

although one of the greatest simplicity as well as dignity, affords of itself, when correctly and skilfully developed, a knowledge of divine ideas and realities.

“ But some may, perchance, inquire, What were those deceptions by which the Soofees were led to imagine that, in very truth, by this ‘ union,’ they could attain divine knowledge? I answer, with Cicero: the same happens to ourselves, when we meditate diligently and continuously upon the mind, as they were wont to do. Those who gaze intently upon the sun in eclipse, frequently lose their eyesight altogether. So the eye of the mind, turned to gaze upon itself, is sometimes paralyzed. But this very paralysis is called, by the mystics, the moment of absorption, for the reason that then, not less than in the contemplation of God, all thought and all self-consciousness ceases. In this misty and torpid state of the mind, how easily one person can come to believe that he has been made a participator of divine life, and another that he has received into his mind the Supreme Divinity himself, no one finds it difficult to understand, especially when he remembers how, with many of these mystics, the powers of both body and mind are broken down by rigid fastings, and other macerations of the flesh.”

There are several other chapters in this interesting book, giving the speculations of the Soofees upon the creation of the world, our first parents, free-will, and connected subjects; but our limits do not permit further extracts.

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### ARTICLE III.

#### MÜLLER'S CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF SIN.

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[In the August Number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1848, we gave a brief abstract of the first book of Müller's *Christliche Lehre von der Sünde*, on the Nature and Guilt of Sin. The following Article is an outline of the remaining part of the work. It will be seen that the author unhesitatingly admits the generally received doctrine of the native depravity of man; but the view, which this doctrine leads him to take of the origin of sin, will probably be dissented from. Neither is it generally received by the theologians of his own country.

It is an interesting and encouraging fact, that the attention of the theological world is now directed more particularly to Theology than to Anthropology; but the deeper and clearer our views are of sin, so much the truer and more comprehensive will be our view of Redemption.—E. R.]

### § 3. *The Origin of Sin.*

In order that man may be accounted guilty for the sin which is in him, it is necessary that he be its author. Most of the theories which have been given for the explanation of sin do, in fact, destroy its guilt, and thus deny its reality, inasmuch as they make it to be the necessary result of influences for which man is not responsible. To maintain the reality of sin, it will be necessary to point out in the sinner a principle of such power and independency, that it can originate actions for which it alone is responsible, and thereby place a limit beyond which the origin of sin is absolutely not to be sought. Such a principle is the human will. Generally man is conscious of necessity only when the determining power is an external one. Only when he strikes upon obstacles, and finds himself hindered in the prosecution of his effort, does he feel the power of necessity over him. He is aware of necessity only so far as it is constraint. It needs, however, but a little observation of the phenomena of human life to be convinced that besides this external necessity, which limits the sphere of human action, there is also an inner necessity arising from the agent himself, and determining the course of his action. The soul of man is not originally *tabula rasa*, but it is rather to be regarded as a closed book; it contains, in itself, a multitude of tendencies, and these are not the same in all, but are different and peculiar in the sexes, races, nations and individuals. It is an inner necessity, with which already in the plays of children the opposition of sex and the peculiarity of the individual is revealed. If the youth embraces a calling for life, he is to be regarded as happy, if he was not led to it by a calculation and comparison of consequences, but by the certainty of a higher instinct, by an undoubting consciousness of his peculiar destination. The artist, the poet wavers not, chooses not in the original conception of his creations, but feels himself borne onward and altogether pervaded by the silent necessity of nature with which Genius works in him. The more completely his plan succeeds, the less does it occur to him that, perhaps, he could have done otherwise. Such are the mighty personalities which early, as if it must be so, devote themselves to an important purpose, and with undivided, unhesitating energy hold it fast for life. In political

communities, those constitutions are the best which have grown up organically and unconsciously out of the history and life of the people, or which owe their legislative power to the inspiration of a great man who was conscious of being the organ of the Divine Will, as well as the bearer and representative of the national spirit; separate, by a wide cleft, from these are those constitutions which a calculating reflection has prepared to be imposed upon a people, and which by excessive minuteness of regulation check the national life.

If a necessity of the kind now illustrated be one which excludes all indifference, all wavering of choice between opposites, yet at the same time it must at first view be regarded as freedom; for it is the acting out of one's own nature. That moral action is free which expresses unconstrainedly the moral condition of the agent, whatever it may be. But the question arises, Does the moral condition of man, as it actually is, stand in such a relation to his true nature, his nature as it ought to be, that an action which the former puts forth, can with confidence be regarded as corresponding to the latter? We know that it does not. Sin cannot belong to the true nature of man; for if it did, it could not produce inward strife and conflict. Man, accordingly, is not truly free when his will is estranged from God, but then only does he realize his true nature, then only is truly free, when with full decision he wills what is good, and in his actions expresses that inner necessity which excludes all thought of the possibility of the contrary. This idea of freedom is confirmed by the Holy Scriptures. In those passages in which the designations *ἐλεύθερος*, *ἐλευθερία* refer to the inner sphere of life; they do not express anything belonging to man in his natural condition, but a possession imparted to him by virtue of Redemption. 1 Cor. 10: 29. 2 Cor. 3: 17. Gal. 2: 4. 5: 1, 13. 1 Pet. 2: 16. The Christian is free, so far as he is delivered from the power of sin. This is the idea of freedom in John 8: 32, 36, where the *δουλος τῆς ἁμαρτίας* is put in contrast with the *ἐλεύθερος*, cf. Rom. 8: 2. This freedom, says Christ, has he alone to whom He gives it. In like manner, James denotes the law fulfilled by Christ as *νόμος ἐλευθερίας*, 1: 25. 2: 12. The Christian cannot be free from the external yoke of the law, if he be not free from the ruling power of sin. But he could not be free from the power of sin, if the law stood over him as merely external authority. In germ, in principle, the redeemed possess this freedom already in the midst of the contests of this life. It will not be manifested in its perfection until their entrance into the kingdom of glory, Rom. 8: 21, 23. But since freedom from sin is at the same time submission to God, obedience to his will from inner impulse, the New Testament denotes this condition as *δουλεία τοῦ θεοῦ*,

Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, τῆς δικαιοσύνης, and both designations (*ἀπελεύθερος κυρίου* and *δοῦλος Χριστοῦ*) are placed side by side, 1 Cor. 7: 22. 1 Pet. 2: 16. In this freedom a power of choice is not thought of, but a condition of the firmest decision. The identity of the same with necessity, is testified in Scripture by the doctrine that the principle of sanctification received into the inner life cannot but produce a corresponding action, Matt. 7: 17—20. 12: 33. 1 John 3: 9. Such an action is accordingly free, and at the same time necessary. In designating the state of obedience to the law of righteousness as freedom, there is not merely the relative meaning of freedom from sin, but of a real self-determination, the purest, most unrestrained spontaneity of the soul. Man realizes his idea when his will is entirely obedient to the Divine Will.

