, an *established* nature of things, with its conjunctions, its connections, its chain of efficiencies, its contexture of reciprocal influences, in distinction from the continual miracle or supernatural of one school, the mere development, or extension of a first cause which characterizes another, and the mere empty phenomena and unconnected sequences of a third.

In this way our philosophizing brings us round to the old doctrine of the Scriptures and the Catechism — a true creation of a true nature of things, and a work of Providence since carried on (with occasional miraculous interventions) *through* and *by* this nature of things. In other words, God made a nature, — originated its substances, — gave being to its dynamical agencies, so as to have immanent and *perduring* efficiency in themselves, or during their unhindered operations, and then implanted in the human spirituality, trustworthy notions corresponding. The Malebranche theory may seem very pious in thus ascribing everything to the direct act of God, but besides the objection before mentioned, it is directly opposed to the Scripture. Even with its continual recognition of an ever present Deity, the Bible everywhere assumes the fact of a nature of things distinct from God, and to which powers belong that are supposed to *remain* in it, and to *act*

by their own efficiency thus given. Even the *first* productions of our renovated earth were through an imparted dynamical agency, instead of proceeding from the immediate energy of God. The new forces were working already, according to an *immanent* law. We gather this, not so much from the causal form of the Hebrew verbs employed, as from the general aspect of the scriptural declaration. "And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass (אֲרָבָה); and the earth *caused* to come forth (אֲצַיֵּן) the herb yielding seed (זָרַע), or *causing* the growth of seed, after its kind."

If there can be a proof of the reality of an objective world, or of an objective nature of things, we do not say, by the understanding, but by considerations drawn solely from the field of the understanding, then it would follow, that there might be such proof even in an atheistic hypothesis. But can this be so? Can man, or the soul of man, be anything but an enigma, can our perceptions and our notionals be anything else but dreams,— can the world have any other reality than that of coming and departing phenomena and unconnected sequences — can there be any real unity of nature, or any harmony of the universe, to a mind for which the highest reality is supposed to have no meaning, and the absolute ground of all truth and all being no objectivity?

If it be demanded what this real *substance* (or hypostasis) is, which thus *stands*, or, to use a more convenient metaphor, lies beneath nature, and which the notional of our understanding claims to represent, we can conceive of nothing that better answers its conditions than our author's "space-filling force." This has its difficulties, but every other view we attempt to take has still greater; that is if we *will* think upon what matter is, and cannot satisfy our minds with the Johnsonian argument of kicking the foot against a stone. Our main trouble is with the originating conception. That once mastered, or assumed, the beauty of its applications, and the harmony of the scheme deduced from it are the great arguments for its absolute verity. The author makes the following distinction between it and *pure act*.

"This, being in one direction, and suiting no other action, could have nothing answering to the conception of force. Except as action meets action, and thereby *counteraction* takes place, no generation of force is conceivable; and hence all conception of force is not original *pure act*, but a product of an antagonism. At the point of contingency, as pure notion in the understanding, shall we first attain the conception of force as pure understanding conception. Such a point becomes an occupied position in space resisting all displacement; and to the extent to which the diverse

points in space are contiguously occupied by pure forces is there a filling of space, and a resistance to all foreign intrusion within such space." p. 386.

But how is this — an antagonism of an antagonism, each of which, if there is nothing conceived of as lying under by way of hypostasis, is an absolute nihility without the other! — a counteraction of a counteraction! We confess that we are quite lost.

Neither is the difficulty wholly cleared up by what is said, p. 608, of creation, or the origination of such force by the Absolute.

“As incorporeal and uncreated reason and will, the Absolute has his own spring of action within himself, and in this a power in liberty which is wholly above and separate from all force in nature. He may originate simple acts which in their own simplicity have no counter-agency, and can, therefore, never be brought under any of the conditions of space, and time, and nature. From his own inner self-determination, he may designedly put forth simple acts in counteraction, and here a force begins which takes position in space, and occupies an instant in time. There is a beginning in something where nothing was, and this has position, instant, and *permanence*. This *perpetuated* energy and counteraction is creation in *progress*. A space is filled, a time is occupied; there is an impenetrable substance which may give content in a sensibility, and be conjoined in definite phenomena. *Above* that point of counteraction, all is simple activity, unphenomenal, unsubstantial, and having all its essentiality in the power of the supernatural as will in liberty. *In* and below that point, all is *force*, phenomenal in the sense, substance and cause, from its antagonism, in the understanding, and existing as physical nature in its essential conditions.”

