

ARTICLE II.

THE TRINITY.

[Translated from the Theological Lectures of Dr. A. D. C. Twisten, Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin, by Rev. H. B. Smith, West Amesbury, Mass. Concluded from No. XII. p. 774.]

† 6. *Character hypostaticus.* (1) *Notae internae.*

Now that we have considered the doctrine of the Trinity as a whole, and have become acquainted with the doctrinal formulas of the church upon the relation of the divine essence to the three Persons of the Godhead, it still remains for us to examine more closely the relations of the Persons to one another, and the peculiar attributes or characteristics belonging to them individually, the sum of which we call their *hypostatic* or *personal character*. These are, as we have already signified,¹ of two kinds: they have reference, partly, to the internal relations of the Persons in their mode of subsistence (*τρόπος υπάρξεως*), and, partly, to the mode in which the Father, the Son and the Spirit are revealed in the world (*τρόπος ἀποκαλύψεως*). Accordingly, we distinguish the internal and external characteristics (*notae internae et externae*), or the internal and external character (*character ad intra et ad extra*), of the three Persons. The first of these, the internal characteristics, we will consider in this section; and the external characteristics, in the following.

Under *internal characteristics* we comprise both the order and the manner of subsistence (*ordo subsistendi, ratio subsistendi*). By the former is meant that the Father is unchangeably the first, the Son the second, and the Holy Spirit the third Person in the Godhead; by the manner of subsistence, which is the necessary condition of the order, is meant that the second Person has the ground of its subsistence in the first, and the third in the first and second. This last rests upon two acts immanent in the divine essence (*opera ad intra, actus personales*), from which we derive, on the one hand, those three peculiar properties which constitute the notion of the three Persons (*proprietaes personales*); and, on the other hand, some other characteristics (called *notiones personales*), which also serve to distinguish them. We will then proceed to consider the internal characteristics of the Persons of

¹ Conf. Bibl. Sacra, Aug. 1846, p. 520.

the Trinity under these four heads : personal acts, personal attributes, personal conceptions, and order of subsistence. Since our later divines are not wholly agreed in their application of this terminology, we will hold fast to the older and stricter usage, from which it will be easier to understand the deviations, and without regard to which we shall hardly be able to appreciate the sense and purport of this whole mode of exhibiting the subject.¹

1. *The personal acts.* Since God is pure action and life (*actus purissimus*), since, in virtue of his absolute self-causation and spontaneity, there is in him nothing dead, nothing independent of his action, nothing produced by an external necessity ; it follows, also, that those relations, by which the divine Persons are distinguished, are to be referred to the divine efficiency. To speak more definitely, they are to be referred to the two *absolutely immanent acts of generation and of procession*, which are called *opera ad intra*, because they have nothing else than God himself for their object ; and they are called *personal acts*, because the divine nature is conceived of as the author of them, not so far as it is common to the three Persons, but so far as it subsists in each one of them under peculiar modifications. From this it of course results, that they are not to be looked upon as actions common to all three, but as the actions of particular persons, as the Father or the Son, or both, (*opera ad intra esse divisa*).² More important, however, than these generic statements would it be, if we were able to make clear to ourselves in what these two actions consist, and how they are connected with the nature of God. Those theologians who believed that they might, after the precedence

¹ Bretschneider (*Entwicklung d. dogm. Begr.* § 68. S. 408 ; *Handb.* § 66. S. 461), Wegscheider (*instit.* § 77), and Hase (*Hutterus rediv.*), would have us believe that the distinction between the personal acts, properties and notions rests only upon this, that the internal relations of the persons are considered either as acts, or as attributes, or as abstract notions ; if this were so, then the distinction would be really only a grammatical, hardly a logical one, and would be scarcely worth the trouble of a moment's consideration. But whoever compares the development of this doctrine among the Scholastics, (whom, and especially Aquinas, our Evangelical theologians have, for substance, followed,) will see, that it is to this very point that the scientific deduction of the whole doctrine of the Trinity is attached.

² Conf. Quenstedt, P. I. cp. X. Sect. 1. *dec.* 1—4. But it is to be considered that all *opera interna* are not *opera ad intra*, nor all *opera ad intra* also *actus personales* : e. g. the divine purpose to redeem the world by Christ is, as a purpose, an internal act, but it has the world as its object, and is so far not *absolutely immanent* ; the omniscience and will of God are, referred to himself, *opera ad intra*, but they belong to the essence of God, and hence must be designated as *essentialia*.

of the Scholastics, develop the doctrine in a speculative way, answered: Since we attribute to God, as the highest intelligence, the immanent powers of understanding and of will, and since these do not act upon the world alone, but also upon God himself as their object, and hence must be conceived of as true *opera ad intra*; and, further, since they must be conceived as operations by means of which, in consequence of their reflexive character, certain distinctions are established in God himself; there would result from this a twofold procession (emanatio, *προβολή*, by which is understood nothing else than the establishment of certain distinctions in the mode of subsistence of the divine nature); viz. *per modum intellectus*, the procession of the Word, which is called generation,—and, *per modum voluntatis*, the procession of love, which is called *spiratio*, or procession in the narrower sense. To such a deduction it were a sufficient objection, that the divine knowledge and will are essential, and not personal operations, and hence cannot be classed among the *opera divisa*.¹ The Fathers of the church, for the most part, insist repeatedly and pressingly upon the unfathomableness of these divine acts.² The greater portion of our Evangelical theologians, considered such a

¹ Other objections are not so pertinent; e. g. when it is said that on the same grounds, since the Son and Spirit are also intelligent beings, we must also make in them a distinction of three persons, and so on to infinity; it may be replied, that the intelligence of the Son and Spirit is not a separate one from that of the Father, but the same numerical divine intelligence, only represented under the hypostatic character of the Son and Spirit. The meaning, too, is not, that the personal acts of generation and procession are identical with the essential acts of knowing and willing, but only that they are connected with one another.

² E. g. *Athanasius*; (Orat. III. contr. Arian.) "It is not fitting to seek to know how the Logos is from God . . . and what is the mode of the generation of God; any one daring this were mad; because it is an ineffable act, and peculiar to the nature of God, known to him alone and to the Son." *Gregory of Naz.* (Orat. 35); "let the generation of God be revered in silence: for you, it is a great thing to learn that there is a generation; but the how, it is not permitted to angels, much less to you to comprehend." *Rufinus*, in his Exposition of the Creed, warns against the curiosity which would scan these profound mysteries, "lest while one attempts to scrutinize the brightness of inaccessible light, he lose the little vision which divine goodness has granted to mortals." *Hilary* (l. II. de Trin.) declares, "the archangels knew it not, the angels have not heard it, the ages do not hold it, prophets perceived it not, apostles did not inquire, the Son himself did not reveal it." *Augustine* (in Joh. tr. 99) says, "it would be a long work to discuss the difference between procession and generation, and a rash thing, after all discussion, to define it:" and contr. Max. III. 14, "I know not, I avail not, I suffice not to distinguish between that generation and this procession."

derivation as objectionable or inadmissible, and appealed to the constantly acknowledged unfathomableness of the acts. There remained, then, nothing for them, but to make out the reality and the difference of these processes, as facts, revealed by the Holy Scriptures, and to be adopted on their testimony; and then, to restrict themselves in the explanation of them, to mere definitions of the terms, considered as indicating certain relations, and as compared with other relations.

Accordingly, they distinguish the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Ghost, on the one hand, from creation, and on the other hand, from each other. In creation the divine essence is the *cause* of something different from itself, which is made from nothing; but in the generation of the Son, the Father is the *ground*, and in the procession of the Spirit, the Father and Son are the *ground* (*ratio*),¹ of the subsistence of the divine essence in another *τρόπος υπάρξεως*: hence, it is said, the Son and Spirit are not created or made from nothing, but generated and proceeding from the substance of the Father, as God from God, light from light.² These two processes, now, are distinguished from one another, *ratione principii*, since the generation is from the Father alone, but the procession is from the Father and Son; *ratione termini*, since it is said of the Son only that he is generated, while the Spirit is breathed forth (*spiratio*); *ratione ordinis*, since the generation is the first internal personal act, which is preceded by no other but is necessarily followed by a second, while the procession of the Spirit is the second act, which is preceded by the generation, but followed by no third process. Such dis-

¹ The words *ratio* and *principium*, rather than the word *causa*, are used to designate these acts; for the effect is a something distinct from its cause, while the *ground* of anything is not separated from that of which it is the ground, but is in it.

² In the concrete notion of a divine person there are two elements, the notion of the divine essence and also of a particular mode of its subsistence; these personal acts, then, must be referred to both. Hence it is equally erroneous to speak of generation as the production of a second divine nature, or of a second subsistence not having the same nature. In the usual definitions of *generatio* and *spiratio*, sufficient care has not always been used to express both points equally: we have e. g. the definition "a communication of the divine essence," which would be easily misunderstood as conveying the meaning, that the communication of the divine attributes was the chief thing, whence we have almost inevitably an incorrect conception of the personal subsistence. It were better to define generation, as that act of the Father by which he is the ground of the subsistence of the divine nature under the hypostatic character of the Son; and to define procession in an analogous way.

tinctions as these have been urged, but it need not be shown that they are merely external ones, and necessarily must be so, if, for want of an adequate philosophical view, we cannot or will not make the analogy of our own self-consciousness the basis of our illustrations. Since these distinctions were so formal, one would think that there was the less need of so zealous a discussion of the question, whether the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father and the Son, or from the Father alone, as we find in the controversies of the Greek and Roman churches.

The motives which originally led the Greek church to hold with exactitude to the Nicene formula, "*who proceeded from the Father,*" and the Western church, particularly the Spanish, to add "*and the Son,*" were not at all opposite to one another; and neither could justly reproach the other with molesting the truth. The Greeks were led to their view, partly by the way in which they were accustomed to maintain the divine monarchy in consistency with the triplicity, since the Father was regarded as "*the original, the root and the fountain of divinity,*" (*ἀρχή, ῥίζα καὶ πηγή τῆς θεότητος*); partly by their opposition to the Pneumatoma-chists, since the latter seemed to exhibit the Spirit as created by the Son and subordinate to him. On the other hand, the Western church, in respect to the divine unity were satisfied by the notion of one identical divine nature in the three Persons; and sought to counteract the Arian subordination of the Son to the Father, by making him equal with the Father also in his relation to the Holy Ghost.¹ Assuredly, neither could the Occidental church accuse the Greeks of not sufficiently acknowledging the consubstantiality and the divinity of the Son; nor on the other hand could the Eastern church accuse the Western of not holding to the monarchy, and to the divinity of the Spirit.² Upon a question, therefore, which, however it might be answered, would endanger no article of faith, and which was decided by no direct

¹ Conf. Neander's Kirchengesch. Bd. II. Abth. II. S. 896—901.

² That the Father is the fountain and original of the whole of deity is a formula always recognized in the Western church: conf. the *decretum unionis* of the Florentine council, A. D. 1439, in the introduction: "The Latins affirm that they do not say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son with the design of excluding the Father from being the fountain and original (*fons ac principium*) of the whole of deity, even of the Son and Holy Spirit." On the other hand no one will doubt the perfect congruity of the Greek view with that given in the Athanasian creed, which was originally more occidental, if he but read the passages bearing upon it in the *Isidoric* of John of Damascus (L. I. ep. 8 seq.).

assertion of the Scripture, there was the less necessity of division in the church, in proportion as the parties were agreed, that these relations are inscrutable to man's understanding: and it would of course follow, that any speculative grounds of decision, if such there were, even if they should be more favorable to one hypothesis than to another, ought still to be regarded as of subordinate weight.¹ As to the Scriptures, the Greek church could urge, that in the only passage in which the procession (*ἐκπόρευσις*) of the Spirit is spoken of, (John 15: 26—we will not inquire whether this be its doctrinal sense,) it is derived "from the Father;" while the Latin church could say, that the Spirit is not only sent by the Father, but also by the Son (John 15: 26. 16: 7), and that he is called the Spirit of Christ and of the Son (Rom. 8: 9. Gal. 4: 6), which would allow the inference of a similar relation in respect of his subsistence also. But as the Greeks denied the validity of this inference, since it was not confirmed by the testimony of Scripture, so might the Latins maintain, that the procession from the Son was as little excluded by the procession from the Father, as is the fact that the Spirit is sent by the Son, (which is elsewhere proved,) excluded, because he is in one place (John 14: 26) described as sent only by the Father. In this state of the contest, how desirable that the parties should have been satisfied with the mediating formula,—that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father *through* the Son.² This, although it would not have prevented any one from making additional statements, would not have excluded any view compatible with the formula; but this is just what theological disputants have seldom been able to conclude upon. The Greeks protest against every interpretation which would make the Son the ground, not merely of the giving but also of the subsistence of the Spirit; they grant that the gene-

¹ This is the position maintained by the Archbishop *Theophanes Prokopovitz* in his *Tractatus de processione Spiritus Sancti* (Gotha 1771), with great thoroughness and acuteness. His chief argument against the Western doctrine is, that it is not based upon Scripture; yet he also applies theological principles. "Vain is the argumentation," he says, "the Son is knowledge, the Holy Spirit is love, therefore the latter is produced by the former. If anything can hence be inferred it is only, that the Son is first in order, and is presupposed by the Holy Spirit, as knowledge is presupposed in order to love." And this is no more than what we concede, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father *by* (per) the Son, that is, the Son being presupposed.