But however significant and important this idea of freedom may be, it is evident, that, in itself considered, it does nothing for our purpose, which is to find in man a power of sufficient independency to originate sin, and thus separate the origin of sin from the Divine causality. But by the preceding view the possibility of sin is excluded from freedom. Now there is another view of the moral freedom of man, which is even as deeply fixed in common consciousness as it is prevalent in science, and which seems perfectly to satisfy the want which the former view left unsatisfied. Here freedom is regarded as a power of choice between good and evil—an action which is free could either have been omitted, or exchanged with another of an opposite character, and the decision between these possibilities rested entirely in the will of the agent.

From the Holy Scriptures this view of freedom does not seem so capable of proof as the other. It matters little that by freedom it never means a power of choice between good and evil. It might, without having the name, yet give instruction respecting the thing itself. But we seek in vain for any such instruction. Nevertheless, this may be accounted for by the practical character of the gospel, which everywhere finds men in the bondage of sin, and does not offer him a first choice between good and evil, but a redemption from the consequences of the perverse decision which he has already made. It constantly appeals to the consciousness of guilt in man as an undeniable part of his inner life, and leaves it quietly to the development of Christian thought to make clear to itself the necessary condition of this consciousness of guilt. Is now this condition no other than that freedom of will by means of which alone man can be the responsible author of his sin, then all those elements of Christian doctrine which confirm the truth of the consciousness of guilt, form at the same time

a foundation for this idea of freedom. And thus the gospel is the strongest testimony of that original freedom in which man was created by God. If one desires a direct confirmation of this idea of freedom from the Holy Scriptures, there is a decisive acknowledgment of its truth in the history of the fall. Not merely the preceding prohibition and the subsequent punishment, but also the process itself, the opposition to the temptation in the lively consciousness which was had of the prohibition, and the commission of the sin notwithstanding this consciousness, all this sets man before us as one who has the power to decide between good and evil. Moreover, in the present condition of the human race, this freedom of choice is acknowledged in various ways by the Holy Scriptures. In the books of the law, not only are there threatenings for the disobedient, and promises for the obedient, but we have the express testimony that the decision between obedience and disobedience, between life and death, is placed in the choice of men, Deut. 30: 15, 16. In the gospel a willing and seeking on the part of man, though it be ever only a yielding to the drawing of the Father to the Son, John 6: 44. Rom. 9: 16, is often denoted as the condition of the efficacy of Divine grace, Matt. 7: 7. 11: 12. Luke 11: 1—13. Heb. 8: 8, and the want of success to the offers of mercy is ascribed to the unwillingness of man, Matt. 23: 37. John 5: 40. Acts 7: 51.

These two ideas of freedom seem mutually to destroy each other, so that, so far as the first, which, as the unity of the will with its true purport, we may call *real* freedom, belongs to man, the other, or *formal* freedom must be denied to him, and *vice versa*. And yet we feel obliged to hold both of them fast, the one, because in it we find an expression for the true independence of our spirit from every foreign power, the other, because the consciousness of guilt and faith in the holiness of God require it. Without the first, we cannot regard the perfection of the human life in Christ attainable; without the second, we cannot explain man's present moral condition.

How are these two definitions of the idea of freedom to be reconciled? Man is originally endowed with formal freedom, in order that by his own self-determination, he may attain unto real freedom. The will were not what by virtue of its formal freedom it should be, the power to determine itself by itself, if it could not set itself as determined, i. e. if it could not give to itself its own direction. Real freedom, or that entire decision for the good, which excludes every possibility of evil, were not possible as freedom, if it did not proceed out of the formal freedom. The one is the essential precondition of the other. To begin with real freedom would not be self-determination,

but a being determined from without, would, therefore, be nature, and not spontaneity. But formal freedom has no other destination than to pass over into real freedom. The former is only means to the latter as end. Formal freedom is the starting point, real freedom is the goal.

Formal freedom contains in itself the possibility of sin, but only the *possibility*. How very far this is from a disposition to sin, appears from the fact that there is also in formal freedom a possibility of choosing the good. The Pelagian idea of freedom is liable to the charge of inconsistency, in representing the same faculty as a root both of good and of evil. Doth a fountain at the same place pour forth sweet water and bitter? And it may seem that formal freedom, as implying the possibility of good and evil, is equally indifferent to both. So it would be, if freedom were already fully determined as *formal*, but in connection with formal freedom, there is the idea of duty to God, by realizing which, the will is to come into possession of real freedom. Moral evil, therefore, arises from formal freedom by no means in the same manner as moral good, for it arises not in the course for which the freedom was originally designed, and which is pointed out by the accompanying consciousness of duty, but by a fall from this destination.

It is not a mere abstraction, but it expresses a real distinction, when we regard *freedom* not as something which is necessarily involved in the idea of will, but as something which the will can be destitute of without ceasing on that account to be *will*.<sup>1</sup> Scripture, church, ex-

<sup>1</sup> By *will* is meant *conscious self-determination*. In considering the subject of moral agency, it is necessary to beware of sundering the will from its living union with the other activities of the spirit's life, and of regarding it in an external relation to them. Rather as the soul makes use of the body as her instrument, and subjects all its members, muscles and nerves to her unity, and is present through them all with determining power; so the feelings, inclinations, interests, convictions, principles, which make up the sum of our spiritual life, together make up, as it were, a body for the will; the will is their forming and moving principle, their proper soul. With a correct view of this relation, the old phraseology, that the will is determined by motives, that these bring forth the decision and the act through the will as their instrument, will give no more embarrassment. Truly a strange psychology, which regarded the conceptions as the properly operative agencies in the soul, and on the contrary, gave to the will a merely receptive, or, to speak more correctly, *passive* place. No less false is it, to represent motives and will as two powers in the inner life which mutually exclude each other, so that, when the motives do not suffice to bring forth a definite decision, the will turns the scale. If the freedom of a volition is in inverse ratio to the degree in which it is determined by motives, the necessitarian always has the advantage; for it will be easy for him to show, that such determining motives are present even when in the moment of volition they escape the notice of consciousness. But even supposing that, on such an hypothesis, it were possible to maintain the freedom of the will, yet the result would be, that man is only then free, when opposing motives have thrown