Our author is one of the last writers that can be justly charged with using words for nothing. Whenever we do follow him, although it has been sometimes with difficulty, we have always found his sentences opening into clear and definite significance. We have derived from him too much light to believe that he has not here, as elsewhere, a meaning distinctly apprehended by his own mind. But we must confess our perplexity. The proportions are all clear if we can only draw a true line between the dualistic *force* which is *in* nature, as the beginning and continuation of nature, and the duality of simple *activities* which are *in* the supernatural above it. Otherwise this *perpetuated* energizing in counteraction would seem to resemble the very thing which is charged upon the Cartesian hypothesis, — namely, the “bringing down the divinity of the supernatural to the perpetual servitude of the natural.”

And yet the difficulties are increased by the conception of matter as *inert* substance excluding all thought of force, or tendency, except

as superinduced *ab extra*. It would be, as the author elsewhere says, a mere *caput mortuum*, and all attempts to show from it how it could become causality, would be in vain. It could give no content in a sensibility; it could exhibit no varied modes of being, so as to appear as events, except by some *ab extra* efficiency. It would *do* nothing, and, therefore, as notion for ground or source, would be<sup>1</sup> nothing; the *ab extra* efficiency accomplishing all without it. There would still be required the Divine activity *immanent* in space, as constant causality and immediate source for every event. Now the understanding may be satisfied with its force, or its matter, let it get the conception whence it may. But the reason demands a separation of nature from God, although not its entire independence of origin and termination. It demands it as the only means of preventing us from falling into that abyss of pantheism, which is just as subversive of the moral and the supernatural, as the most atheistic naturalism. Hence, if it could get nothing better, it would be content with the *fact*, however it might transcend every conception we might attempt to form of the manner in which it was accomplished. And here the Scripture coincides with this highest behest of the reason. "*Lo, I call to them; they stand together.*"<sup>2</sup> It gives us the origination, and the subsequent perdurance, as though by a separate inherent force, once imparted and then self-exercised through its own immanent law. "*He commanded, and they stood fast,*"<sup>3</sup> is the sublime language of another passage. What was the *commanding*, and what was the *standing*, or *standing fast*, are not explained to us, and perhaps we could never know; but the fact, as a fact, may be admitted, and once received, it makes all the separation between God and nature which the reason demands, and on which the understanding can rest. We may accept, therefore, the author's space-filling force as the nearest approach that can perhaps be made to the absolute and ineffable verity, regarding, however, its origin and its perpetuation as among the mysteries which pass all understanding, and all powers of adequate representation in human speech.

Taking, however, this conception of force, as the mother of matter, or as itself matter enough for all substantial<sup>4</sup> purposes, (seeing

<sup>1</sup> It may be doubted whether we can ever wholly separate the thought of *being* from that of *power*. Can anything truly *be* which *does* nothing? or is not this, as Plato says in the Sophista, the very *ἄρος* or definition of it? *Ἰδέμας γὰρ ἄρον ὄρεσιν τὰ ὄΝΤΑ, ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἀλλὸ τι πλὴν ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ — εἴτε εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὄντων, εἴτε εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ ἀμικρότατον.* Sophista, 247, E.

<sup>2</sup> Isaiah 48: 13.

<sup>3</sup> Psalm 38: 9.

<sup>4</sup> A view very similar to that of Dr. Hickek, has been given in a late number

there is no event or phenomenon of matter that may not be deduced from it,) and taking, too, this perpetuated antagonism or counteraction as once assumed, we may go on to those interesting results which are presented as its legitimate deductions.

"Past a doubt," says the author speaking (p. 555) of an *à priori* law running through all distinguishable forces in nature, "past a doubt such a law exists, and determines how each distinguishable substance *must be*." This *à priori* law would be the exact correlation of the developed ideal contained in the understanding conception of the first substance in nature and of the added forces that may be in harmony with it. In other words, just as in the pure intuition of *space*, the intellectual energy, (call it by what name we will,) finds all mathematical truth, so in the pure conception of *force*, an intellect strong enough and clear enough, and with a keenness of vision that could be sustained long enough, would see involved all physical science. This is very different from the belief that nature, in itself, is necessary. It *may* be, or it may not be. It may be empirical or purely ideal. God may originate it, or he may not; he may allow it to continue or he may cause it to cease, just as he pleases.<sup>1</sup> But if it *is*, it *does* something; and, in that case, he has given an understanding and a reason to see, that in certain initiatory conceptions are to be found its most general conditioning principles, and which compel us to affirm, even when from the tiring of the intellectual energy we cannot see and cannot understand, that in those first conceptions, and those first conditioning principles, there is somehow certainly contained the science of the most minute operations that fall under the notice of our senses.

