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wrote the book of the *Acts*, and as the confidential friend and fellow-traveller of the apostle Paul enjoyed such means for collecting the necessary facts, stands before us with claims to our confidence which still remain, and must ever remain, unimpaired.

ARTICLE III.

REMARKS ON A PASSAGE IN PLATO'S GORGIAS, p. 497. A. ed. Steph.

By T. D. Woolsey, Yale College.

Callicles. Οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἀττα σοφίης, οὐδὲ Σωκράτεος. *Socrates.* Οἶσθα, ἄλλὰ ἀκκίζει, οὐδὲ Καλλίκλεος. καὶ πρότι γε ἔτι εἰς τούμπροσθε, ὃν ἔχων ληρεῖς, ἵνα εἰδῆς ὡς σοφὸς ὡς με νονθετεῖς. οὐχ ἀμα διψεῖτε ἐκαστος πεπανται καὶ ἀμα ἡδόμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνεται.

THESE words are intelligible enough in themselves, and there is no uncertainty respecting the text; so far as it depends on manuscript authority. There is however a difficulty in the clause *ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς*, which all the commentators seem to feel. Cornarius proposed to read *ὅτι* *ἔχων ληρεῖς*, probably on account of the harshness of the parenthesis with *ὅτι* in this place. Coray conjectured *ὅτι* *ἐκὼν ληρεῖς*. Heindorf's nice tact led him to go deeper into the difficulty, and he expresses himself as follows: "Verbis his *ὅτι* *ἔχων ληρεῖς*; quid faciam non video. Calliclem haec sane decerent: (conf. § 100.) Socratem, leniter ubique et argumentorum vi, non verborum asperitate adversarii nugas convincentem meo quidem judicio parum decent. Tum prorsus pervertunt ironiam in verbis quae statim post inferuntur, *ἵνα εἰδῆς ὡς σοφὸς ὡς με νονθετεῖς*; atque, ut sunt h. l. interposita sensu propemodum omni carent.—Nunc nulla mihi relinquitur dubitatio quin alieno loco a librario intrusa sint, in proximis fortasse Callicli sic tribuenda; *οὐκοῦν ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς*."

In the appendix to Heindorf's Select Dialogues of Plato (second ed. Berl. 1829), Buttmann acknowledges in part the force of Heindorf's objections, but endeavors to weaken it by the following considerations: "ut aliquo modo vulgatam lectionem tuear, per parenthesin quandam inserta haec accipio, quae sic quoque, et magis sane pro more suo ef-

¹ He refers to p. 490, D. E.

ferre potuerit Plato: *ληρεῖς γὰρ ἔχων*. Illa autem, quae est in verbis *ώς σοφὸς ὡς με τονθετεῖς*; ironia, mihi quidem non ita lenis videtur, ut eam graviore hac reprehendendi formula perverti patem." Of Heindorf's argument, drawn from the inconsistency of these words with the character of the Platonic Socrates, he says nothing,—perhaps because he felt that it could not be controverted.

Stallbaum in his first Gotha edition (1828) and Ast (Vol. XI of his Plato, p. 831), adopt the views of Heindorf and include the words in question between brackets. On Buttmann's words, which were just now cited, the former justly observes: Buttmanno tamen omnia sana videntur; nam ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς per parenthesin esse insertum, ita ut more usitatiore dici etiam potuerit: *ληρεῖς γὰρ ἔχων*. Quae ratio haud scio an cuiquam satisfaciat: mihi quidem displicet mirifice." Probably Buttmann meant no more than to make the best defence of words, which he felt to be doubtful.

In his second Gotha edition (1840) Stallbaum has deserted his original ground to adopt a remedy for the difficulty suggested by Winckelmann in a note on Euthydemus, 295, C. (Leipzig, 1832). This is a passage where the sophist expresses himself concerning Socrates in language like that which we are considering: *οὐκ ἀποκρίνεται, σφῆ, πρὸς ἀ τὴν δὲ οὐλαμβάνεις, ὅτι ἔχων φλυαρεῖς καὶ ἀρχαιότερος εἰ τοῦ δέοντος*. Winckelmann—after remarking that in Gorgias, 490, E. we should point *ποιὰ ὑποδήματα*; *φλυαρεῖς ἔχων*, instead of making of the four words one interrogative sentence,—goes on to suggest, that the difficulties in the present passage may be removed by assigning the words *καὶ πρόδιπτος γε . . . τονθετεῖς* to Callicles and making Socrates resume his discourse at *οὐκ ἄμα*. Of the sentence beginning at *καὶ* he says: "καὶ in adhortando dici hodie satis constat. V. Matth. p. 1258." Stallbaum in embracing this conjecture says: "quo uno errore" (the error of assigning all the words from *Oλοθα* to *πίνετο* to Socrates) dici non potest quam multi alii quamque graves errores prognati sint. De quibus quidem nunc, vero reperto, narrare non attinet. Debetur autem laus omnis hujus inventi Winckelmanno," etc.