perience teach of an enslaved will, *servum arbitrium*. The will, which cannot withdraw itself from the ruling power of sin, or resist temptation, is destitute not only of real freedom, but also of formal freedom. Is there in such a man still a desire which resists that ruling power of sin, but only a *velleitas*, a desire which cannot carry itself into execution, as in the state described, Rom. 7: 14—24, then he will feel the want of freedom as a heavy burden, as the sick man feels his pain so long as his constitution reacts against the power of sickness. But has that resisting desire vanished, and is the will wholly given up to selfishness, then the bondage of sin is no more felt by such a one, but is yet, notwithstanding the assent of his will to it, so much the more completely present. The *voluntarium* remains, the *liberum* is lost.

Has man in this life formal freedom?

If there were, at the commencement of our conscious existence, such an individual act as the stepping forth of the will out of a state of indecision into a sinful purpose, it would remain as a dark background in the memory. But who is able to say definitely when and how he for the first time acted in contradiction to his moral consciousness? Certainly our recollection, if our attention is directed sufficiently early to this point, goes back further than is generally supposed, and many a one will be able to say, when, for example, the first feelings of hatred and of revenge were enkindled within him, and what a tumult they produced in the soul of the child. But if we descend deeper into the shaft of self-recollection, we discover behind these earliest moments of sin, still others by which they were prepared, and which accordingly must have been of the same sinful character, and, if we seek to fix these, yet other similar emotions loom up in our memory, and these again, if we seek to hold them fast, lose themselves in an uncertain twilight. To a pure beginning, to an original determining act it is impossible in this way to attain. The earliest sinful act, which presents itself to our consciousness, does not appear as the incoming of an altogether new element into the youthful life, but rather as the development and manifestation of a hidden agency, the awakening of a power slumbering in the deep. Sin does not then for the first time exist in us, but only steps forth into light. However im-

him in some doubt before his decision is made, and, that he manifests his freedom the most essentially, when he decides without motives, or even against them. But every one regards it as something unworthy, to decide in any important matter without or against motives; and no one feels it as a want of freedom, but rather he has then the strongest feeling of freedom, when in any instance he is moved to a definite decision quickly and without at all wavering by the force of powerful, and clearly perceived reasons. A volition, then, is not a simple, but a complex exercise of the spirit.

portant the epoch of awakening moral consciousness may be, it has a past behind it, which is not without co-determining influence upon the conduct of the child in that crisis.

And is it probable that a decision on which depends the future moral character of an immortal soul, would be entrusted to the weak hand of a child? Go back as far as we may, we do not find formal freedom in this life. From the earliest period of his existence in this world, the moral character of man is already determined. On the ground of a practical empiricism, i. e. a mode of thinking which seeks for the circumstances and conditions of the moral actions of men only in what comes under our observation during this earthly life, the doctrine of necessity cannot be refuted.

To originate one's own character is an essential condition of personality, and since from the beginning of this life man's character is already determined, we are obliged to step over the bounds of time to find the source of his freedom of will, to discover that act of free-will by which he determined himself to a course of sin. Is the moral condition in which, irrespective of redemption, we find man to be, one of guilt, and a consequence of his own act; is there truth in the testimony of conscience which imputes to us our sins; is there truth in the voice of religion that God is not the author of sin, then the freedom of man must have its beginning in a domain out of time. In this domain is that power of original choice to be sought for, which precedes and preconditions all sinful decisions in time.

In contemplations of this kind the unfathomable depth of our depravity and guilt is opened to us, and we find a solution to the riddle of that inextinguishable melancholy and sorrow which forms the hidden ground of all human consciousness, until relieved by the light of redemption. The irrational animal is joyous and contented, if its natural wants are supplied, and if it is undisturbed and unendangered from without; in the human consciousness the dark background of sinful choice casts its shadow even upon the brightest scenes of life, and amid the sounds of hearty joy is mingled the tone of secret complaint. Here we may find a cause of that spirit of sadness which breathes in the arts and mythology of ancient times, and in the popular poetry and music of the moderns. Moreover, that anxiety and sorrow which modern philosophers have regarded as the pervading and constant character of animal life, is scarcely anything else than the coloring of that gloom which the sorrow of the human self-consciousness throws upon the animal world; only *personal* beings have in themselves this original source of pain and discomfort, and only they can have it, because they alone have the beginning of their existence without the domain of time.

#### § 4. *The Universality of Sin.*

Sin is not merely to be found here and there among the children of men, but it is a universal characteristic of the race. With but one exception, no human life is free from it. It is sufficient to say of any person that he belongs to the family of man, and at once to settle the point that he is a sinner. The natural condition of man presents itself as a supremacy of selfishness over moral and religious impulses, and in connection therewith, as a partial and often almost total perversion and obscuration of the knowledge of God and of duty. Consistent with this is the acknowledgment, that even in heathenism and generally in the entire extent of unrenewed life, there are found elements of a nobler striving which betoken a reverence for moral law; for, in human nature in its present condition, there is a discordant action; there is the idea of God and the sense of duty, there is also a propensity to selfishness, but the latter is the dominant one. Consistent also is the acknowledgment of a relative innocence in early childhood in comparison with the period of riper years, and by reason of which it is set before us as a pattern for imitation, Matt. 18: 3. 19: 14. 1 Cor. 14: 20; for this innocence rests upon the fact that the germs of sin are still undeveloped, but that the germs are already present in the child, is evident from the fact, that as soon as moral consciousness is awakened by the moral law, sin appears.

The Holy Scriptures declare the universal presence of sin in the human race, not merely by individual texts which expressly teach it, Rom. 3: 9, 20, 23. 5: 12. Gal. 3: 22. Eph. 2: 3. 1 John 1: 8. 1 Kings 8: 46. Ps. 143: 2. Prov. 20: 9. Eccles. 7: 20, but still more decisively by the facts, that the New Testament everywhere refers redemption to the whole world, and thereby describes the whole world as needing redemption, therefore sinful, John 3: 16. 6: 51. 12: 47; that it knows of no other salvation than in Christ, John 1: 12. 14: 6. Acts 4: 12. Mark 16: 16; that Christ announces as an indispensable condition of a share in this salvation to all without distinction, repentance and regeneration, Matt. 4: 17. Mark 1: 15. 8: 12. Luke 24: 47. John 3: 3, 5, and even designates as evil those who had already allied themselves to him, Luke 11: 13.