Past a doubt physical knowledge has its *à priori* axioms, necessitated (for us) by the laws of our understanding, as well as the mathematics. Nor does this drive us to the conclusion that *all that now is* in the natural world grew by development out of the first force, or as a work which since its origination by the Absolute has been going on without him. It is perfectly consistent with the idea of new forces implanted by God in nature at different periods, or from time to time coming into nature from the supernatural; — which new forces, also, when once sown by the Divine hand, have their own conditioning

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mathematical work, entitled, *The Calculus of Operations*, by John Patterson, A. M., a production presenting a rare union of high mathematical and metaphysical talent.

<sup>1</sup> Pure *space*, pure *force*, pure *will* in personality. In this ascending series we have the initiatory cognitions for the phenomenal, the physical and the supernatural.

principles and the understanding conceptions connected with them by an ideal or *à priori* bond. There is more in nature now than there was in the beginning. This appears from the rock bound volumes of geological science, as is most conclusively shown in the examination which the author gives of "the order of nature's formation." Sec. II. Ch. II. Part III.

It is perfectly consistent, too, with the belief of the miraculous and the providential. In other words, it may admit, as coming from the Supernatural Power, not only new forces *added* in nature, and afterwards becoming a part of nature, but also new *directions* of forces already existing, turning them to results they would not otherwise have produced; and, moreover, sudden *interventions* breaking up any particular action of any particular force, or putting an end to all nature herself with all her forces. Yet still we must agree with the author, that as a nature undiverted, unimpeded, it is *à priori* determinable; — determinable (we would say by way of qualification) in its first general conditioning principles by our intellects — determinable downward, even to its ultimate operations, by an intellect of a given energy.

The expression is not too strong. Past a doubt, we find the conviction in our souls, if we will look for it, that nature, thus viewed by herself to the exclusion of *ab extra* considerations, is *one*, and *must* be one. Even to the most common mind it is the security (although there may not be a direct consciousness of it) against that dissolving view which would represent the universe as a mere collocation of phenomena, or a mere succession of arbitrary unconnected sequences. The mind demands some such conception as that of the universal space-filling force, as the support of its very natural, if not in-born, idea of a one nature, or one kosmos, an undivided plenum, instead of a phantasmagoric series of *events* which after all are not *o-events* because they come *out* of nothing, or a ghost-like procession of magical *occasions* with voids of all power, and, therefore, of all being between them.

There is a letter of Newton to Bentley, in which this great philosopher says, that "it is inconceivable to him how one thing should act upon another through a vacuum," — that is, not a mere exhaustion of the air pump, but a vacuity of all being; such as our author has set forth (p. 369) where he regards the space-filling force, although with its added modifications forming higher or lower degrees of substance, in particular places, yet in its primary state as pervading the universe. Instead of being a scholastic subtlety, the axiom that "nothing could

act but *when* it is and where it is," was one out of which Newton could not think. Dugald Stewart, however, and others of that school, find no difficulty with what appeared to Newton so inconceivable; and in their doctrine of occasions and sequences, there certainly is no such difficulty. They have in this respect greatly the advantage of the author of the *Principia*. If one thing is but the occasion, the antecedent, or the sign of another, without any inherent causality or efficiency, then, *ex vi terminorum*, they may be parted, not only by distances and periods, occupied with reciprocally acting *in-fluences*, or *con-tiguously* impulsive forces, but by any chasms of nihility both in space and time. Newton could not conceive of this. His great mind, like the most common mind, could not divest itself of that conception of causality which God had made part of its constitution, — an imperative law of its thinking. He felt himself compelled to follow that vulgar notion of impulse through an intervening medium, (whether we call it matter, or fluid, or force, or anything else,) as of a real *ens* in space, in distinction from *non-ens*; and the result was his sublime doctrine of universal gravitation. That false Baconianism which is everlastingly talking about bare *facts* and sequences, as being the only object of science, or of philosophical investigation, would never have seen the one-ness of the kosmos in the fall of the apple. To the sound understanding of Newton, nothing possessed the dignity of a fact unless it could be held to be what the word truly imports, a something *done* (*factum*) an *eff-ect*, an e-vent, coming *out of* an efficiency, and that connected with all the physical efficiency of the universe.