² John of Damasc. *de fide orth.* 1, 12—not ἐξ αὐτοῦ but δι' αὐτοῦ. More full is Gregory Nyss. c. Eunom. L. 1. The same formula is found among the Latins, with the needful explanation. Conf. Thos. Aquin. *Summ.* 1, qu. 36, art. 3—who follows Hilarius de Trin. L. XII. fin.

tion of the Son may be regarded as the condition of the procession of the Spirit,¹ but they say, that the Father alone is the ground or cause (*αἰτία*) of his divinity.² The Latin church, on the other hand, agreed with this formula only in the sense, that as the Son has from the Father his subsistence and his divine nature, so too he has this from him, that the Holy Ghost proceeds from him;³ but they do not concede any difference in the mode in which the Father and the Son are the source of the Spirit who proceeds from them. And even the statement in the Florentine formula of union, which has the air of being made to set aside the chief objection of the Greek church—that the Latin church seemed to hold to two principles or sources of the procession; even this statement, which is, that in the procession of the Spirit the Father and the Son are to be regarded as one principle, and that the act itself is one identical act,—is in fact most opposite to the real views of the Greek church; one cannot, therefore, wonder that they indignantly repelled the decree of union.

The Lutheran theologians have remained true in this respect to the doctrinal type of the occidental church; with even more strictness than many of the Scholastics⁴ they maintained the theorem, that the Holy Spirit proceeds (*spiratus est*) from the Father and the Son, as from one principle, in one indivisible act. We cannot blame them for this; since this position was so interwoven with the mode of exhibiting the doctrine of the Trinity, that whoever kept the latter could not well depart from the former. Nor can we see, that the inference from the relation in which both the Father and the Son stand to the sending of the Spirit, to that of his like procession from both, is as groundless as it seemed to the Greek church—according to the maxim, princi-

¹ This is the meaning of Prokopovicz—when he says (pp. 337—349) of his tractatus)—that the Fathers here use *per*, not for *ex* but for *post*; not for indicating the cause but the order—an order not of time, but of conditionality.

² John of Damasc. expressly says: *μόνος γὰρ αἰτίας ὁ πατήρ*; in his interpretation of the Homily de sancto sabbatho (II. p. 815, ed. of Lequien) he says: the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son, because he is by him revealed and imparted to men; not because he had his subsistence from him.

³ Decret. Unionis concil. Florent.—the essential parts are cited in Gieseler's Chh. Hist. Vol. 2. Pt. 4. p. 541-3: "Since all things which belong to the Father he has given by generation to his only begotten Son, except that he is the Father; this thing also, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, the Son has eternally from the Father." Conf. Aquinas, ubi supra. The idea belongs to Augustin, de Trin. XV. 17. Conf. Petri Lomb. Sentent. I. dist. XII.

⁴ Quenstedt rejects the expression "processio per filium," which even Aquinas concedes in a certain sense.

pium missionis in tempore est principium originis in aeterno.¹ Yet the theologians of Tübingen, when this subject was discussed in their correspondence with the Patriarch Jeremias,² might have been more forbearing towards the view of the Greek church, since, as has been remarked, the Scriptures do not decide directly against it, and the rational grounds for the opposite doctrine are not free from objections; while all that the Christian consciousness demands would be satisfied, if it were conceded, that we cannot conceive of the imparting of the Spirit except through the Son. Yet, since that time, the contesting of the Greek doctrine has become a standing article of Protestant polemics.

2. Let us turn now from the personal acts to the *personal properties or qualities*. The latter flow from the former. As no complete act can be conceived of without subject and object,³ so the personal acts of generation and procession cannot be otherwise represented. Since it is a universal law of language, that wherever the logical subject is also the grammatical subject, (e. g. the Father generates,) the *active* is used, and wherever the logical object is the grammatical subject, (e. g. the Son is generated,) the *passive* is employed; so here, too, as these acts are referred either to their subject or their object, we make a distinction into *generatio et spiratio activa et passiva*, (thus, Pater generat, Filius generatur;—Pater et Filius spirant, Spiritus S. spiratur); although it should be remarked, that this designation is to be regarded only as a grammatical one, since there cannot be actual passivity in God. (On this account it were perhaps better, instead of the expression *generatio et spiratio passiva*, to adopt another, often used, *generatio et spiratio terminative spectata*). The *generatio activa*, now, is also called *paternity*, and this is the personal property of the Father; the *generatio passiva* is called *sonship*, and is the personal property of the Son; the *spiratio passiva* is also called *procession*, and is the personal property of the Holy Spirit; for, it is these very relations which make it necessary to distinguish the persons of the Godhead, and which constitute the idea of these persons. We must make this distinction, because, although God himself is the generating and the generated, although he is both

¹ Quenstedt ubi supra. Compare what is said in the fourth section upon the relation of the essential and revealed Trinity.

² Acta theologor. Wirtemberg. et patriarchae Constantinop. (1584); p. 159—162 and p. 270—296.

³ To prove this, and especially to show that the apparent exception of *intransitive* actions is not really such, must be reserved to the logical or metaphysical investigation of these categories.

the cause and the object of the procession, yet we must still say, that so far as he is to be conceived of as generating he cannot also be generated, so far forth as he is the source he is not also the object of the act of procession, and the converse; but yet the Father is nothing other than God represented as generating—the divine essence with the personal property of paternity; the Son is nothing other than God as generated, and the Holy Ghost is nothing other than God represented as proceeding—the divine essence with the personal properties of sonship and procession. This we have already stated in the previous section.¹

But since the three personal acts involve four relations, it is a natural inquiry, why only three of these are represented as personal properties, and the fourth, the *spiratio activa*, omitted? The answer is, because this act belongs to both the Father and the Son, not so far as they are personally distinguished, but so far as they are one.² We might regard this as made out purely by the testimony of the Scriptures, as the Western church interprets them; for these do not speak of a special *principium spirationis* besides the Father and the Son, but they say expressly of the former, and let us infer of the latter, that the Holy Ghost proceeds from them; but if this be something common to both of them, it cannot be something which goes to constitute their differences as persons, it cannot be considered as a personal property. But it has also been attempted to show by deduction that this is necessary. It is said, that we are warranted in distinguishing several persons in the divine nature, only because the relations which are embraced in the personal acts are so opposed to or contrasted with each other, that one person cannot be the subject of them; in virtue of this opposition the Father can only be Father and not Son, the Son can only be Son—the subject and the object of the generation cannot but be distinguished from each

¹ Conf. Basil. ep. 391: "We must make confession of our faith by conjoining the peculiar and the common: the deity is common, the paternity is peculiar; we must then say, uniting the two, I believe in God the Father: and, again, in the confession of the Son we must do the like, join what is peculiar to him with what is common, and say, in God the Son; in like manner with the Holy Ghost. . . . Thus is the unity saved by the confession of the one divinity, and what is peculiar to the persons is confessed in the statement of the properties ascribed to each."

² Since Augustine the canon has been universally received that the difference of the persons is constituted solely by their mutual and opposite relations (*per id, quod ad alterum dicitur, per ὀρέσθαι, relationem s. habitudinem mutuanam*). Conf. Petaviius theolog. Dogmat. de Trin. L. IV. ep. 10. § 5 seq.

other; and so, too, the *principium spirans* must be distinguished from the *principium spiratum* or *procedens*. But where no such opposition or contrast exists, there the general canon holds good, that in God all is one, which we, on account of the limitations of our knowledge, are obliged to look at from different sides or in different relations, and hence to regard as distinct.¹ Since, now, the procession and generation have no such mutual relation, cannot be set over against each other, it follows that the *principium* or *subjectum spirationis* from which the Holy Ghost proceeds, though not indeed identical with the Holy Ghost itself as the *objectum spirationis*, (for here there is a relation of opposition,) can and must be one with the *subjectum* as well as the *objectum generationis*, with that which generates and that which is generated. Indeed, the Scholastics have derived from this an argument for the position, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son also; for if, say they, the Spirit is to be really distinguished from the Son, there must be an *oppositio relationis* between them; this is so, if the Son is conceived of as the subject, and the Spirit as the object of the *spiratio*, if the former is *spirans* as the latter is *spiratus*: but if the Son were not, together with the Father, *principium spirationis*, since the Father is represented as both *generans* and *spirans*, there is nothing to hinder the Son from being both *generatus* and *spiratus*, that is, from being conceived of as identical with the Spirit; and, according to the above canon this must be so.² But from this it also follows, that the Father and the Son

¹ *In divinis omnia sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio.* Calov. Syst. tom. III. p. 836; Baier, P. I. cp. 1. § 42 not. b. Conf. Petav. l. c. lib. IX. cp. 7. § 7. In conformity with this Aquinas (Summ. P. I. qu. 30. art. 2.) in answering the question: *Utrum in Deo sint plures personae quam tres?* arrives at this conclusion: *Ostensum est, quod plures personae sunt plures relationes subsistentes ad invicem, realiter distinctae; realis autem distinctio inter relationes divinas non est nisi ratione oppositionis relativae; ergo oportet duas relationes oppositas ad duas personas pertinere: si quae autem relationes oppositae non sunt, ad eandem personam necesse est eas pertinere; but this holds of the spiratio activa in relation to the generatio activa et passiva.*

² Conf. Aquinas in Summ. P. I. qu. 36. art. 2. Spiritus S. ita necessario procedit a Filio, quod, si non procederet, non distingueretur ab eo personaliter; for, si in Filio et Spiritu S. non esset invenire nisi duas relationes, quibus uterque refertur ad patrem, illae relationes non essent ad invicem oppositae, sicut neque duae relationes, quibus Pater refertur ad illos; unde, sicut persona patris est una, ita sequeretur, quod persona Filii et Spiritus S. esset una, habens duas relationes oppositas duabus relationibus Patris. Anselm, in his work *de Spiritu S. processione contra Graecos*, led the way in this argumentation. This work had very great influence upon the mode of exhibiting the doctrine of Trinity among the Scholastics, and, through them, in the whole Western

are not to be considered as two, but as one *principium spirationis*; or, as above stated, that it is one indivisible act which is the ground of the subsistence of the Holy Ghost; for in all things in which they are not distinguished by opposite relations, they are to be considered as one.¹ Accordingly, the *spiratio activa* cannot be looked upon as a proper *personal attribute*.

3. If not to be included among the personal attributes, it must have its place among the *notiones personales*. Thus are called those internal traits, which, though they do not constitute the notion of personality, (as do the *relationes personalitatis constitutivæ*,) do yet serve for the recognition and distinguishing of the Persons of the Trinity.² Besides the *communis spiratio*, which is the *notio personalis* of the Father and the Son, the elder theologians are accustomed to reckon here the *innascibilitas*, ἀγεννησία, as the *notio personalis* of the Father. By this is meant, that while the Son has the ground of his subsistence in the Father, and the Holy Ghost in the Father and Son, the Father has it in himself, he himself is the *principium personalitatis* for himself. If to these, now, we add the three personal attributes, (which is

church. Anselm however grants that the Son and Spirit are distinguished by the *modus procedendi*, (viz. generatio and spiratio). Here the Greeks stand, not granting, what Aquinas, in order to weaken the concession of Anselm, asserts, that the mode of procession is distinguished only by the one being referred to the Father alone, and the other to both Father and Son. Conf. Procopioz libr. cit. Cap. XVIII. § 304.

¹ Aquinas, Summ. I. qu. 36. art. 4. Thus, too, Augustin (de Trin. V. 14) declares, "As the Father and the Son are one God, and relatively to the creature one creator and Lord, so relatively to the Spirit they are one principle." Anselm (de proces. Sp. S. cp. 9.) uses, among other things, this illustration; as a lake made by a fountain and a stream, is not produced by them so far as they are different, but by the water in which they are one; so the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father and the Son so far as they are distinguished, but from the divine essence, in which they are one. Thus, too, the Lutheran theologians, e. g. Quenstedt, de Trin. Sect. I. thes. 30: Sect. II. qu. 12; who give special prominence to the unity of the ἐπεψία, or the *una et indivulsa spiratio*.