There are many facts of common life which serve for confirmation of the doctrine that in every man there is a deeply rooted, an inborn tendency to sin. On what other ground are we to comprehend the certainty with which, whenever a human form meets us, we know we have to do, not with a holy, but with a sinful being? Whoever presumes to have a little knowledge of men, compassionates him as a

good natured fool, who would work upon them or with them in the various relations of life without taking into the account their moral weakness, and the consequences that may result therefrom. We would not, indeed, deny that that view of human nature which teaches us to expect only evil of others, is itself of evil. We must rather acknowledge it as duty to meet every one with confidence in the honesty of his disposition, till we have proof of the contrary; but will any one, on that account, call in question the general conviction above referred to? On the contrary, the certainty of it is so great, that if any one should profess to be absolutely sinless, the conclusion would be, that his share in human sinfulness was doubled by his arrogance and conceit. So universal is sin, that it is precisely the morally earnest man, the man who means to do right, that least ventures to declare himself to be free from it; and only then would we acknowledge an exception to the doctrine, when the entire moral appearance of a man who announced himself as holy, was altogether another and a higher than that of other men, even of those who were prominent among their fellows for their virtue.

If we consider the general course of the moral development of man, it is one of the most known and acknowledged facts, that in order to progress in good, constant exertion, toil and conflict are necessary; while, on the other hand, progress in wickedness is easy, and can be made without difficulty. The seed of sin grows and ripens in the human heart of itself, without any special care; one needs only hold no restraint upon himself, and he is at once deep in sin. But that any man can, only through new and repeated conquests over himself, make progress in good, has no meaning, if there is not something in the natural condition of man, which must be resisted as striving against the good, and which consequently is a propensity to sin.

Another fact which shows us how deeply rooted sin is in our nature, meets us in the observation, that virtues are usually so intertwined with faults, that often the latter present themselves as the reversed side of the former. Serious earnestness imperceptibly glides into a censorious hardness, and mildness into softness; a ready activity for the welfare of others goes over into an imprudent intermeddling, and quiet moderation into a lazy ease; firm decision, which would make one's own conviction avail, becomes intolerant narrowness, and a regard for the rights of the individuality and convictions of others becomes an idle and crippling indifferentism; a lively, vigorous confidence degenerates into haughtiness and presumption, and wise caution into pusillanimity and wavering fear. Upon every human virtue easily creeps its degeneracy, and this exchange is wont to take place by such slight transitions,

that by the comparatively unimportant alteration of a few features, the noble countenance has become a repulsive caricature.

One of the most convincing testimonies of the exceeding depth of human depravity is, that it is still everywhere present in the life of those who, by means of the new powers imparted to them by redeeming grace, are striving after sanctification. True, in them the dominion of sin has been broken; the individual will is, with determined purpose, devoted to the Divine will; this unity is the impelling and determining principle of their life; in them, sin is deprived of its power to develop itself progressively; it is to be regarded as declining and vanishing, as the after-working of the old man, Eph. 4: 22 sq. And one should not be induced to doubt this because of those occasional progressive movements by which sin sometimes, in the life of the renewed, seems again to recover a lost domain; for every such result, since it cannot sunder the continuous connection of the new life, calls forth a stronger and more deeply penetrating refection of the Divine principle; and so, taking into view the entire condition, it still remains true that the power of sin is on the decline. Yet notwithstanding all this, it is a decided fact in reference to the life that is renewed by Christ, and a fact which will be denied least of all by those in whom this life really is, that in its earthly development it never becomes completely free from sin; that in the Christian life there is a continual conflict; that it needs careful watching lest by an imperceptible decline of the principle within which comes from God, and by a corresponding unperceived growth of the selfish element, it be made to suffer losses which are hard to be retrieved. Sometimes the power of sin, yet remaining in the renewed, manifests itself in the form of an unholy emotion which arises in the heart before the better will can hinder it; at other times, in the form of unknown or indistinctly perceived intermingling of impure and selfish elements with those services which arise from worthy and holy impulses. And there is also another remarkable fact in Christian experience, that scarcely anywhere, where sanctification has begun, is there wanting an accompanying consciousness (as if of an essential necessity), that within the bounds of this earthly life one cannot come to a complete and perfect purity from sin. This can be explained only on the ground that sin is so interwoven with our nature from the beginning of our earthly life, as to co-determine the form of its development.

The universality of sin in the human race has been generally explained by the doctrine of *Original Sin*. The doctrine is briefly this. God made man in his own image, i. e. he endowed our first parents

with an original righteousness, the elements of which are holiness of will and wisdom of understanding. These glorious attributes belong to human nature itself; so that, if they fail, the purity of nature is lost. Therefore, God gave them to man not merely as a personal possession, but with the destination, if they should truly keep the same, to continue them to their posterity, of course in such a manner that in the latter they should at first be only as a disposition, or a faculty to produce and exercise these qualities with unconstrained ease. But our first parents fell from the state wherein they were created, by disobedience to the divine command; and thereby not only lost the divine image, but also poisoned human nature in soul and body with a lust to all iniquity. The loss of the divine image, together with the dominant sinful inclination, passes over from them to all their children, who are descended from them in the way of natural generation; and in these two elements (the negative—*defectus justitiæ originalis*; and the positive—*concupiscentia*) consists original sin, the inexhaustible source of all actual sins. But original sin is by no means to be regarded merely as a calamity, which brings no guilt with it to him in whom it is; but as it is really sin, so it makes every man, from the beginning of his life, guilty before God and worthy of eternal damnation. Original sin is, at the same time, original *guilt*.