Thus regarded, the smallest change in nature is a witness to this universal efficiency. There is before me on my table a beautiful toy, which does as well for this purpose as the most extensive philosophical apparatus. It is an elegant representation of a ship with its masts and sails all rocking upon a point, and brought to an equilibrium by a weight suspended below the frame on which it is supported, and directly underneath its centre of gravity. As it swings gracefully upon its pivot, or rests calmly in the repose of its equilibrium, it answers every purpose of an intellectual sedative. I gaze upon it as an object not only of sensitive but of ideal beauty. It represents visibly to me this great truth, — the unity of nature, the unbroken plenum of causality, the perfect reciprocity of dynamical influence, not only through all the space but all the time occupied by the natural universe. All that ever has been, all that is now, and all that ever will be, is here — here, as an assumed centre of all previous

causality, of all present efficiency, of all future effect. In other words, it may be taken as the symbolical embodiment of the necessary *à priori* conviction of all rationalized understandings, that, as far as nature is concerned, (we mean nature uninterrupted and undiverted,) no one thing would now be what it *is*, if all things were not what they *are*, and had not from the beginning been just what they *were*. Why do we feel that the mind is compelled by an inward law to make this affirmation? Why is it a necessity of our thinking, unless God has implanted it in the organization of our souls as a witness to the outward truth to which it corresponds, and made such a connection between them, that, the conception of nature's unity once broken, the conceived unity of our own existence suffers a shock, if it is not wholly broken up with it into a fragmentary succession of sequences, occasions, and phenomena, to the exclusion of all substance from our spiritual as well as our material being?

Nature abhors a vacuum. This intense and far-reaching affirmation of the ancient mind has long enough been the stale jest of superficial lecturers. It is, however, some satisfaction to know that the best modern science is slowly but surely coming round to it again. There is a law of the understanding which makes it a necessary part of our thinking, as long as we remain true to the innate notions of cause and effect; and it is one great recommendation of the author's doctrine of the space-filling force, that in it we find the best scientific expression for such a law. Nature is a plenum. The universe is full. Whatever may be the limits which God assigned to it in the beginning, when He created the heavens and the earth, — however remote may be that frontier where utter non-existence commences — still, within those limits there is no part or point of space in which there is not something which is truly *ens*, in distinction from non-ens. It is a plenum, not of that which is capable of affecting *our* senses, but of something conceived by the understanding as a space-filling entity, and which, as the author maintains, might give content in the sensibility to beings of a higher and more refined organization.<sup>1</sup> The differences would be differences of intensity, (*πύκνωσις καὶ μά-  
ρωςις*, to use Aristotle's terms,<sup>2</sup>) and that of every degree from zero upwards, as the author says, p. 388. He must mean, however, as far

<sup>1</sup> Thus Aristotle gives two senses in which the word *κενόν* or *vacuum*, may be taken, "Some say it is that *ἐν ᾧ μηδὲν ἐστὶ αἴσθητόν* in which there is nothing sensible; others say it is that *ἐν ᾧ ὅλας μετέν ἐστι*, in which there is nothing at all." *Phys. Ausc.*, Lib. IV. 6, 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 9, 5.

as the occupation of space was concerned, without denying that there might be other differences. But nowhere within these bounds of the created universe is there absolute nothingness. Everywhere is there the *ראש צפורית תבל*, *the highest or first part of the dust of the world*, as the architectural Wisdom styles it, Prov. 8: 26. If we admit at all the idea of nihility, then is nature severed, and equally severed, whether the chasm be thinner than the almost invisible leaf of beaten gold, or wider than the widest bounds of stellar systems; whether below the keenest search of the microscope, or extending to a distance immensely beyond where the telescope has ever reached.

In this conception of nature, too, as the author shows, there necessarily comes in, not merely a *chain* of causality, or the conception of many chains tending ever in one direction of progress, but a wide woven contexture of reciprocal influences. It is not only up and down, but transverse and athwart. Nature is a web, and every point in space and time may be taken, at pleasure, as the centre on which all her past and present influences may be regarded as being brought to bear. Although pressed for space, we cannot omit giving an extract to this effect from the volume we are reviewing. It is presented not only for the great value of the thought, but as one specimen, out of many that might be offered, of the writer's admirable power of language.