² Conf. Hutteri loc. p. 103: Per notionem nihil intelligunt Scholastici hoc loco aliud quam propriam rationem cognoscendi divinam personam, uti definit Cajetanus. Aliæ enim sunt proprietates personales relativæ, personam ipsam constituentem, quæ nimirum relationem ad aliam personam habent, et ordinem producentium et productorum constituunt; quales proprietates sunt tantum tres, *figere, gigni, procedere*; aliæ sunt proprietates personales, quæ non sunt relativæ constituentes, h. e. non relationem habent ad alteram personam respectu productionis; neque enim personam, qualis ratione productionis sit sed tantum, qualis in se et ex se sit, h. e. quatenus aliquid ab altera persona distinctam obtineat, definiunt.

done when the notions personales are taken in a wider sense,) we shall have five of them, and this is the number reckoned by Aquinas, and several of our Lutheran theologians.¹ Duns Scotus was of opinion that a sixth should be added, viz. *inspirabilitas*, as a *notio personalis* of the Son.² But if in this way, a beginning is once made, of converting the mere negation of personal relations into special internal characteristics, the number of them might easily be increased to twelve, as in the following table :

<i>Pater.</i>	<i>Filius.</i>	<i>Spiritus S.</i>
generat,	non generat,	non generat,
non generatur ;	sed generatur ;	neque generatur ;
spirat,	spirat,	neque spirat,
non spiratur ;	non spiratur ;	sed spiratur ;

which would seem to be recommended, not only by its completeness, but also because each person has an equal number of internal notes. But such symmetry and completeness belong only to that false scholastic tendency, in which one gets mere names instead of real conceptions. This is most strikingly manifest in the fact, that thus the same characteristic of *ἀγεννησία* is attributed both to the Father and the Holy Spirit, although with a wholly different meaning.³

But if we affirm this of the Father alone, if he alone subsists through himself, and the Son and the Spirit through him, does it not then follow, that he alone is *absolute*, and that the other persons are relative and dependent ? In spite of all our pains, does not Arianism show itself here ? Is there not an inequality in the persons, if the power to generate dwells in the Father alone, and not in the Son and Spirit, and if the Spirit is represented merely as proceeding, without any *actus transitivus* peculiar to himself ?

The orthodox doctrine may concede a certain inequality ; and

¹ Aquinas Summ. P. I. qu. 32. art. 3. (utrum sint quinque notiones?) *Baier* theol. pos. P. I. cp. 1. § 42.

² Lib. I. dist. 28. qu. 1. art. 3: Sicut in Patre innascibilitas, quae est negatio processionis, est quaedam nota distincta a paternitate et spiratione ; ita inspirabilitas est quaedam notio in Filio distincta a filiatione et spiratione, quae significat negationem spirationis passivae, sicut innascibilitas in Patre significat omnem negationem processionis passivae.

³ Conf. *Hutter*, loc. p. 104. When Augustine (de Trin. XV, 26) says that the Father alone is *ingenitus*, he means that he alone is not produced in any manner by any other—and in this sense (in libro ad Orosium) he denies that the Holy Spirit can be called *ingenitus*. When Jerome and others say that the Holy Spirit is *ingenitus*, the meaning is, that he is not begotten, as is the Son. And this is the sense in which this note is predicated of both the Father and the Spirit. In the Latin fathers the word has this double sense.

why not? Can it not repudiate Arianism, without denying that there is in it, as in all error, an element of truth? Its office cannot be to get as far as possible from everything which any body can call Arianism, but to come as near as possible to the truth.¹ We may still and ever say, that the Father is greater than the Son (John 14: 28), not merely so far as we consider the humanity of the latter, but also, as many orthodox theologians² have taught, in his divine nature; the only question is, in what respect?

4. *Ordo subsistendi.* Since now, it is clear, that any inequality of nature or essence is utterly out of the question, because the essence in all three persons is one and the same; the difference which exists can relate only to the subsistence, and, not to the notion or the necessity of the subsistence, but only to the order thereof, (*ordo subsistendi*). By virtue of this, as was remarked at the beginning, the Father is the first, the Son the second, the Holy Ghost the third person; not in the order of time (*ratione temporis*), for in God all is alike eternal; not in their nature (*ratione naturae*), for this is coincident with the essence which is identical in all; but in view of the origin or emanation of one person from another, in their relations as generating, generated and proceeding, upon which alone the distinction of the persons reposes. In this sense, then, the Athanasian creed can maintain, that, "in this Trinity none is afore, or after other," (that is, in time,) "none is greater, or less than another," (that is, in nature,) "but the whole three Persons are co-eternal together and co-equal," (that is, on account of their consubstantiality or sameness of substance); and yet an inequality can be conceded, if thereby nothing else is meant, than that the Father is the principle of the subsistence of the divine essence in the Son, and that the per-

¹ It is an incontestable advance in the way of looking at doctrinal differences, when we consider not merely the formulas maintained, but also the general tendencies from which these differences have resulted. The angle of divergence may be very small, and the ultimate separation very wide. But with this is often connected an objectionable mode of disputation, when, in order to avoid an opinion which is seen to be extreme, we are warned against everything which seems to look that way; for error is for the most part only an exaggeration of the truth. Certain words as Arianism, Pelagianism, Gnosticism, Dualism, are often mere bug-bears, by which many a one, in seeking to avoid one extreme, is forced into errors on the opposite side, from which, if he had kept the matter itself before him, he would have been saved by a sound sense for truth.

² Conf. Petavius, Theol. Dogm. de Trin. Lib. II. ep. 2. § 1.

sonality of the Spirit has its ground in the Father and the Son ; for the doctrine of the church is so far from denying this, that it is, on the contrary, wholly based upon it.¹

But does it follow from this that the Father alone is *absolute*, and the other Persons not so? If this be so, then indeed the Father alone is God ; for to be absolute, and to be of divine nature, are interchangeable notions. But for this very reason, since it is a definition of the divine nature identical in all three persons, we say that they are all absolute. One thing we should especially guard against, and that is substituting the notion of three divine natures, instead of the true doctrine of the church, of one absolute essence, subsisting in a threefold mode (*τρόπος υπάρξεως*) as begetting, begotten and proceeding ; in this case, indeed, only one of them, that which is unbegotten and begets the others, could be considered as absolute. Here, and not in the former view, is Arianism not yet conquered. We may derive an illustration for this from our own personality. I make my own self an object of thought ; here is *I* as subject and *I* as object ; in the object, now, the *I* is no less really present than in the subject ; and yet this objective *I* is produced by the subjective ; or, here is a personal subject, determining itself to action, to activity in the most general form conceivable ;² now, in this activity to which this person, this *I*, determines itself, the person himself, the *I* is also present ; it is present in the action determined upon, no less really than in the act of determining. Thus we may say, that because all which is the Father's is also the Son's (John 16: 15), because he is the perfect image of his nature (Heb. 1: 3), because he is God of God ; so, too, this also is given to the Son by the

¹ In the language of the church this is indeed not called inequality, and we may say, justly so ; for what is equal in quality, we are not wont, on account of a difference in relations, to call unequal ; e. g. two men of like qualities and excellences, we do not call unequal because they may be father and son. But since many persons take offence just here, because they cannot bring into agreement with the assumed equality of the persons their relation as *principium* and *principiatum* (as the Scholastics express it) ; it would perhaps be better, considering that it is not the word but the thing with which we are concerned, in order to set aside this objection, at once to concede a certain inequality, only not of the nature, but in the relation of subsistence. [Conf. Pearson on the Creed, p. 48 seq. Waterland on the Athanasian Creed. Bull. Defens. Fid. Nic. Lect. IV. c. 1. § 1. c. 2. § 1. c. 4. § 1. Also Faber, Apostolicity of Trinitarianism, Bk. 2. ch. 9.]

² This is perhaps a better illustration because here the *I* has in a certain sense an absolute character—an absolute tendency to the absolute, according to Fichte, Sittenlehre, p. 23.

Father, in begetting him, to have life in himself, even as the Father has life in himself (John 5: 26); that is, to him also belongs the absolute and independent existence, which is contained in the very essence of the Godhead. "As the Father," says Anselm,¹ "has essence and wisdom and life in himself, exists not by another's, but by his own essence, is wise by his own wisdom, and lives by his own life: so too in begetting the Son, he gives to him to have essence, and wisdom and life in himself, so that not by another's, but by his own essence and wisdom and life, he subsists, is wise and lives; otherwise the Son would not have the same attributes as the Father." Much as Calvin was blamed for calling the Son, considered in his essence, *αὐτόθεος*, still he was in the right, and moreover is supported in it by Lutheran theologians.² In another point of view, that is, considered in his personal subsistence, the Son cannot be called *αὐτόθεος*, but only the Father, since he alone is *ἀγέννητος*; but the *ἀγέννησία* of the person is not to be confounded with the absoluteness of the essence.³ Or, if one should say that the former is something abso-

¹ *Anselm*, monolog. cap. 43.

² *Calvin*, instit. L. I. cp; XIII. § 25: "We say that Deity is absolutely self-existent; hence we confess that the Son, as far as he is God, independently of the consideration of Person, is self-existent; but so far as he is Son we say that he is of the Father; that his essence is not from any originating principle, but the originating principle of the person is God himself." He brings this out more fully in his polemic upon Valentinus Gentilis. Calvin's view was strongly contested by several Catholic theologians, although Bellarmine blames his expression more than his meaning, (Controvers. de Christo, Lib. II. cp. 19. With all his polemical prejudice and bitterness, Bellarmine is yet so straightforward and upright, that it were much to be wished that the polemics of our days would take him in these respects for a pattern). The Lutheran theologians, too, were not satisfied with Calvin's mode of expression; the Calvinistic formula: *Christum esse a se ipso secundum essentiam, a Patre secundum personam*, seemed to them to separate essence and person too much, and not to hold sufficiently fast the concrete notion of person as being the essence itself represented under a certain relation; but still they defended the *αὐτοθεότης* of Christ against the Catholics as well as other opponents. Conf. *Gerhard* Loc. de Deo Patre, § 179; *Exeges*. Loc. IV. de pers. Chr. § 67; *Quenstedt* de Trin. Lect. II. qu. VII. The latter cites *Danhauer's* words as almost classical: "The *αὐτοθεότης* may be opposed either to dependence or to communication; if to the former, then Christ is *αὐτόθεος*, because he is an entity equally independent with the Father; if to the latter, then he is not *αὐτόθεος* because his essence is communicated to him by the Father. The divine essence which is in the Son is from itself (a se), although the Son himself is not from himself, but God from God, light from light."

³ *John of Damascus* distinguishes in this respect between *ἀγέννητος* and *ἀγέννητος*; using the former word, written with one ν, to signify that which is not

lute, and that what is begotten or what proceeds, is, in distinction from this, something relative; yet we are not obliged to give to this terminology any other sense, than we do when we speak of God in his absolute independence, and in his relation to the world, or when we distinguish the absolute and relative attributes of God, by which we do not imply that the latter conflict with the idea that God is an unconditional and infinite being. What Keckermann says¹ of the notion of the infinite, may be perfectly applied to the notion of the absolute in this connection. He cites the objection: "Person, in God, is either finite or infinite; if finite, then it is not God; if infinite, then there are three infinities, because three persons;" and to this he replies: "Person is to be considered in a twofold way; 1. In respect to the essence, and so it is infinite but is not triple; 2. In respect to the relation, or mode of existence, and so is neither finite nor infinite, because finitude and infinitude are properties of an entity or thing; but a person, so far as person, that is in respect to the mode of its existence, is not an entity, but the mode of an entity; modes, however, are neither finite nor infinite."

It is also, if not against the letter, yet contrary to the sense of the orthodox doctrine, to exhibit the difference in the relation of the Father and the Son, to the immanent act of generation, or the relation of both these and the Holy Spirit, to the act of procession, as a relation of ability on the one side, and inability on the other, of capacity and incapacity. But when we say that the person, the *I*, is both the subject and the object of its own thinking and willing, shall we say that this relation implies, that in the one, the *I* as subject, there is a power, which is wanting in the other, the *I* as object? Equally unjust would it be, even if we call the relation of the Persons a relation of dependence, (the orthodox doctrine prefers to call it a relation of communication, and it is at any rate wholly different from that relation of dependence in which the world stands to God,) to describe it as a partial or one-sided relation, in which the Son alone is dependent upon the Father, and to assert that there is no relation of the Father to the Son which can be brought as an equipoise.² Even according to the letter of the doctrine of the church we should be

created, and the latter, that which is not begotten or produced. The three Persons of the Trinity are *ἀγένητοι*; the Father only is *ἀγέννητος*. Vide, his *ἐκδοσις*, 1, 9.

¹ Syst. theol. L. I. p. 81.