In the doctrine thus stated, two principles are manifestly presupposed. 1) Where sin is, there is guilt. 2) A condition of human nature, from which all kinds of actual sins proceed, must be regarded as itself sin. These principles are true. But it is equally true, that where in relation to actions and states which appear as sinful, the origination of those actions and states by the subject of them is absolutely impossible, there those actions and states are not really sinful. It is a question, whether the doctrine is sufficiently protected against the application of this principle. Only a personal being, and not a mere being of nature, can render himself a subject of guilt; for only a personal being is the real author of his actions and states. Where there is no personality, and accordingly no freedom of will, there the power of original self-determination is wanting; what appears as a self-determining, if traced into its real causes, is resolved into a being determined. Accordingly, reprobate actions and states can be regarded as criminal, only so far as they have their ultimate ground in the self-determination of the subject. If the subject is merely the transition point for influences received from another power, whether that other power be of nature, or a personal one, then these states and activities are not his fault, unless he by some preceding self-determination gave entrance to the determining influence of such power upon him. Now

the doctrine of original sin teaches, that the sinfulness, which is rooted in our nature, and which, according to the canon, *semper cum malo originali simul sunt peccata actualia*, is continually producing actual sins of every kind, is in all mankind solely as the consequence of the sin of our first parents. But if this sinfulness is in us solely by the action of other personalities, without our having had anything to do with it, it cannot be imputed to us as its authors, but only to them; it is in us, not as guilt, but solely as evil and calamity. Moreover, in all the actual sins which arise out of this sinfulness, it is not properly we who act, but the first man in us; how then should our apparent action be real sin, on account of which we should be condemned?

In this theory two undeniable facts with regard to sin are brought to view which appear to be irreconcilable. 1) Sin is innate in our nature. 2) Each individual, in whom it is, is responsible for it.

It is a superficial view of human nature which regards the race as being in a moral respect merely an aggregate of individual personalities, morally connected with each other, and dependent upon each other, only in so far as in the progress of their development they receive, one from another, discipline, doctrine, example. Behind this division into atoms may be discerned a native substantial unity, in which the moral life of the individual is rooted as in its maternal soil. It would be a very superficial conception, if one should suppose that the community, in which he lives, exercises a determining influence upon him only so far as he pleases to give room for it. Rather he grows up in it unconsciously, in its moral tendencies and interests, in its modes of thinking, and even when he acts with the most complete self-consciousness, the moral atmosphere in which he has lived hitherto, and which has become a quality of his own being, has a co-determining influence upon his decisions and actions. Yea more, if the community is not merely an artificial one, but has a firm ground in nature, the individual is born into it, and breathes a common life with it. For example, the Caucasian, notwithstanding the essential unity of the race, has a different destination in life from that of the Negro; the German, from that of the Slavonian. But the individual receives his particular share of this common impress, not merely by education and custom, but he is supported and determined by the moral substance of the community, from which he is arisen.

Here the question is of a character which belongs, not to one community only, but to the race. This character, although spread over the race, is yet in its nature discordant with the idea of man, consequently, does not belong originally to man, but must have been originated by him; if now its extension over the race shall be accounted

for consistently with its origination by man, how natural it becomes to regard the universal corruption of man as having arisen in our first parents by their apostasy from God! And corruption having once penetrated into the substantial nature of the species, as this nature continually produces individuals and becomes individualized in them, so must corruption appear in all the individuals, and that too, not as something foreign, imparted to them from without, but as something rooted in their innermost nature, arising from the depths of their own being, as a characteristic of the race, and yet at the same time the property of each, interwoven in all the tendencies of their being. Experience teaches us clearly enough, how often in a family, vices are propagated from generation to generation, of course not as ready formed exercises, but as evil dispositions and inclinations, and yet those who are swayed thereby, if they perceive the operation of this law, do not on that account feel justified in their consciences.

We are far from denying a relative truth to this view of sin (which we may designate as the *organic*, in opposition to the *atomistic*, which, overlooking the generic character of sin, regards it merely as pertaining to the individual); much rather must we acknowledge that the fundamental idea, the hereditary transmission of sinful dispositions, must have its place in every not altogether one-sided and therefore defective theory of sin;<sup>1</sup> but there is a difficulty in reconciling this fact with the idea of guilt. If the individual, by means of a necessity preceding his own self-determination, is the subject of a perverse disposition which inheres in the race, then is this hereditary sinful condition, however closely it may be interwoven with the nature of the individual, and be cherished and nourished by his own active power, by no means to be imputed to him, but to the nature of the race, and to him who brought this disorder into human nature.

This difficulty has given rise to the following modification of the doctrine of original sin. It is admitted that the sin of Adam has brought not merely a physical, but also a moral disorder and corruption into human nature; so that the descendants of Adam are not born in the same integrity in which he was created, but from the beginning

<sup>1</sup> The process of generation by beings endowed with souls is a true generation of souls, calling into existence not merely a new manifestation of animal life, but a psychical principle, which serves as the frame of a definite individuality. But that a mere process of nature should bring into existence what is qualitatively different from nature, appears to us as a perfect contradiction. Much rather does the personality, as such, proceed from a timeless ground, and the process of generation gives to it a basis for development in time. That this leads to a certain pre-existence is true; but it is such, that the *prae* is to be understood not as a relation of time, and the existence not as a ready formed state of being.

are affected with a certain *impurity*, with a *strong inclination to sin*. But this inclination to sin, it is said, cannot be imputed to them as *guilt*, because it is born within them without their agency; it is in them as an evil, as a disease, but not as sin. Sin arises not till the individual yields to the allurements of this corrupt disposition, and, according to the theory, each individual has the power, although weakened by the sinful disposition, to abstain from such consent.

Now aside from the difficulty of reconciling such a theory with some texts of Scripture, especially Eph. 2: 8, it is a question, whether it solves the proposed problem. The problem is manifestly twofold; it relates partly to the possibility of a definite distinction between the corruption which is native and for which, therefore, man is not guilty, and the sin which is connected with individual guilt; partly to the compatibility of the fact, that no human life, which has passed over the period of moral unconsciousness, is free from guilt, with the fact that there is no guilt except by free self-determination. Now it is impossible to draw the line between the corruption which is native, and the voluntary transgression, and, in the next place, it still remains an unaccountable fact that none of the human race should have exercised and maintained their power of resisting and overcoming the in-born propensity.

Because of the indissoluble connection of sin with guilt, it is evident that the native sinfulness of man can with justice be referred to the original sin of Adam as its source, only when it is proved that all the descendants of Adam share personally in the guilt of his fall. Can this be shown? The passage of Scripture specially relied upon in proof of this, is Rom. 5: 12—19. With regard to the doctrinal import of this passage, it first represents the universal dominion of death as a consequence of the fall of Adam, and in so far as it sets forth death as the consequence of sin, it puts the sinfulness of Adam's descendants in a real connection with his fall; and a doctrinal view, which denies any determining influence of this fall upon the development of sin in the race, cannot be reconciled with the purport of these words of Paul. But that the sufficient causality of the dominion of sin in the natural life of the race lies in the sin of Adam, the apostle does not say. This doctrine is not contained, as some suppose, in v. 19, for the apostle would then have chosen some other word than *καθίστασθαι*, since *καθιστάνας* in the New Testament, with the exception of Acts 17: 15, is expressive not so much of a constitutive as of a declarative agency. The many have been (as it were, before the divine tribunal), through the disobedience of one man (as the determining starting-point of the

sinful development), declared sinners thereby, that they have become subject to death.