“With this conception of the *reciprocity of influence* throughout nature, and that no one thing can be changed in its inner modifications, but it has been acted upon by all, and that thus one portion of nature acts through every other portion, while every other portion is also acting through it, we have the analytical judgment *à priori*, and thus a primitive principle of nature, that it can be no *coëcervation* of particular things which are merely in *apposition* in space; nor yet a mere *concatenation* of various series of things in independent lines of cause and effect; but that which all have a *perpetual* source, and a conditioned order of *succession*, this warp of all lines of causation is also woven across with the *connecting* woof of reciprocal influences, and thus that nature has its complete *contexture* which may be held as one web of a determined experience, and which no more *adheres continuously*, than it also *coheres transversely*.”

We would only remark, that the etymological precision so striking here, especially in the words we have italicised, is everywhere a constant characteristic of the author's style. When it is difficult to follow him, it is because the region through which he takes us is dark, or it has been but little visited, or, which is more likely, it has become intricate in consequence of being traversed by the confused

paths and cross-roads which more careless writers have made in every direction upon its surface, and not from the want of the utmost caution of the author in setting upon it guide-posts at every point exposed to the danger of error. The reader accustomed to the confused platitudes of Dugald Stewart, or the loose exuberance of Brown, or the smirking common-places of Sydney Smith, or it may be, the spectral twilight of the mystical and idealistic schools, is not prepared for the exact simplicity of terms employed throughout this book. Thus in reading the above extract, (although we do not select it as presenting any unusual difficulty) one may see no emphasis in such words as *particular, series, perpetual, connecting*, etc., to say nothing of the more unusual and therefore striking expressions. He may even regard some of them as redundancies, when a close examination would show in respect to every one, not only a distinct thought, but a thoughtful selection,— would show, not only their adaptedness, but that no others would have answered in their place. A still more careless reader might take it as some common sentence in which words are often used for their rhetorical flow, or to round a period. Another critic might condemn it for its length and apparent complication, without being aware that this is sometimes the only mode of securing the utmost conciseness and the utmost perspicuity. In the above extract alone there is truth and thought enough to furnish some writers with material for half a dozen chapters. It might, in that way, too, require much less study, but what it would gain in ease it would lose in force and clearness. If, on the other hand, it were cut up into short periods, it would lose that *con-vincing* power which it can only possess when the whole thought, with all its *complications*, is presented as a unity.

The easiest reading is not always the most perspicuous,— certainly not the most conspicuous. One who reads Dr. Hickok's work as it ought to be read, will find, often, that it requires great steadiness and concentration to follow him; but he will also find, that there is meaning there, and that when discovered nothing could be more transparent. He will often, too, be satisfied that in no other manner could the thought have been presented without some deficiency, or some redundancy, or some less eligible arrangement of its parts that would have detracted from its force no less than from its significance. In these respects we do not deem it extravagant to compare him with some of the master minds of antiquity. His sentences must be studied; and so must those of Bacon, of Plato, and of Aristotle. But if the text of these writers be not corrupt, we are sure of a meaning, and

when we discover that meaning we are sure that we have it, and not only that, but as with a flash of light comes the conviction, that, much as its deciphering may have cost us, there is no other way in which that meaning could have been so well expressed. We see that their sentences have been the result of great pains and carefulness on their part, and that only by a like process could the thought, in all its completeness, and all its unity, be mirrored in the reader's soul.

It may appear to some a strange assertion, and yet it is strictly true, that Dr. Hickok's style is deeply metaphorical. We refer not now to the formal figure or comparison, although some of his illustrations of this kind are marked by great force and beauty, but to that hidden metaphor which is contained in the most important terms in language, and in no department more than in that which is representative of psychological processes. They are the metaphors involved in the primary senses of words, and which were originally brought into use, not for purposes of adornment and illustration, like the figurative language of later times, but through a necessity of the soul striving to find the best outward expression of the inward action, and thus the safest representative of all we can truly know respecting it. They are a development, a formation of the soul acting spontaneously without a philosophical consciousness, and thus are they the best exponents of its laws, just as any physical product is the most exact outward expression of the interior force to which it owes its formation.<sup>1</sup>