² Conf. Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, Th. II. S. 582 of the second edition; 702 of the first.

obliged to say, that just as little as the Son can be conceived of, as Son, without the Father, just so little can the Father be conceived of, as Father, without the Son; the paternity and the sonship, the *spiratio activa* and the *processio* presuppose each other.¹ If we concede to the speculative view, the value only of a mere illustration, we shall still find it conceivable, that just as we become self-conscious persons only as we view ourselves objectively as well as subjectively (to speak with Leibnitz, as the soul from being merely a passively percipient monad, comes to a clear apprehension); so too in God, the subsistence of the eternal omnipotence, wisdom and love, under the clearly defined relations of generation and procession, is a more perfect view of the Godhead than when we conceive of it as without any such relations, having as its only characteristic that it is unbegotten.²

§ 7. *Character hypostaticus. (2) Notae externae.*

Under the *external characteristics or notes* of the three Persons, we comprise those works, by which they are revealed to the

¹ This is the meaning of Aquinas when he says: *Quendam in divinis naturae ordinem esse, secundum quod ibi quoddam originis principium sit absque prioritate. (P. 1. qu. 42. art. 3.)* That De Wette unjustly calls this a contradiction in adjecto, is clear from the explanation which Aquinas himself gives of it (in II.): *In rebus creatis, etiam cum id, quod est a principio, sit suo principio coevum secundum durationem, tamen principium est prius secundum naturam et intellectum, si consideretur id quod est principium; sed si considerentur ipsae relationes causae et causati, et principii et principii, manifestum est quod relativa sunt simul natura et intellectu, in quantum unum est in definitione alterius. Sed in divinis ipsae relationes sunt subsistentes personae in una natura; unde neque ex parte naturae neque ex parte relationum una persona protest esse prior alia, neque etiam secundum naturam et intellectum.* The Father, nevertheless, always remains the one, a quo procedit Filius, and the Son the one, qui procedit a Patre: thence is the Father principium originis, although not prius originato or principiato suo.

² *Schleiermacher*, (Glaubensl. § 171, 5 of the 2d ed.) finds an evidence that this doctrine is treated as though there were an inequality in the three Persons, in the fact, that it is found necessary to prove in so special a manner that the divine attributes and works belong to the Son and the Spirit, while it is taken for granted the Father has all of them. But the aim of these proofs is not to show that the Son and Spirit, considered as the second and third Persons in the Godhead, have these attributes; but to show that he who has redeemed us, and the Spirit who sanctifies us are to be considered not as created but as divine, because divine attributes and works are ascribed to them. And as to the Father himself, such proof lies in all the arguments by which we show that the existence of the world supposes a creator of infinite power, wisdom and love.

world (*opera ad extra*). The most prominent among them are, the work of *creation*, which, in accordance with the apostolic creed, together with preservation and providence, is ascribed to the *Father*; the work of *redemption*, whose centre is the incarnation, and which is ascribed to the *Son*; the work of *sanctification*, which is attributed to the *Holy Ghost*, and of which we may regard the indwelling of God in believers, that began at the first Christian Pentecost, as the central point. For the religious consciousness, this aspect of the Trinity is the most important; De Wette justly calls it the true basis of the doctrine; yet it is usually kept very much in the back-ground in dogmatical treatises. This disregard of it is to be explained, not only from the position which is almost universally assigned to our doctrine in systems of theology;¹ but also from certain special difficulties which we encounter in respect to these external notes themselves, when we reflect upon them in connection with other doctrines.

For, the Holy Scriptures do not ascribe creation to the Father only, nor redemption and sanctification to the Son or Spirit alone. It is also said of the Son, that by him all things were created (Col. 1: 16), and that he upholds all things by his powerful word (Heb. 1: 3); the name of Saviour (*σωτήρ*) by which we are accustomed to reverence Christ, is also given to the Father (1 Tim. 1: 1. 2: 3. 4: 10. Tit. 1: 3. 3: 4); the Son himself prays to the Father that he would sanctify his disciples (John 17: 17). In like manner, also, certain individual acts comprised in the total work of redemption and sanctification are ascribed, now to one, and now to another of the divine persons; e. g. it is usually said that the Father raised up Jesus from the dead (Acts 3: 15); but Christ, also, declares that he has power to lay down his life and to take it again (John 10: 18); it is God the Father who judgeth without respect of persons (1 Pet. 1: 17); and yet the judgment is committed to the Son (John 5: 22). When those gifts, offices and powers are spoken of, by which the church is made the temple of the indwelling Spirit (1 Cor. 3: 16); not only is the Holy Spirit named as the author of them, but one Lord and one God are also mentioned, through whom, whatever is demanded for the common good, is imparted to every member (1 Cor. 12: 4—7). In short, there seems to be no divine work from which any one person of the Godhead can be excluded.

And in fact it could not be otherwise if the doctrinal principles, above developed, are correct. For the divine essence, with all the absolute and relative attributes belonging to the idea of it, is not

¹ Conf. Bib. Sacra, Aug. 1846, p. 515, note 1.

merely common to the three Persons, but it is one and the same in them all. And if we are to hold fast to this unity, wherever the opposition of the relations inseparably connected with the notions of generation and procession, does not demand a distinguishing of the Persons (*ubi non obviat relationis oppositio*); then, too, we must also conceive of all action of God in and upon the world as one and indivisible,¹ and must concede the truth of the canon of Augustin, which is received by all our Lutheran theologians, as well as by the Scholastics—*opera Dei ad extra indivisa esse*. But if this be so, how can we, then, attribute individual *opera ad extra* to the individual persons, and make such works a means of distinguishing them?

There are two grounds on which this may be vindicated. In the first place it must be remarked, that as the oneness of essence and being does not exclude a difference in the order and mode of subsistence (*ordo et modus subsistendi*), so the unity of action does not exclude a corresponding difference in the order and mode in which the actions may be referred to individual persons (that is in the *ordo et modus agendi*). Indeed, since it is certain that in God being and action cannot be separated, we should rather say that those very relations under which we represent the being of God (as an essence existing through, from and in itself), would also necessarily be mirrored in the divine manifestations. But from this it follows, in the second place, that what, considered in itself, is common to all the persons, may likewise be ascribed to a single one of them, not merely so far as this one is a participant in all the attributes of the divine nature, but also because this action has a closer connection with that mode of subsistence (*σφραγὶς ἐνάρξεως*) which we ascribe to this particular person, either in the very notion of it, or because it is exhibited in a manifestation in which we recognize a revelation of just this person. Hence, the above-mentioned canon—*opera Dei ad extra tribus personis communia esse*, is further defined by the addition—*salvo tamen eorum ordine et discrimine*. This definition has a two-fold sense. It means, that when an action is attributed to the Father, to the Son, or to the Holy Spirit, the Father is to be considered as acting (as well as subsisting) from or of himself, the Son from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.² It also

¹ In respect to the stress which even the Fathers of the Church laid upon this unity of the divine *ἐνίπνευα*, may be compared the passages cited and explained by *Pelavius*, *Theologicor. Dogm. de Trin. L. IV. cp. XV. § 1—8*.

² *Quenst. P. I. cp. IX. Sect. I. thes. 21, note 3*; "Because the Father has

means, that when we speak of an operation of God upon the world, this can or must be attributed not merely to God in a general way, but also to the Father, Son and Spirit; and it may be thus referred, either *attributive*, *per appropriationem*, or *terminative*.¹

The reference by *appropriation* (*per appropriationem*) is made, when attributes which are essential to the divine nature are assigned to one of the persons of the Godhead, or when one of these persons reveals himself by attributes of the divine nature.² This is especially the case when such an attribute stands in closer connection with the hypostatic character of the person; which is seen in this, that, although we cannot deny it to any one of the persons, we yet find it to be especially appropriate to the one or the other; (this may be called *appropriation* in the more limited sense, while the other cases may be designated by the more general word, *attributio*). Thus, for example, power, wisdom and love are attributes of the divine nature in general; but, *per appropriationem*, power is assigned to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and

his essence from himself, he therefore acts from himself; the Son acts and works from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both." Keckermann *Syst. I. IV. p. 71*: "As is the order of existence, so is the order of action in the persons of the sacred Trinity; the Father acts from himself, the Son from the Father, the Holy Spirit from both."—The most of the theologians for ages, find this relation expressed in the passage John 5: 19. The unity of action is seen in the words, *ὁ ἄν ἐκείνος (ὁ πατήρ) ποιῶ, ταῦτα καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ὁμοίως ποιεῖ; ταῦτα*, says Quenstedt, not by imitating the like, but by effecting the same things at the same time; for these words imply an identity, not an imitation and parity in the mode of action. The order of action is seen in the words: *ὁ θύναται ὁ υἱὸς ποιεῖν ὡς ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲν, ἐὰν μὴ τι βλέπη τὸν πατέρα ποιοῦντα*; that is, says Quenstedt, the Son does not do these things from himself as does the Father, since he is not from himself but from the Father, from whom as he has his essence, so also his omnipotence;—but the Son sees what the Father does, not after the operation, but because he is the wisdom of the Father by means of which the works are done. In like manner, in John 16: 13—15, it is said of the Holy Ghost, that he does not speak from himself (*ὡς ἑαυτοῦ*), but that what he announces to the apostles he takes from that which belongs at once to Christ and the Father.

¹ These expressions are not usually so carefully distinguished as they are here and in what follows; yet it might easily be shown that there is a ground for these distinctions, not only in the thing itself but also in the doctrinal *usus loquendi*.

² Aquinas *Summ. I. qu. 39. art. 7*; "The manifestation of the persons by means of essential attributes is called *appropriation*." Gerhard *in loc. de Trin. § 53*: "Certain essential attributes are *appropriated* to each person by ecclesiastical writers, although essential attributes, on account of the identity of essence, are common to the three persons."

love to the Holy Ghost. So, too, it is said of God, without special designation of the persons, that of (from) him, through him and to him (*ςίς πάντων*) are all things (Rom. 11: 36); and even of the Father (Eph. 4: 6), that he is above all, through all, and in all; but, per appropriationem, the *from* is ascribed to the Father, the *through* to the Son, the *is* to the Holy Spirit.² That this is not arbitrary, will be apparent to every one who has a clear view of the distinction of the persons, in accordance with the declarations of the Scriptures, and the doctrinal development of this distinction; although it is not easy to carry out the proof of it, since we have here to do with attributes of the divine nature which are common to all the persons; and it is especially difficult if, with the majority of the evangelical theologians, we have doubts about taking our point of departure from any speculative views of the Trinity. The most important point here is the appropriation of the *particulæ diacriticæ* *ἐκ*, *διὰ* and *ἐν*, which may be directly and sufficiently justified from the Holy Scriptures themselves (conf. 1 Cor. 8: 6. Eph. 2: 18. John 1: 3); for this appropriation is made in view of the relation of the Persons to the divine works, and points, on the one hand, to the difference in the order and mode of action,³ and, on the other hand, to the unity which still exists in the action itself; for, when the Father works through the Son

¹ Some theologians do indeed assume that the name *πατήρ* in this passage is not to be understood *προστατικῶς* but *οὐσιωδῶς* (as designating not the First Person but the divine nature); e. g. Quenstedt, *de Trin. Sect. I. thes. 22. not. 2*; yet there is here no ground for this assumption, although it cannot be denied that elsewhere "Father" is used as a predicate of the divine nature; e. g. Matt. 6: 9.

² Aquinas *Summ. I. qu. 39. art. 8*, treats expressly of the *appropriatio* in this sense, and adduces the following chief species thereof: In consideratione Dei, qua Deus absolute secundum esse suum consideratur, Patri æternitas, Filio species, usus vero Spiritui sancto: in consideratione vero Dei, qua unus consideratur, Patri unitas, Filio æqualitas, Spiritui S. concordia vel connexio: in consideratione vero Dei secundum rationem causalitatis Patri potentia, Filio sapientia, Spiritui S. bonitas attribuitur; in consideratione vero Dei, ut suos respicit effectus, appropriatur Patri a quo, Filio per quem, Spiritui S. in quo.