If we turn now to the section of the Old Testament, to which the apostle here evidently refers, to the account of the fall, Gen. iii, we need not enter upon the question how far a historical character is belonging to it, since it is the doctrinal import alone, with which we are at present concerned. We cannot, however, assent to the prevalent assumption, that it is a philosopheme, clothed in a historical garb, by which a reflecting Israelite would explain the origin of evil, since this would bring it into a later period of philosophical reflection, with which the simple and ancient character of the language and style is at variance. Moreover, it is difficult to comprehend how the deep, meditative piety of an Israelite, exercising his imagination upon the holy traditions of the first parents of the race, would have dared to represent his own imaginings as history. Much rather, in this narrative there is an historical germ, certain features of which appear in many other Oriental traditions respecting the origin of evil. Its historical character is further evinced by its internal and external connection with the first eleven chapters of Genesis, the historical character of which no prudent critic will easily give up. It finds a confirmation in the testimony of the inspired apostle, who not merely occasionally refers to the fall, 2 Cor. 11: 13. 1 Tim. 2: 14, but in such a manner, that it forms unmistakably an element of his religious consciousness. Rom. 5: 12—19. 1 Cor. 15: 21. 22. If we thus go beyond the mythical view of this narrative to the acknowledgment of a historical basis, it is not meant thereby that theology must take upon itself to defend the historical character of every individual feature. It may easily be supposed that an event, which took place amid altogether peculiar relations, which relations have vanished in consequence of that event, handed down in oral tradition through a series of generations, should gradually have woven for itself a garb in order to represent its meaning to those who, through the absence of these original relations, were incapable of understanding a literal statement of it. If, then, later theological investigations labor in vain to separate the figurative elements from the original substance, and to draw a mathematical line between what is historical and what is allegorical, they will better preserve their scientific character by an open confession of their present inability, than by setting up some untenable solution, in order to avoid the unpleasantness of not giving a categorical answer.

But supposing that we could take every feature of the narrative in its strict literal sense, still it teaches nothing of a moral corruption which entered first with the fall, and, by reason thereof, is transmitted

to the posterity of Adam, so that thereby all the children of men from the beginning of their life are affected with sin and guilt. Rather the design of the narrator is not to explain the origin of the universal *sinfulness*, but the origin of the universal dominion of evil; it teaches us to regard the toils and sufferings of our earthly life, and especially death, as the consequence and punishment of sin, and the sentence pronounced upon our first parents in Gen. 3: 16—19, is doubtless meant to be that of the entire human race. The idea of a transition of the first man from an absolutely pure condition, free from every sinful disposition, is not necessarily contained in it, but only this at all events is taught, that the corruption of man, in whatever manner it may have originally arisen, has its ground in himself. When it is said, Gen. 1: 31, God looked upon all that he had made, and, behold, it was very good, this refers only to what God had made, and is well compatible with a germ of sin still lying concealed and inoperative in man, provided it had its origin in man, not in God. And the Divine sentence, v. 31, which relates to irrational, as well as to rational creatures, was designed to express, not their moral goodness, but their adaptation to their designed ends.

And here arises the question, whether the Old Testament, or Scripture anywhere, teaches anything of an original holy condition of the human race at the beginning of its history, from which, by the first actual sin, there was a transition to the opposite condition of natural sinfulness. That the narrative of the first sin, as well as the description given of the condition of man preceding the same, does not necessarily mean anything more than an initial non-appearance of sin, is partly in itself clear, and partly is evident from what has already been remarked. The main argument for the affirmative of the question is based upon what is said in Gen. 1: 26—28, respecting the *divine image*, in which the first man was created. Lutheran theology understands by this image (principaliter) a perfect holiness and wisdom, and maintains, that our first parents by their transgression forfeited the same for themselves and all their posterity.

The Mosaic record employs as the designation of the Divine image, which man bears in distinction from all other earthly creatures, two expressions, עֶלְמָא and רִמְיוֹ, sometimes both together, sometimes separately, cf. Gen. 1: 26, 28, with Eccl. 1: 9: 6. In this two-fold designation most of the Greek Fathers, and following them, Bellarmin and other Catholic theologians found a difference of meaning, inasmuch as they understood עֶלְמָא (*eikôn*) of the moral and intellectual faculties belonging to man, and רִמְיוֹ (*ὁμοίωσις*) of the godlike perfection, which it was the destination of man to strive after. Doctrinally considered,

such a distinction is correct, but exegetically, there is no ground for this interpretation, and the duplication is only to render the meaning more definite or intensive.

The Socinians, in part also the Arminians, understand by the Divine image the dominion granted to man over the lower creation. That this dominion is closely related to the Divine image, is clear, but the relation is one, not of identity, but of cause and effect. Because man by the image of God is different from all that is merely nature, and *to to genere* exalted above it, has he also the destination and the power to rule over it.

The argument by which it has been attempted to prove that a condition of holiness is meant by the image of God spoken of in Genesis, is derived from those passages in the New Testament, especially Col. 3: 10. Eph. 4: 24, in which it is said, that the new man in Christ Jesus is renewed after the image of him that created him, from which it has been inferred that the same was lost by the fall. But there lies at the basis of such an argument an assumption, that must first be proved, namely, that the new creation by redemption is essentially nothing else than a restoration of the condition in which Adam was before the fall. Undoubtedly the Divine image, which is the result of redemption, stands in close and essential connection with the image, which man bears from his creation; the former is the true realization of the latter; the one is first given to man in order that he may attain unto the other, if not in the straight way of faithful continuance in communion with God, then in the circuitous way of redemption; but from the nature of this connection it follows, that the purport of the two is not the same.<sup>1</sup>

So far from there being any biblical testimony for the loss of the Divine image of which mention is made, Gen. i, that we find on the contrary decisive evidence of its presence after the sin of our first parents. In Gen. 9: 6, the violent destruction of human life is sentenced with the severest vengeance, and it is given as a reason therefore, that God made man in his own image, which manifestly presupposes that man still bears this image, as the seal of his inviolableness. In a very similar connection, James (3: 9,) gives as a reason why we should not curse our fellow men, that men (*τοὺς ἀνθρώπους* not *τὸν ἄνθρωπον*) were made in the image of God.