Seldom do we find more of this etymological precision than in the work before us. The author has proceeded, and proceeded safely, on the principle that in the primary senses and metaphors contained in the most truly philosophical as well as in the most common language (and the most philosophical ever resolves itself etymologically into what was once the most common, although long since passed from an ordinary to a scientific use), we have the most direct guide to those original notions of the human soul *out of which we cannot think* without a logical contradiction. How different this from the course of some of the more popular writers on psychology whose works are used as text-books in our colleges, and who are ever telling us that this or that idea is but a "*pre-judice* generated in unphilosophical minds by the unfortunate use of metaphorical language." But whence

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<sup>1</sup> It would be enough to suggest, for example, to any reader of the book, how much depends on getting a clear view of the etymological distinction between the words *conjunction* and *connection*, and how much of what is said of the different action of the sense and the understanding would otherwise appear pointless and unmeaning.

came the metaphor? and is it the child or the parent of the prejudice? This question they never think of answering; or should they attempt the solution of the difficulty, they would doubtless maintain that they had poured upon it all needed light, by resolving it, as they do all causality, into some unaccountable sequence of the human mind, or some inexplicable *occasion* through which, without any *conceivable* necessity therefor, it is ever running into falsehood and absurdity.

A science of psychology, says Morell, is still a desideratum. We will however hazard the assertion that in this book of Dr. Hickok such desideratum is supplied. Whatever may be thought of its completeness, it is the *science* of psychology — the science itself, instead of that mere writing *about* it, or those rambling semi-historical, semi-philosophical discussions of certain topics connected with it which form the substance of most of the treatises used in our schools and colleges. Abstract indeed the author is, but there is an intellectual beauty in the mathematical straight-forwardness with which he carries us on from section to section through every part of his condensed and well-arranged system. Independent of the truths presented, there is awakened a scientific interest allied to the aesthetic emotion called out by contemplating an exquisite work of art. It is as though some splendid and harmonious structure were rising before the eye, as we observe him, preparing for his after-work by the most exact definition, commencing next with consciousness in order to make a pure and perfect abstraction of all its content except the indestructible intuitions which, by remaining, show themselves to have been *à priori* conditions for all experience, — then, after thus going down to the foundation, returning step by step, and *building up* through the aid of these shaping intuitions an *à priori* science, every part of which has been as rigidly demonstrated as any theorem in geometry, — and lastly, going back to experience, not now for the purpose of emptying it in order to get at the underlying cognitions, but to show how its *whole* content is *actually filled up* by a law in exact correspondence with the before constructed *à priori* idea.

Nothing diverts the attention from that rigid method the writer has marked out for himself. He suffers himself to be led away by none of that fondness for illustrative discussion, or still more idle philosophical story-telling which characterizes such writers as Brown and Abercrombie. In proof of this it may be observed, as a striking fact, that in this large volume, there is not a single note from beginning to end. Whatever came not directly within the field of scien-

tific demonstration is not allowed to divert the attention even to a passing marginal remark. Could the book be introduced into the higher classes in our colleges, it would, no doubt, possess a value, even as a means of mental training, or a course of intellectual gymnastics, equal to, if not surpassing any that is afforded by the most accurate instruction in mathematics or philology.

We can, however, very readily anticipate an objection arising from its very title page. *A Rational Psychology—The Subjective Idea and the Objective Law.* These, and the very common use of the words *à priori*, to the shame of our philosophy be it said, are sufficient to frighten many readers, and to give others a ground for condemning the work at once. It must be all transcendental moonshine, or German idealism, or Hegelianism, or something worse. Facts—give us facts. This is the law of philosophizing since the time of the great Bacon whom every body quotes. Facts says Dugald Stewart,—facts says Brown,—facts says Sidney Smith,—facts says Macaulay,—facts say the Edinburgh and Westminster reviews,—facts, say all the popular lecturers—this is now the demand of science, of philosophy, of theology. “With facts,” says the writer of a late most valuable essay, “philosophy begins, proceeds, and ends; ideas and ideal systems however profound must give way to realities.” There are so many rich trains of thought in the treatise to which we now refer, that its author, we hope, will pardon our slight criticism on the passage, should it meet his eye. We should not have chosen it, had it not come in so appositely to the view we are taking. We introduce it to show that although one who thinks, and thinks profoundly, may fall into this style, he must very soon be led by the *à priori* necessities of his own mind, to qualify, in some way, the barrenness of such a statement. We read on—“These the mind seeks in the realm both of matter and spirit, and as thus fact after fact, and principle after principle, discovers itself in *beautiful harmony*, the soul rejoices, etc.” But where is the scale which is to guide the ear in resolving noise into tune and proper music? In other words, what is it which converts a “fact” into a “principle,” and whence the “harmony” that shapes these facts, the spirit that hovers over them, and without which they would ever remain in chaos? How are they ever to arise from the *tohu* and *bohu* which becomes darker and deeper with their accumulation, unless there is an *ideal* light in the soul that shines down upon them, and which is *à priori* to the facts themselves. We must somehow have the harmony, or who shall tell, or how shall we tell, whether they truly “rise in harmony” or not.