³ Quenstedt *de Trin. S. I. th. 19*: The order of operations is insinuated in the Scripture by the diacritical particles *from*, *through* and *in*, Rom. 11: 3; according to the holy Fathers, the particle *ἐκ* is attributed to the Father, *διὰ* to the Son, *ἐν* to the Holy Spirit.—But as the natural order of the divine persons is not always employed in the Scriptures,—so these particles are changed;—by which very permutation the *ὁμοουσία* and *ισότης* of the divine persons is preserved, and inequality in dignity is excluded.

in the Holy Spirit, the action is one, and yet it is defined in a three-fold way in reference to the three Persons.¹

From the *attributio* and *appropriatio*, we distinguish the cases in which something is ascribed *terminative* to a divine person. This occurs, when anything which proceeds from a common efficiency of all the three Persons ends in a manifestation, which we cannot avoid viewing as a revelation of one distinct Person. The *theophany* at the baptism of Jesus may serve as an example (Matt. 3: 16, 17).² In the voice: This is my Son, we must manifestly recognize the Father; in Jesus who received the baptism, the Son; in the descending dove, the Holy Spirit. Although, then, the bringing about this manifestation is to be referred back to the invisible efficiency of the triune God, yet, in that which proceeded from it, in its *terminus*, there is so definite a reference to the three persons, that we (and without being able to exchange the subjects as in *appropriation*), must say of the Father, that he declared Jesus to be his beloved Son, of the Holy Spirit, that he descended upon him, and of the Son, that, coming out of the water, he saw the heavens opened, and the Holy Spirit descending.³ In applying this, now, to the individual *opera ad extra*, we must distinguish those works which express the general dependence of the world upon God, from those which have reference to the Christian life. The former are comprised under the rubrics of creation, preservation, coöperation, providence and government, of which we may take creation as the most prominent, in place of the others; the latter, the *opera oeconomica*, we will not attempt to enumerate completely, but will comprise them all under the head of redemption and sanctification as the most essential.

The former would not lead us of themselves to distinguish three persons in the one divine nature; on this account, after this distinction of persons has been made known to us from other sources, we cannot look upon them as three coordinate causes

¹ Athanasius *ep. ad. Serap.* "The efficiency is like in itself and indivisible as to the nature, and one; for the Father does all things through the Son in the Holy Ghost; and thus the unity of the holy Triad is preserved; and thus in the church is preached one God, who is over all and through all and in all."

² Our older theologians lay great weight upon this as being a kind of visible manifestation of the Trinity. Gerhard devotes to it a whole chapter: *Exeges. loc. III. cap. IV. § 75—81.* Quenstedt, too, gives an extended interpretation—*de Trin. thes. 14 of Sect. 1, and Vindication, in VII. of the ἐκδικησις to quaest. I. of Sect. 11.*

³ Augustin. *de Trin. II. 10;* and in more general terms in the work *de trinitate et unitate Dei*, op. 9.

(causae sociæ),¹ of creation, preservation, etc.; these acts are to be ascribed to them, not so far as they are three different persons, but so far as they are of one essence; they are *opera essentialia*, and therefore *communissima*, since the distinction of persons recedes the most in these acts. Yet they can be referred to the individual persons *attributive* (whence, in Baumgarten and others, the name, *opera attributiva*); and so, in accordance with the canon adduced in respect to the *ordo et modus operandi*, we may say, that all things are created, preserved and governed by the Father, through the Son, in the Holy Ghost.² But creation is attributed to the Father in an especial manner *per appropriationem*. Creation, as *opus ad extra*, manifestly corresponds with generation as *opus ad intra*; as in the latter the Father is seen as the original and fountain of divinity (*ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος*), so in the former, he is recognized as the ground and source of all created existence. And, in the strictest sense, we cannot so well consider that person as the creator, through whom or in whom all things are, as that one from and out of whom all things are, or, who by absolute omnipotence is the first cause of their existence; the *αὐτῷ*, however, and the omnipotence belong, as we know, to the attributes appropriated to the Father.³ Yet the Son and the Spirit

¹ Quenstedt *de creatione* Sect. II. qu. III. *θεοσις*: "One is the creator of the heaven and the earth, Father, Son and Spirit; and these three persons of the Godhead are not rightly called coördinate causes (*causae sociæ*) of creation." — *βελαιωσις*, 2: "That which acts is the one Deity common to the three persons, says Nazianzen, Orat. II. de theol. As there is therefore one divine essence and one power, there is also one creative energy equally common to these three persons, and consequently, only one creator; but where there is only one creator, there distinct causes of creation cannot be established."

² It is of course understood that these particles here also do not declare any separable efficiency of the three persons. "Gregory of Nazianzen says correctly that these particles do not divide the nature, nor lead to an inequality of the persons; but only express peculiar personal properties in the one and unconfounded nature; Quenstedt l. c. *διάλυσις*, I. Aquinas holds still more strictly to the unity of the act of creation; Summ. I. qu. 45. art. 6: "To create is common to the whole Trinity, and is ascribable to the divine persons only as they include essential attributes." (That is, *Deus est causa rerum per suum intellectum et voluntatem, sicut artifex rerum artificiarum; artifex autem per verbum in intellectu conceptum et per amorem suae voluntatis ad aliquid relatum operatur; unde et Deus Pater operatus est creaturam per suum verbum, quod est Filius, et per suum amorem, qui est Spiritus S.; et secundum hoc processionem personarum sunt relationes productionis creaturarum, in quantum includunt essentialia attributa, quae sunt scientia et voluntas*).

³ The mode in which this appropriation is exhibited by our older divines is not wholly satisfactory; probably because it appeared to them more important

should not only not be excluded from the work of creation, but their relation to it should not even be considered as subordinate; they should not, for example, be regarded as mere instruments or organs of the Father, since this would conflict with the consubstantiality and the essential unity of their *εὐάγγελια*.¹

In the *opera oeconomicæ* the distinction of the persons is much more apparent. The restitution of the human race is indeed a work of the whole Trinity, which is achieved *by* the Father *through* the Son *in* the Holy Spirit—according to the principle of the order and mode of the operation of the Persons, which is here, too, of valid application. But since, to the execution of this work *through* the Son, that is, to our redemption, the incarnation of God is necessary, which can be attributed *terminative* only to the Son; and, to the completion of this work *in* the Holy Spirit, that is, to our sanctification, the indwelling of God in believers is necessary, which can be attributed *terminative* only to the Spirit; to which elements, then, as a third, the eternal purpose of the Father *from* which the whole work of redemption proceeds, is to be coördinated;² it is clear from this, that the participation of the three per-

to maintain the equal participation of the Son and the Spirit in the work of creation, than to prove that it is to be attributed to the Father. Conf. Quenst. I. c. *διάλ.* VI.

¹ Quenst. de Trin. Sect. I. thes. 32: "The work of creation is attributed to the Father, not exclusively, nor *ἐξοχικῶς*, nor as proper to him alone, much less as to one originating cause, so that the Son can only be an instrument; but on account of the order in the persons of the Trinity." He considers it as an *ἀκρολογία*, or a popular mode of speech, when some of the Fathers of the church designate the Father as *causam creationis προκαταρκτικῆν*, the Son as *causam δημιουργικῆν*, the Holy Ghost as *causam τελειωτικῆν*; or when Luther, in the interpretation of Genesis, calls the Son the instrument of the Father in creation; at least, he thinks, he is to be considered only as a conjoint or integral instrument, somewhat as the hand may be called an instrument of the man; but, properly speaking, the Father created all things by the Son, not as by an instrument, "sed tanquam per suam sapientiam et virtutem ὑποστατικῆν, Prov. 8: 30." Quenst. de creat. s. II. qu. III. *διάλ.* 2—5.

² These constitute the three *principia salutis* according to which, in the analytical method of treating theology, the first half of the doctrine respecting salvation was divided. This division shows a correct feeling of the importance of these principles for the Christian consciousness, and of the right connection of Christian doctrines. Conf. Hollaz, P. III. ep. I. qu. 2: "The principles of salvation are three; first, there is the benevolence of God the Father in his purpose to restore and bless a fallen world; secondly, there is the paternal redemption of us by Christ from sin and its penalty; thirdly, there is the gracious and, through certain media, efficacious operation of the Holy Spirit, by which the salvation obtained by Christ is offered and conferred."

sons in this work of restitution, which is designated by the prepositions *from*, *through* and *in*, expresses a wholly different relation from that of their participation in the work of creation, which is also designated by the same prepositions. On this account, the *opera oeconomica* are called *personalia* and *minus communia*; but yet *only* *minus communia*, (not as the internal works, *divisa*,) and *personalia* only *secundum quid*, (not absolutely personal, as are generation and procession); for it is not so much the efficiency itself as its result, its terminus, in which the separation of the persons is revealed.¹ And even *terminative* we cannot make this separation valid, without taking precautions for again holding fast the union of the persons in some other manner; this is done, as we shall see, by means of the conception of the *sending* (the *missio*) of the Son.

In the application of these principles we find no entire agreement, even among our older divines; the ideas of redemption and sanctification are too general; and all depends upon this, what elements of them are made prominent, or especially regarded,² and also in distinguishing the points which are to be referred to the whole Trinity or to some one person, there may be a difference in the degree of acuteness and precision; but these differences are of no detriment to the validity of the principles themselves.

For illustration let us take the *opus oeconomicum* of the second person, that is, the redemption of the human race. One who has no occasion or call to enter into more exact investigation will simply hold to this, that the Son has redeemed the world from sin and death; and, as to the relation of this to the Trinity, will say that it was brought about according to a divine purpose, and that for this end the Son was sent by the Father into the world. Another, who feels himself compelled to discuss with more precision the leading elements of redemption, and its relation to the divine nature, or to the individual persons, will perhaps say with Quenstedt: "That redemption is a work of the whole Trinity, partly in view of the divine ordering of it, partly in view of the acceptance of the ransom paid by Christ; but that it is a work of

¹ According to a rule which Calovius gives: *Communia sunt ratione efficientiae s. principii et inchoative, personalia vero s. propria uni alicui personae ratione termini s. terminative, quia in certa persona terminantur.*

² The most exact and complete division is to be found in Baumgarten, Th. l. S. 477 sq. S. 491 sq. S. 499 sq.

the second person alone in respect of merit and attainment." But, properly speaking, it is the assumption of human nature made in behalf of redemption, which is to be specially attributed to the Son; yet even from this, the Father and Spirit are not to be absolutely excluded. The Son alone became flesh, but God prepared for him the body (Heb. 10: 6), and he was conceived by the Holy Ghost (Luke 1: 35). Considered as an act, according to Thomas Aquinas,² the incarnation is the work of the whole Trinity; but in respect to its *terminus*, that is the personal union of the divine and human nature, it belongs only to the Son; since, according to the doctrine of the church, it is first and properly not the nature but a person, and that the second person, which has assumed humanity.³ But that which is ascribed, *terminative*, to the Son must at the same time be also ascribed in another way to the Father: the Word became flesh, and the Son of God assumed the form of a servant, because he was *sent* by the Father into the world, born of a woman, born under the law, to redeem us from the curse of the law, and make us the children of God. And so, too, God has *sent* his Spirit into our hearts, to make us perfect in childlike obedience and trust in him (Gal. 6: 4—6).

The notion of the *Sending* is, thus, that by which the separation of the persons in reference to the *opera ad extra* is done away with, although, at the same time, it is that by which this separation is also reestablished; that is, he who sends and he who is sent must be conceived of as two, no less than he who begets and

¹ Quenstedt *de Trin.* Sect. I. § 53. not.

² Summæ P. III. qu. 3. art. 4: Tres enim personæ fecerunt, ut humana natura uniretur uni personæ Filii. Conf. Quenstedt de Christi persona et natura, Sect. I. thes. 24: Causa efficiens unitionis est tota S. S. Trinitas, *inchoative* scil. s. ratione initii et effectiois s. productionis humanæ naturæ; *terminative* vero solus λόγος est, utpote qui solus incarnatus est.

³ According to the Confession of Faith of the eleventh council at Toledo (anno 675): "The whole Trinity effected the incarnation, yet the Son alone received the form of a servant in the *singleness of his person*, not in the unity of the divine nature, in that, which is peculiar to the Son, not what is common to the Trinity; which form is conjoined with him in a *unity of person*, that is, so that the Son of God and the Son of man are one Christ." Conf. Petav. theol. Dogm. de Incarn. L. II. ep. 4. § 7. Quenst. l. c. thes. 26.—But why just the second person? This is a question which the church doctrine does not venture to answer, and even the Scholastic theology answers it only timidly; as is natural, since, according to the opinion of the most esteemed Scholastics, the Father also or the Holy Spirit might have assumed humanity. Conf. Thomæ Aq. Summ. III. qu. 3. art. 5 and 8.

he who is begotten.¹ Thus this separation of the persons is done away with in all that concerns the unity of the efficiency (*ἐνέργεια*) in the work of redemption (*opera oeconomica*); the separation holds in reference to the relation of this work to the different modes of subsistence (*modi subsistendi*) of the divine nature. That the Father sent the Son, and that the Father and Son have sent and send the Holy Spirit, is expressly taught in the Holy Scriptures (John 14: 24, 26. 16: 5, 7). The further statements which the Evangelical theology has here made, are rather of a negative than positive character; for example, that the sending does not involve any separation in space, or any inequality.² We may say that there is in the very notion of sending a twofold relation, one to that which sends, and another to that to which the sending is made.³ In the last respect the sending of the Son and the Spirit consists in this, that, although they were present with men from the beginning, yet in the fulness of time they entered into a new and closer fellowship with them, the Son by a personal union with Jesus, the Holy Spirit by his indwelling in the Christian church, which was the result of the incarnation. In respect to the first of these relations, the *sending* expresses nothing else but an order of operations (*ordo operandi*) in the divine persons, corresponding with their order of subsistence (*ordo subsistendi*), a *τρόπος ἀποκαλύψεως* analogous to their *τρόπος ἐπαρξίας*; the sending is the consequent (*consequens*) of the generation and procession, and is the manifestation or revelation of these internal relations of the Godhead in time, or in the world.⁴ We may even say that the *sending* thus viewed, is the same relation as that expressed by generation and procession; only the former is this relation viewed in its temporal aspect, the latter is

¹ Qui enim ut mittens et missus distinguuntur, illi ut personae differunt. Calov. III. p. 194.