<sup>1</sup> The loss of the Divine image by the fall is not proved by Gen. 5: 3. In v. 1, we read, God made man in his own likeness, and without mention of any change having intervened, in v. 3, it is said, Adam begat a son in his own likeness, after his image; from which an impartial exegesis would conclude, that also Adam's son bore in himself the image and likeness of God.

Consequently out of all which the Holy Scriptures contain respecting the image of God in which man was originally created, the proposition cannot be established, that Adam by his fall introduced into human nature a new principle before foreign to it, which usurped dominion over his descendants, and ensnared them in sin and guilt.

What is to be understood by the Divine image, is not expressly stated in Genesis, but may easily be inferred. When after the account, how the different orders of the creation arose into being by the creative word of God, the creation of man is introduced in a peculiar manner by the counsel of God to create a being in his image, after his likeness, it is manifestly implied, that in the aforementioned orders his image is not to be met with. Therefore, the image of God in man is that by which man is different from all beings of nature, and exalted above them. This he is thereby, that he has ideas of moral truth, the idea of God, of eternity, in short, that he is a *personal being*. The other orders of creation may reveal God and his eternal thoughts; but images of God can they only be, who are a revelation of God, not merely for others, but also for themselves, who not merely are, but are *for themselves*, who are conscious of themselves, and therefore conscious of God. God has made us in his image. Therefore, we are capable of knowing and loving God.

The problem is, to reconcile the guilt of each individual with the universality of sin in the race, and thus show the falsity of the conclusion drawn from that universality, that sin is an essential constituent of human nature, or a matter of metaphysical necessity. On the one side, there is in all men an innate sinfulness, and on the other side, wherever sin is, there is guilt, i. e. each individual is, by his own self-determination, the author of his sin. This would be a manifest contradiction, if there were not preceding our earthly development in time, an existence of our personality as the sphere of that self-determination by which our moral condition from birth is affected. And so, from these undeniable facts of human life, we are led to the same idea to which the examination of human freedom brought us, the idea of a mode of existence of created personalities out of time, and from which their life in time is dependent. Should we, however, ascribe to *all* personal creatures in the timeless state of their being such a perversion of will as is found in man, we should transfer the same difficult problem to the sphere, in which, we suppose, is found its solution. But here we are met and relieved by a doctrine which finds a place in the religious belief of most nations, that a part of the spirit-world by their self-determination founded a moral state of being in undisturbed harmony with God, and thus elevated the original purity

In which they were created, to a free holiness, and that another portion of those beings entirely and decidedly turned away from God, whereby for their existence in time every inclination to good was excluded. In human nature sin has produced a division. The will of man is not so decisively sundered from its eternal law, as to be entirely beyond the reach of its influence, but by the reaction of that law against the dominant principle of selfishness, arises the strangely mingled and wavering condition in which we find the natural man. Not out of total darkness, but out of a night, in which there is left yet some glimmering of day, man's moral development proceeds. Hence that deep seated desire after light, which every moral and religious influence may calculate upon meeting with, provided it begins its work sufficiently early.

If, preceding our development in time, there was an original decision of our self-will, by which it usurped the place of a ruling principle, we may understand why it is, that our earthly life, in its general course as well as its minuter circumstances, is for nothing so well adapted as to check and subdue our self-will. Self-denial it preaches to us wherever we turn; from the first awakening of consciousness this hard lesson is sounded in our ears; our dearest wishes we must bend to the commanding will of others; accustom ourselves to regulations which we did not make, and revere authorities whose grounds we do not see. No plan of life, unless the knowledge of the necessity to be resigned to disappointments had not already deprived it of all definiteness, is really executed; what we would hold fast, is torn from us by the power of circumstances, and something else pressed upon us, of which we did not dream. No individual work remains truly our own, its going out from us is its entrance into incalculable combinations, in which it not only becomes free from our control, but may become a burdensome restraint upon our favorite inclinations. To break the self-will of man is the aim of the discipline of life. For as unbridled self is evil through and through, even when in its outward actions it agrees with the regulations of social morality, so earnest discipline is the soil, in which alone true virtue can flourish, and obedience the sure though bitter root, from which is developed the growth of a genuine freedom.

##### § 5. *The increasing Power of Sin in the Development of the Individual.*

The timeless original act, in which every human will determines itself, generates an inherent quality, a moral condition; it is that in which we all are born. At first present only as a hidden power, it becomes actual with the awakening of moral consciousness.

Of all sinful acts within our life in time, there is none which can possess an equal power of forming a condition, a state; but they all in a less degree share in this determining power. The freedom of the will is not an ability by which the will, after the commission of any sin, can return to its former undetermined state with respect to that sin, but the self-determining of the will becomes immediately a being determined; by an act of sin the will gives itself a tendency to sin. The element of lust becomes a constant factor of the inner life.

It is the might of the divinely appointed law of the universe, which is thus active in the rebellious will of man. The will sundered itself from the moral law, and God hinders it not, but it still remains subject to the universal law of development, and thereby necessitated to a continuous course and a certain order of progression in sin. Without this order, it is not conceivable how man could ever become free from sin and attain to an unchangeable holiness. If this element of disorder has once entered into being, it must then unfold its nature with a certain completeness, because only so can it be thoroughly taken away. As the heavy vapors, which, arising from the earth, fill the air, are drawn together by the powerful rays of the sun into clouds, in order that falling as rain they may restore to the atmosphere its purity, so must sin gain a definite form in the life of man, in order that it may be duly striven with, and the strife be carried through to an ever enduring victory, which, indeed, is not possible to man left to himself, but only through redemption, John 8: 36.