On the other hand, nothing can be more opposed, than the method of this book, to a smoky and mystical idealism. As the result of the most diligent study we are prepared to pronounce the author one of the *most* common sense writers we ever read — in other words, most in accordance with the *νοῦσι ἐνοῦσι*, the *semper ubique et ab omnibus* of the universal human soul. The whole design of his book is to give a substantial ground for all our knowledge; and the result of our own individual experience in this very feeling of substantiality as opposed to all that is dreamy and sceptical. We rise from its perusal with the thought that we are on solid ground,— with a clearer conviction of a one substantial nature, a true human soul and a true human body, — a dread Absolute Personality, and a moral accountability tremendously real.

It is on these accounts we feel warranted in describing this work by an epithet which is seldom applied to similar productions. It is a very *serious* book. Although so purely speculative there is, at times, something almost fearful in the views it presents, of the superiority of the ethical to the aesthetical and the philosophical, of our ethical relations to the Absolute Right, and the awful doom and degradation which must await the related finite personality when it irrecoverably sinks the spiritual and the supernatural into the sentient and the natural.

Should we make any objection to this part of the work, it would be to point out what seems to us an omission rather than an error. The author, we think, is led by the peculiar course of his argument to find sin too exclusively in the sentiency, or the region which connects our spirituality with nature. Certainly he would not deny a soul-sin, or a pure sin of the spirit, having its seat in the supernatural will above all temptibility from nature, and deriving an immensely enhanced malignancy from this very fact. By such sin fell the angels. By such a sin of the spirit must our first parents have *first* fallen, or Satan never could have tempted them through that poor sentiency on which some, theologians as well as philosophers, are so much disposed to throw the blame of all our depravity. The author's mind was too exclusively drawn to the relation of the natural to the supernatural. We regret that he did not enter into the analysis of such soul-sin; as he might well have done in connection with what he says of the aesthetic and philosophic characteristics. Such an analysis might have made the subject of one of his richest chapters.

But our space will not permit us to dwell on these important themes. Instead of giving even a summary of them we must content

ourselves with calling attention to a few of the admirable positions the volume furnishes for assailing some of the worst errors of the day. It is in its later chapters a complete armory of weapons against the scientific naturalism of such books as the *Vestiges of Creation*, and that still worse thing, the spurious ethical naturalism which sinks all ethics into physics, making the great end of human existence obedience to physical laws, and that too, through a continual exchanging of one physical good for another, as Socrates says, teaching men to be temperate through intemperance and to be brave through fear, or which has no idea of self-denial except as a means of avoiding a greater pain or securing a greater pleasure. So, also, its strong maintaining of the *inherent* merit of righteousness, and of course, the inherent demerit of sin irrespective of all physical consequences, leads directly to the inherent *desert* of punishment, and presents one of the best grounds of argument against all such theories (now so rife) that would resolve it into cure, or prevention, or a police contrivance for the preservation of order in God's political universe. For the same reason, we may say, its whole spirit is in point blank opposition to that monstrous system of theological Benthamism which makes the universe a grand sentient democracy in a *state of nature*, where all law and all morality are nothing more than a summed expression for the *majority*, or balance, of "pleasing sensations" (as a late writer defines happiness), and God is to be had in respect and deferred to, mainly as being a greater sentiency, or as having a greater *capacity* for happiness than all lower *natures* in existence.

But we must bring our long review to a close. Deeply impressed with a conviction of the value of the book, we have attempted, as well as we could, to convey that conviction, and the grounds of it, to others. In doing so we have endeavored also to discharge a debt of gratitude for the rich instruction received from its perusal. After weeks of intense study, we laid it down with the impression that it must be henceforth one of our few books, to be kept as a settled standard for future thinking. We believe the same feeling of substantiality will be left upon the mind of every intelligent man who will give it that close study which is the only worthy tribute to its intrinsic excellence.