² Quenst. de Trin. sect. thes. 50. not.: "The sending of the Son of God, 1. is not a banishment and separation in respect to space, as though he had been banished from the highest heavens, and separated from his celestial Father; for this would be repugnant to the infinite and intimate identity of the persons of the Father and the Son; 2. The mission is not of command, but of free consent, and therefore argues no inequality of him that sends and him that is sent, —but only supposes an order of origination; 3. the sending is not coerced but spontaneous, John 4: 34. 5: 30."

³ Thomas in Summ. I. qu. 43. art.

⁴ So everywhere where the *sending* is spoken of; e. g. Quenstedt l. c. thes. 2, 31, 50, 52, 62. Quenst. distinguishes the sending, as the consequent and manifestation of the *opera ad intra*, from the proper *opera ad extra*, redemption and sanctification. Hollaz. de myst. Trin. qu. 30 and 52.

the relation comprehended as an eternal act. Thus is the conception of the *sending* (*missio*) the bond between the internal and the external characteristics of the persons of the Trinity, between the opera ad intra and extra, and forms the fitting conclusion of the doctrine, since it brings back the end to the beginning.

The statement as to the coincidence of the *processio* and *missio* which we have above made is the view which Petavius maintains (De Trin. Lib. VIII. cp. 1. § 1—10), after Manuel Kalekas, to whom it gave a firm foundation for his polemics against the Greek church in his books, de processione Spiritus S. Petavius declares (l. c. § 10): *Mitti a patre Filium, est gigni naturam hominis assumpturum et suo tempore assumptentem; mitti Spiritum Sanctum, est procedere externum opus aliquod efficientem.* Calov indeed contests this (tom. III. p. 195), yet without reason, and because he gives Petavius' meaning incorrectly, as if he held that the *missio* was the *aeterna processio* itself. In the sense of Petavius only this can be said, that the *missio* considered in its eternal relation to God as the one who *sends*, coincides with the *processio*, viewed in its relation to the manifestation in time of him who *proceeds*. But just here may perhaps lie the highest tension, and the possibility of an adjustment, of the antagonism between the Orthodox and the Sabellian view of the Trinity. Here is the highest variance, so far as we can call it a tendency of Sabellianism, that it knows nothing of any other *processio* than that which exists in the *missio*, while according to Petavius the *missio* coincides with the *processio*. Here, too, may be the possibility of an adjustment of the difference, because, if the *missio* and *processio* are comprehended in their unity, the whole conflict ceases. The difference between the two, according to Schleiermacher,¹ runs out into this, "that Sabellius maintains that the *threeness* is something which has relation only to the different modes and spheres of action of the Deity,—considered as governing the world, in its general action upon all finite existence, it is the Father,—considered as redeeming, however, and in its special action in the person of Christ, and through him, it is the Son,—but, viewed as sanctifying, in its likewise special action in the body of believers, and as the unity of the same, it is the Spirit :

¹ Schleiermacher on the Contrast between the Sabellian and Athanasian view of the Trinity—translated by Professor Stuart in the Biblical Repository, vols. 5 and 6.

while, on the other hand, the doctrinal view prevalent in the church maintains, that the *threeness* is something purely internal, and originally separate in the Godhead, even when viewed apart from these different modes of action; and that the Godhead would have been Father, Son and Spirit in itself, in an eternal manner, if it had never created anything, never been united with an individual man and never dwelt in the community of believers." Now, although the latter is the orthodox view, yet if we adopt the expression of Petavius—*gigni carnem assumpturum*, we may set aside the question whether a generation is to be assumed without regard to the incarnation, as one that rests upon a needless, not to say, an empty abstraction. And thus the first hint which Schleiermacher, at the close of his System of Theology (S. 707 of the first, 592 of the second edition) gives towards a new elaboration of the doctrine of the Trinity, will be found in fact to lie nearer to the prevalent view than he himself seems to believe.

There is an objection of Schleiermacher's, bearing upon the points discussed in this section, to which we will just refer in closing it.¹ In reference to the divine causality, which according to our doctrine is to be viewed as undivided, he puts two cases. Either the divine causality belongs wholly to the one Godhead as such, to the Persons, however, only so far as they are in the Godhead, and not so far as they are distinguished from each other; or, this causality belongs to the three persons as such, and to the unity of nature only so far as it consists of these persons. The first view, now, Schleiermacher thinks has never been able to gain currency, because in it the *threeness* recedes more than the prevalent tendency allowed; hence the other has been generally adopted, but yet not without some secret opposition; for, properly speaking, according to this view the whole divine causality must be considered as threefold; but since, in that case, the divine unity would become merely nominalistic, it has been assumed, that every act in all three is also one and the same, not that in every one there is its own act; in so saying, however, we do not refer the act to the persons but to the divine nature in its unity.—Most certainly! but what follows from this? Nothing else, but that Schleiermacher is not correct in saying, that of these two views the first has never been able to gain currency, and that the second has been generally espoused. In respect to the ope-

¹ *Glaubenslehre* § 180, 3. S. 699 of the first ed. § 171, 4. S. 585 of the second.

ra attributiva, the expression chosen by Schleiermacher is almost word for word the received formula ; and this is also clear in the very name of the opera essentialia. In respect to the opera oeconomica, this formula, especially in its second part, is not wholly applicable ; but yet that which Schleiermacher gives as the second view is still less applicable to these operations. But, between these two views, there is a third, viz. that the divine causality is to be ascribed to the one Deity, and to the Persons *ratione ordinis et patefactionis* (conf. Hutter's locc. p. 112). When Schleiermacher adduces, now, as proof that, with the first view, the *threeness* is really maintained *almost* only in reference to the special act of the persons, such points as these ; that the Son himself became man, while the justifying agency is attributed to the one and undistinguished divine nature ; that the Holy Spirit as such is poured out upon believers, while that divine agency which guides and vivifies the Christian community, is attributed to the one and undistinguished divine nature ;¹ all this, with some enlargement of the conceded *almost*, the doctrinal theology of the church will recognize as being its own position, in accordance with the above intermediate view.

§ 8. Concluding Reflections.

We have endeavored to explain the doctrinal formulas and positions of the church with more than usual care, and to fortify them with the declarations of the most esteemed theologians, because among their opponents as well as friends, we not seldom see the want of that more exact acquaintance with them, without which they can neither be justly judged, nor fittingly defended. Indeed, it often happens, that it is something wholly different from the real doctrine of the Trinity, as held by the church, which the one attacks, and the other tries to establish. But perhaps, as we have gone along, the question has forced itself upon some, whether such prolonged and subtle investigations are in any correct proportion with the importance of the doctrine for religion and Christianity ? whether the chief thing, the proper religious element, is not rather kept out of sight, than made clear and impressive by all this pains-taking ? For it is not to be denied, that not only the formulas, which are the residuum of the discussions upon this doctrine, but also the discussions themselves, and the

¹ Glaubenslehre S. 700 of the first ed. which is here more clear than the second.

endless works which have been devoted to them in all ages of the church, are better fitted to awaken and nourish every other kind of emotions and reflections, than those of a religious nature. How then can we justify the importance which our Evangelical theology has always assigned to these doctrinal positions, if not from their bearings upon Christian piety? Shall we do it because these positions are decisively revealed in the Holy Scriptures? But it has been often repeated and conceded, that the principal notions around which this doctrine revolves, are either foreign to the Bible,—as *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, *τρόπος ὑπάρξεως* and *ἀσφαλύψως*, *τριάς* and *ὁμοουσία*; or that they do not seem to have the same significancy in the Bible as in doctrinal theology —e. g. *γεννηθῆναι*, *ἐκπορευθῆναι*, *πέμψαι*, and even *Πατήρ* and *υἱὸς θεοῦ*. Shall we do it on speculative grounds? Speculation may decide for itself, what importance this doctrine has for it in its own sphere, but so far as a system of doctrines is concerned, especially the Evangelical, the speculative elements have never been the chief thing; and on this account we have all along held fast to the position, that we can consider them of value, only so far as they help to illustrate what is elsewhere established. Many a one might then be inclined to agree with De Wette's¹ conclusion: "That this doctrine, since it is said to be established only upon the Bible, but is not there contained in the form in which the church receives it, had better be looked upon as antiquated, and be exchanged for the doctrine of the Bible, historically and scientifically defined and illustrated."

It is with good reason that De Wette here says, "the doctrine of the Bible *scientifically defined and illustrated.*" For, many as are those, who, in later times, have brought the doctrine of the Bible into contrast with that of the church, there are still very few among them, who would be taken seriously at their word, and would receive the doctrine precisely as it stands in the Bible, as expressing the full truth. And even he who sees in it a divine revelation will hardly be able, as a theologian, to abide by the mere letter of the Scriptures, without further examination. For, apart from the difficulty of determining what the exact doctrine of the Bible is in all its relations, in consequence of the great variety of modes in which the subject in all its bearings, is presented by the different Biblical writers; it contains in itself too

¹ In his *Dogmatik der Lutherischen Kirche*. De Wette is so frequently referred to in this Article, because this work is used by Dr. Twisten as his textbook in these Lectures.

many references to notions, whose exact meaning and authority may seem doubtful, and there remain so many questions to be answered, so many by-ways to be avoided, that it would not be possible to stand by the letter alone, without further investigation.

We have indeed, as everywhere else, so here, to wonder at the wisdom with which the Scripture imparts those truths which no understanding of the wise can fathom, in a form which is intelligible even to the unlearned; since it presents the divine mysteries in that aspect, in which they are manifestly and most adapted to our religious wants; so that we may rather experience their power in the heart, than speak about them in lofty words (*καθ' ἑπιτροχὴν λόγου ἢ σοφίας*, 1 Cor. 2: 1). The Scriptures do not speak of the perplexing union of the *threeness* with the oneness; nor of a divine essence which is common to three persons, and numerically one; nor of the three persons which subsist in the Godhead, and yet do not divide it. Manifold as have been the attempts to make such things a part of the experience of the Christian church, by means of formulas impressed upon the memory, and images presented to the imagination, by speculative categories or in mystic vision; every one must still feel the broad difference between all this and the clearness of the Scriptural statements, so simple in their depth and fulness. In the centre is placed Christ, in whom the Word has become flesh, and the fulness of the Godhead dwells bodily; and so near does he stand to us, being made like us, so easily grasped in our conceptions, by our feelings, and even by our senses (1 John 1: 1), that the personality of the Son of God, which is thus brought before us in clear vision, does not seem to present to us any difficulty. And when we also read that the same Christ, thus evidently set forth before our eyes (Gal. 3: 1), so that we see and hear him, came from heaven, was with God, and equal with God, is the light and life of the world, without whom nothing was created; or that he has been again received to heaven, and sits at the right hand of God, guarding and guiding his followers with divine power, judging the living and the dead; all this is no stumbling-block, because we have here presented perfectly clear and definite conceptions, which by these predicates are only extended as it were, in two opposite directions, and brought into connection with the infinite. In connection and contrast with him, the Father is described as the being who sent his only begotten Son into the world. In him we see the eternal power and Godhead, which,

from the creation of the world, are understood from the things that are made (Rom. 1: 20); the one true God (John 17: 3), who did not leave himself without a witness, even when he suffered all nations to walk in their own ways (Acts 14: 15—17), but who now commandeth all men everywhere to repent, and to believe in him whom he has raised from the dead (Acts 17: 24—31). And here again the distinction between the two persons does not seem to us obscure, neither does the union of the Father with him who is the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, who is in the Father, as the Father is in him (John 14: 9—11). The Holy Ghost, finally, whom we receive from the Father, through the Son, is described as the being whose operations we may discern in our own minds; for it is he who witnesses to our spirits that we are the children of God (Rom. 8: 16); who intercedes for us, with groanings which cannot be uttered (Rom. 8: 26); of whom we are told that he is the Spirit of God (1 Cor. 2: 12), and the Spirit of Christ (Rom. 8: 9), therefore one with them, and yet different, as is that which is given from him who gives; as is the one that is sent from him who sends (Rom. 5: 5. Gal. 3: 5. 1 Thess. 4: 8. John 14: 26. 16: 26. 20: 22. 1 John 4: 13). If, in the apostolic times, there is to be found no trace that the confession of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, in this mode of viewing it, created any difficulty or opposition, this is something easy to be understood; and we may also see in it an example and norm for our times and for all times, as to the mode in which this doctrine is to be presented in ordinary discourse.¹ Whatever makes it weighty and edifying in Christian experience, we may easily attach to this mode of representation; whatever gives employment only to the understanding, and involves it, as many believe, in inextricable problems, is here left in the back-ground.