The relation which progress in good and progress in evil hold to formal freedom, is directly the opposite, one of the other. The good, having its root in love to God, is the truth of the human will, and the will, uniting with it, is conscious of no restraint of its freedom in so doing, but finds rather the confirmation thereof. The more closely the will cleaves to the good, so much the freer, so much the more the master of himself is the man. Evil on the contrary is foreign to man's being. Although taken up into the will freely, it produces only bondage. Whoso committeth sin, says Christ, John 8: 34, is the servant of sin, cf. 2 Pet. 2: 19. There is but one way from formal freedom to real freedom, the way of sanctification; all development in evil is at the same time a progressive envelopment in its bondage. And if in his growing deterioration by constant yielding to sin, any one should lose the feeling of the foreignness of sin to his being, this would be an indication of its power. As in the sickness of the body, the coming on of an insensibility to pain is a sign of the deadly power of the disease, since organic nature no longer works against it, so man ceases to feel painfully the power of sin when it meets no more restraint

in his moral consciousness; but then it is at its highest point, and man must feel its despotic dominion in being given up a prey to conflicting desires and passions.

However fearful the power of sin in consequence of the *law of gradation* may be, yet it is not a single decision of the will which is sufficient to give a man wholly up to iniquity. Though the way downwards is beyond all comparison easier to the human race than the upward way, yet it has its definite steps; and if man with one stride would pass over them all, he would be as little able to do it, as one in the fellowship of redeeming grace is able by a single decision, a single act of inner submission, to become a perfect saint. We can imagine the horrible case, and it is in reality not unheard of, that men, who to a certain degree were already affected by holy principles, perhaps driven to despair by frequent relapses, in some dark moment formed the definite decision rather to give themselves over to the devil, or (if their theory would make no account of him) to sin, and from that moment were violently driven in a mad, reckless career. But in spite of this evil will, they will yet for a period experience the after-workings of a better nature within them, until the constant execution of their decision has gradually brought about a complete obduracy.

Nevertheless, progress in evil is not of so simple a nature that it depends solely upon psychological conditions. Not merely his own inner constitution, the outward world also holds man fast in his sinful wanderings; the productions of his freedom become fetters to his freedom; his choice becomes his destiny. For example, a lie obliges the liar to lie yet more daringly; hate enkindles hate, and itself thereby burns the more ardently. How often does a single act, which seems to be one only of weakness and haste, ensnare its author in a labyrinth of sins! The dark thought, scarcely expressed, malicious powers seize upon and weave from it an invisible net which gradually folds itself around the will and drags it, as with irresistible force, to the purposed fulfilment; the enticed falls by sin in the power of the enticer who knows fiendishly how to use it; after the first hesitating step in transgression, the door closes behind the lost one, he finds himself compelled to cover crime with crime, and by new sins to give new strength to the works that sin has produced. *One* way of return there always is; but only he can find it, who is ready to forego himself, his entire earthly life.

There is one fact which, perhaps, more than any other illustrates the increasing power of sin, and that is, the *hardening* influence of divine truth upon the soul that refuses to receive it. No one can withdraw from the revelation of God which comes near to him, and have

his moral condition remain as before ; but the sluggish disinclination which he opposes to it, necessarily rises to positive hatred and obstinate resistance to what is holy and divine. If a ray of divine light meets one, he cannot, as many would like to do, pass by it with quiet unconcern and indifference ; but, if he closes himself to the light, he is driven to bitterness and spite against it. In relation to such a one, the means of spiritual recovery not merely lose their saving efficacy, but immediately operate in an opposite manner. Christ himself hath expressed this law in those words of deep moment : Whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance ; but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath, Matt. 13: 12.

The New Testament speaks of *one* sin as absolutely unpardonable, the *blasphemy of the Holy Ghost*, Matt. 12: 31, 32. Luke 12: 10. Mark 3: 28. This sin is not designated by Christ as one particular kind of unpardonable sin, but as the *alone unpardonable sin*, in express distinction from all others. We conclude, therefore, that the acme of sinful development in every instance, unless prevented by redeeming grace, is blasphemy of the Holy Ghost.

The nature of this sin may be understood by a view of the system of God's revelations to man.<sup>1</sup> They who have merely the light of nature with regard to God and holiness and eternal life, do not commit this sin, for the dispensation of the Spirit has not yet been given to them. It is the office of the Spirit to take of the things of Christ and to show them unto men. He who refuses to accept the salvation offered to him by the Spirit of God in Christ, sins against the highest and final revelation of God's mercy to man. It is the sin unto death, 1 John 5: 16.

Divine Love draws to itself all that does not resist its drawing ; but in the freedom of the will there is the possibility of eternal sinning, and consequently of eternal damnation. Sin is something spiritual in its nature. It is the setting up of one's own will in opposition to the will of God. The body is rather a check upon it than an incentive to it. The fine, subtle poison of selfishness receives in the earthly corporeity an alloy, as it were, of gross material, which retards its diffusion through all the veins and nerves of the inner life, and prevents it from uncovering its satanic depth ; and what is to hinder the sinful self-will, when free from the body, from manifesting the intensity of its hatred against God and his holy law ?

It is sometimes objected, that it is inconceivable that an element of

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Schaf's Treatise Ueber die Sünde wider den heiligen Geist.

disorder should exist forever in any part of God's universe. But this difficulty is solved by the correct idea of *punishment*. Opposition to the Divine will does not prevail, but is then absolutely vanquished when the entire condition of the beings, in whom it is, is a condition of punishment. God will certainly realize his idea of the world in all its completeness; but whether every member of the human family shall, as one of the redeemed, have a share in this realization, cannot *a priori* be decided; and the words of Christ with regard to the blasphemy of the Holy Ghost, decisively deny it. The manifold wisdom of God has at command infinitely many ways and means for the attainment of its ends; should the individual withdraw forever from the place where he might be an accord in the harmony of the whole, yet creative wisdom has certainly otherwise provided that nothing shall be wanting to this harmony; but he, even by his opposition and against his will, will be obliged to affirm the same. He who will not humble himself in order to be truly exalted, who will not die in order to live, all hatred and yet utterly powerless, unceasingly raging against God, will yet be obliged forever to acknowledge him as the almighty Creator of all things, whose he is and whom he is bound to obey.

There is One among men who is wholly free from evil; and this his freedom he imparts to all who become one with him by the act of justifying faith. But still they have this freedom only in him, not in themselves; still their being-in-him is not become a perfect being-in-themselves; still their self-will is not entirely purified and glorified; therefore, every exercise of their consciousness of being one with him, is ever conditioned by a new giving up of self. It is the significance of the Christian hope, that one day all which they have in him, they will at the same time perfectly have in themselves. Then the broken accords, which now, like the sound of far distant music, we can but faintly hear, will become united in a full chorus of harmony, from which every dissonance has wholly vanished away.