Now we think it may be shown that Stallbaum has been led by his guide into an error which he would have avoided by trusting himself to his own soundness of judgment, and familiarity with Plato.

For, in the first place, the words *ώς σοφὸς ὡς με τονθετεῖς* have no meaning in the mouth of Callicles. Socrates had nowhere been performing this office, but rather sought to lead Callicles by a series of questioning after his usual manner to do it for himself. And,—what is perfectly decisive in the matter,—Socrates had already used the same word in speaking of the discourse of Callicles, p. 488, A: *οὐ*

οὐν, τῶντερ ἡρήσω πονθεῖτε με, μὴ αἰσθῆταις ἀλλ' ικαροῦς μοι ἐνδεῖξαι εἰ δέται τούτοις ἐπιτρέψεντεος μει. The speech of Callicles containing this πονθεῖται extends from 482, C. to 486, D, and contains the germ of the remainder of the dialogue. The latter part of it especially, from 484, C. onwards, contains advice given in a lofty and even contemptuous tone; and is several times referred to by Socrates.

2. *xai πρόσθι γε*, containing an exhortation to advance in the argument is unsuited to Callicles, who wishes all the while, and especially here, to close it. It will not do to say that Callicles utters these words maliciously, hoping to involve Socrates in absurdities; for two lines before he sees the conclusion coming down on himself and tries to escape from it by the words *οὐκ αὖτα ὅ τι σογίησι*; and his next words, *οὐκ αὖτα ὅ τι λέγεις*; so far from helping Socrates forward are a positive refusal to answer.

3. By the division of the words between the speakers, which Winckelmann proposes, an abruptness of transition is introduced which appears to us wholly unauthorized. Give *xai πρόσθι* to Socrates, and it naturally leads on to what he had just said. The use of *xai* then will resemble that in many other places where the sentence is earnest, and either of the interrogative or imperative kind. But give these words to Callicles—a new speaker, and we think that it will be hard to defend *xai* by parallel places or by a logical explanation.

And so *ἄμα xai* comes in without giving the slightest notice that a new speaker begins. This might be allowed, if the preceding words of themselves indicated such altering. But they tell so little about it, that Socrates if he begins at *οὐχ ἄμα* pays not the least respect to the words which had been just spoken by his antagonist.

We conclude then that the new way of marking the dialogue here is altogether inadmissible. And on the other hand we are far from thinking that we can remove the difficulty in *ὅτι λέγεις λαγοῖς*, which has troubled so many persons. They look wholly unlike a gloss, containing, as they do, a very choice and idiomatic expression. They are not entirely suited to the person of Socrates. Heindorf's conjecture that they were thrust out of their place in the text by *ὅτι λέγεις* in the sentence *οὐκ αὖτα ὅ τι λέγεις*, and that then they crept back from the margin into a wrong place may be entitled to some favor. And yet it supposes two processes, for neither of which there is diplomatic evidence. Since then they form a part of the text and are spoken of by Socrates, we must look around to find some apology for his uttering words so little in accordance with his character. That apology can be found only in the fact that he is merely hurling back the words of a provoking adversary. Callicles had used similar expressions

several times in speaking of the pursuits of Socrates. In p. 486, C. he says: ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφεῖς, εἴτε ληρόματα χοῇ φάναι εἴναι εἴτε φλυαρίας. In 489, B. he says: οὐτοὶς ἀπὸ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. And again in 490, E. occurs the passage which has already been cited: ποῖα ὑποδήματα φλυαρεῖς ἔχων. Now after three such passages and many others, filled with insults, it might be more in keeping than on any other occasion with the character of Socrates to retort the words in allusion to those of his adversary. And Plato might write thus with more than usual reason in the Gorgias, because this dialogue is marked by unusual earnestness and by an irony which sometimes runs into sarcasm and severity. If then the text is sound, which certainly for the reason given by Heindorf must be with reason questioned, we believe that the above is the only possible defence of these words. In conclusion we remark that σοφὸς οὐ playfully carries the mind back to σοφίας occurring three lines before.

ARTICLE IV.

HÄVERNICK'S INTRODUCTORY REMARKS TO HIS COMMENTARY ON EZEKIEL.

Translated from the German by Edward Robie, Resident Licentiate, Theol. Seminary,
Andover.

[H. A. Ch. Hävernick, late ordinary professor of theology in the university at Königsberg, was born in 1799 at Cröpelin in Mecklenburg. He studied some time at Halle and became the pupil and intimate friend of Prof. Tholuck. He then went to Rostock as a *privat docent* and licentiate, and thence as Professor to the New Theological School at Geneva. Here, however, he remained but a short time. From Rostock, where he had returned as professor *extraordinarius*, he was called by the government of Prussia to the university of Königsberg. Here, it is well known, he encountered a violent opposition from the rationalist party long predominant there. His health sank under it, and, it is said, that he died of a broken heart. He was a man of indefatigable industry and of great learning, and all his works breathe the spirit of fervent love to the truth as it is in Jesus. Some of his earlier productions betrayed marks of haste and inaccuracy. This charge has not been laid, so far as we know, against his more