But as theologians we cannot avoid reflecting upon these difficult points; for, on the one hand, so far as faith is concerned, we must seek to unite biblical conceptions with biblical words, in order to guard against doubt, and confirm belief; and, on the other hand, our intellect, although it may not presume to penetrate the

¹ According to the oldest and most universally received Confession, not merely in its Occidental or Roman form, which we are accustomed to call the Apostolical, but also as it was handed down in the Oriental churches, and recognized and more clearly defined at Nice. Very different is the character of the so-called Athanasian Creed, or the Symbolum Quicunque, which, however, on that very account, is less adapted to general use.

mysteries of the divine nature, does yet always desire to be assured that there is nothing contradictory or self-destructive in the articles of faith which we receive. Hence arises the necessity, in the first place, for historical investigations, in order to answer such questions as these; whether the conceptions of Spirit and of the Logos, which were current in the times of Christ and his apostles, and not invented by them, were received in the way of accommodation, or whether they are essential to the Christian system, and what is their Christian significance, valid for all times: in the second place, for philosophical definitions, in order to determine whether those principles designated as the Logos and the Spirit, which are connected with facts or phenomena of the Christian life, be natural or supernatural, created or divine, personal or impersonal; and what is their relation to one another, to the divine nature, and to their revelation in time? If, now, we are convinced that the three positions from which we started¹ are actually contained in the Scripture; that is, that no view of the subject is Christian and Scriptural, which, either does not see anything truly divine in Christ or in the Spirit who dwells in believers; or, does not truly distinguish the one from the other, and both from the divinity of the Father; or, which would set aside the unity of the divine nature; and if we find it necessary in expressing all this, to employ conceptions and formulas, by which the errors may be avoided, and the truths maintained; then, we say, that the results of such investigations, though they may be given in a terminology not contained in the Scriptures, cannot be said to be opposed to the doctrine of the Bible. It is the doctrine of the Bible itself, philosophically illustrated and defined; and, though it may be best in popular instruction to abide by the biblical mode of presenting the doctrine, yet the philosophical mode will still be a *regulative and corrective* for any untenable and erroneous notions, which might be connected with the former. The connection of such investigations, with our religious and Christian experience is indeed more indirect than direct. A false standard is applied, when it is asked how far these conceptions and theorems, these termini and formulas are valuable as an expression of Christian views and feelings. In their indirect relations, as precautions for preserving the purity of Christian experience, and the correctness of its transference into the form of intellectual apprehension, from all disfigurement, error and misunderstanding, they might, nevertheless, be of the greatest impor-

¹ Bib. Sacra, No. XI. p. 507—8.

tance, and, under some circumstances, indispensable. In itself considered, for example, faith, in order to see in Christ the divine ground of our redemption, would need no other expression than that which the Scriptures give, when they call Christ the Son of God, or the Word manifest in the flesh. If, however, any one should advance the notion that this was to be understood only as the designation of a divinely exalted man, or of a Spirit, elevated indeed above all things, yet created; by the doctrine of the Consubstantiality he would have to be reminded, that even the highest of created beings could not be a partaker of such a union with God as that upon which our redemption rests; but only a being who from all eternity was, not created, but begotten, by the Father (God of God), and who, in the fulness of time, became man. And although the doctrine in this form is not contained in the Scripture, yet it is not foreign to the Scripture, but the doctrine of the Bible philosophically defined; nor can it be regarded as antiquated so long as there is danger of such a misunderstanding.

That this is in point of fact the true connection of the doctrine of the Trinity, as held by the church, with the biblical doctrine, may, we believe, be shown, with all the historical and exegetical evidence, which in such a case is possible. This is the position of our older divines,¹ and must, we think, be conceded by all who are agreed with them in principle; that is, who believe firmly in the absolute truth of the Scriptural declarations, and in the necessity and reality of a redemption and atonement, effected and applied only by God. We believe it to be true, that if we follow the development of the doctrine of the Trinity in a historical and genetic manner, that the antagonisms and points of contest, which must come up and be discussed, one after another, could not be

¹ These do indeed believe that they can prove the ecclesiastical formulas more directly from the Scriptures, not only of the New, but even of the Old Testament, than we find to be possible. For in the latter, only through the mediation of the N. Testament, can we find the germs; and, even in the N. Testament, it will be hard to find the form of the doctrine of the Trinity as it is received in the church, in any other way than as we interpret it in view of the elements of its historical development, and of the conflicts through which it passed; for even the questions to which we seek an answer in the Scriptures, *as, for the most part, given to us only in subsequent history.* Yet even our older divines concede that the termini introduced into the church (without which, however, the doctrine itself cannot be maintained), are derived only by inference from the Scripture, in order to set aside erroneous conceptions; and that, outside of the theological sphere, the truth can and should be communicated only in the words of the Bible. Conf. Hollaz de Trin. myster. qu. II. et LVIII.

otherwise adjusted or decided than they have been, in order to be in accordance with the results of a true interpretation of Scripture, as guided by a vital Christian experience; consequently, that the dogma itself could not take any other form than that it has taken. It will be enough here to call to mind the general outlines of its history.

In the primitive church we find a simple and untroubled agreement with what the Scriptures declare respecting the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. And when the reflections of the early Christians were specially directed to the subject, as was the case, partly from inward necessity, and partly for apologetic and polemic reasons,—in order to guard against the opinions of the Gnostics and Ebionites, or to remove all suspicion of an approximation to heathen notions; they connect all their speculations with that germ of a Christian philosophy (*γνώσις*), which is given us in Scripture in the doctrine of the *Logos*. Since the distinction between the Son and the Father seemed clear, as long as they remained upon biblical grounds, the chief problem with which they were first concerned was to show the unity of the Father and the Son; and this, too, did not seem to be of difficult solution, whether they took their departure from the notion of the close union and agreement, that is, of the equality or, at least, similarity of the Son with the Father, or from the conception of his dependence from him, that is, of his emanation or procession; both of which are contained in the idea of the creative wisdom (*σοφία*), or of the reason (*νοῦς*), which is the medium of the divine revelation. But, since these two points were not kept distinctly separate, they did not, on the one hand, arrive at the conception of the identity of the nature, while, on the other hand, they were in danger of disregarding the difference of subsistence; hence the fluctuations between Subordinationism and a Unitarian Monarchianism, which were the two co-existent forms, the one the complement of the other, in which this truth found its imperfect expression in the first centuries. It was, however, Monarchianism which was first condemned by the church, since it stood in contradiction with the Holy Scriptures; in the form in which some held it (Theodotus, Artemon, Paul of Samosata), by its approximation to the heresy of the Ebionites, which denies the divine in Christ; in the form in which others held it (Praxeas, Novatus, Sabellius), by the denial of the pre-existence of the *Logos*, as a truly subsisting *περιγραφή τῆς θείας οὐσίας*, even independently of its manifestation in the world. The Subordination

theory, however, was itself necessarily soon condemned, when, after being freed from the restraint which Monarchianism had hitherto exercised, and not merely encouraged, but apparently justified in the most decided opposition to it, it was hurried forward, in the form of Arianism, to an extreme, more at variance than even the other, with the Scriptures, and with Christian experience, by declaring that the Logos is only the first of creatures. Many, (as the Eusebians and other so-called Semi-Arians,) did indeed now at first attempt to hold fast to the more ancient scheme of Subordination; but this was impossible, now that the earlier simple and undoubting faith was lost, and that the opposing views, which were at first limited and restrained by one another, had become freely developed, and were seen in their mutual opposition. The discussions upon this doctrine could be brought to a close, only by seeing and declaring, that both the elements, the equality and the subordination, had equal rights, and were compatible with one another; the former being defined as consisting in the unity of essence, which does not exclude a difference of subsistence; and the latter, in the order of subsistence of the persons, which does not exclude their consubstantiality. This was the result of the conflicts of the fourth century, and it left to the following ages nothing to be done,¹ excepting to give the doctrine that more definite form, in respect to the mode of expressing and establishing it, and of stating the consequences flowing from it, which has passed over into dogmatic systems since the times of John of Damascus. Along with this, however, we do indeed find a constantly increasing divergence (e. g. in the Athanasian creed more than in the Constantinopolitan,) from the biblical doctrine, not merely in the mode of expression, but also in the type; since the Scriptures have an appearance of favoring Subordination, while the doctrine of the church receded from this more and more.² Yet this involved no contradiction, but was only a change in the point of view, brought about by the course which constant reflection upon the subject would necessarily take. The Holy Scriptures, when they speak of the Son of God, direct our gaze chiefly to the Incarnate Word, the man Christ Jesus, who is indeed, although, or we may even say, because, the Word was manifest in him, absolutely subordinate and subject to the Father; and, in contrast with this, they bring before our eyes the essence of God, as seen in its majesty and glory in the Father. The doctrine of

¹ Baumgarten-Crusius, *Dogmengeschichte*, S. 1016. § 40.

² *Conf. Bib. Sacra*, No. XI. p. 508.

the church must answer the query, what we are to think of the Logos, that was united with Jesus, when viewed by itself and apart from this union; what is its personality in its eternal relation to the Father and to the nature of God? And if this were a question which could not be passed by, neither could those distinctions which are necessary to answering it, e. g. of the Person of the Father from the divine essence; nor those propositions which the nature of the case demands, as that the Son has the same essence with the Father, in spite of the difference in the *ordo subsistendi et agendi*. But still it must be granted, that the church doctrine, even in what pertains to the mode of presenting it, has attached itself closely to the Scriptural statements; thus, for example, it has not allowed itself to separate the idea of the divine nature from the conception of the first person;¹ on the contrary, in the language of the church, as well as of the Scriptures, the name of the Father is usually employed to designate both the nature and the person (*ὁσινωθεὺς* and *ἕνος σαρκινός*). With so much the more assurance, then, may it be maintained, that if it were possible wholly to forget the church doctrine of the Trinity, and to go back to an earlier stage in its development, or even to the simple statements of the Bible; still, when we came to reflect closely upon the doctrine, we should be carried forward by the inward necessity of the case, through essentially the same conflicts, to the same results.

This is confirmed by the mode in which the Reformers treated

¹ In fact there was a strong temptation to do this in the general tendencies of the church doctrine. That is, the unity may, so to speak, be construed with the *threeness* in one of two ways; either by finding it in the idea of the one identical essence in the three persons, or by finding it in the Father considered as the *principium divinitatis*, from whom the Son was begotten and the Holy Spirit proceeded; the second of these modes would be nearest to the Subordination system, which holds that the Father is the one true God who has revealed himself in the Son and the Holy Ghost. Hence, it would have been very natural for the orthodox doctrine, after it had freed itself from Subordinationism, to have decidedly attached itself to that other mode of constructing the doctrine, and, consequently, to have subordinated the idea of the Father, as well as of the Son and the Holy Spirit to the idea of the one true God (after the analogy of the relation of specific to generic notions); and thus, at the same time, to have avoided the reproach of being illogical in making the Son and the Holy Spirit both equal with and subordinate to the Father. A certain tendency "to this separation of the Father's name from the Monas," (as Baumgarten-Crusius calls it, *Dogmengesch.* S. 1028,) is apparent in many representations of the doctrine of the church; but it has never been able to gain exclusive authority, and that because the Scriptures stand in the way.

the doctrine. It has been said that they retained it, only because they were still unconsciously fettered by the Catholic subserviency to authority; and that they would have given it up, if they had been excited to a full discussion of the subject. But as to their being embarrassed by mere authority, this was not the case at first; they did not deny the doctrine, but laid no stress upon it; Melancthon, in the first editions of his *Loci*, passed it by altogether, and spoke with depreciation of the labors which the Scholastics bestowed upon it. Nor can it be said that there was no polemic inducement to abandon the doctrine; for it is well known, that at the time of the Reformation there were many who doubted, and many who attacked it, and that there were several attempts to give it another form. And yet we see Melancthon himself, by occasion of these doubts and attacks, in the later editions of the *Loci* again returning into the path which he had left; we see him with increasing earnestness interpreting, proving and defending the doctrinal positions of the church, with more and more thoroughness; with a zeal in which he seems almost to forget his natural mildness, we see him contending against the opponents of the doctrine, in special controversial treatises. And why all this, if he had not become more and more convinced, that, with the doctrine of the Trinity, the very foundation of our Evangelical faith would be undermined, and that if we followed the Holy Scriptures, we could come to no other result than that already attained by the church? That he was ignorant of the objections that might be brought against it, cannot be assumed, when we see how frequently he speaks of the severe struggles which he foresaw it would encounter; nor can it have been mere authority by which he silenced these objections in his own mind, since he constantly refers his readers to the declarations of Scripture, which, he says, must be received with all simplicity. Or, can we perhaps say, that the polemical inducement did not come from the right quarter? That would be to make the convictions on which our church is based too much dependent upon accidental circumstances! And from what quarter should it have come? From whatever quarter it might have come, we may be assured that it would have found the Reformers firm in their faith in Christ as the only ground of all justification and redemption; and on this account also, firm in their conviction of the divinity of Christ; for, if they abhorred even the opinion that any one could do something of himself for his own justification, as casting dishonor upon Christ, how could they have been satisfied with an opinion, by which his

dignity was directly lowered?¹ But with the Consubstantiality of the Son, the whole church doctrine of the Trinity is virtually given to every one, who holds so firmly to the word of the Bible as not to be satisfied with a Sabellian interpretation of it; especially if he allows as little weight as did Luther² to those objec-

¹ Luther especially expresses so deep a feeling of the connection of the whole of Christianity with the doctrine of Christ's person, and of this with the Trinity, that it is impossible to suppose that he was merely led by circumstances to hold it fast. Conf. his *Remarks upon the Three Confessions* (Works, Walch's edition, Th. 10. S. 1198 sq.) published in 1538: "I have remarked in all the histories of the whole of Christendom, that all those who have rightly had and held that chief article about Jesus Christ, have remained good and true in the right Christian faith; and though they may have erred and sinned in other things, yet they have held out to the last. For whoever stands right and firm in this, that Jesus Christ is true God and man, died for us and is risen, will agree to and stand by all the other articles; thus it is most true, what St. Paul says, that Christ is the chief good, ground, soil, and the whole sum, to whom and under whom all the rest is gathered together;—for thus it is determined, says St. Paul, that in Jesus Christ the whole perfect divinity shall dwell bodily or personally; hence, he who does not find or get God in Christ, shall never more, and no where, be able to find God out of Christ, though he go above heaven, under hell and beyond the world; for here will I dwell, says God, in this man, born of Mary the virgin, etc.—Again I have also remarked that all error, heresies, idolatry, scandals, abuses and evil in the churches, have come originally from this, that this article about faith in Jesus Christ has been despised or lost; and when one looks at them in the light and rightly, he sees that all heresies fight against this dear article about Jesus Christ, as Simeon says of him, that he is set for the fall and rising again of many in Israel, and for a sign which shall be spoken against." Similar to this, in his *Commentary upon Galatians* (1535) chapter 3: 13. Conf. also his *Auslegung der andern Artikels*, preached in the castle at Torgau, 1533; Sermon upon John xiv.—xvi, 1538 (specially John 14: 13); and, *von den letzten Worten Davids*, 1543.

² Luther speaks against all intermixture of reason, even to lessen the apparent hardness and difficulty of this doctrine, and to make it more comprehensible, in a way which might seem objectionable, were it not made honorable by the strength of faith which he expresses. Conf. among other things his, *disputatio de anno 1539, d. XI. Jan.*, and the *disputatio de unitate essentialis et de distinct. personar. d. a. 1545*, in the *Opera Latina Jenens. tom. I.* (S. 528 and 534 of the edition of 1564). "When logic objects to this doctrine, that it does not square with its rules, we must say, *Mulier taceat in ecclesia.*" "By reason and philosophy nothing can be said about these majestic things; but by faith all things may be rightly said and believed." "Reason is like a line which touches the whole sphere, but only at one point, and does not grasp the whole." "He who wishes not to wander in his inquiries, and not to be oppressed by the glory of the majesty, let him by *faith* touch and lay hold of the Son of God manifest in the flesh; for this brightness of the Father's glory touches an object and becomes a reflex ray, illuminating every man that comes into the world."—Since we shall not probably soon have a

tions which are said to be taken from reason, and which have really operated much more strongly against the doctrine than all the arguments drawn from Biblical Theology. But we would not be understood to deny, what a bare inspection shows, that our theologians took the doctrine, after they had become convinced that it was Scriptural, into their systems of theology almost in the very shape which the Scholastics had given to it. And why should they not do this? Is it in Doctrinal Theology alone, that we can never look upon a labor as already completed? And even when Gerhard¹ confesses, that the doctrine of the primitive church, the consent of the most esteemed ecclesiastical writers, and the decisions of the most famous councils have had a certain weight in confirming us in our conviction of the correctness of our interpretation of Scripture, and thus giving us vantage-ground against the opponents of the doctrine; no one can find this unreasonable, who believes that the truth, under the coöperation of the Spirit of truth, must approve itself as true in history also; at any rate, this is something wholly different from receiving a doctrine on mere authority, and without personal conviction.

But if the doctrine of the Trinity seemed to those who composed and defined our doctrinal systems, to be a necessary result of Scriptural interpretation, and to have its foundation in Christian consciousness, how shall we then account for the opposition, which, in later time, has been raised against hardly any dogma so loudly as against this? In part, unquestionably, from this, that there are many, who neither have a conscious experience of the redemption which is effected only by the Son of God, or of the sanctification which is applied only by the Spirit of God; and who are not inclined, on the bare testimony of Scripture, to adopt mysteries which seem inaccessible to natural reason. But there are also many, to whom the biblical and religious basis of the doctrine is sure and dear above everything else, and who are yet not satisfied, but rather restrained and repelled, by the form in which the doctrine is held in the church. Even where they do not entirely misunderstand it, they yet see in it a dead and dry formula, in which they cannot take any interest, since the original occasions and aims of the formula have long since passed

complete edition of Luther's Latin Works, it were much to be wished that the theses which he put up at different times in Wittenberg, and in which he has expressed most precisely his views upon the most important doctrines, might be made more accessible by a special reprint.

¹ Gerhard, *Exeg.* III. 1. 15 sq.

away. The very character of these formulas, they say, which are rather negative than positive, which ward off error rather than promote clear insight, is such that they find nothing explained by them, no difficulties solved, no truth disclosed. While on the other hand, these same formulas are hindrances and disturbances in the way of one's own attempts to get a clear view of the biblical system, by means of his own free reflections, or to adapt them to his other ideas and convictions, according to his own wants and way of thinking. And, certainly, it may easily become a consequence of such definite doctrinal propositions, that while they guard against error, they also restrain the free movements of mind, and establish a dead uniformity in the place of a living and manifold development; and, on this account, even for historical treatment, those times in which men were endeavoring to approach the truth in different ways, though they may have been sometimes by-ways and false ways, seem more attractive than those in which they believed that they had attained the goal, and must keep precisely to the levelled track. And if any one now longs for a return of this earlier freedom and mobility, in the belief, that then the interest in our doctrine would be far more fresh and living than it is with the constant repetition of the same traditional forms of speech; if he believes that he must seek after, or has found, another mode of exhibiting it, which corresponds as well or better with the Scriptures and with Christian experience, which is less exposed to misapprehension, which is more free from doubt and objections, which ensures more profound disclosures, or at any rate, is more simple; shall we then put him off, by merely holding up in opposition the doctrine of the church? This would be to act neither in the spirit of our church, which never puts the inferences and deductions of men on a line with the words of Scripture;¹ nor in a truly philosophical spirit, which cannot give the same authority to that which is the result only of our reflections with that which forms a part of our direct religious experience. Consequently, one might have much to say against the doctrine of the Trinity, in the form in which it is held by the

¹ On this account Luther, in his admirable *Confutatio rationis Latomianae* (Opp. Lat. Jenens. tom. II. p. 430, translated in Walch Th. XVIII. S. 1455), will not have even the word *δοσούσιος* forced upon him; (*Si anima mea odit vocem δοσούσιος, et nolim ea uti, non ero haereticus, quis enim me coget. uti, modo rem teneam, quae in concilio per scripturas definita est?*) although in other places (e. g. in his work upon Councils and Churches, where he treats of the Nicene council) he shows that he sees the necessity of it in setting aside erroneous views.

church, and yet we might find him agreeing with us in essentials; but whether and how far the latter, would in the end be decided by his relation to the former. This form of the doctrine, then, must be held fast, so far as it expresses, on the one hand, what must always be considered by the Christian consciousness, as the chief element, the relation of the Persons to the *opera ad extra*, especially the *oconomica*; on the other hand, so far as it expresses the general tendencies, from which our reflections should not deviate, either on the side of Modalism or of Tritheism, if we would not put ourselves into opposition with the Bible.¹ So far as this, the church doctrine remains, as we said above, *the regulative and corrective*, not only of the popular, but also of the philosophical mode of presenting the *Christian* doctrine of the Trinity. And that very thing, which in other respects might be an objection to it, its negative rather than positive character, makes it so much the more adapted to such a use; since, within the assigned boundaries, it leaves room for a diversity of methods of explaining the doctrine, according to the wants of different minds, especially, if in doing so, they proceed with that liberality, which keeps in view the thing itself rather than the letter. Presupposing such a regulating statement, we gladly grant a relative degree of truth and value to the varied attempts which have been made to illustrate this doctrine.² And

¹ The very least, according to our view, which should be conceded to the doctrine as held by the church is, "that the views to which it stands opposed are also," according to the Bible, "actual misapprehensions," (Steudel's *Glaubensst.* S. 430). When, on the other hand, Baumgarten-Crusius (*Bibl. Theol.* § 41. S. 408), maintains, "that the New Testament conjunction of Father, Son and Spirit has no connection with the higher Christology, and with that higher idea of Spirit which views it as a person;" and when v. Cölln (*Bibl. Theol.* § 205. Th. II. S. 282), asserts, "that the names Father, Son and Spirit are not to be taken as distinguishing three subjects (persons), but that the one true God is called *πατήρ, υἱός* and *πνεῦμα* in different relations;" this seems to me to be only a new evidence, how little honest intentions and a philosophical fitness for a so-called purely historical view of things, can ensure one against the influence of dogmatic prejudices, rationalistic no less than ecclesiastical.

² As when Daub (*Einleit. in d. Dogmatik*, S. 65, 66), finds in the doctrine of the Trinity an expression of the knowledge of God as the revealer (i. e. one who can reveal), the revealed and the self-revealing; or Nitzsch (*System d. Christl. Lehre*), that relation of our Christian experience (considered both as a state and a process) to the divine nature, according to which we pay homage, in the Son, to the divine love as speaking and mediating; in the Spirit, to that love as imparting itself to us and giving life; and, in the Father, to that love both as original and also as the result of the mediation; or Steudel (*Glaubensst.* S. 432), the idea of God, actualized as the ground and condition of all being, as the most intimate alliance of God with all being, and as the imparting of God

this is doubtless what has commended them to the minds of thoughtful theologians. And this, too, is an illustration of that fulness of grace and truth (John 1: 16, 17), which has come to us, not merely in Christianity as a whole, but also in its separate confessions and doctrines; that every one can look at them in the point of view which best corresponds with his wants and peculiarities; and that error usually first enters in, when one considers that aspect of the truth, in which it is first presented to his own mind, as the only one under which it can be viewed, and denies everything which does not come within his own sphere of vision.

ARTICLE III.

THE MOOD IN LANGUAGE.

By Henry N. Day, Professor of Sacred Rhetoric in Western Reserve College, Hudson, Ohio.

LANGUAGE is the body of thought. It is something more than the mere dress of thought. It has an internal, vital connection with it. As the living spirit, in assuming to itself a body, penetrates what was before inert, dead matter with its own peculiar life, fashions, organizes and animates it according to its own proper nature, so thought enters sounds in speech with a vital, determining, organizing power. It exists before language in order of nature. It makes language what it is. In order to determine the properties and laws of language, the nature and uses of its various functions or members, we must accordingly, first go to the thought which is the organic principle of speech, and ascertain what are the actual or possible characters of thought which may be incorporated and expressed in speech. It is in this view of the relations of language to thought that the follow-

to all being; or Hase (*Lehrbuch d. Dogmatik*, S. 527), the doctrine of God the Father over all, with whom humanity was united in new love through the Son of Man, who became (rather, was) a Son of God, so that all men might become sons through the Holy Spirit that binds together the church; or Wegscheider (*Institut.* S. 93), that God as Father, through Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, has revealed himself to man, so that he, being redeemed from the bondage of sin, might become holy and blessed.